Hasty US exit from Europe could drive allies away from American arms, RAND says

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NATO and U.S. flags are set on the table as U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte meet at the Pentagon on April 24, 2025. (Nathan Howard/Reuters)

A rapid, uncoordinated U.S. military drawdown from Europe could push key NATO allies further away from American weapons over the long term, according to a new RAND study , a shift the authors say would hurt the U.S. defense industrial base.

RAND released the report, “Anticipating Allies’ Responses to U.S. Retrenchment from Europe,” on Wednesday. It examines how France, Germany, Poland and the U.K. would likely respond to different versions of what RAND calls limited retrenchment: cuts to American commitments and forces in Europe that stop short of leaving NATO altogether.

The study draws on Cold War precedents, allied government documents and public debate, and interviews with 51 officials and experts in the four countries, most conducted between April and November 2025.

The authors caution that their findings apply only to those four allies.

The report’s main finding is that how the U.S. withdraws will shape how allies respond. The four allies “see a stark difference between a coordinated, orderly U.S. withdrawal, which they feel they could handle, and a rapid, uncoordinated one, which they see as creating major capability gaps and potentially emboldening Russia to attack a NATO member,” the authors wrote.

The authors recommend the U.S. follow through with larger force cuts on a long-term timeline worked out with allies, which they say may help keep allies’ defense spending on track even as it gets harder to sell at home.

RAND weighs those choices against NATO 3.0 , the alliance concept Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby presented in February. It calls for Europe to take primary responsibility for its own non-nuclear defense while the U.S. shifts resources to the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific.

The Pentagon has already begun reducing its footprint in Europe. About 80,000 U.S. troops were stationed there across roughly 30 bases as of 2025, according to congressional testimony from the head of U.S. European Command cited in the report.

In May, the Pentagon announced it would pull about 5,000 troops out of Germany . Then in June, the U.S. cut the forces it would make available to NATO in a crisis . A review of U.S. forces in Europe is underway.

Defense ministers from France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the U.K. said Monday in a joint statement that Europe “must assume greater responsibility for its own security.” They also called the U.S. “an indispensable Ally.”

A sudden pullout would put allies in a bind, U.K. interviewees told RAND. In the short term, they would have little choice but to buy off-the-shelf equipment, often from U.S. suppliers, to fill gaps. Over the long term, broken trust would push allies toward European or homegrown alternatives, the authors concluded.

In Britain’s case, a sudden withdrawal would “accelerate the UK’s reorientation away from U.S. defense equipment toward sovereign or European alternatives,” those interviewees said. The authors expect Germany, and possibly Poland, to reach a similar conclusion.

Germany has bought U.S. arms partly to keep Washington committed to Europe. A rapid, uncoordinated withdrawal would suggest that approach had failed, and Berlin “may not see a benefit to continuing to privilege U.S. firms for arms sales or other deals,” the authors write.

“Such a shift would be detrimental to the U.S. defense industrial base, which benefits from exports that help create economies of scale,” the report said. “The main cause of this shift would be perceptions of U.S. reliability as an ally rather than the loss of any specific U.S. military capabilities.”

The U.S. supplied 58% of the major weapons European NATO members imported from 2021 to 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute , down from 64% in the institute’s previous five-year count.

U.S. soldiers parachute during Iron Wolf military exercises with NATO forces and partners on May 16, 2025, at the Gaiziunai training area near Rukla, Lithuania. (Paulius Peleckis/Getty Images)

In Monday’s statement, the five ministers also committed to “closer defence-industrial cooperation.” But British Defense Secretary Wes Streeting said Oct. 15 that buying European or American equipment “should not be an either/or choice.” British industry produces about 15% of each F-35, he told the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

A sudden U.S. pullout would likely have little impact on how much France buys from U.S. defense companies, as Paris is already “the most committed of the four allies to reducing reliance on the United States,” the study said.

During wartime, however, French officials told RAND their military would still count on U.S. forces for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; long-range precision strike; fighter jets; air and missile defense; command and control, the systems used to direct forces in combat; and logistics.

Until France can fill those gaps itself, Paris would see a sudden U.S. pullout as a sign Washington cares little about its allies’ security, the authors wrote. That could make the two countries less likely to agree on military plans or diplomatic initiatives.

Intelligence sharing

The authors also looked at what would happen if the U.S. moved to normalize relations with Russia while the war in Ukraine continued, without addressing Europe’s security concerns. In that case, allies might limit intelligence sharing and joint military planning, fearing leaks to Moscow.

Some allies have already begun limiting intelligence sharing over other disagreements with Washington, albeit modestly, the report said. It cites U.K. concerns about U.S. military operations in the Caribbean, and Dutch concerns about U.S. policy toward Russia, which led both countries to reduce some intelligence sharing.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin as they meet to negotiate for an end to the war in Ukraine, at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Aug. 15, 2025. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

Still, none of the four allies would side with Russia or China on security under any scenario RAND examined, the authors concluded.

“Some strategists’ fears about allies aligning with Russia as the United States draws down are overblown,” the authors wrote. The four countries and Italy called Russia “the most acute and long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability” in Monday’s statement.

A limited pullback is more likely to spur allies to spend more and work more closely together, the authors found. All four have committed to NATO’s target of at least 3.5% of gross domestic product, or GDP, for core defense spending by 2035, according to the alliance’s 2025 summit declaration .

Poland has more than doubled defense spending as a share of GDP since 2014 and is aiming for 5% this year, the report said. Germany plans to spend €649 billion on its military over five years, raising spending from 2.4% of GDP in 2025 to 3.5% by 2029, Defense News reported .

Members of the Polish Air Force watch the arrival of one of three Lockheed Martin F-35A “Husarz” fighter jets at the 32nd Air Base in Lask, Poland, on May 22, 2026. (Damian Lemanski/Bloomberg via Getty Images)

France and the U.K. will struggle to meet NATO’s target because of high debt and slow growth, the report said. French public debt rose from 98% of GDP in 2019 to an average of 112% from 2020 to 2024. One interviewee called the budget problem France’s “Achilles’ heel” in rearming.

The U.K. Ministry of Defence asked for an extra £28 billion to cover a shortfall through 2030 and received £15 billion, the report said. The British government said Oct. 28 it would fully fund its Defence Investment Plan, Reuters reported .

The authors also warn against using troop levels to reward or punish individual allies. Questionnaires the Pentagon sent allies as part of the review asked about their defense spending and support for U.S. foreign policy priorities. Some allies read that as a sign troop decisions would hinge on political alignment, the report said.

Poland has already seen how quickly U.S. troop decisions can change. In May, the Pentagon abruptly canceled a planned deployment of about 4,000 soldiers to Poland . President Donald Trump later pledged to send 5,000 troops at an unspecified date. Warsaw credited the reversal partly to reminding Washington that Poland is a “model ally” that buys U.S. systems.

The authors said the episode demonstrates both the payoff Poland expects and the weakness of its approach: U.S. troop levels and commitments rest on “abrupt, easily reversible decisions.”

“NATO 3.0 is a vision for a reduced U.S. role and reallocation of resources. But there is no concrete, long-term plan,” the report said.

The authors urge the administration to work with allies to set how many U.S. troops stay in Europe in peacetime and how many the U.S. would send in a war, along with a timeline to get there.

It is unclear whether the Europe review will produce such a plan. Under a Pentagon document seen by Reuters in August, the review is due to give Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at least four sets of troop options by Nov. 6. The full review is due in December.

Predictable long-term plans that give allies a say “could sustain a continued, if reimagined, transatlantic partnership,” the authors wrote. Adding that treating troops and commitments as bargaining chips, by contrast, “could undercut regional cooperation and, in turn, NATO 3.0’s goal of European strength.”

Michael Scanlon is a defense journalist covering air and space warfare. A former U.S. Air Force A-10 crew chief, he has supported land and sea programs for the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.

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2025年4月24日，美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯和北约秘书长马克·吕特在五角大楼会晤，桌上摆放着北约和美国国旗。（Nathan Howard/路透社）

兰德公司的一项新研究表明，美国从欧洲迅速且不协调地撤军，可能会使北约主要盟国在长期内进一步远离美国武器。研究作者称，这种转变将损害美国的国防工业基础。

兰德公司周三发布了题为《预测盟友对美国从欧洲撤军的反应》的报告。该报告分析了法国、德国、波兰和英国可能如何应对兰德公司所称的“有限撤军”的不同版本：即削减美国在欧洲的承诺和兵力，但并不完全退出北约。

该研究借鉴了冷战时期的先例、盟国政府文件和公众辩论，并采访了这四个国家的 51 位官员和专家，其中大部分采访是在 2025 年 4 月至 11 月期间进行的。

作者提醒，他们的研究结果仅适用于这四个盟友。

报告的主要结论是，美国的撤军方式将决定盟国的应对措施。报告作者写道，四个盟国“认为协调有序的美国撤军（他们认为自己能够应对）与快速无序的撤军（他们认为后者会造成巨大的能力缺口，并可能助长俄罗斯攻击北约成员国的胆量）之间存在着显著差异。”

作者建议美国按照与盟友制定的长期时间表，继续推进更大规模的裁军，他们认为，即使在国内越来越难以推销，这也有助于保持盟友的国防开支不超支。

兰德公司将这些选择与北约3.0进行比较。北约3.0是美国国防部负责政策的副部长埃尔布里奇·科尔比在2月份提出的联盟概念。该概念呼吁欧洲承担自身非核防御的主要责任，而美国则将资源转移到西半球和太平洋地区。

五角大楼已经开始缩减其在欧洲的军事存在。报告援引美国欧洲司令部司令在国会作证时的说法称，截至2025年，约有8万名美军士兵驻扎在欧洲大约30个基地。

今年5月，五角大楼宣布将从德国撤出约5000名美军士兵。随后在6月，美国削减了在危机情况下向北约提供的兵力。目前，美国正在对驻欧美军进行评估。

法国、德国、意大利、波兰和英国的国防部长周一发表联合声明称，欧洲“必须承担起更大的自身安全责任”。他们还称美国是“不可或缺的盟友”。

英国受访者告诉兰德公司，突然撤军将使盟友陷入困境。短期内，他们别无选择，只能购买现成的设备（通常来自美国供应商）来填补缺口。作者总结道，从长远来看，信任的破裂将促使盟友转向欧洲或本土的替代方案。

受访者表示，就英国而言，突然撤军将“加速英国从依赖美国国防装备转向自主研发或欧洲替代方案”。作者预计德国，或许还有波兰，也会得出类似的结论。

德国购买美国武器的部分原因是希望华盛顿继续对欧洲保持承诺。作者写道，如果德国迅速且不协调地撤出美国武器，则表明这种策略已经失败，柏林“可能认为继续在武器销售或其他交易中给予美国公司特权并无益处”。

报告指出：“这种转变将对美国国防工业基础造成损害，因为出口有助于实现规模经济。造成这种转变的主要原因是人们对美国作为盟友的可靠性的看法，而不是美国任何特定军事能力的丧失。”

根据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的数据，2021年至2025年期间，欧洲北约成员国进口的主要武器中，美国供应了58%，低于该研究所此前五年统计的64%。

2025年5月16日，在立陶宛鲁克拉附近的盖济乌奈训练区，美军士兵在与北约部队及其伙伴举行的“铁狼”联合军事演习中进行跳伞。（Paulius Peleckis/Getty Images）

在周一的声明中，五位部长还承诺“加强国防工业合作”。但英国国防大臣韦斯·斯特里廷10月15日表示，购买欧洲或美国的装备“不应是二选一的选择”。他告诉华盛顿战略与国际研究中心，英国工业生产了约15%的F-35战斗机部件。

该研究称，美国突然撤军可能不会对法国从美国国防公司购买多少产品产生太大影响，因为巴黎已经是“四个盟国中最致力于减少对美国依赖的国家”。

然而，在战时，法国官员告诉兰德公司，他们的军队仍然会依靠美国军队提供情报、监视和侦察；远程精确打击；战斗机；防空和导弹防御；指挥和控制（用于指挥作战部队的系统）；以及后勤保障。

作者指出，在法国自身能够填补这些空白之前，巴黎会将美国的突然撤出视为华盛顿漠视盟友安全的信号。这可能会降低两国在军事计划或外交举措上达成一致的可能性。

情报共享

作者还探讨了如果美国在乌克兰战争持续期间，不顾欧洲的安全关切，就着手与俄罗斯实现关系正常化，将会发生什么。在这种情况下，盟友可能会因为担心情报泄露给莫斯科而限制情报共享和联合军事计划。

报告指出，一些盟友已经开始因与华盛顿的其他分歧而限制情报共享，尽管程度不大。报告援引了英国对美国在加勒比海地区军事行动的担忧，以及荷兰对美国对俄政策的担忧，导致两国减少了部分情报共享。

2025年8月15日，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在阿拉斯加州埃尔门多夫-理查森联合基地举行会晤，就结束乌克兰战争进行谈判。（凯文·拉马克/路透社）

不过，兰德公司的作者总结道，在兰德公司研究的任何情况下，这四个盟国都不会在安全问题上站在俄罗斯或中国一边。

作者写道：“一些战略家担心随着美国撤军，盟友会倒向俄罗斯，这种担忧有些过头了。”这四个国家和意大利在周一的声明中称，俄罗斯是“对欧洲-大西洋安全与稳定的最严峻、最长期的威胁”。

研究发现，有限的国防开支削减更有可能促使盟国增加国防开支并加强合作。根据北约2025年峰会宣言，这四个成员国均承诺到2035年将核心国防开支提高到国内生产总值（GDP）的至少3.5%，以实现北约的目标。

报告称，波兰自2014年以来国防开支占GDP的比例增加了一倍多，并计划今年达到5%。据《防务新闻》报道，德国计划在未来五年内增加6490亿欧元的军费开支，使军费开支占GDP的比例从2025年的2.4%提高到2029年的3.5%。

2026年5月22日，波兰空军人员在波兰拉斯克第32空军基地观看三架洛克希德·马丁F-35A“骠骑兵”战斗机中的一架抵达。（图片来源：Damian Lemanski/Bloomberg via Getty Images）

报告指出，由于债务高企和经济增长缓慢，法国和英国将难以实现北约的目标。法国公共债务占GDP的比重从2019年的98%上升至2020年至2024年的平均112%。一位受访者称，预算问题是法国重整军备的“阿喀琉斯之踵”。

报道称，英国国防部要求额外拨款280亿英镑以弥补到2030年的资金缺口，最终获得了150亿英镑。路透社报道称，英国政府于10月28日表示，将全额资助其国防投资计划。

作者还警告不要利用驻军规模来奖惩个别盟友。报告指出，五角大楼在评估过程中向盟友发放的问卷调查了他们的国防开支以及对美国外交政策优先事项的支持情况。一些盟友认为这表明驻军决策将取决于政治立场。

波兰已经见识过美国驻军决策变化之快。今年5月，五角大楼突然取消了向波兰部署约4000名士兵的计划。之后，唐纳德·特朗普总统承诺将在某个未定的日期向波兰派遣5000名士兵。华沙方面认为，这一政策逆转部分原因是提醒华盛顿，波兰是购买美国产品的“模范盟友”。

作者表示，这一事件既表明了波兰所期望的回报，也表明了其做法的弱点：美国的驻军规模和承诺取决于“突然的、容易逆转的决定”。

报告指出：“北约3.0设想降低美国的作用并重新分配资源，但目前尚无具体的长期计划。”

作者敦促政府与盟友合作，确定和平时期美国在欧洲驻扎的美军人数以及美国在战争时期将派遣的美军人数，并制定实现这一目标的时间表。

目前尚不清楚欧洲评估是否会制定出这样的计划。路透社8月份看到的一份五角大楼文件显示，评估工作将于11月6日前向国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯提供至少四套部队部署方案。完整的评估报告预计将于12月发布。

作者写道，可预测的长期计划，让盟友拥有发言权，“可以维持跨大西洋伙伴关系的延续，即便这种伙伴关系需要重新构想”。他们还补充说，相反，将军队和承诺视为谈判筹码，“可能会削弱区域合作，进而阻碍北约3.0实现欧洲强大的目标”。

迈克尔·斯坎伦是一位报道空天战的国防记者。他曾是美国空军A-10攻击机的机组长，并为美国陆军、海军、海军陆战队和海岸警卫队的陆地和海上项目提供支持。