Behind attacks on Ukrainian cities, Russia is building a drone empire

THE HAGUE, Netherlands — The Russian government has developed a far-reaching, multi-level approach to turbocharge the country’s development and production of drones with an eye to becoming a world leader in the field. The comprehensive strategy includes large amounts of federal and state funding, thousands of startups and even the systematic training of schoolchildren.

Drones have emerged as a key technology in the war in Ukraine, which is now in its fourth year after the Russian military’s large-scale invasion of the country that commenced in February 2022. The cheap, unmanned flying systems, often no heavier than a few kilograms and put together out of easily available, commercial components, have inflicted death and psychological torment on soldiers on both sides of the front lines, and especially on civilians in Ukrainian cities.

The importance of these technologies quickly became clear both to Kyiv and Moscow. Both have developed ambitious strategies to boost their domestic production of the versatile aerial platforms and to support innovation to continuously outsmart the new countermeasures employed by the enemy.

Although Russia’s arms economy has heavy state involvement, the drone strategy has been unique in the emphasis it places on supporting startups and small enterprises around the country. Of the nearly 900 companies involved in drone-making, 70% were considered small- or medium-sized enterprises, the Russian news agency TASS reported in March. These small businesses together employ over 7,000 people.

“This is largely due to the implementation of government support measures for the SME segment,” TASS noted.

Ukrainian explosives experts and police officers examine parts of a Shahed 136 military drone following an air-attack in Kharkiv on June 4, 2025. (Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images)

Naturally, the big players are having a piece of the pie, too. United Aircraft Corporation, established in 2006 by President Vladimir Putin to consolidate Russia’s main assets in aircraft design and production, in June announced it would create a dedicated unmanned systems division and fund it with billions of rubles. The company’s director-general also said UAC would scout private-sector players to give them the “opportunity” to cooperate with a large, state-owned enterprise, Russian business news outlet Tadviser reported.

Russia, like Ukraine, has thrown immense sums of money at the sector. Russia specifically allocated 243 billion rubles ($3 billion) to drone making from 2022 to 2025. A further 112 billion rubles ($1.38 billion) are allocated in the next three-year budget. This is in addition to and separate from military spending, which makes up almost one-third of government funding on its own.

Moscow’s stated aims for the drone money aren’t military applications and indeed often appear benign in their nature. The drones being developed are supposedly intended for use in agriculture, infrastructure monitoring, and delivery services - just a sampling of the civilian applications that government officials and companies like to tout.

But the very nature of the technology means that the lines between civilian and military are often blurred. The same technologies that can be used to surveil long pipelines are capable of delivering warheads across the frontline, for example. Supporting these so-called dual-use technologies is a key point of the Russian government’s strategy, and the civilian guise is often little more than a thin veil of plausible deniability.

“There is no clear boundary — the technology can be used for both military and civilian purposes,” Russian Minister of Agriculture and Trade, Anton Afanasyev, was quoted as saying by the independent Russian publication The Insider .

Indeed, the deliberately dual-use drone work extends beyond drone companies and into schools, too. Many educational institutions in Russia have introduced curricula surrounding the development, construction and operation of drones.

“We were forbidden to say that it was necessary in war, and we came up with civilian applications for the developments,” The Insider quoted a 17-year-old drone instructor named Maxim. “This is a children’s program. That is, a project should always have a dual purpose … there is always such an unspoken rule at all competitions that I have come across.”

The involvement of schoolchildren in the drone plans of the government is official policy and supported by state institutions like the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, and competitions are sponsored by state-owned defense contractors like Rosatom, Rostec and Almaz-Antey. Sometimes, participation in drone initiatives is rewarded with extra exam points or promises of better career prospects. Other times, students are directly involved in building or testing drones with military applications. At least parts of the program targeting schools were personally approved by Putin.

The strategy is having some of the desired effects. Year over year, Russia produced 2.5 times more drones in 2024 than it did in 2023, the first full year of the war in Ukraine. Since then, Russian long-range drone production has increased fivefold again in less than a year, according to Ukrainian intelligence information from May, cited by the Ukrainian news service TSN .

Putin, while announcing the rising figures in 2024, said that he wanted Russia to become one of the global technological leaders in unmanned aircraft systems by 2030.

A unique aspect of the Kremlin’s drone strategy is its broad geographical spread. A line item in the federal budget for 2025 through 2027 allocates 21 billion rubles ($260 million) to eleven specialized regional centers for research and production of UAV technologies. Many of these are established within existing commercial infrastructure, such as free trade zones, technology parks, or near longstanding research and industrial sites. These locations range from the St. Petersburg Technopark on Russia’s Baltic coast to Tomsk, deep in Siberia.

Press releases and Russian media coverage portray an organizing principle behind the spread, known to Kremlinologists as “strategic depth.” By dispersing facilities, it becomes harder for a single enemy strike to take out a given capability, the idea goes. Several of the sites have been targets of Ukrainian drone attacks.

Additionally, many of the eleven centers appear to be specializing in a specific niche in UAV production. While plants in Moscow and St. Petersburg focus on advanced R&D and high-tech work, Tomsk makes electric components and specialized onboard systems, while Perm develops engines and propulsion systems.

The specialized center in Tatarstan, located in central Russia north of Kazakhstan, has become the site of what may be the world’s largest drone factory. The plant is undergoing massive expansion, satellite images show.

Alongside more production facilities, the special economic zone is seeing work on housing that may accommodate tens of thousands of workers, according to analysts. The Yelabuga factory has been identified as the site where Russia assembles the Geran-2, the domestically produced version of Iran’s notorious Shahed-136 kamikaze drone. These cheap, sturdy flying wings with a large explosive warhead have become a staple of Russian air assaults against Ukraine. The factory, which recently completed two new 700-meter-long assembly halls, reportedly churns these loitering munitions out around the clock, in three daily shifts.

A satellite image from June 2025 shows construction work at Russia's Yelabuga drone factory, Tatarstan province. (Planet Labs, provided by Middlebury Institute of International Studies)

The company running the production, Albatross, previously specialized in farming tech, the Financial Times reported. Indeed, its eponymous Albatross drone, now used in surveillance against Ukraine, was originally developed as a civilian, agricultural drone.

Last year, a Defense News investigation described a Russian drone maker , Integrated Robotics Technologies, publicly posing as an agricultural and industrial drone maker but secretly marketing one-way exploding drones. The company continues to operate and has formed a subsidiary in St. Petersburg, which participated in a 2024 military expo. In channels on Telegram channels, a communication app popular with Russian users, IRT has marketed its drones as “short life vehicles … suitable for the delivery of mines.”

One of its drones also features on a deck of playing cards emblazoned with various UAVs, uploaded by a Russian state university (archived here ).

On IRT’s bare-bones website , however, there is no mention of military applications.

Integrated Robotics Technologies remains unsanctioned at the time of writing.

One key aim of IRT and the Russian drone space in general has been import substitution, a buzzword in the Russian infosphere referring to the concerted efforts to produce all parts of a product domestically.

Russia’s high-tech sector, in particular, has been hit by Western sanctions and export controls, and domestic capabilities often lag significantly behind cutting-edge technology, for example, in chipmaking processes. Similarly, when it comes to drones, Russia still relies heavily on foreign imports, particularly on components made in China.

And while Moscow and Beijing have signed a strategic partnership agreement, the dependency presents a major vulnerability for the Kremlin.

Producing components domestically – from materials for drone fuselages to motors to microchips and rotors – Russia aims to become independent of whatever happens outside of its territory, removing key pressure points that still slow down its economy and military production. Several of Russia’s heavily-sanctioned partners, like Iran and North Korea, have pursued similar strategies, though their cases have also shown the limits there are to prosperity when cut off from global trade.

Both have also played important roles in Russia’s drone strategy. Iran provided the blueprints and materials to start Russia’s largest drone factory in Tatarstan’s Alabuga special economic zone, the Washington Post reported in 2023. And Ukrainian intelligence has hinted that Russia is both building North Korean domestic drone capabilities and may be receiving cheap labor from the “hermit kingdom” for use in Yelabuga.

Exports of drones to the highest bidder are likely a key incentive for cash-strapped North Korea and may also lie in the future for some of the more successful Russian drone makers.

To that end, Russia’s Duma, the country’s rubber-stamp parliament, has approved a policy that eliminates value-added tax for all drones and for imported UAV components such as motors, expanding on previous tax incentives.

Linus Höller is Defense News' Europe correspondent and OSINT investigator. He reports on the arms deals, sanctions, and geopolitics shaping Europe and the world. He holds master’s degrees in WMD nonproliferation, terrorism studies, and international relations, and works in four languages: English, German, Russian, and Spanish.

荷兰海牙——俄罗斯政府制定了一项影响深远、多层次的战略，旨在加速该国无人机的研发和生产，力争成为该领域的全球领导者。这项综合战略包括大量的联邦和州政府资金投入、扶持数千家初创企业，甚至还包括对中小学生进行系统培训。

无人机已成为乌克兰战争中的一项关键技术。这场战争自2022年2月俄罗斯军队大规模入侵乌克兰以来，至今已持续四年。这些廉价的无人飞行系统，通常重量不超过几公斤，由易于获得的商用部件组装而成，给交战双方的士兵，特别是乌克兰城市的平民，带来了死亡和心理上的折磨。

基辅和莫斯科很快都意识到了这些技术的重要性。两国都制定了雄心勃勃的战略，旨在提升本国多功能空中平台的生产能力，并支持创新，以不断超越敌方采取的新型反制措施。

尽管俄罗斯的军工经济高度依赖国家力量，但其无人机战略的独特之处在于，它特别重视扶持全国各地的初创企业和小企业。据俄罗斯塔斯社3月份报道，在近900家无人机制造企业中，70%被认为是中小企业。这些小企业共雇佣了7000多名员工。

塔斯社指出：“这主要是由于政府对中小企业实施了扶持措施。”

2025年6月4日，乌克兰哈尔科夫发生空袭，乌克兰爆炸物专家和警察正在检查一架“沙赫德136”军用无人机的残骸。（图片来源：Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images）

当然，大型企业也想从中分一杯羹。俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京于2006年成立的联合航空制造集团（UAC）旨在整合俄罗斯在飞机设计和制造领域的主要资产。今年6月，UAC宣布将成立一个专门的无人系统部门，并为此投入数十亿卢布。据俄罗斯商业新闻媒体Tadviser报道，UAC总经理还表示，UAC将寻找私营企业，为它们提供与大型国有企业合作的“机会”。

与乌克兰一样，俄罗斯也向无人机领域投入了巨额资金。俄罗斯在2022年至2025年期间专门拨款2430亿卢布（约合30亿美元）用于无人机制造。此外，在未来三年的预算中还将追加1120亿卢布（约合13.8亿美元）。这笔资金与军费开支分开，而军费开支本身就几乎占政府财政预算的三分之一。

莫斯科公开宣称无人机资金的用途并非军事用途，而且其用途往往看似无害。据称，正在研发的无人机将用于农业、基础设施监控和物流配送——这只是政府官员和企业喜欢吹捧的众多民用应用案例中的一部分。

但这项技术的本质决定了民用和军用之间的界限往往模糊不清。例如，用于监视长距离输油管道的技术同样能够将弹头运送到前线。支持这些所谓的两用技术是俄罗斯政府战略的关键所在，而所谓的民用伪装往往不过是一层薄薄的、似是而非的否认面纱。

据俄罗斯独立媒体《内幕》报道，俄罗斯农业和贸易部长安东·阿法纳西耶夫表示：“没有明确的界限——这项技术既可以用于军事用途，也可以用于民用用途。”

事实上，这种刻意将无人机用于军民两用领域的研究不仅局限于无人机公司，也延伸到了学校。俄罗斯许多教育机构都开设了围绕无人机的研发、制造和操作的课程。

“我们被禁止说这项技术在战争中是必要的，所以我们提出了民用方面的应用，”《内幕》援引一位名叫马克西姆的17岁无人机教官的话说。“这是一个儿童项目。也就是说，一个项目应该始终具有双重用途……在我遇到的所有比赛中，都存在这样一条不成文的规则。”

让中小学生参与政府的无人机计划是官方政策，并得到战略倡议署等国家机构的支持。竞赛则由俄罗斯国家原子能公司（Rosatom）、俄罗斯国家技术集团公司（Rostec）和金刚石-安泰公司（Almaz-Antey）等国有国防承包商赞助。有时，参与无人机项目可以获得额外的考试加分或更好的职业前景。有时，学生会直接参与军用无人机的建造或测试。至少部分针对学校的项目得到了普京的亲自批准。

这项战略已初见成效。2024年，俄罗斯无人机产量是2023年的2.5倍，而2023年正是乌克兰战争爆发后的第一个完整年份。据乌克兰新闻社TSN援引乌克兰情报部门5月份发布的消息，此后不到一年时间，俄罗斯远程无人机产量又增长了五倍。

普京在宣布 2024 年无人机数量增长目标时表示，他希望俄罗斯到 2030 年成为全球无人机系统技术领先国家之一。

克里姆林宫无人机战略的一个独特之处在于其广泛的地域覆盖。2025年至2027年联邦预算中，有一项专项拨款210亿卢布（约合2.6亿美元）用于设立11个专门的区域中心，用于无人机技术的研究和生产。其中许多中心都建在现有的商业基础设施内，例如自由贸易区、科技园区，或毗邻历史悠久的科研和工业基地。这些中心的选址范围从俄罗斯波罗的海沿岸的圣彼得堡科技园，一直延伸到西伯利亚腹地的托木斯克。

新闻稿和俄罗斯媒体报道揭示了此次部署背后的组织原则，克里姆林宫专家称之为“战略纵深”。其理念是，通过分散部署设施，可以降低敌方单次打击摧毁特定能力的难度。其中一些设施曾遭受乌克兰无人机袭击。

此外，这11个中心中，许多似乎都专注于无人机生产的特定领域。莫斯科和圣彼得堡的工厂侧重于先进研发和高科技工作，托木斯克生产电子元件和专用机载系统，而彼尔姆则开发发动机和推进系统。

位于俄罗斯中部、哈萨克斯坦以北的鞑靼斯坦共和国的这个专业中心，已经成为可能是世界上最大的无人机工厂所在地。卫星图像显示，该工厂正在进行大规模扩建。

据分析人士称，除了更多生产设施外，该经济特区还在建设可容纳数万名工人的住房。叶拉布加工厂被认为是俄罗斯组装“格朗-2”（Geran-2）无人机的地点，该无人机是伊朗臭名昭著的“沙赫德-136”（Shahed-136）自杀式无人机的国产版本。这种廉价、坚固的飞翼无人机配备大爆炸弹头，已成为俄罗斯对乌克兰空袭的主要武器。据报道，该工厂最近新建了两座700米长的装配车间，每天三班倒，昼夜不停地生产这些巡飞弹。

2025年6月的卫星图像显示，俄罗斯鞑靼斯坦共和国叶拉布加无人机工厂正在进行建设。（图片由Planet Labs提供，由米德尔伯里国际研究学院提供）

据《金融时报》报道，负责生产该无人机的公司Albatross此前专注于农业技术。事实上，该公司同名的Albatross无人机，目前被用于监视乌克兰，最初就是作为民用农业无人机开发的。

去年，《防务新闻》的一项调查揭露，俄罗斯无人机制造商“集成机器人技术公司”（Integrated Robotics Technologies，简称IRT）表面上是一家农业和工业无人机制造商，实则暗地里销售单向爆炸无人机。该公司目前仍在运营，并在圣彼得堡设立了一家子公司，该子公司参加了2024年的军事博览会。在俄罗斯用户常用的通讯应用Telegram上，IRT曾将其无人机宣传为“短寿命飞行器……适用于投放地雷”。

该公司的一架无人机还出现在一副印有各种无人机的扑克牌上，这副扑克牌由俄罗斯一所国立大学上传（存档于此）。

然而，在 IRT 的简陋网站上，并没有提到军事应用。

截至发稿时，集成机器人技术公司仍未获得授权。

IRT 和俄罗斯无人机领域的一个关键目标一直是进口替代，这是俄罗斯信息界的一个流行语，指的是齐心协力地在国内生产产品的所有部件。

俄罗斯的高科技产业尤其受到西方制裁和出口管制的影响，其国内技术能力往往与尖端技术存在显著差距，例如在芯片制造工艺方面。同样，在无人机领域，俄罗斯仍然严重依赖进口，特别是中国制造的零部件。

尽管莫斯科和北京签署了战略伙伴关系协议，但这种依赖关系给克里姆林宫带来了一个重大的脆弱性。

俄罗斯正致力于自主生产从无人机机身材料到电机、微芯片和旋翼等零部件，力求摆脱对外部局势的依赖，从而消除目前仍制约其经济和军事生产的关键压力点。俄罗斯的一些受到严厉制裁的伙伴国，例如伊朗和朝鲜，也采取了类似的战略，但它们的案例也表明，一旦脱离全球贸易，繁荣发展终将受到限制。

伊朗和俄罗斯在俄罗斯的无人机战略中都扮演了重要角色。《华盛顿邮报》2023年报道称，伊朗为俄罗斯在鞑靼斯坦共和国阿拉布加经济特区建立俄罗斯最大的无人机工厂提供了蓝图和材料。乌克兰情报部门也暗示，俄罗斯不仅在帮助朝鲜发展国产无人机能力，而且可能还从这个“隐士王国”获取廉价劳动力，用于叶拉布加工厂。

对于资金短缺的朝鲜来说，向最高出价者出口无人机可能是一个重要的激励措施，而且对于一些比较成功的俄罗斯无人机制造商来说，这也可能成为未来的发展方向。

为此，俄罗斯橡皮图章议会——国家杜马——批准了一项政策，取消所有无人机和进口无人机部件（如电机）的增值税，扩大了之前的税收优惠。

林努斯·霍勒是《防务新闻》的欧洲记者和开源情报调查员。他报道影响欧洲乃至全球的军火交易、制裁和地缘政治。他拥有大规模杀伤性武器不扩散、恐怖主义研究和国际关系三个硕士学位，并精通英语、德语、俄语和西班牙语四种语言。