Don’t let Trump let Putin miscalculate on Europe

The new U.S. National Security Strategy makes clear that President Donald Trump wants his foreign policy legacy to be “The President of Peace.” He takes credit for eight peace agreements during the past year, including Gaza. He has put his name on the U.S. Institute for Peace. He has lobbied for a Nobel Peace Prize and accepted an inaugural FIFA Peace Prize. He has been critical of America’s “forever wars.”

But some of the policies outlined in the new strategy may leave him with an entirely different legacy. He may become known as the president who allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin to miscalculate and start another major war in Europe.

It’s not too late for Trump to correct this potentially grave error.

The new strategy reaches back more than a century to assemble pieces of previous U.S. foreign policy approaches. It lists the Western Hemisphere as America’s top priority and creates a new Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, much as Teddy Roosevelt’s interventionist Corollary did. It harkens back to William McKinley’s use of tariffs in the 1890s and the destructive Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. It embraces the use of economic power much as William Howard Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy did.

There are elements of isolationism embedded in the strategy, as was the case with Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah after World War I. There are uncomfortable echos of the America First Committee run by Charles Lindbergh and Gerald Nye who lobbied against aid to Britain in its lonely fight against Nazi Germany. And it expands on Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” which is listed as Trump’s second regional priority.

President Trump’s formula for global peace has some constructive elements. The strategy stresses peace through strength, much as Ronald Reagan did. It calls for strengthening America’s defense industrial base. It relies on economic sanctions and rewards as a main instrument of Trump’s peace efforts. Trump is willing to use personal diplomacy to stimulate peace talks. The strategy notes rightly that the United States is overstretched and that our allies need to do more. The strategy encourages our allies to meet their “Hague Commitment” to increase annual defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 .

But there is a potentially fatal flaw in the strategy which needs to be corrected. It has created alarming doubts about America’s enduring commitment under NATO’s Article 5. While the strategy does say the US supports its allies “in preserving the freedom and security of Europe,” that is a climb down from the “attack on one is an attack on all” language in Article 5. It is a climb down from President Joe Biden’s formula that the U.S. will defend “every inch” of NATO territory.

Despite the strategies focus on sovereignty and respect, the document contains a broad attack on European leaders and institutions. It calls European economies “in decline” due to over-regulation. It has brought America’s culture wars officially to Europe, suggesting that some European countries are risking “civilizational erasure,” a reframing of the Great Replacement Theory of the American right wing.

The strategy calls for Europe rapidly to become the primary defender of Europe. Administration officials are suggesting a 2027 deadline , which is unrealistic. It will take years for Europe to replace America’s ability to supply battlefield enablers such as operational intelligence, strategic lift, air refueling, long range fires, and missile defenses. It will take even longer for Europe to adequately strengthen its independent nuclear deterrence. Getting the transition timing wrong could be fatal.

The strategy stresses military deterrence in Asia and justifies the effort by noting the vital commercial role of the South China Sea and Taiwan’s economic and strategic importance. It does not stress deterrence in Europe to the same degree and in fact criticizes Europeans for seeing Russia as an existential threat. It places Europe third in terms of regional priorities.

The new strategy further declares that America’s global predisposition is for non-intervention. This is perhaps comforting for some Latin American countries but not for Europeans who rely on American intervention to deter Russia.

And the strategy calls for an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, for reestablishing strategic stability with Russia, and for the need to prevent unintended escalation. These may sound like noble goals, but they disregard Russia’s role as the aggressor and Putin’s opposition to a cease fire. The strategy goes so far as to blame European governments for having “unrealistic expectations” and for delaying the peace process.

The Ukraine part of the strategy must be seen in the context of Steve Witkoff’s 28-point peace plan, which essentially calls for Ukraine’s capitulation. We can be grateful to Secretary of State Marco Rubio for restructuring the peace plan so that it is somewhat acceptable to Kyiv. Putin has rejected the revised plan, and Trump’s next move is unclear. Europe is not really in the loop.

Taken together, Trump’s policies towards Europe have an isolationist flavor with lack of clarity about U.S. commitments. It undercuts deterrence. That could cause Putin to believe Europe is vulnerable and eventually to miscalculate. History is replete with such miscalculations.

The Kaiser in 1917 miscalculated the nature of American neutrality and its ability to mobilize quickly in response to unrestricted U-Boat warfare. Hitler miscalculated British long-term intentions in 1938 when Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich and traded the Sudetenland for “peace in our time.” Japan miscalculated in 1941 when it attacked Pearl Harbor in an effort to destroy America’s Pacific Fleet. Kim Il Sung and Stalin miscalculated U.S. intentions in 1950 when in a speech Dean Acheson left South Korea out of America’s defense perimeter. And Saddam Hussein miscalculated in 1990 when the State Department sent Ambassador April Glaspie to say that the U.S. did not want to interfere in intra-Arab issues.

Each of those miscalculations led to war.

Putin has already miscalculated the ease with which he could defeat Ukraine. He can miscalculate again.

The United States and Europe both need to take immediate steps to re-establish a credible deterrence. Trump should reemphasize America’s enduring defense commitment to NATO and avoid significant U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe.

He should treat Russia as the aggressor in Ukraine. Europe for its part should embrace the “burden sharing network” proposed by the strategy, accelerate movement towards meeting the 5% goal, and continue to supply Ukraine with need weapons. In the longer run, a new transatlantic compact may be needed to restructure roles, responsibilities, and missions within the alliance.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was previously NSC senior director for Defense Policy and was a principal author of three national security strategies.

Editor’s note: This commentary was updated to correct the portrayal of a historical anecdote. It was then-British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who flew to Munich and traded the Sudetenland for “peace in our time.”

美国新的国家安全战略明确表明，唐纳德·特朗普总统希望将自己的外交政策遗产定为“和平总统”。他声称过去一年达成了八项和平协议，其中包括加沙和平协议。他还以自己的名字命名了美国和平研究所。他曾​​游说获得诺贝尔和平奖，并接受了首届国际足联和平奖。他一直批评美国发动的“无休止的战争”。

但新战略中概述的一些政策可能会让他背负截然不同的政治遗产。他或许会被认为是那个放任俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京误判形势、在欧洲发动另一场大规模战争的总统。

特朗普现在纠正这个可能造成严重后果的错误还不算太晚。

这项新战略追溯到一个多世纪以前，融合了美国以往外交政策的方方面面。它将西半球列为美国的首要任务，并提出了新的“特朗普推论”，作为对“门罗主义”的补充，这与西奥多·罗斯福的干涉主义推论颇为相似。它借鉴了威廉·麦金莱在19世纪90年代运用关税的做法，以及1930年破坏性的《霍利-斯穆特关税法》。它像威廉·霍华德·塔夫脱的“金元外交”一样，强调运用经济实力。

这项战略中蕴含着孤立主义的成分，正如一战后参议员亨利·卡伯特·洛奇和威廉·博拉的政策一样。它令人不安地回想起查尔斯·林白和杰拉尔德·奈领导的“美国优先委员会”，该委员会曾游说反对援助孤军奋战对抗纳粹德国的英国。此外，它还扩展了巴拉克·奥巴马的“重返亚洲”战略，而“重返亚洲”也被列为特朗普的第二大区域优先事项。

特朗普总统的全球和平方案包含一些建设性要素。该战略强调以实力求和平，与罗纳德·里根的理念颇为相似。它呼吁加强美国的国防工业基础，并将经济制裁与奖励作为特朗普和平努力的主要手段。特朗普愿意运用个人外交手段来推动和平谈判。该战略正确地指出，美国目前军力捉襟见肘，其盟友需要承担更多责任。该战略鼓励盟友履行其“海牙承诺”，即到2035年将年度国防开支提高到GDP的5%。

但这项战略存在一个潜在的致命缺陷，需要加以纠正。它引发了人们对美国在北约第五条款下长期承诺的严重质疑。尽管该战略声称美国支持其盟友“维护欧洲的自由与安全”，但这与第五条款中“攻击一个成员国即是攻击所有成员国”的措辞相悖。它也与拜登总统提出的美国将捍卫北约“每一寸”领土的理念相去甚远。

尽管这些战略侧重于主权和尊重，但该文件却对欧洲领导人和机构进行了广泛的抨击。它称欧洲经济因过度监管而“衰落”。该文件正式将美国的文化战争带到了欧洲，暗示一些欧洲国家正面临“文明消亡”的风险——这是对美国右翼“大替换理论”的重新诠释。

该战略要求欧洲迅速成为欧洲的主要防御力量。政府官员建议的最后期限是2027年，这并不现实。欧洲需要数年时间才能取代美国在战场支援能力方面的贡献，例如作战情报、战略运输、空中加油、远程火力支援和导弹防御。而欧洲要充分加强其独立的核威慑能力，则需要更长的时间。过渡时机的把握不当可能会造成致命后果。

该战略强调在亚洲的军事威慑，并以南海重要的商业作用和台湾的经济及战略意义为由，论证了这一努力的合理性。然而，它对欧洲的威慑重视程度却远不及亚洲，甚至批评欧洲人将俄罗斯视为生存威胁。该战略将欧洲置于区域优先事项的第三位。

新战略进一步宣称，美国的全球立场是不干涉主义。这或许会让一些拉美国家感到欣慰，但对于依赖美国干预来遏制俄罗斯的欧洲国家而言，却并非如此。

该战略呼吁迅速停止在乌克兰的敌对行动，重建与俄罗斯的战略稳定，并防止局势意外升级。这些目标听起来或许崇高，但却忽视了俄罗斯作为侵略者的角色以及普京反对停火的立场。该战略甚至指责欧洲各国政府抱有“不切实际的期望”，并拖延了和平进程。

该战略中的乌克兰部分必须放在史蒂夫·威特科夫的28点和平计划的背景下看待，该计划本质上要求乌克兰投降。我们应该感谢国务卿马可·卢比奥对和平计划进行了调整，使其在某种程度上能够被基辅接受。普京拒绝了修订后的计划，而特朗普的下一步行动尚不明朗。欧洲方面对此并不知情。

总体而言，特朗普对欧洲的政策带有孤立主义色彩，且美国的承诺缺乏清晰度，这削弱了威慑力。这可能导致普京认为欧洲不堪一击，最终导致误判。历史上此类误判屡见不鲜。

1917年，德皇威廉二世误判了美国的中立性质及其迅速动员应对无限制潜艇战的能力。1938年，希特勒误判了英国的长期意图，当时内维尔·张伯伦飞往慕尼黑，以苏台德地区换取了“我们时代的和平”。1941年，日本误判了形势，偷袭珍珠港企图摧毁美国的太平洋舰队。1950年，金日成和斯大林误判了美国的意图，当时迪安·艾奇逊在一次演讲中将韩国排除在美国的防御圈之外。1990年，萨达姆·侯赛因也误判了形势，当时美国国务院派遣大使艾普丽尔·格拉斯皮表示，美国不想干涉阿拉伯内部事务。

每一次误判都导致了战争。

普京已经低估了击败乌克兰的难度。他可能再次误判。

美国和欧洲都需要立即采取措施，重建可信的威慑力量。特朗普应该重申美国对北约的长期防务承诺，并避免从欧洲大规模撤军。

他应该将俄罗斯视为乌克兰的侵略者。欧洲方面则应接受该战略提出的“负担分担网络”，加快实现5%的目标，并继续向乌克兰提供所需武器。​​从长远来看，或许需要达成一项新的跨大西洋协议，以重组联盟内部的角色、责任和任务。

汉斯·宾嫩迪克是大西洋理事会的杰出研究员。他曾任国家安全委员会国防政策高级主任，是三项国家安全战略的主要撰写人。

编者按：本文已更新，以更正对一则历史轶事的描述。当时的英国首相内维尔·张伯伦飞往慕尼黑，用苏台德地区换取了“我们时代的和平”。