Niger mutiny exposes growing reliance on Russia

The attempted power grab has exposed deep grievances within the army and tested Niger’s ties with its Sahelian allies.

A military armoured vehicle takes position on a street following a mutineers’ attack on the airport and presidential palace in Niamey, Niger, on August 30, 2026 [Reuters]

Niamey, Niger – The failed mutiny in Niger has shown the extent to which President Abdourahamane Tiani now relies on Russian support when his government comes under threat, including from within his own security forces.

On August 29, soldiers calling themselves the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Homeland attacked Air Base 101 at Niamey’s international airport, the presidential palace and the national broadcaster in a coordinated assault. A statement circulated during the fighting falsely declared that Tchiani had been removed.

Loyalist presidential guard units held the palace overnight, while about 200 Russian Africa Corps soldiers, backed by drones and reportedly reinforced from Mali and Libya, helped retake the airbase by evening. At least 27 people were killed, and about 100 mutineers were arrested.

The mutiny showed who Tchiani could rely on when his own security forces turned against him. Nigerien troops held the presidential palace, while Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake the key airbase.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Ryan Cummings, head analyst at Signal Risk, said the attempted mutiny was rooted in grievances that had been building inside the military.

“The insurrection indicates discord within the Nigerien armed forces,” he said. “This stems from multiple sources. The foremost pertains to significant casualties being inflicted against the country’s military by an array of non-state armed actors which appear to be as well equipped, if not better, than their military counterparts.”

Cummings pointed to a widening gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those protecting the country’s political leadership.

“Other factors include discrepancies in deployment and remuneration between low- to middle-ranking officers, who led the attempted mutiny and putsch, versus their more senior counterparts, such as the presidential guard who thwarted the coup attempt,” he said.

“Junior to middle-ranking soldiers are generally deployed to conflict front lines, where they face well-equipped and increasingly professional militant units that are capable of overrunning their positions,” Cummings noted. “Conversely, more senior military units, most notably the presidential guard, are deployed to garrisoned cities such as Niamey and Agadez, where the threat of engagement is generally lower. Despite facing a lower risk profile, senior military units generally enjoy significantly higher remuneration than their low- to middle-rank counterparts.”

The mutiny exposed the gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those serving in better-protected units in the capital.

Tchiani expelled French and American troops in 2023 and 2024, and troops from Russia’s Africa Corps entered Niger as the military government sought to replace Western support.

But the mutiny showed that Moscow’s role now goes beyond helping Niger fight armed groups.

When soldiers inside Niger’s own military threatened the government, Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake Air Base 101. The episode showed that Russia’s role in Niger now extends beyond the fight against armed groups to helping protect the military government itself.

That is a significant shift from how the partnership was initially presented to Nigeriens: as a way to strengthen the fight against armed groups after the departure of Western forces.

For Tchiani, that reliance on Moscow comes as he faces continued attacks by armed groups and growing discontent among soldiers fighting them.

A test for the AES alliance

The response from Niger’s fellow military leaders also raised questions about how much help the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) can provide when one of its members is under serious pressure.

According to Romane Dideberg, a research analyst at Chatham House’s Africa Programme, the response was one of the most revealing aspects of the rebellion.

“What the security response says about the cohesion of the Alliance of Sahel States might be one of the most telling elements of the mutiny,” she said. “As with the April attacks in Mali, the two other Sahelian juntas remained largely unreactive during this existential moment for the Nigerien junta, reacting only once the mutiny was neutralised.”

“This partly reflects the operational shortcomings of the confederation’s security architecture, but also, more critically, the sensitive relations between Tchiani’s junta and his Malian and Burkinabe counterparts,” she said.

Dideberg said Tchiani was rumoured not to have reached out to Mali. She also pointed to a generational and cultural gap between Tchiani and his Sahelian allies, saying his government showed more continuity with the former establishment while a different rationale had underpinned the coup that brought him to power.

The mutiny tested how far the three miltary governments were prepared, and able, to come to one another’s aid.

Alongside the Russian role, allegations have emerged that French and Emirati interests were connected to the mutiny, amid wider friction over Niger’s Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project.

The allegations have not been independently substantiated.

Roger Gabriel, a Nigerien army captain and commander of the elite 1st Parachute Battalion, appeared on state television on September 4 and alleged that several people, including associates of deposed President Mohamed Bazoum and officers from Chad, Benin and the Ivory Coast, were behind the attack.

He also said people from the United Arab Emirates had called and urged him to join the mutiny.

The claims are difficult to independently verify, but they have put fresh attention on the UAE’s growing presence in the Sahel.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI), said the possibility of Emirati involvement “cannot be dismissed” given the information circulating and the UAE’s broader regional activity.

“The UAE has been expanding its influence across the Sahel, from the western states to Sudan, primarily through official partnerships with military regimes, but also via informal networks, resource extraction, notably gold, and ties to non-state actors including separatist groups when needed,” he said.

“Its approach is pragmatic and dual-track: it prioritises formal state-level relations first, then pivots to alternative channels if the official path falters,” Ibrahim said.

“All of this is deeply political and strategic, interlinked with ambitions to secure leverage over Mediterranean and Red Sea routes. The growing friction with Algeria underscores how these moves are widely read in the region as an effort to reshape the balance of influence, making any allegations around the recent events in Niger worth careful scrutiny rather than either exaggeration or dismissal,” he said.

For now, the allegations remain allegations.

Tchiani survived the mutiny, but the failed attempt to remove him exposed strains inside his military, highlighted his growing reliance on Russia, and raised questions about how much help his closest regional allies can provide when he needs it.

For Dideberg, the implications go beyond the failed attempt to unseat Tchiani.

“This mutiny calls the effectiveness, but also, to an extent, the sincerity, of the mutual assistance pact into question,” she said.

这次企图夺权的行为暴露了军队内部的深层不满，并考验了尼日尔与其萨赫勒盟友的关系。

2026年8月30日，在尼日尔首都尼亚美，叛乱分子袭击了机场和总统府后，一辆军用装甲车在街道上就位。[路透社]

尼日尔尼亚美——尼日尔兵变失败表明，当总统阿卜杜拉哈曼·蒂亚尼的政府受到威胁时，包括来自其自身安全部队内部的威胁，总统在多大程度上依赖俄罗斯的支持。

8月29日，自称“祖国复兴武装部队”的士兵对尼亚美国际机场的101空军基地、总统府和国家广播公司发动了协同攻击。战斗期间流传的一份声明错误地宣称奇亚尼已被撤职。

效忠总统的卫队部队彻夜坚守总统府，约200名俄罗斯非洲军团士兵在无人机的支援下，据称还得到了来自马里和利比亚的增援，于傍晚时分协助夺回了空军基地。至少27人丧生，约100名叛乱分子被捕。

这场兵变表明，当奇亚尼自己的安全部队背叛他时，他可以依靠谁。尼日尔军队占领了总统府，而俄罗斯人员和装备则帮助效忠他的部队夺回了关键的空军基地。

Signal Risk 的首席分析师 Ryan Cummings 在接受半岛电视台采访时表示，这次未遂兵变源于军方内部不断积累的不满情绪。

他说：“这场叛乱表明尼日尔武装部队内部存在分歧。这源于多方面因素。最主要的原因是，一些非国家武装力量对该国军队造成了重大伤亡，这些武装力量的装备即便不是比军队更好，也至少与军队不相上下。”

卡明斯指出，在前线作战的士兵与保护国家政治领导层的士兵之间的差距正在扩大。

“其他因素还包括领导叛乱和政变的低级和中级军官与挫败政变企图的总统卫队等高级军官在部署和薪酬方面的差异，”他说。

“中低级军官通常被部署到冲突前线，在那里他们要面对装备精良且日益专业的武装部队，这些部队随时可能攻占他们的阵地，”卡明斯指出。“相反，级别更高的军事单位，尤其是总统卫队，则被部署到尼亚美和阿加德兹等驻军城市，这些地方的交战风险通常较低。尽管风险较低，但高级军事单位的薪酬通常比中低级军官高得多。”

这次兵变暴露了在前线作战的士兵与在首都安全防护较好的部队服役的士兵之间的差距。

2023 年和 2024 年，奇亚尼驱逐了法国和美国军队，俄罗斯非洲军团的军队进入尼日尔，因为军政府试图取代西方的支持。

但这次兵变表明，莫斯科现在的作用已经超越了帮助尼日尔打击武装团体。

当尼日尔军队内部的士兵威胁政府时，俄罗斯人员和装备帮助效忠政府的部队夺回了101号空军基地。这一事件表明，俄罗斯在尼日尔的作用如今已不仅限于打击武装团体，还包括帮助保护军政府本身。

这与最初向尼日尔人介绍的伙伴关系有了重大转变：当时的关系是西方军队撤离后加强打击武装团体的一种方式。

对奇亚尼而言，这种对莫斯科的依赖源于他不断遭受武装团体的袭击，以及与他们作战的士兵日益增长的不满。

对AES联盟的一次考验

尼日尔其他军事领导人的反应也引发了人们的疑问：当萨赫勒国家联盟（AES）的某个成员国面临严重压力时，该联盟能够提供多少帮助？

据查塔姆研究所非洲项目研究分析师罗曼·迪德伯格称，这一反应是叛乱中最具启发性的方面之一。

“安全方面的应对措施反映了萨赫勒国家联盟的凝聚力，这或许是此次兵变最能说明问题的因素之一，”她说道。“与四月份马里发生的袭击事件一样，在尼日尔军政府面临生死存亡之际，另外两个萨赫勒军政府基本上保持沉默，直到兵变被平息后才有所反应。”

“这部分反映了该联邦安全架构的运作缺陷，但更重要的是，也反映了奇亚尼的军政府与马里和布基纳法索的同行之间敏感的关系，”她说。

迪德伯格表示，有传言称奇亚尼并未与马里方面进行接触。她还指出奇亚尼与其萨赫勒盟友之间存在代沟和文化差异，称奇亚尼的政府与之前的政权保持着更多的连续性，而他发动政变上台的背后则有着不同的逻辑。

这次兵变考验了三个军事政府在多大程度上愿意并能够互相援助。

除了俄罗斯的角色之外，还有指控称，法国和阿联酋的利益也与这场叛乱有关，而这场叛乱的背景是围绕尼日尔跨撒哈拉天然气管道项目的更广泛摩擦。

这些指控尚未得到独立证实。

尼日尔陆军上尉兼精锐部队第一伞兵营指挥官罗杰·加布里埃尔于9月4日出现在国家电视台，声称包括被罢黜总统穆罕默德·巴祖姆的同伙以及来自乍得、贝宁和科特迪瓦的军官在内的几个人是此次袭击的幕后黑手。

他还说，来自阿拉伯联合酋长国的人给他打过电话，敦促他加入叛乱。

这些说法很难得到独立证实，但它们确实让人们重新关注到阿联酋在萨赫勒地区日益增长的影响力。

布鲁姆斯伯里情报与安全研究所 (BISI) 的非洲分析师 Hossamaldeen Ibrahim 在接受半岛电视台采访时表示，鉴于流传的信息以及阿联酋更广泛的地区活动，不能排除阿联酋参与的可能性。

他说：“阿联酋一直在扩大其在萨赫勒地区的影响力，从西部国家到苏丹，主要通过与军事政权建立官方伙伴关系，但也通过非正式网络、资源开采（特别是黄金）以及在必要时与包括分离主义团体在内的非国家行为体建立联系。”

“它采取务实的双轨制方法：首先优先发展正式的国家级关系，如果官方途径受阻，则转向其他渠道，”易卜拉欣说。

“所有这一切都具有深刻的政治和战略意义，与确保对地中海和红海航线的控制权密切相关。与阿尔及利亚日益加剧的摩擦凸显了这些举动在该地区被广泛解读为重塑影响力平衡的努力，因此，任何围绕尼日尔近期事件的指控都值得仔细审查，而不是夸大其词或轻描淡写地予以驳斥，”他说道。

目前，这些指控仍只是指控。

奇亚尼在兵变中幸存了下来，但罢免他的失败尝试暴露了他军队内部的紧张局势，凸显了他对俄罗斯日益增长的依赖，并引发了人们对他最亲密的地区盟友在需要时能够提供多少帮助的质疑。

对迪德伯格而言，其影响远不止于试图推翻奇亚尼的失败尝试。

“这次兵变不仅使互助条约的有效性受到质疑，而且在某种程度上也使互助条约的诚意受到质疑，”她说。