Inside the Houthis’ expanding war economy in Yemen

The Houthis have restructured Yemen’s commercial sector, securing billions in revenue amid a humanitarian crisis.

A man walks in front of a mural symbolising restrictions on shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's key shipping lanes, in Sanaa, Yemen, Monday, September 14, 2026 [Osamah Abdulrahman/AP]

The rapid advance by Yemen’s Houthis down the country’s Red Sea coast has raised questions over whether the group could turn its territorial gains into new sources of revenue, adding to an already extensive war economy.

But the Houthis already had control of large sections of the Red Sea coast, including the major port city of Hodeidah, and the financial benefits associated with that. Their military gains over the past week do not necessarily change the restrictions they have to deal with as an internationally unrecognised governing authority.

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Ahmed al-Shalafi, Al Jazeera’s Yemeni affairs editor, said that the advance has been a “geographical and military gain” but not an economic one, as it doesn’t remove the international sanctions that have been placed on it, which severely restrict their ability to commercially exploit the new territory under its control through formal international channels.

But the Houthis already enjoy significant financial benefits from their long-time control of northwestern Yemen, the most populous part of the country.

Since the Houthis’ capture of the capital Sanaa in September 2014, the group has developed a centralised financial system to collect revenues through taxes, customs duties, zakat (religious alms), and other levies.

A July report by the Mokha Center for Strategic Studies described this as a “parallel economy”, estimating that the system generated direct and indirect financial resources and costs worth approximately $2.5bn annually.

Of that total, the report estimated that around $800m came from taxes and customs, $600m from additional feeds and levies, and $300m from cash and in-kind contributions to the war effort. It also counted about $100m linked to mobilisation events and another $700m in indirect costs borne by businesses through higher transport, service, and fee-related expenses.

The Houthi authorities have also revoked the licenses of 4,225 established commercial agencies – the legal local representatives for foreign companies – according to a July report by Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, which said the move could pave the way for businesses affiliated with the group to take their place. For their part, the Houthis defended the move, claiming that the agencies had not renewed their registrations for three years.

But Houssam al-Saeedi, an economic researcher and the head of the Economic Studies Program at the Yemen and Gulf Center for Studies, told Al Jazeera that he viewed the restructuring as deliberate.

“It seizes companies belonging to existing merchants and manages them in favour of the [Houthis],” al-Saeedi noted. “What is happening is a network aimed primarily at bringing about a change or replacement of capital; so that even in the event of reaching a political settlement or a military victory, this group retains financial sources in the future.”

The Houthis reject the characterisation of their economic policies as simply an effort to tighten control over the private sector, saying measures introduced in recent years are intended to encourage domestic production, investment and small businesses, and simplify commercial regulation.

Reshaping the private sector

Houthi commercial activity has increasingly shifted towards sectors that offer the greatest potential for revenue collection and control.

The Mokha Center data showed that 26 percent of the nearly 68,000 commercial records analysed by the study were in general trade and imports, followed by food commodities at 18 percent.

“The Houthi group established a completely separate system, based on creating an internal economy parallel to the actual available economy first,” al-Saeedi explained to Al Jazeera.

He said the group uses state mechanisms to collect official taxes while simultaneously extracting non-state levies.

“There are various, long, and large collection operations under the name of ‘supporting the war effort’ and others, and these are not taken through government mechanisms.”

Energy trade and smuggling networks

Beyond revenues raised inside Yemen, the US government says illicit oil trading has become one of the Houthis’ most important sources of external financing.

The US Treasury Department alleged in January that the Houthis generate more than $2bn annually through illicit oil sales. It said Iran sells and provides oil to the group, including free monthly shipments, using Iranian-owned or affiliated companies based in Dubai.

Al-Saeedi said that the group has long prioritised the energy sector.

“These companies work primarily as a front for money laundering for the group,” he stated, adding that smuggled oil could provide direct income through domestic sales and monopoly pricing.

Al-Saeedi said that the Houthis used a range of illicit channels to move weapons, oil, and money, including smuggling networks and financial laundering. Another source of Houthi financing, he said, came from Iranian oil sold to third parties, with the proceeds transferred to the group through complex financial networks, including cryptocurrency transactions and local exchange houses.

The networks operate under extensive international sanctions. The US designates the Houthis as both a “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” and a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” group. The United Nations Security Council separately lists the Houthis under its Yemen sanctions regime, subjecting the group to a targeted arms embargo.

“Cutting off external funding to the Houthis may lead to suffocating them, but they have other sources of income, of course,” al-Shalafi said.

The Houthis have previously denied using Iranian fuel to finance their operations.

A domestic economic crisis

The Houthis’ extensive revenue-raising network exists alongside a deepening economic and humanitarian crisis in the areas it controls and across Yemen more broadly.

The UN estimated in March that 22.3 million people in Yemen require humanitarian assistance and protection.

In Houthi-controlled areas the crisis is compounded by the fact that public sector employees have not received salary payments for years. The economic misery has led to increasing public criticism of the Houthis in the areas under their control, despite the group’s intolerance for dissent.

Al-Shalafi pointed out that the group’s regional actions are deeply tied to this domestic reality, seeking an escape from crises over unpaid salaries and high prices.

“They transformed these economic crises into a combat priority, turning them into war, confrontation, and mobilisation,” al-Shalafi said. “The war, of course, gives them the justification to continue imposing levies, for military spending, and to postpone the entitlements of the people inside.”

The Houthis say the root cause of the issue – the lack of payment of public sector salaries – stems from the transfer of the headquarters of the Central Bank of Yemen to government-controlled Aden, and the loss of access to the country’s oil and gas revenues. They accuse Saudi Arabia, which backs the Yemeni government, of blockading them.

Can the Houthis profit from their gains?

The question now is whether control of the coastline, ports, and territory around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, will substantially expand the group’s financial power – or primarily increase its military leverage.

“[Houthi] control over the Mocha coast and Bab al-Mandab will not be met by a world standing idly by or paying royalties and levies to the Houthis; there will be a confrontation or conflict of some kind to settle this issue,” al-Shalafi said.

Whatever the effect of the latest territorial gains, Yemen already has two increasingly separate economic systems, posing long-term challenges.

“There are two completely different economies in the Houthi-controlled areas and the government-controlled areas,” al-Sa’eedi said. “In my view, these current economic complexities cannot be resolved without a decisive military outcome that controls the ground, or a comprehensive political settlement.”

胡塞武装重组了也门的商业部门，在人道主义危机中获得了数十亿美元的收入。

2026年9月14日星期一，在也门萨那，一名男子走过一幅象征着限制通过曼德海峡（世界主要航道之一）航运的壁画。[Osamah Abdulrahman/AP]

也门胡塞武装沿红海沿岸的迅速推进引发了人们的疑问：该组织能否将获得的领土转化为新的收入来源，从而进一步扩大其已经十分庞大的战争经济。

但胡塞武装此前已控制了红海沿岸的大片地区，包括主要港口城市荷台达，以及由此带来的经济利益。他们在过去一周取得的军事胜利，并不一定会改变他们作为国际上不被承认的执政机构所面临的种种限制。

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半岛电视台也门事务编辑艾哈迈德·沙拉菲表示，这一进展是“地理和军事上的胜利”，但并非经济上的胜利，因为它并没有解除国际社会对其施加的制裁，这些制裁严重限制了他们通过正式的国际渠道对新控制的领土进行商业开发的能力。

但胡塞武装长期控制着也门西北部（也门人口最多的地区），已经从中获得了巨大的经济利益。

自胡塞武装于 2014 年 9 月占领首都萨那以来，该组织建立了一个集中式的金融体系，通过税收、关税、天课（宗教施舍）和其他征费来收取收入。

莫卡战略研究中心在 7 月份的一份报告中将其描述为“平行经济”，并估计该系统每年产生价值约 25 亿美元的直接和间接财政资源和成本。

报告估计，在这些总额中，约8亿美元来自税收和关税，6亿美元来自额外的饲料和征费，3亿美元来自对战争的现金和实物捐助。报告还统计了约1亿美元与动员活动相关的支出，以及企业因运输、服务和收费相关费用增加而承担的约7亿美元间接成本。

据萨那战略研究中心7月份的一份报告显示，胡塞武装当局还吊销了4225家已成立的商业代理机构（外国公司在当地的合法代表）的营业执照。该报告称，此举可能为与胡塞武装有关联的企业取而代之。胡塞武装则为这一举动辩护，声称这些代理机构三年未续期注册。

但也门和海湾研究中心经济研究项目负责人、经济研究员胡萨姆·赛义迪告诉半岛电视台，他认为此次重组是蓄意的。

“它接管现有商人的公司，并将其转为胡塞武装所有，”赛义迪指出。“这实际上是一个旨在改变或替换资本的网络；这样，即使达成政治和解或取得军事胜利，该组织未来也能保留资金来源。”

胡塞武装否认其经济政策仅仅是加强对私营部门控制的努力，并表示近年来推出的措施旨在鼓励国内生产、投资和小企业，并简化商业监管。

重塑私营部门

胡塞武装的商业活动日益转向那些最有可能带来税收和控制收入的行业。

莫卡中心的数据显示，该研究分析的近 68,000 条商业记录中，26% 为一般贸易和进口，其次是食品商品，占 18%。

“胡塞武装建立了一套完全独立的体系，其基础是首先建立一个与现有经济平行的内部经济，”赛义迪向半岛电视台解释说。

他说，该组织利用国家机制征收官方税款，同时还征收非国家税费。

“以‘支持战争’等名义开展的各种旷日持久的大规模募捐活动，并非通过政府机制进行。”

能源贸易和走私网络

除了也门境内的收入外，美国政府表示，非法石油贸易已成为胡塞武装最重要的外部融资来源之一。

美国财政部今年1月指控胡塞武装每年通过非法石油销售获利超过20亿美元。财政部称，伊朗通过设在迪拜的伊朗公司或关联公司向胡塞武装出售和提供石油，包括每月免费供应石油。

赛义迪表示，该集团长期以来一直将能源领域列为优先发展领域。

他表示：“这些公司主要充当该集团洗钱的幌子”，并补充说，走私石油可以通过国内销售和垄断定价提供直接收入。

赛义迪表示，胡塞武装利用多种非法渠道运输武器、石油和资金，包括走私网络和洗钱活动。他还说，胡塞武装的另一项资金来源是伊朗向第三方出售石油，所得款项通过复杂的金融网络（包括加密货币交易和当地外汇兑换机构）转移到该组织名下。

这些网络在广泛的国际制裁下运作。美国将胡塞武装列为“外国恐怖组织”和“特别指定的全球恐怖组织”。联合国安理会也将其列入也门制裁名单，并对其实施定向武器禁运。

“切断对胡塞武装的外部资金来源可能会导致他们窒息而亡，但他们当然还有其他收入来源，”沙拉菲说。

胡塞武装此前否认使用伊朗燃料为其行动提供资金。

国内经济危机

胡塞武装庞大的收入来源网络与其控制区乃至整个也门日益加深的经济和人道主义危机同时存在。

联合国3月份估计，也门有2230万人需要人道主义援助和保护。

在胡塞武装控制区，公共部门雇员多年未领到工资，这使得危机雪上加霜。尽管胡塞武装对异议零容忍，但经济困境仍导致其控制区内民众对胡塞武装的批评日益增多。

沙拉菲指出，该组织的地区行动与国内现实密切相关，旨在摆脱拖欠工资和物价高企带来的危机。

“他们将这些经济危机转化为作战优先事项，将其演变为战争、对抗和动员，”沙拉菲说。“战争当然给了他们继续征税、用于军事开支以及推迟民众应得权益的借口。”

胡塞武装称，问题的根源——公共部门工资拖欠——在于也门中央银行总部迁至政府控制的亚丁，导致他们无法获得该国的石油和天然气收入。他们指责支持也门政府的沙特阿拉伯对他们实施封锁。

胡塞武装能否从这些收益中获利？

现在的问题是，控制红海南入口处的曼德海峡周围的海岸线、港口和领土，是否会大幅扩大该组织的财政实力，还是主要增加其军事影响力。

“如果胡塞武装控制了摩卡海岸和曼德海峡，世界不会袖手旁观，也不会向胡塞武装缴纳特许权使用费和税款；为了解决这个问题，将会发生某种对抗或冲突，”沙拉菲说。

无论最近领土扩张带来的影响如何，也门已经存在两个日益独立的经济体系，这将带来长期的挑战。

“胡塞武装控制区和政府控制区的经济状况截然不同，”赛义迪说。“在我看来，如果没有一场决定性的军事胜利来控制局势，或者没有全面的政治解决方案，这些当前的经济难题就无法解决。”