‘Buy American’ is good for the US and strengthens our partnerships with allies

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed how a global superpower becomes critically vulnerable when it depends on foreign nations to manufacture basic components, such as semiconductors, that are vital to the daily life of every American.

A nation that once led the world in manufacturing semiconductors watched helplessly this fall as General Motors temporarily shut down production at North American auto plants because the deadly pandemic decimated the overseas factories that our country now relies on to produce the chips that power nearly every device we use with an on and off switch.

The fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, advanced by the House Armed Services Committee in September, would help reverse this troubling trend by strengthening existing “Buy American” requirements that implement a basic principle: When American tax dollars are invested, they should be invested in American businesses and workers.

Our NDAA provision recognizes that a strong national defense requires a robust domestic defense-industrial base with thriving U.S.-based manufacturers, small businesses and, most importantly, American workers. “Buy American” encourages our defense-industrial base to leverage taxpayer dollars to source more parts from American-made manufacturers and build more with U.S. labor. Unfortunately, opponents of the provision seek to undermine this critical reform.

Recent criticism of our reform has followed a similar theme: that creating American jobs is bad for national security and will exclude products built by our allies. The reality is the exact opposite. The “Buy American” provision we champion reaffirms American priorities, strengthening our domestic supply chain while encouraging cooperation with qualifying countries and those with whom we have trade agreements.

An argument commonly used to critique “Buy American” is that the provision will increase the costs and complexity of doing business, or degrade the business environment in an industry where international cooperation and trade are the norm. This, so goes the argument, will harm our alliances or the interoperability of the U.S. armed forces when working alongside allies. This interpretation of the provision is uninformed at best and misleading at worst.

Current “Buy American” provisions in the established law allow the Department of Defense flexibility to contract with partner countries when it is in the public interest, a trade agreement supersedes the situation, a product is domestically unavailable or there’s an unreasonable cost, among others. Currently, 27 countries with which we have reciprocal agreements — including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway — already qualify under these waivers. Indeed, “Buy American” promotes the positive working relationships we’ve established with our allies and partners to reinforce America’s key supply chain.

Furthermore, the Defense Department’s planning documents recognize the need for policies that secure critical supply chains. For example, the Department of Defense Climate Adaptation Plan explicitly recommends assessing supply chain resilience and onshoring manufacturing capacity.

“Buy American” provisions do exactly this. “Buy American” encourages future manufacturing capacity by maintaining and growing our domestic workforce. By increasing domestic sourcing and manufacturing capacity, we strengthen America’s supply chain by improving our ability to build what we need, when we need it. As the national economy continues to confront supply chain disruptions brought on by COVID-19, we must do everything we can to reshore manufacturing and increase resiliency — especially on issues of national security.

In short, “Buy American” addresses pressing strategic needs identified by the Department of Defense, ensures a domestic workforce capable of supporting our national security-industrial base, and strengthens the valuable network of defense trade relationships between America, our allies and partners — resulting in our ability to produce and source materials necessary to defend our nation.

Rep. Donald Norcross, D-N.J., chairs the House Armed Services Committee’s Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee. Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill., is a retired Army National Guard lieutenant colonel and chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Airland Subcommittee.

新冠疫情暴露了当一个全球超级大国依赖外国制造半导体等对每个美国人日常生活至关重要的基本零部件时，它会变得多么脆弱。

今年秋天，曾经在半导体制造领域领先的美国，眼睁睁地看着通用汽车暂时关闭了北美汽车工厂的生产，却无能为力。因为致命的疫情摧毁了美国赖以生产芯片的海外工厂，而这些芯片为我们使用的几乎所有带开关的设备提供动力。

2022 财年国防授权法案于 9 月由众议院军事委员会提出，该法案将通过加强现有的“购买美国货”要求来扭转这一令人担忧的趋势，该要求实施了一项基本原则：当美国纳税人的钱被投资时，就应该投资于美国企业和工人。

我们的《国防授权法案》条款承认，强大的国防需要健全的国内国防工业基础，包括蓬勃发展的美国本土制造商、小型企业，以及最重要的——美国工人。“购买美国货”鼓励我们的国防工业基础利用纳税人的钱，从美国制造商采购更多零部件，并更多地雇用美国工人。不幸的是，该条款的反对者试图破坏这项至关重要的改革。

近期对我们改革的批评主要围绕一个主题：创造美国就业机会不利于国家安全，并且会排挤盟国的产品。但事实恰恰相反。我们所倡导的“购买美国货”条款重申了美国的优先事项，加强了国内供应链，同时鼓励与符合条件的国家以及与我们签订了贸易协定的国家开展合作。

一种常见的批评“购买美国货”条款的论点是，该条款会增加经商成本和复杂性，或者在国际合作和贸易已成为常态的行业中破坏商业环境。这种论点认为，这将损害我们的盟友关系，或影响美国武装部队与盟友并肩作战时的互操作性。这种对该条款的解读往好了说是缺乏了解，往坏了说是误导。

现行法律中的“购买美国货”条款允许国防部在符合公共利益、贸易协定优先于其他情况、产品在国内无法获得或成本过高等情况下，灵活地与伙伴国家签订合同。目前，已有27个国家——包括澳大利亚、加拿大、法国、德国、荷兰和挪威——与我们签订了互惠协议，并符合这些豁免条件。事实上，“购买美国货”政策促进了我们与盟友和伙伴建立的良好合作关系，从而加强了美国的关键供应链。

此外，国防部的规划文件也认识到需要制定政策来保障关键供应链的安全。例如，国防部气候适应计划明确建议评估供应链的韧性并将制造能力迁回国内。

“购买美国货”条款正是如此。“购买美国货”通过维持和扩大国内劳动力，鼓励未来的制造业发展。通过增加国内采购和制造能力，我们能够更好地满足自身需求，从而增强美国的供应链。随着新冠疫情持续冲击美国经济的供应链，我们必须竭尽所能将制造业迁回国内，增强经济韧性——尤其是在国家安全问题上。

简而言之，“购买美国货”满足了国防部确定的紧迫战略需求，确保了国内劳动力能够支持我们的国家安全工业基础，并加强了美国、我们的盟友和伙伴之间宝贵的国防贸易关系网络——从而使我们能够生产和采购保卫国家所需的材料。

众议员唐纳德·诺克罗斯（Donald Norcross，DN.J.）担任众议院军事委员会战术空地部队小组委员会主席。参议员塔米·达克沃斯（Tammy Duckworth，D-Illinois）是退役陆军国民警卫队中校，担任参议院军事委员会空地部队小组委员会主席。