Morocco’s 2026 election: A test of political trust and engagement

Youth unemployment, living costs and public services are key issues before the September 23 vote.

Volunteers from Morocco’s Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) distribute campaign leaflets before the September 23 legislative election [Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

Rabat, Morocco – Morocco’s parliamentary election campaign began on September 10, with 27 political parties competing for 395 seats in the House of Representatives. More than 15.8 million voters are registered for the September 23 vote, which will determine Parliament’s composition and play a central role in forming the next government.

But beyond the competition between parties, the election raises a deeper question: whether citizens believe the political system can respond to the problems shaping their daily lives.

That question is particularly important for younger Moroccans. An Afrobarometer survey published in March found that roughly a third of Moroccans aged 18 to 35 expressed trust in Parliament, the head of government and political parties. At the same time, young people were more likely than older Moroccans to post political content on social media and participate in demonstrations.

That does not necessarily mean young Moroccans are disengaged. The more important issue is whether they see electoral politics as an effective way of addressing the problems they face.

An election within a distinctive system

Morocco’s electoral politics operate within the constitutional framework established in 2011. The constitution defines Morocco as a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social monarchy and establishes a separation and balance of powers while preserving the monarchy’s central institutional role.

Under Article 47, the king appoints the head of government from the political party that comes first in elections to the House of Representatives. The king also presides over the Council of Ministers, while the government exercises executive power and Parliament exercises legislative and oversight functions.

Winning the largest number of seats, therefore, matters for forming the government, but the parliamentary result does not by itself determine the full distribution of political power.

A younger electorate, an older political system

The age profile of the electorate makes the question of political engagement more consequential.

Women walk past electoral symbols used by political parties in Morocco’s legislative election in Rabat on September 14, 2026 [Abdel Majid BZIOUAT / AFP]

Official figures show that voters aged 18 to 24 account for 4 percent of those registered, while people aged 60 and above account for 29 percent. But those figures describe the electoral roll, not turnout, but they show how heavily the registered electorate is weighted towards older citizens.

Morocco also faces a substantial youth employment problem. The IMF estimates that unemployment stood at 13 percent in 2025, while unemployment among 15-to-24-year-olds reached 37.3 percent. It estimates that 25.2 percent of young people were not in employment, education or training in the third quarter of 2025. The IMF also points to skills mismatches, limited private-sector dynamism and pronounced gender disparities in labour-market participation.

For young people struggling to enter the labour market, promises about growth, jobs and purchasing power are not abstract campaign issues. They are measures of whether the political system can deliver opportunities visible in everyday life.

When economic frustration becomes political

Those pressures have also surfaced outside formal electoral politics.

In late July, roughly 60,000 people entered the autonomous Spanish city of Ceuta from Morocco in the largest such surge in recent history, according to the news agency Reuters. The report linked the crossings to economic hardship, social unrest and misinformation circulating on social media, alongside migration aspirations and false expectations about Spanish court rulings.

While this episode may not have been a direct measure of electoral opinion or evidence of a single political cause, it illustrated how economic expectations, migration aspirations and perceptions of opportunity can intersect.

That provides a wider context for the election’s economic debate: whether Morocco’s recent growth and major development projects are producing opportunities that younger citizens can see in their own lives.

The economy has been growing strongly. The IMF estimates that real GDP grew by 4.9 percent in 2025 and projects growth of 4.4 percent in 2026. Yet high unemployment, particularly among young people, has remained a significant challenge.

Strong growth has not translated into sufficient job creation.

What the parties are promising

Employment and purchasing power feature prominently in the programmes of the three parties that have formed the governing coalition since 2021: the National Rally of Independents (RNI), the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) and Istiqlal.

The RNI’s 2026–2031 programme promises one million jobs and a gradual increase in the minimum wage to 5,000 dirhams (about $530) per month. PAM has pledged at least one million jobs and put the cost of its five-year programme at 350 billion dirhams ($37.1bn). Istiqlal has placed purchasing power and public services at the centre of its campaign, alongside proposals on healthcare, housing, employment, water management and food security.

The programmes differ in emphasis, but their common focus is revealing: Employment, household purchasing power and public services have become central measures of political credibility.

The challenge for the next government will be turning investment and growth into more productive jobs and higher living standards.

The PJD tries to recover

The Justice and Development Party (PJD), led by former head of government Abdelilah Benkirane, enters the election seeking to rebuild support after its dramatic losses in 2021.

A truck carrying a campaign billboard for Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD) drives through Rabat before the September 23 legislative election [Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

The party fell from 125 seats in the previous parliament to 13. In the September 2021 election, the RNI won 102 seats, followed by PAM with 87 and Istiqlal with 81. The three parties subsequently formed the governing coalition.

The PJD has presented a programme built around five axes and 467 measures covering institutional, economic, social and foreign policy. The programme emphasises concrete reforms and measures rather than extensive numerical targets, covering areas including public services, employment, purchasing power and institutional reform.

Its return adds another dimension to the contest as the governing parties defend their record since 2021 and the PJD attempts to rebuild its electoral base.

What the election will test

The election will test whether Morocco’s political system can maintain a credible connection between an ambitious development agenda and the expectations of citizens who want to see its benefits in everyday life.

For younger Moroccans, the relatively low trust in political institutions alongside very high youth unemployment points to traditional electoral politics facing competition from other forms of political expression at a time when employment and living standards are increasingly important.

At a time when employment and economic standards are central to political party platforms, economic researcher Nouh El Harmouzi argues that the challenge extends beyond what parties can promise during an election campaign.

“Morocco’s economic problems are fundamentally structural and cannot be resolved through short-term electoral promises.”

青年失业、生活成本和公共服务是9月23日投票前的关键问题。

摩洛哥真实与现代党（PAM）的志愿者在9月23日立法选举前分发竞选传单。[Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

摩洛哥拉巴特——摩洛哥议会选举竞选活动于9月10日开始，共有27个政党角逐众议院395个席位。超过1580万选民登记参加9月23日的投票，此次选举将决定议会的组成，并在组建下一届政府中发挥核心作用。

但除了政党之间的竞争之外，这次选举还提出了一个更深层次的问题：公民是否相信政治体制能够应对影响他们日常生活的各种问题。

这个问题对年轻的摩洛哥人来说尤为重要。非洲晴雨表（Afrobarometer）3月份发布的一项调查显示，大约三分之一的18至35岁摩洛哥人对议会、政府首脑和政党表示信任。与此同时，年轻人比年长的摩洛哥人更倾向于在社交媒体上发布政治内容，也更愿意参与示威游行。

这并不一定意味着摩洛哥年轻人对政治漠不关心。更重要的问题是，他们是否认为选举政治是解决他们所面临问题的有效途径。

一个独特体系内的选举

摩洛哥的选举政治在2011年建立的宪法框架内运作。该宪法将摩洛哥定义为一个立宪制、民主制、议会制和社会君主制国家，并确立了权力分立与制衡，同时保留了君主制的核心制度作用。

根据第47条，国王从众议院选举中得票最高的政党中任命政府首脑。国王还主持内阁会议，政府行使行政权，议会行使立法和监督职能。

因此，赢得最多席位对于组建政府很重要，但议会选举结果本身并不能决定政治权力的完全分配。

年轻的选民群体，老旧的政治体制

选民的年龄结构使得政治参与问题变得更加重要。

2026年9月14日，在摩洛哥拉巴特举行的立法选举中，妇女们走过各政党使用的选举标志。[Abdel Majid BZIOUAT / AFP]

官方数据显示，18至24岁选民占登记选民总数的4%，而60岁及以上选民占29%。但这些数据反映的是选民名册上的选民人数，而非实际投票率，不过它们确实表明，登记选民中老年人的比例非常高。

摩洛哥也面临着严峻的青年就业问题。国际货币基金组织（IMF）估计，到2025年，摩洛哥的失业率将达到13%，其中15至24岁人群的失业率将高达37.3%。IMF还估计，到2025年第三季度，25.2%的年轻人既没有就业，也没有接受教育或培训。此外，IMF指出，技能错配、私营部门活力不足以及劳动力市场参与方面存在显著的性别差距也是造成这一问题的原因。

对于那些努力进入劳动力市场的年轻人来说，关于经济增长、就业和购买力的承诺并非抽象的竞选议题，而是衡量政治体制能否提供日常生活中切实可见的机会的指标。

当经济挫败感演变为政治挫败感时

这些压力也出现在正式选举政治之外。

据路透社报道，7月下旬，约有6万人从摩洛哥涌入西班牙自治市休达，这是近年来规模最大的一次偷渡潮。报道指出，此次偷渡潮与经济困境、社会动荡、社交媒体上流传的虚假信息、移民愿望以及对西班牙法院判决的错误预期有关。

虽然这一事件可能并非直接衡量选举民意或证明单一政治原因，但它说明了经济预期、移民愿望和对机会的看法是如何相互交织的。

这为选举中的经济辩论提供了更广泛的背景：摩洛哥近期的增长和重大发展项目是否为年轻公民创造了他们自己生活中能够看到的机会。

经济一直保持强劲增长。国际货币基金组织估计，2025年实际GDP增长4.9%，并预测2026年增长4.4%。然而，高失业率，尤其是青年失业率，仍然是一个重大挑战。

强劲的经济增长并未转化为足够的就业机会。

各方承诺

就业和购买力在自 2021 年以来组成执政联盟的三个政党的纲领中占据重要地位：独立人士全国联盟 (RNI)、真实性和现代性党 (PAM) 和独立党 (Istiqlal)。

国家基础设施委员会（RNI）的2026-2031年计划承诺创造100万个就业岗位，并将最低工资逐步提高至每月5000迪拉姆（约合530美元）。人民行动党（PAM）承诺至少创造100万个就业岗位，并预计其五年计划的成本为3500亿迪拉姆（约合371亿美元）。独立党（Istiqlal）则将购买力和公共服务置于其竞选活动的核心，同时还提出了有关医疗保健、住房、就业、水资源管理和粮食安全的提案。

这些方案的侧重点各不相同，但它们的共同关注点却很有意义：就业、家庭购买力和公共服务已成为衡量政治信誉的核心指标。

下一届政府面临的挑战是如何将投资和增长转化为更多高生产力就业机会和更高生活水平。

PJD试图恢复

由前政府首脑阿卜杜拉·本·基兰领导的正义与发展党（PJD）参加此次选举，旨在重建其在 2021 年惨败后的支持率。

一辆载有摩洛哥正义与发展党（PJD）竞选广告牌的卡车驶过拉巴特，此时距离9月23日的立法选举还有一段时间。[Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

该党在上届议会中席位从 125 个锐减至 13 个。在 2021 年 9 月的选举中，RNI 赢得 102 个席位，PAM 赢得 87 个席位，Istiqlal 赢得 81 个席位。这三个政党随后组成了执政联盟。

正义与发展党（PJD）提出了一项围绕五大支柱和467项措施的纲领，涵盖体制、经济、社会和外交政策。该纲领强调具体的改革措施，而非冗长的数字目标，内容涉及公共服务、就业、购买力和体制改革等领域。

它的回归为这场竞争增添了新的维度，执政党要捍卫其自 2021 年以来的政绩，而正义与发展党则试图重建其选民基础。

这次选举将考验什么

此次选举将检验摩洛哥的政治体制能否在雄心勃勃的发展议程与希望在日常生活中看到发展成果的公民期望之间保持可信的联系。

对于年轻的摩洛哥人来说，他们对政治机构的信任度相对较低，加上青年失业率居高不下，这表明在就业和生活水平日益重要的当下，传统的选举政治正面临着其他政治表达形式的竞争。

在就业和经济标准成为政党纲领核心的当下，经济研究员努赫·哈尔穆齐认为，挑战远不止于政党在竞选期间所能做出的承诺。

“摩洛哥的经济问题本质上是结构性的，无法通过短期的选举承诺来解决。”