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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized Ukraine’s eagerness to establish an energy ceasefire with Russia.

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俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月21日

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized Ukraine’s eagerness to establish an energy ceasefire with Russia and announced that he will meet US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. Zelensky stated on September 20 that he spoke with Trump by phone and that the two agreed to meet during the United Nations General Assembly session in New York City.[1] Axios reported on September 20, citing sources familiar with this phone call, that Trump and Zelensky discussed Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, and Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service Head Rustem Umerov stated that Zelensky will likely meet with Trump on Tuesday, September 22.[2] Trump stated on Truth Social on September 21 that Russia has “lost control of its diesel oil industry due to its war in Ukraine.”[3] Zelensky responded to Trump’s Truth Social post on September 21, emphasizing that Ukraine is willing to engage in a mutual ceasefire of strikes on energy and food infrastructure and is ready to work with its partners amidst strong diplomatic proposals.[4]

The predictable September 18-20 State Duma election results continue the Kremlin’s efforts to militarize the Russian government and particularly the United Russia Party and to portray public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war effort in Ukraine and potential future aggression against NATO. United Russia won 355 out of 450 seats (about 78 percent) in the Duma as per preliminary election results on September 21, an eight percent increase from the 315 Duma seats United Russia currently holds.[5] Both figures are well above the 226 threshold for an absolute majority. United Russia Party General Council Secretary Vladimir Yakushev stated on September 21 that 49 veterans had won seats on the United Russia ticket, accounting for about 11 percent of the total number of Duma seats.[6] Yakushev retracted an earlier statement in which he claimed that 86 veterans and two members of the Russian military patriotic youth education movement Yunarmiya won seats and that United Russia mandates in the Duma. Kremlin-coopted war correspondent and United Russia Party candidate Yevgeny Poddubny stated on August 19 that United Russia intended to elect between 40 and 100 veterans to the State Duma in the 2026 elections.[7] 49 seats are on the lower end of Poddubny’s range but still constitute just under 14 percent of the total United Russia presence in the Duma, according to the preliminary results. These veterans represent a significant bloc that will support Putin’s efforts to militarize United Russia, the broader State Duma, and the Russian government as a whole.

Russian officials continue to project the election results as a successful referendum on the war in Ukraine and Putin’s broader foreign policy. Chief of the Yunarmiya General Staff and United Russia member Captain Vladislav Golovin emphasized voter turnout in the elections (57 percent in preliminary results) and claimed that the voter turnout level and presence of election observers confirm the Russian government’s legitimacy.[8] Russian state media outlet Moskovsky Komsomolets published an opinion piece on September 21 arguing that Putin won a “new national referendum” on support for the war in Ukraine.[9] Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko celebrated the elections as showing Russian citizens “understanding” of Putin’s policies and the Russian values that Russia is fighting for.[10] This article and statement follow statements from Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on September 20 that the election results will confirm Russian parties’ and voters’ support for Putin’s policies, including foreign policy.[11] Putin will likely use the Duma election results to justify increased demands on Russian society, such as mobilization in some form, and claim societal approval for further aggression against Ukraine and potential future aggression against NATO.

Russia is expanding the production of key composite materials used in Geran-type strike drones and is constructing underground facilities at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to protect its drone production from Ukrainian strikes. Russia is taking steps to expand its polyacrylonitrile (PAN)-based carbon fiber production capacity at the Alabuga-Volokno facility, a subsidiary of Russian state nuclear energy agency Rosatom, by 500 tons per year by 2029, according to Politico.[12] This production could allow Russia to produce an additional 28,000 Geran strike drones per year, a 78 percent increase over current annual production. Alabuga-Volokno is part of Russia’s Geran drone production complex at the Alabuga SEZ in the Republic of Tatarstan. Satellite imagery captured between May and July 2026 shows clearing operations for the expansion project adjacent to Alabuga-Volokno’s current carbon fiber factory, according to a Ukrainian official speaking to Politico. An entry on a Russian government website from May 2026 confirmed that Alabuga-Volokno planned to build a new carbon fiber production line with a capacity of up to 500 tons per year at this facility.[13] Russian forces extensively use carbon fiber for the airframe of delta-wing Geran-1, Geran-2, Geran-3, and Geran-4 drones and for the fuselage skin, wings, and tail assembly of the jet-powered Geran-5 drone.[14] A People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-owned company supplied Alabuga-Volokno with 46 tons of PAN precursors to produce carbon fiber earlier in 2026.[15] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported on September 19, citing satellite imagery collected on an unspecified date, that Russia has constructed 42,000 square meters (4.2 hectares) of underground space for future production facilities.[16] The underground workshop is part of a broader construction site at the Alabuga SEZ covering about 500 hectares that Russia began developing in late April 2026, and Russia is building the new carbon fiber facility next to a passive air defense perimeter of lattice towers constructed between May and July 2026.[17]

European intelligence officials warned that Russia may take openly aggressive action against NATO in the next several months while Baltic State officials continue to emphasize that there are no signs of preparations for an imminent attack. Czech Security Information Service (BIS) Head Lieutenant General Michal Koudelka stated to the Guardian in an article published on September 20 that Russia may conduct a military operation against NATO in a matter of “months, not years,” and that this activity could involve increased drone activity in NATO countries, a “limited incursion,” or false-flag incidents.[18] Latvian State Security Service (VDD) Director General Normunds Mežviets also acknowledged that Russia is preparing unspecified actions against Europe but stated that the VDD has not observed signs of an “imminent attack.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized Ukraine’s eagerness to establish an energy ceasefire with Russia and announced that he will meet US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.

The predictable September 18-20 State Duma election results continue the Kremlin’s efforts to militarize the Russian government, particularly the United Russia Party, and to portray public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war effort in Ukraine and potential future aggression against NATO.

Russia is expanding the production of key composite materials used in Geran-type strike drones and is constructing underground facilities at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to protect its drone production from Ukrainian strikes.

European intelligence officials warned that Russia may take openly aggressive action against NATO in the next several months while Baltic State officials continue to emphasize that there are no signs of preparations for an imminent attack.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.

Russia launched 172 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on September 21.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on September 21. Ukrainian forces struck bunkers and hangars at the Tsimbulova drone port near Tsimbulova, Oryol Oblast (roughly 175 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated satellite imagery published on September 21.[19]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[20]

Russian forces are resuming attempts to infiltrate northern Sumy Oblast from Sudzha, Kursk Oblast, using pipelines. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian 8th Airborne Corps reported on September 20 that Russian forces have not been able to advance in Sumy Oblast and have reverted to the practice of moving through the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod gas pipeline that connects Sumy Oblast and Sudzha, Kursk Oblast.[21] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have attempted to conduct two infiltration missions through this pipeline over the past week. ISW has observed that Russian forces have conducted at least two such infiltration missions in Sumy Oblast since September 13, including one with a platoon-sized group.[22]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strike campaigns against Russian military assets in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Stary Khutor, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 6 kilometers from the frontline).[23] Ukrainian forces also struck the Seymskaya 110 kV electrical substation east of Kursk City, Kursk Oblast (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) on September 17, according to geolocated imagery published on September 20.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in southern Vovchansk, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area, based on geolocated footage published on September 21.[25]

Russian forces continue to make aggrandized claims of their advances northeast of Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 21 that Russian forces seized Pilna and Novooleksandrivka (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[26] Russian milbloggers credited the Russian 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the seizure of Novooleksandrivka and the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the seizure of Pilna.[27] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces are operating as far as 10 kilometers away from Pilna and 25 kilometers away from Novooleksandrivka.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Velykyi Burluk. Russian servicemembers operated south of Blahodatne during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 20.[28] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on September 20 that Russian forces do not control Blahodatne.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 20 and 21 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[30]

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces are slowing down their offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction. A commander of the Ukrainian unmanned systems company operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on September 21 that both Ukrainian and Russian forces are gradually slowing down their offensive operations and that the offensive tempo intensity in the area will drop by one hundred percent by mid-October 2026.[31] The commander stated that Kupyansk remains a stronghold for Ukrainian forces despite constant Russian strikes. The commander stated that Russian forces are constantly trying to reinforce their positions in the area and to advance in small infantry groups, but noted that there is no large Russian assault concentration in the Kupyansk direction at this time as the Oskil River inhibits Russian advances in the area. The commander added that Ukrainian forces have disrupted Russian transport logistics within 20 kilometers of the frontline.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 20 and 21 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[32]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Lyman. Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions southeast of Stavky in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions, according to footage published on August 21 and geolocated on September 20.[33] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 21 that Ukrainian forces continue to pressure Russian forces on the southern approaches to Lyman and that fighting continues near Dibrova and toward Yampil (both southeast of Lyman).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka and toward Mykolaivka on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are infiltrating toward northeastern Mykolaivka from Pyskunivka (northeast of Mykolaivka) and toward southern Mykolaivka from Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Mykolaivka) but are struggling to advance in the area.[36] Russian forces likely view Mykolaivka as a primary tactical objective because its potential seizure would facilitate Russian assaults westward towards Slovyansk, bypassing difficult canalizing terrain features.

Russian forces continue to intensify drone and artillery strikes against Slovyansk, preparing the battlespace for future offensive operations. The chief of artillery of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on September 21 that Russian forces are constantly building up their capabilities, including increasing aviation, drones, and artillery activity in the area.[37] The chief stated that Russian forces are attempting to reach the Mykolaivka-Orikhuvatka line (south of Mykolaivka) but that Russian forces have failed to reach either settlement thus far.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced east of Kramatorsk. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 21 that elements of the Russian 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Vasyutynske.[38]

Russian forces continued to employ “human safari” tactics on prior dates, purposefully hunting civilians in Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka. Russian forces struck civilians in Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk based on geolocated footage published on September 10 and 20.[39] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of first-person view (FPV) drones to strike civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued prioritizing offensive operations near Kostyantynivka and to the west and southwest of the settlement on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[41]

Russian forces continue heavy airstrikes to facilitate advances on the southern flank of the Fortress Belt. Russian airstrikes recently destroyed a bridge in Krasnotorka (south of Kramatorsk), according to geolocated footage published on September 21.[42] Russian forces conducted five FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against a purported Ukrainian position in Staroraiske (west of Druzhkivka), according to additional geolocated footage published on September 20.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continue efforts to reach Dobropillya using infiltration tactics and heavy airstrikes. Russian forces infiltrated into southwestern Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on September 20.[44] Russian forces conducted four FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against a purported Ukrainian position in Bilozerske (north of Dobropillya), according to additional geolocated footage published on September 20.[45] Russian glide bomb strikes likely aim to degrade Ukrainian positions such that Russian infiltrators can more readily move between Ukrainian forces, concentrate larger numbers of personnel, and exert control over new areas.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya) and entered Novovodyane (northwest of Zolotyi Kolodyaz) and seized a total of 29 square kilometers in the area.[46] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces still control Zolotyi Kolodyaz and several other settlements in the surrounding area, refuting the Russian claim of seizing Zolotyi Kolodyaz and advancing beyond the settlement.[47]

Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction to reach the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 21 that Russian forces have doubled and sometimes tripled their assaults in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR), which includes Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), Udachne (west of Kotlyne), and Serhiivka (northwest of Udachne).[48] These settlements are nine, five, and one kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border, respectively. The Russian effort to advance beyond Pokrovsk has largely stalled after the seizure of Pokrovsk itself in February 2026.[49] Russian forces operating southwest of Pokrovsk are likely intensifying their assaults in the area to take advantage of a perceived or actual localized opportunity to advance and achieve informational effect. The location of these efforts does not clearly support a current Russian operational objective unless the Russian high command imagines that it can conduct a very wide encirclement of Dobropilliya from the south. These efforts are too far north of Novopavlivka to support a plausible encirclement of that settlement, and Russian forces have largely deprioritized offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction, in any event. They are therefore most likely opportunistic, but ISW will continue to monitor developments in this area.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Kasta 20E2 (39N6) radar near Pikuzy (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline) on September 20 or overnight on September 21 and a Russian Nebo-U radar and drone storage, preparation, and launch sites in occupied Donetsk Oblast between September 14 and 20.[50] Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian armored vehicles northwest and northeast of occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline), based on geolocated footage published on September 17.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 21.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[52]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ground control station near occupied Dniproenerhiya (east of Oleksandrivka and roughly 7 kilometers from the frontline) on September 20 or overnight on September 20 to 21.[53]

Ukrainian drone surveillance and clear weather conditions are hindering Russian infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on September 21 that Russian forces decreased the tempo of their infiltration missions due to clear weather, which enables effective Ukrainian drone surveillance.[54] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces might attempt to increase their infiltration efforts once the weather changes. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are continuously mining routes both deep in the Ukrainian rear and on the frontline.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Oleksandrivka direction, according to audio that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) intercepted on September 21.[55] ISW last observed elements of the Russian 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Toretsk direction (southeast of Kostyantynivka) in April 2025.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northwest and southwest of Hulyaipole on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of and toward Orikhiv on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[58] Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces are infiltrating western and central Orikhiv, contrary to all available evidence.[59]

Ukrainian forces continue to interdict Russian logistics at the tactical and low-operational levels in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian 7th Corps reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces conducted airstrikes against four bridges near occupied Polohy (about 26 kilometers from the frontline), significantly reducing Russian forces’ ability to transport personnel, heavy vehicles, and ammunition to the Orikhiv direction.[60] Geolocated footage published on September 20 shows Ukrainian forces using fiber-optic sleeper drones to strike Russian vehicles in occupied Pokrovske (31 kilometers from the frontline), Tokmak (about 39 kilometers from the frontline), and Ilchenkove (16 kilometers from the frontline).[61]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 21.

Geolocated footage published on September 21 shows a Ukrainian airstrike against a purported Russian field command post east of occupied Ushkalka (northeast of Kherson City along the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir).[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[63]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 20 and 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 21 that Russian forces launched 172 Shahed- (64 of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Belgorod cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 147 drones and one Banderol/Dan-T loitering munition, that unspecified air vehicles struck 14 locations, and that air vehicle debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, critical, railway, warehouse, industrial, educational, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[65]

Russian forces are increasingly launching jet-powered Shahed drones against Ukraine while also using new routes and leveraging weather conditions to evade Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on September 21 that Russian forces have launched over 7,700 Shahed-type jet-powered drones against Ukraine thus far, including 1,900 drones in September 2026 alone.[66] Ihnat stated that Ukraine’s interception rate of jet-powered drones remains at about 60 percent. Ihnat reported that Russian forces are deliberately leveraging foggy and cloudy weather and using new flight paths in their strike packages in order to complicate Ukrainian air defenses.[67]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42307 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37080 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19838 [31] https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/21/bez-kolon-i-velykyh-shturmiv-rosiyany-pishly-na-kup%e2%80%99yansk-inshym-shlyahom/ [32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42307 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42309 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19838 [33] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/16953 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13016 [34] https://t.me/grvZapad/19838 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42309 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42307 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56084 [36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47847 [37] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1408744-rosianam-ne-vdalosa-vijti-na-rubiz-mikolaivka-orihuvatka-35-obrmp/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM [38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56098 [39] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2101953639929536828; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/880 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2101660350122693055; https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/28028 [40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/ [41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42307; https://t.me/dva_majors/99316 [42] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2102025907271516504; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/31216 [43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75348; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/31206; https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/2101711816673898636; https://x.com/Volodimyrovich_/status/2101741623096779164 [44] https://t.me/Osintpen/3586; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10692; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13020 [45] https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/2101714720696721629; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/31206; https://x.com/Volodimyrovich_/status/2101748415776313839 [46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56093 [47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/ [48] https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/21/kotlyne-peretvorylosya-na-tochku-na-mapi-rosiyany-namagayutsya-prorvatysya-do-dnipropetrovshhyny/ [49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ [50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42313 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42317 [51] https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100664218093600975 ; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100687418508591265 ; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100690074824327315 ; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100699997436047859 ; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100694250564251722 ; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100713165088510357 [52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42307 [53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42313 [54] https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/21/vorog-prychayivsya-cherez-pogodu-desantnyky-rozpovily-shho-vidbuvayetsya-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/ [55] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9519 [56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025/ [57] ttps://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42309; https://t.me/voin_dv/21215; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42307; https://t.me/wargonzo/37080; [58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42309; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42307; https://t.me/wargonzo/37080; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33939 [59] https://t.me/wargonzo/37080; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56087 [60] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1802; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/21/aviaudary-po-mostah-zsu-uskladnyly-vorozhu-logistyku-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku/ [61] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2101910408898716153?s=20 ; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2101910412338094543?s=20 ; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2101910415886426327?s=20 ; https://t.me/riamelitopolua/94522 [62] https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2101946651975835762?s=20 ; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2101946654987374963?s=20 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38439 [63] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [64] https://t.me/kpszsu/79268 [65] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20969; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32160; https://t.me/synegubov/25816; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4652; https://www.facebook.com/Ukrzaliznytsia/posts/pfbid0FhgMj5pJyAcuwQQh3StyzrDom7dAfpePRmfKsBNBGstef8d1PrYhnasRABU4Qikdl; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2933; https://t.me/kyivoda/58068; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2943; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2932; https://t.me/kyivoda/58044; https://t.me/kyivoda/58046; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7550 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7551; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02GTMyNvoztKocNuZhRubMWijULoMRBvoUsQjBy7Tn7vER2nEnKWeurBkYijtMK331l; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20546; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48696 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48697 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48699 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48703 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48715 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48719 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48725 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67740 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67741 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67742; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/18472 [66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM; https://armyinformd dot com.ua/2026/09/21/ne-lyshe-velyka-kilkist-bpla-a-j-nova-taktyka-yak-rosiya-zminyuye-povitryani-ataky-reaktyvnymy-shahedamy/ [67] https://suspilne dot media/1408902-z-pocatku-veresna-rf-vipustila-po-ukraini-1900-reaktivnih-droniv-ignat/

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