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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2026

President Putin uses contradictory language about the possibility of achieving peace in Ukraine to obscure Moscow’s true objectives.

ISWNadia Sleiman查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月3日

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use contradictory language about the possibility of achieving peace in Ukraine to obscure Moscow’s true objectives. Putin addressed the Eastern Economic Forum on September 3 and stated uncertainly that, in his opinion, there is a chance that Russia and Ukraine can hold constructive peace talks.[1] Putin added that only Russia and Ukraine can ultimately resolve the war in Ukraine and that all other countries, including the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are supporting negotiations processes, rather than leading them. Putin stated on September 1 that Russia cannot negotiate directly with Ukraine because it considers the country to be a “terrorist entity” and that US involvement is critical in negotiations, notably in contradiction to his September 3 remarks.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly reiterated on September 3 Russian demands that equate to full Ukrainian capitulation, feigning willingness to negotiate by proposing demands that Ukraine could never agree to.[3] Putin and senior Kremlin officials are likely intentionally using contradictory language to obfuscate the true nature of Moscow’s unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations, trying to portray itself as a willing negotiator while simultaneously maintaining its maximalist demands of Ukrainian capitulation.[4]

Putin continues to downplay the war’s mounting economic and demographic costs to ordinary Russians, portraying persistent economic challenges as indicators of Russia’s economic resilience and gradual stabilization. Putin claimed that Russia currently has an annual inflation rate of 6.3 percent — a rate that differs from the Russian Central Bank and Russian state-owned bank Sberbank’s estimates of six to seven percent and 6.5 percent, respectively.[5] Putin claimed that inflation in Russia is “falling” and “gradually normalizing,” portraying the 6.3 percent rate as evidence that the Kremlin’s economic policies are succeeding. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development, however, increased its inflation rate estimate to 6.32 percent on August 31 from its July 2026 estimate of 5.98 percent, showing that inflation during this period increased.[6] Putin also attempted to frame Russia’s declining unemployment rate of 2.3 percent across Russia and 2.2 percent in the Russian Far East as a sign of positive economic health, while simultaneously promoting employment incentivization programs in the Far East. Putin also refused to respond to a question on the effects of the war in Ukraine on Russian demographics. Russia’s very low unemployment rate and new employment programs are consequences of Russia’s yearslong struggles with labor shortages fueled by Putin’s war in Ukraine and declining birth rates, which are particularly strong in the Far East.[7] Russia is facing these issues likely in part due to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) prioritizing recruitment in poor and rural regions to shield urban Russians from the demographic effects of the war.[8] Putin is likely trying to reassure the Russian domestic populace that the Russian government is taking appropriate measures to address Russia’s economic challenges ahead of the upcoming September State Duma elections by downplaying the effects that the cost of the war and international sanctions have on the Russian economy.[9]

Putin attempted to portray the Russian government as promptly responding to the Ukrainian drone threat while continuing to deflect responsibility for providing air defense onto private businesses. Putin vaguely acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes are causing economic and other adverse effects on Russian oil refining capabilities and fuel exports but claimed that Russian authorities will complete repairs on the remaining facilities that Ukrainian forces damaged “in the very near future.”[10] Putin attempted to present what will likely be very costly and drawn-out repairs as an easy fix that the Russian government is quickly addressing, downplaying the long-term impacts that repeat Ukrainian strikes will likely have on Russian oil refining capabilities. Putin stressed the importance of air defenses in repelling Ukrainian strikes but focused primarily on the new legal obligations requiring private Russian companies to fund and maintain air defense capabilities to protect their facilities. Putin also stated that his August 24 decree — which authorized the federal government to seize critical infrastructure facilities failing to adequately protect or repair their assets — is not a nationalization measure but rather a mechanism requiring critical infrastructure companies to install air defense systems.[11] Russian authorities notably began requiring private businesses and other entities outside of the federal government to maintain their air defenses in late May 2026 amidst Russian forces’ failure to protect Russia’s vast rear.[12] Ukrainian long-range strikes have increasingly forced Putin to publicly acknowledge the economic effects that over four years of war have had on Russia as the Kremlin fails to shield the Russian population and business community from witnessing these strikes and experiencing their effects. Putin likely is attempting to present himself as aware of the current domestic problems while assuring the Russian public that the Russian government is taking appropriate measures to address these challenges ahead of the upcoming September State Duma elections.

Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned surface vessel (USV) strike on the Port of Sochi demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike deeper into the Russian Black Sea coast and further restrict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) operations. The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 3 that a Ukrainian USV struck the Russian multi-purpose support ship Nefrit in the Port of Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, causing an explosion and a smoke plume.[13] The nautical distance between Sochi and the Ukraine-controlled Black Sea coast is approximately 820 kilometers, and the USV strike demonstrates Ukraine’s ability to precisely strike Russian ports situated farther on the Black Sea coast. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on September 3 that Russian forces have not deployed missile-equipped vessels from Russian ports over the past three months due to security concerns, maintenance requirements, and resource conservation, and instead launched all sea-based cruise missiles from the areas near the naval bases in Russia.[14] Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces have not been able to repair and conduct maintenance of their ships and submarines over the past two years, likely due to the increased Ukrainian drone threat. Pletenchuk stated that these vessels require repairs due to their frequent use for unspecified missions, likely referring to sea-launched cruise missile strikes.

Ukraine’s sustained strikes against BSF vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian USVs and other unmanned systems continue to pose a significant threat to Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, even after the Russian naval command withdrew several vessels from the BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[15] Ukrainian technological innovations, such as incorporation of first-person view (FPV) drone launchers into USV systems, allow Ukrainian forces to precisely strike Russian vessels, air defense positions, and port infrastructure across BSF’s area of responsibility (AoR), which spans across the Black and Azov seas. Ukrainian strikes are effectively denying the BSF the ability to freely operate in the region, subsequently decreasing the effectiveness of sea-launched cruise missiles that traditionally benefit from a geographically wider launch area. The Ukrainian interception rate of sea-launched Kalibr missiles has reportedly reached nearly 100 percent, likely as a result of Russian forces launching these missiles from farther distances.[16]

Unknown actors reportedly attempted to assassinate Commander of the Russian 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division (Long Range Aviation, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich in Saratov Oblast on September 3. Russian law enforcement agencies told Russian business outlet Kommersant on September 3 that unknown actors shot an unspecified VKS officer in Engels, Saratov Oblast, on the morning of September 3.[17] Russian insider sources claimed that Varpakhovich was the target, that he is currently in critical condition, and that authorities have not apprehended the assailant.[18] The Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened a criminal case for attempted murder.[19] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) charged Varpokhovich in absentia on August 31 for his involvement in the cruise missile strike against the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv City in July 2024.[20] This is notably the fourth assassination attempt on a Russian officer in rear areas since August 1.[21]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use contradictory language about the possibility of achieving peace in Ukraine to obscure Moscow’s true objectives.

Putin continues to downplay the war’s mounting economic and demographic costs to ordinary Russians, portraying persistent economic challenges as indicators of Russia’s economic resilience and gradual stabilization.

Putin attempted to portray the Russian government as promptly responding to the Ukrainian drone threat while continuing to deflect responsibility for providing air defense onto private businesses.

Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned surface vessel (USV) strike on the Port of Sochi demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike deeper into the Russian Black Sea coast and further restrict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) operations.

Ukraine’s sustained strikes against BSF vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian USVs and other unmanned systems continue to pose a significant threat to Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, even after the Russian naval command withdrew several vessels from the BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.

Unknown actors reportedly attempted to assassinate Commander of the Russian 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division (Long Range Aviation, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich in Saratov Oblast on September 3.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Russia launched 163 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The threat of Ukrainian drones in Russian airspace is reportedly causing disruptions at major Russian airports in Moscow Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 2 that Russian international airlines began suspending flights to Russian airports following his September 1 warning that Ukrainian drones would threaten Russian airspace.[22] Russian independent newspaper The Moscow Times reported on September 3, citing flight monitoring data, that Vnukovo and Sheremetyevo airports in Moscow Oblast suspended operations for the second night in a row following Zelensky’s warning.[23] Russian state aviation regulator Rosaviatsia announced on September 2 that Vnukovo and Sheremetyevo airports temporarily suspended operations, after originally claiming that Russian air transport was operating as usual and that a Ukrainian-issued NOTAM (notice to air men) over Russian airspace was illegitimate.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 2 and 3 but did not advance.[25]

Ukrainian officials refuted recent Russian MoD and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that Russian forces are approaching Sumy City. The Ukrainian Kursk Grouping of Forces published footage on September 3 reportedly showing Ukrainian servicemen operating in settlements that the Russian MoD claimed Russian forces have seized since January 2026.[26] Putin claimed on June 29 that Russian forces advanced up to 10.5 kilometers from Sumy City and later claimed on September 1 that Russian forces were operating 12 kilometers from Sumy City — notably directly discrediting his earlier exaggerated claims.[27]

The Kremlin may be attempting to set information conditions to justify potential future offensive operations against Chernihiv Oblast from the north, although there is no concrete evidence that Russian forces are preparing to attack northern Ukraine at this time. Russian security agencies allegedly told Kremlin newswire TASS on September 3 that Ukrainian forces have allegedly intensified reconnaissance operations in the Chernihiv Oblast border area using Western-made drones.[28] The Kremlin may attempt to use the claims of Ukrainian presence in the area to justify the need for potential military buildup along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, an attack against Chernihiv Oblast, or partial rolling involuntary call-ups — although ISW has not observed evidence that Russia is imminently preparing for an attack in the area.

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast. Ukrainian forces conducted an FPV drone strike against a Russian air defense machine gun at the Premix Plant in Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast (roughly seven kilometers from the international border).[29]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 2 and 3 but did not advance.[30]

Ukrainian officials and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) refuted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 1 claim that Russian forces seized Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City). Ukraine’s 14th Army Corps reported on September 2 that Ukrainian forces continue to control Kozacha Lopan, directly refuting Putin’s September 2 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[31] A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF claimed on September 3 that Russian servicemembers are infiltrating northern Kozacha Lopan and raising flags but noted that Russian forces do not control the settlement.[32] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces are present only in 13.39 percent of Kozacha Lopan at the time of this writing.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southwest of Velykyi Burluk. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers in western Odradne (southwest of Velykyi Burluk) according to geolocated footage published on September 3, which ISW assesses occurred after a Russian infiltration mission.[33] The Russian MoD claimed on September 3 that Russian forces seized Vasylivka, Blahodatne, and Dovzhanka (all north of Velykyi Burluk).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk . Ukrainian forces cleared a forested area up to the western outskirts of Dvorichna and northeast of Zapadne (both north of Kupyansk) according to geolocated footage published on September 2.[35] The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps reported on September 3 that Ukrainian forces cleared an additional four square kilometers between Dvorichna and Zapadne and have now liberated 13.5 square kilometers in the area since August 30.[36]

Ukrainian drones are reportedly complicating Russian movement and logistics in the Kupyansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 3 that the increased Ukrainian strikes on the gas pipeline north of Kupyansk are constraining Russian movement and logistics efforts across the Oskil River.[37] Russian forces have been using extensive systems of underground pipelines to infiltrate in and around Kupyansk and avoid being spotted by Ukrainian drones.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 3 that Russian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) only for critical support missions and are quickly concealing UGVs due to the threat of Ukrainian drones in the Kupyansk direction.[39] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are increasingly using light multiple-rocket launch systems (MLRS) near Kupyansk.

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 3, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced in the area.[40]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system along the M-30 Luhansk-Donetsk City highway northeast of occupied Yurivka (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline) according to geolocated footage published on September 2.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on September 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. [42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[43] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on September 3 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Lyman and Drobysheve (both northeast of Slovyansk).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[45] The Russian MoD claimed on September 3 that Russian forces seized Izhevka (north of Kostyantynivka).[46] Russian servicemembers raised flags throughout Izhevka according to geolocated footage published on September 3.[47] ISW has reasons to assess that the footage may have been modified or AI-altered.

Russian forces are deploying UGVs near Kostyantynivka to operate in the kill zone conditions. A Ukrainian drone operator operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area stated on September 2 that it is difficult for Ukrainian and Russian forces to understand which forces control individual positions due to “asymmetric” characteristics of the battlefield, likely referring to the expansive kill zone in the area and frequent infiltration missions.[48] The drone operator stated that Russian forces began using atypical assault methods in the area, particularly those involving UGVs.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and Pokrovsk direction on September 2 and 3 but did not advance.[49]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions as Russian forces made limited tactical advances in the Novopavlivka direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 3 that Russian forces are operating southeast of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) and Novopavlivka, indicating that Russian forces likely have no presence south of Novopavlivka.[50] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces reached the Zaporizhzhia-Myrne line (both northeast of Oleksandrivka) and liberated Zaporizhzhia (a small settlement not to be confused with Zaporizhzhia City).[51] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces reached the northwestern outskirts of Shevchenko and advanced up to 800 meters from the northeastern outskirts of Pavlivka (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).[52] Mashovets noted that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and are attempting to infiltrate northwest of Novomykolaivka and north of Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[53]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a drone depot in occupied Blahodatne (former Zhelanne, roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of September 2 to 3.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Hulyaipole direction. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers in eastern Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) according to geolocated footage published on September 2, which ISW assesses occurred after a Russian infiltration mission.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyubytske and Rizdvyanka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 and 3 but did not advance.[57]

Russian forces continue attempts to use flag raisings to make false claims of advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The official Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) Telegram channel posted footage on September 2 purporting to show Russian flags in Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and claimed that Russian forces control Novodanylivka.[58] The footage, however, does not show any Russian servicemembers operating in the settlement.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Vostochny training ground in occupied Novopetrivka (roughly 70 kilometers from the front line) on the night of September 2 to 3.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Kasta-2E2 (39N6) mobile radar station in occupied Vyshneve (either roughly 23 or 84 kilometers from the frontline) on September 1.[60] The Kasta radar can track air targets at low and extremely low altitudes of up to six kilometers and at a range of five to 150 kilometers. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian vehicle on the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway northeast of occupied Prymorsk (roughly 91 kilometers from the frontline) according to geolocated footage published on September 2.[61]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 3.

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ground control station in occupied Marine (one of several settlements between roughly 135 and 215 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian Project 02510 class BK-16 speed transport and landing boat in occupied Sevastopol (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline); and a Krasukha-4 mobile electronic warfare (EW) station near occupied Sevastopol on the night of September 2 to 3.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [63]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 163 Shahed-type (about half of which were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 135 drones, that an unspecified number of air targets struck 15 locations, and that debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, logistics, and administrative infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[65] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Odesa Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck a residential building in Odesa Oblast, injuring 17 people, including three children, and damaging 20 private apartments.[66] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported a temporary deterioration in air quality in Kyiv City following Russian strikes.[67]

Russian forces launched Geran-5 drones against Kyiv City for the second day in a row. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 3 that Ukrainian forces shot down Russian Geran-5 drones near Kyiv City for the second day in a row.[68] Beskrestnov noted that Russian forces launched Geran-5 drones from 400 kilometers away in an unspecified direction and that Ukrainian air defense systems can intercept these drones.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80677 [2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665 [3] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2137977/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2137977/ [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_89/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_89/ [5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80677 ; 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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024/ [8] https://www.cbr dot ru/Collection/Collection/File/62346/0926.pdf ; https://www.cbr dot ru/Collection/Collection/File/60838/0426.pdf [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/ [10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80677 [11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/ [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/ [13] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/22202 [14] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/03/%c2%abmorskaya-dyerzhava%c2%bb-na-yakori-chomu-rosijski-korabli-boyatsya-vyhodyty-v-more/ [15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2026/; 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https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095366210074378687; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095369469493178602; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095375955522957494; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095391166657138751 [59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42106 [60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42107 [61] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2095148490901041401; https://x.com/3sofua/status/2095134657901695188 [62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42106 [63] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [64] https://t.me/kpszsu/76051 [65] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31542; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1394226-poskodzena-gospodarska-budivla-rosijska-geran-vlucila-po-prisadibnij-dilanci-u-gorodnanskij-gromadi/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31806; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28453; https://t.me/vilkul/17780l ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/02/vorog-atakuvav-dnipropetrovshhynu-dronamy-artyleriyeyu-i-aviabombamy-chotyry-lyudyny-zagynuly/ ; https://t.me/dneprovski_volonteri/629; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73523; https://t.me/synegubov/25415; https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/11314; https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/11315 ; https://suspilne dot media/khmelnytskiy/1289531-poranenij-colovik-ta-pozeza-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-na-hmelnicku-gromadu-2-veresna/; ttps://www.facebook.com/faceprok/posts/pfbid02GjjWMgfmzbxaHPzsvPRLFoy9hVJdXf7z8fCaZXgV85vE3uSiFJxbwCPbMsHpKD9Rl?rdid=VapmyynbFMFJLrim#; https://suspilne dot media/khmelnytskiy/1394280-poranenna-ludini-ta-pozezi-na-skladah-prokurori-dokumentuut-naslidki-nicnih-atak-rf-na-hmelniccinu/; https://t.me/kyivoda/55931; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2794; . https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2795; https://t.me/kyivoda/55935; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2796; https://t.me/kyivoda/55983; https://suspilne dot media/zhytomyr/1394048-armia-rf-atakuvala-zitomirsku-gromadu-poskodzeni-obekti-civilnoi-infrastrukturi/; 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