Flight-tracking data shows continued Russian air bridge to sub-Saharan Africa

VIENNA — Russian state-aligned military forces operating in the Central Sahel relied on at least 75 flights by military and military-linked aircraft between January 2025 and July 2026, according to a new analysis by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, a Washington-based research organization that tracks illicit networks.

The report , published Wednesday, examined Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data sourced from FlightRadar24 for aircraft models historically linked to Russian private military contractors or the Ministry of Defense, filtering for flights touching Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger.

Burkina Faso received the most flights of the three countries, at 56, followed by 38 to Mali, while Niger recorded only six, the report found. C4ADS attributed Burkina Faso’s volume in part to its position as a transit point between Mali and Niger, and to the intensity of attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara during the period.

The busiest single operator was Flight Unit 224, a Russian Ministry of Defense-owned airline sanctioned by the United States in May 2023. The Russian Special Flight Squadron, which transports senior officials, conducted 14 flights, while Russia’s Ministry for Emergency Situations carried out 12. Despite the ministry’s ostensibly humanitarian mandate, prior media reporting linked it to military cargo transport to Mali, Syria and Iran.

C4ADS also flagged several private carriers it said remain unsanctioned by the U.S., EU or U.K. despite documented links to Russian military logistics, including Kyrgyzstan-registered Sapsan Airlines.

On routing, C4ADS said state-owned aircraft such as Flight Unit 224’s RA-82030 typically refueled at Russia’s Khmeimim air base in Syria and at Libyan sites including Al-Khadim before continuing to the Sahel. Private carriers more often transited commercial hubs in the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Türkiye.

Defense News published an investigation in April on a shadowy fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft making more than a hundred flights to Algeria over the preceding year. Flight-tracking data, interviews and satellite imagery suggested the network was being used both to deliver fighter jets to the Algerian air force and as a logistics system for onward flights into the Sahel and West Africa.

C4ADS said its findings were preliminary and intended to identify avenues for further inquiry rather than draw firm conclusions, citing limitations including inconsistent ADS-B coverage and the possibility that operators manipulate transponder data to conceal destinations. The organization pointed to a growing number of flights through Togo and Algeria before or after Sahel stops as a subject warranting additional scrutiny.

Linus Höller is Defense News' Europe correspondent and OSINT investigator. He reports on the arms deals, sanctions, and geopolitics shaping Europe and the world. He holds master’s degrees in WMD nonproliferation, terrorism studies, and international relations, and works in four languages: English, German, Russian, and Spanish.

维也纳——据总部位于华盛顿、专门追踪非法网络的“高级国防研究中心”的一项最新分析显示，在2025年1月至2026年7月期间，在萨赫勒中部地区活动的俄罗斯国家支持的军事力量至少使用了75架次军用或与军方有关的飞机。

该报告于周三发布，审查了来自 FlightRadar24 的自动相关监视广播 (ADS-B) 数据，这些数据针对历史上与俄罗斯私人军事承包商或国防部有关联的飞机型号，并筛选出与马里、布基纳法索或尼日尔接壤的航班。

报告显示，在三个国家中，布基纳法索接收的航班数量最多，达56架次，其次是马里，有38架次，而尼日尔仅有6架次。C4ADS认为，布基纳法索航班数量较多的部分原因是其作为马里和尼日尔之间的过境点，以及在此期间伊斯兰与穆斯林联盟和“大撒哈拉伊斯兰国”发动的袭击强度较高。

最繁忙的单一运营商是俄罗斯国防部下属的224飞行队，该航空公司于2023年5月受到美国制裁。负责运送高级官员的俄罗斯特种飞行队执行了14次飞行，而俄罗斯紧急情况部执行了12次飞行。尽管该部表面上的职责是人道主义援助，但此前的媒体报道将其与向马里、叙利亚和伊朗运送军事物资联系起来。

C4ADS 还指出，一些私人航空公司尽管有记录显示与俄罗斯军事后勤有联系，但仍未受到美国、欧盟或英国的制裁，其中包括在吉尔吉斯斯坦注册的萨普桑航空公司。

C4ADS表示，在航线方面，俄罗斯国有飞机，例如第224飞行队的RA-82030，通常会在俄罗斯位于叙利亚的赫梅米姆空军基地和包括哈迪姆在内的利比亚基地加油，然后再继续飞往萨赫勒地区。而私营航空公司则更常经停阿联酋、阿尔及利亚和土耳其的商业枢纽。

《防务新闻》4月份发表了一篇调查报道，揭露了一支与俄罗斯军方有关联的神秘货运机队，该机队在过去一年中向阿尔及利亚执行了超过一百次飞行任务。飞行跟踪数据、采访和卫星图像显示，该机队既用于向阿尔及利亚空军运送战斗机，也作为飞往萨赫勒地区和西非的后续航班的后勤保障系统。

C4ADS表示，其调查结果为初步结果，旨在确定进一步调查的方向，而非得出确切结论。该机构指出，调查存在诸多局限性，包括ADS-B覆盖范围不一致，以及运营商可能篡改应答器数据以隐瞒目的地。该机构还指出，越来越多的航班在经停萨赫勒地区前后途经多哥和阿尔及利亚，这一现象值得进一步关注。

林努斯·霍勒是《防务新闻》的欧洲记者和开源情报调查员。他报道影响欧洲乃至全球的军火交易、制裁和地缘政治。他拥有大规模杀伤性武器不扩散、恐怖主义研究和国际关系三个硕士学位，并精通英语、德语、俄语和西班牙语四种语言。