Navy wants more offensive, ‘expeditionary’ cyber capabilities

Lt. Christian Asaban views a computer monitor aboard the forward-deployed Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) during Multisail 17. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class William McCann/Released)

WASHINGTON — The Navy’s cyber advisor is looking for more tools from industry to conduct offensive cyber operations at the tactical edge, demonstrating a significant development and maturation of the application of cyber capabilities.

“What I would offer to industry … if you are interested in talking about expeditionary cyber, cyber at the tactical edge, particularly offensive or capabilities that support offense, please come talk to me. I would love to hear more from industry about expeditionary cyber capabilities,” Anne Marie Schumann, principal cyber advisor for the Department of the Navy, said at the Billington Cybersecurity Summit in Washington earlier this month.

Schumann didn’t say exactly what kinds of capabilities the Navy was seeking, and in a follow-up statement to Breaking Defense, she only said the goal is to “meet the Secretary of War’s intent for robust cyberspace effects options.”

“As we continue to mature our Information Warfare enterprise, we are focused on integrating multi-domain capabilities to support tactical and operational commanders in contested environments,” she said. “These efforts are designed to deliver timely, relevant effects in support of maritime operations, enhancing the agility and self-sufficiency of forward-deployed Sailors and Marines. We are working in close coordination with U.S. Cyber Command.”

The public plea to industry for offensive, expeditionary cyber options reflected both a shift to a more aggressive cyber stance throughout the military, and an acknowledgment that some cyber capabilities are going to have to be employed at tactical edge by the different servicemembers in different combatant commands at different times.

That’s a change from the decades-long paradigm that, generally speaking, US Cyber Command conducted virtually all cyber attacks from more established facilities.

The shift has been years in the making, as a revised version of a Pentagon cyberspace doctrine published in 2022 formally recognized “expeditionary cyberspace operations” as doctrine and provided a definition for it.

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Each of the services have begun developing their own versions of these expeditionary or tactical capabilities from the Army’s 11th Cyber Battalion — with approval to establish a second cyber battalion — to Air Force Cyber Enabled Air Superiority , a Guard unit charged with an offensive cyber mission to protect the Air Force’s core functions, to non-kinetic effects teams in the Navy .

Hacking on the tactical edge requires different equipment, as battlefield targets are less likely to be connected to the traditional internet. Often that means hitting targets using the electromagnetic spectrum via radio waves, an authority battlefield commanders have much more leeway over than traditional cyber or hacking.

Conceptually, the Pentagon has always desired these types of tactical effects or teams to play a role in gaining access to hard to reach networks — like hardened networks controlling air defense systems, for instance — that can then be passed off to top tier cyber operators at CYBERCOM.

Navy officials in the past had hinted at the need for offensive cyber capabilities at the fleet level. The Navy’s 2022 cyberspace superiority vision outlined a three-pronged approach of “secure, survive, strike,” with the latter alluding to an offensive need .

For the Navy, the ability to be able to launch these effects from a ship as opposed to having to ask for permission or wait for a high-demand cyber mission force team to perform them provides the commanders greater flexibility against an increasingly sophisticated adversary.

“I’m not at liberty speak on specific operations, but I think we do have some recent examples that other defense officials have spoken about publicly where we have seen the integration of fleet and kinetic and non-kinetic effects in a joint environment. And that is going to be the norm, not the standard deviation,” Schumann said in an interview in February. “As we push on the expeditionary cyber, it’s going to be interesting to see what new constructs emerge from that. But I am seeing a ton of interest.”

With her public offer to industry last week to help, Schumann noted that department members had to take a hard look at themselves and realized they were not best positioned to partner with industry to accept the capability delivered and get them out to the force quickly .

But, amid broader acquisition reforms, Schumann said the Navy is in an “incredibly exciting moment.”

“The ship has turned,” she said.

在“多帆17”演习期间，克里斯蒂安·阿萨班中尉在前沿部署的阿利·伯克级导弹驱逐舰“菲茨杰拉德”号（DDG 62）上查看电脑显示器。（美国海军二级大众传播专家威廉·麦肯拍摄/发布）

华盛顿——海军网络顾问正在寻求来自业界的更多工具，以便在战术边缘开展进攻性网络行动，这表明网络能力的应用取得了显著发展和成熟。

“我向业界提供的是……如果您有兴趣探讨远征网络、战术前沿网络，特别是进攻性网络或支持进攻的能力，请来与我交流。我非常希望听到业界更多关于远征网络能力方面的想法，”海军部首席网络顾问安妮·玛丽·舒曼本月初在华盛顿举行的比灵顿网络安全峰会上表示。

舒曼没有具体说明海军正在寻求哪些类型的能力，在随后向《防务新闻》发表的声明中，她只表示目标是“满足战争部长对强大的网络空间效应选项的意图”。

她表示：“随着我们信息战体系的不断完善，我们正致力于整合多域能力，以支持战术和作战指挥官在对抗环境中的行动。这些努力旨在为海上行动提供及时有效的支持，增强前沿部署的海军和海军陆战队员的敏捷性和自主作战能力。我们正与美国网络司令部密切合作。”

公开呼吁业界提供进攻性、远征性网络选项，既反映了整个军队网络战略向更积极的方向转变，也承认某些网络能力必须由不同作战司令部的不同军种成员在不同时间以战术前沿的方式运用。

这与数十年来美国网络司令部通常从更成熟的设施发起几乎所有网络攻击的模式截然不同。

这一转变酝酿已久，2022 年发布的五角大楼网络空间理论修订版正式承认“远征网络空间作战”为一项理论，并为其提供了定义。

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可推力系统、助推段拦截和新的制造能力扩大了导弹防御的选择范围。

从陆军第 11 网络营（已获准建立第二个网络营）到空军网络赋能空中优势部队（一支负责进攻性网络任务以保护空军核心功能的国民警卫队部队），再到海军的非动能效应小组，各军种都已开始开发各自版本的这些远征或战术能力。

在战术前沿进行黑客攻击需要不同的设备，因为战场目标不太可能连接到传统互联网。这通常意味着利用无线电波等电磁频谱攻击目标，而战场指挥官在这方面比传统的网络攻击或黑客手段拥有更大的操作空间。

从概念上讲，五角大楼一直希望这类战术效果或团队能够在获取难以访问的网络（例如控制防空系统的加固网络）的访问权限方面发挥作用，然后将这些网络移交给网络司令部的顶级网络操作员。

海军官员过去曾暗示需要在舰队层面具备进攻性网络能力。海军2022年网络空间优势愿景概述了“安全、生存、打击”的三管齐下策略，其中“打击”暗示了进攻性需求。

对于海军而言，能够从舰艇上发射这些效果，而不是必须请求许可或等待高需求的网络任务部队团队来执行，这为指挥官提供了更大的灵活性，以对抗日益复杂的对手。

“我不方便谈论具体行动，但我认为我们确实有一些近期的例子，其他国防官员也公开谈到过，这些例子表明，在联合作战环境中，舰队、动能和非动能效应已经融合。这将成为常态，而非例外，”舒曼在二月份的一次采访中说道。“随着我们推进远征网络作战，看看会涌现出哪些新的作战模式将会很有意思。但我看到各方对此都非常感兴趣。”

上周，舒曼公开向业界提出提供帮助，她指出，国防部成员必须认真审视自身，并意识到他们并不具备与业界合作的最佳条件，无法接受所提供的能力并将其迅速交付给部队。

但舒曼表示，在更广泛的采购改革背景下，海军正处于“一个无比激动人心的时刻”。

“情况已经逆转了，”她说。