Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 30, 2026

Russia conducted a massive combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 29 to 30, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and marking the beginning of Russia’s strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2026-2027 and forcing Ukraine to capitulate. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 30 that Russian forces launched nearly 190 strike drones and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles against Ukraine overnight, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast energy infrastructure.[1] Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi stated that this recent strike package is the largest combined strike package targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since the end of the last heating season (roughly early April 2026).[2] Ukrainian energy company Centrenergo reported on September 30 that Russian strikes damaged the Trypillya Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Kyiv Oblast.[3] Ukrainian state energy company Ukrenergo introduced emergency power outages in Kyiv Oblast following Russian strikes.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 30 that Russian forces also struck the Kyivska electrical substation, the ⁠Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant, and a battery energy storage park in Kyiv Oblast.[5] A Ukrainian monitoring channel reported that Russia will systematically and methodically attempt to strike Ukrainian electricity generation and transmission facilities in order to disconnect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants from the unified grid, cut off Kyiv City from external power supplies, and destroy energy infrastructure in Ukraine’s industrial east.[6] Ukraine’s Economic Minister Oleksandr Kravchenko stated that Winter 2026-2027 could be the “hardest and the harshest winter” of the war thus far, with intensified Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[7]

Russia notably began its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure ahead of Ukraine’s heating season, as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely recently adopted a modified theory of victory that relies on Russia’s long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender over Winter 2026-2027. ISW recently assessed that Ukraine’s 2026 battlefield successes may be forcing Putin to reevaluate his original theory of victory and shift his rhetoric (and possibly his strategy) to focus on compelling Ukraine to surrender using Russia’s long-range strike campaign.[8] Putin is likely beginning the systematic combined strikes campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure before Ukraine can adequately protect its energy grid and develop countermeasures to Russian ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones. Putin is likely also attempting to demoralize the Ukrainian population and force Ukraine to surrender before the start of any meaningful peace negotiations, on which Ukraine and its US partners are currently working.[9]

A likely Russian drone violated Moldovan airspace and crashed near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi, on the morning of September 30. The Moldovan police reported on September 30 that an unspecified drone crashed and exploded near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi Raion (roughly 18 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Moldovan border) early in the morning on September 30.[10] Geolocated footage published on September 30 shows the drone striking a radio tower southeast of Hirbovat.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russian drone incursions, whether intentional or accidental, are likely part of the Kremlin’s efforts to normalize airspace violations, as they both become more regular and more dangerous.[12]

The Kremlin is signaling its intention to use the seizure of assets belonging to European companies operating in Russia and to hold such companies’ assets hostage in order to coerce European states into reconsidering their sanctions policies against Russia. A senior Kremlin official with direct knowledge of recent Russian seizures of assets belonging to prominent European companies operating in Russia stated on September 30 that Russia is taking “asymmetric measures” to compel European states to reconsider their sanctions policies against Russia.[13] The Kremlin official did not rule out the possibility of the Kremlin seizing Russian assets of Italian bank UniCredit and Austrian bank Raiffeisen. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees on September 17 and 28 that placed the assets of European enterprises — including French companies Auchan and Lemana PRO (formerly Leroy Merlin), Swiss company Nestlé, and German company Metro AG — under the indefinite “temporary management” of Russian companies.[14] The Kremlin is likely seeking to use these so-called temporary seizures of European assets to take commercial entities as corporate hostages and coerce affected states to reconsider their sanctions policies against Russia, as well as seek temporary fiscal bumps from the revenues of seized European assets.[15] This Kremlin strategy likely assumes that European corporations will decide that the benefits of continuing to operate in Russia outweigh the risks of the Kremlin seizing their assets. Whether the Kremlin decides to seize foreign assets operating in Russia depends entirely on the political situation between the Kremlin and the foreign states in which the companies are headquartered, as the Kremlin is seeking to hold foreign company assets in Russia as a corporate hostage to compel various states to lift sanctions against Russia.

Russia conducted a massive combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 29 to 30, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and marking the beginning of Russia’s strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2026-2027 and forcing Ukraine to capitulate.

Russia notably began its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure ahead of Ukraine’s heating season, as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely recently adopted a modified theory of victory that relies on Russia’s long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender over Winter 2026-2027.

A likely Russian drone violated Moldovan airspace and crashed near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi, on the morning of September 30.

The Kremlin is signaling its intention to use the seizure of assets belonging to European companies operating in Russia and to hold such companies’ assets hostage in order to coerce European states into reconsidering their sanctions policies against Russia.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sumy City.

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Zircon or Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles, an unspecified number of Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles, and 188 drones against Ukraine overnight on September 29 to 30, and 285 drones during the day, an unspecified number of ballistic missiles, and several Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions during the day on September 30.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Open-source imagery provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. Geolocated imagery published on September 30 shows damage to a hangar belonging to the Russian 856th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD], a pumping station, and an outbuilding belonging to the Russian 1032nd Separate Logistics Battalion (144th Motorized Rifle Division) in Pochep, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline), following Ukrainian strikes on September 22.[16]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Korchakivka (north of Sumy City) based on geolocated footage published on September 29.[17]

Russian sources continue to make unconfirmed claims of advance in northern Sumy Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 30 that Russian forces seized Tovstodubove (northwest of Sumy City).[18] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian Chechen 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD], under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) with the claimed seizure of Tovstodubove.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Prokhody and in Velykyi Prykil (both east of Sumy City).[20] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Kindrativka is a contested gray zone, despite previous Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[21]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 29 to 30 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area. [22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 30 that Russian forces seized Shabelne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Shabelne.[24]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 29 to 30 but did not advance. [25]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 29 and 30 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area. [26]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 29 and 30 but did not advance. [27]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post in occupied Lysychansk (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline) and a military repair base in occupied Starobilsk (roughly 66 kilometers from the frontline) on September 29 or on the night of September 29 to 30.[28]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman tactical effort on September 29 and 30 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area. [29]

Russian sources continue to push false narratives about Russian offensive efforts in the Lyman direction, refusing to acknowledge successful Ukrainian counterattacks during Operation Vivaldi. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sources are publishing false information about Ukrainian positions in Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman), that Russian forces retain positions in Lyman, and that Ukrainian forces have not cut off the Russian salient north of Lyman.[30] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on September 30 that the Kremlin-instructed Russian milblogger channels are amplifying altered footage and false information to conceal Russian losses during successful Ukrainian counterattacks, including in Nove (north of Lyman).[31] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces control both Nove and Shandryholove, with the closest assessed Russian positions being roughly at least 16 kilometers from Shandryholove and roughly at least 8.5 kilometers from Nove. Prominent voices within the Russian information space have however become increasingly critical of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) refusal to acknowledge Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi and where the true frontline is.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Slovyansk near Pyskunivka and east of Slovyansk toward Mykolaivka on September 29 and 30 but did not advance.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kalenyky (east of Mykolaivka) and Vasyutynske (east of Kramatorsk).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations near and southwest of Kostyantynivka and toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka on September 29 and 30 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and northwest of Kostyantynivka.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations south and northeast of Dobropillya on September 29 to 30 but did not advance. [36]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot in occupied Hranitne (one of two settlements roughly 91 or 99 kilometers from the frontline) and material and technical equipment depots in occupied Azovske, Manhush, Novoandriivka, and Volnovakha (all between 55 and 114 kilometers from the frontline) on September 29 or overnight September 29 to 30.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 30.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka on September 29 and 30 but did not advance. [38]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 29 and 30 but did not advance. [39]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues attempts to use flag-raising tactics to claim territory which Russian forces do not control. Four Russian servicemembers of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raised flags in Yehorivka (northeast of Orikhiv) according to geolocated footage published on September 30.[40] ISW assesses that these flag-raisings were part of a Russian infiltration mission. The Russian MoD used the footage to claim that Russian forces had seized Yehorivka. [41] ISW continues to assess that flag-raising tactics are a systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and flag-raising infiltration missions to exaggerate Russian gains and create a false perception of military strength.[42]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 29 or 30.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called on the international community to address the humanitarian crisis in occupied Oleshky on September 30. Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administrator Oleksandr Prokudin reported on September 30 that Russian forces in occupied Oleshky are conducting an information operation in the city by filming videos of residents receiving food packages and praising Russian forces occupying the city.[43] ISW has previously reported that residents of Oleshky face food and medicine shortages, that Russian forces have mined the roads out of the town, making escape difficult, and that Russian forces have mistreated the local population.[44]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical equipment depot in occupied Kumove (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline) either on September 29 or overnight on September 29 to 30.[45]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Significant Activity in Belarus

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21140; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105208503988031510; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/32008; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1415372-u-cerkasah-bulo-cutno-vibuh-so-vidomo-pro-ataku-rf/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32255; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32256; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32259; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4691; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4695; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4696; https://t.me/press_kobl/4487; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2986; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2984; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7706; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7702 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7703; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7707 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7708 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7709; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid08m8qvsYF5GXDRX4ogTZCwjD9rNAPUX5pZXRHjibrM2ZG3UqsLt2rmZxiqB8c9TS7l; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid0pnHe4NgAeAw9XWwDdAwRcTRzmiuLoP1CvAUKcgnr6wabdEZ8Mmaw4G736AskeGYPl?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/12073; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/12089 [50] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5466 [51] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/30/missile-alerts-cost-ukraine-businesses-halt [52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ [53] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ [54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ [55] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4169586-retraslatori-u-bilorusi-dopomagaut-dronam-rf-biti-po-volini-vpritul-do-kordonu-z-polseu-demcenko.html [56] https://suspilne dot media/1415410-ukraina-otrimae-vid-belgii-f-16-rf-skinula-na-sumi-cotiri-kabi-1680-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790751672&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; youtube.com/live/QuO_LXCWhUk?si=wV1jwgU6FRvR4CBw ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2026/09/30/8055696/ [57] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/

9月29日至30日夜间，俄罗斯对乌克兰发动了大规模无人机和导弹联合打击，主要目标是基辅市的能源基础设施。此次打击标志着俄罗斯旨在削弱乌克兰能源安全、迫使乌克兰在2026-2027年冬季投降的打击行动正式开始。乌克兰总统泽连斯基于9月30日表示，俄罗斯军队连夜向乌克兰发射了近190架攻击型无人机和数量不详的弹道导弹，主要目标是基辅市和基辅州的能源基础设施。[1] 乌克兰总理科列茨基表示，此次打击是自上一个供暖季结束（大约在2026年4月初）以来，针对乌克兰能源基础设施的最大规模联合打击。[2] 乌克兰能源公司Centrenergo于9月30日报告称，俄罗斯的打击破坏了基辅州的特里皮利亚火力发电厂。[3]在俄罗斯发动空袭后，乌克兰国家能源公司Ukrenergo在基辅州实施了紧急停电。[4] 俄罗斯国防部于9月30日声称，俄军还袭击了基辅州的基辅变电站、基辅水电站和一个电池储能园区。[5] 一家乌克兰监控频道报道称，俄罗斯将有条不紊地袭击乌克兰的发电和输电设施，目的是将乌克兰的核电站与统一电网断开，切断基辅市的外部电力供应，并摧毁乌克兰东部工业区的能源基础设施。[6] 乌克兰经济部长奥列克桑德·克拉夫琴科表示，2026-2027年的冬季可能是迄今为止这场战争中“最艰难、最残酷的冬季”，俄罗斯将加大对乌克兰能源基础设施的打击力度。[7]

值得注意的是，俄罗斯在乌克兰供暖季到来之前，便已启动了针对乌克兰基础设施的2026-2027年冬季打击行动。俄罗斯总统普京可能近期采纳了一种新的胜利理论，即依靠俄罗斯的远程打击行动迫使乌克兰在2026-2027年冬季投降。ISW近期评估认为，乌克兰在2026年战场上的胜利可能正迫使普京重新评估其最初的胜利理论，并调整其言辞（甚至可能是战略），转而集中精力利用俄罗斯的远程打击行动迫使乌克兰投降。[8] 普京很可能在乌克兰能够充分保护其电网并研发出应对俄罗斯弹道导弹和喷气式无人机的反制措施之前，就开始对乌克兰的能源基础设施进行系统性的联合打击行动。普京也可能试图打击乌克兰民众的士气，并在乌克兰及其美国伙伴目前正在进行的任何有意义的和平谈判开始之前迫使乌克兰投降。[9]

9月30日清晨，一架疑似俄罗斯无人机侵犯摩尔多瓦领空，并在阿内尼诺伊区希尔博瓦特附近坠毁。摩尔多瓦警方于9月30日报告称，一架不明型号的无人机于9月30日清晨在阿内尼诺伊区希尔博瓦特附近（距乌克兰-摩尔多瓦边境约18公里）坠毁并爆炸。[10] 9月30日公布的地理定位视频显示，该无人机撞击了希尔博瓦特东南部的一座无线电塔。[11] 信息系统安全局（ISW）持续评估认为，俄罗斯无人机入侵，无论是有意还是无意，都可能是克里姆林宫为使侵犯领空行为正常化而采取的措施之一，因为此类行为正变得越来越频繁，也越来越危险。[12]

克里姆林宫发出信号，意图通过扣押在俄运营的欧洲公司的资产，并以此胁迫欧洲国家重新考虑对俄制裁政策。一位直接了解俄罗斯近期扣押在俄运营的知名欧洲公司资产的克里姆林宫高级官员于9月30日表示，俄罗斯正在采取“不对称措施”，迫使欧洲国家重新考虑对俄制裁政策。[13] 这位克里姆林宫官员并未排除扣押意大利联合信贷银行（UniCredit）和奥地利莱夫艾森银行（Raiffeisen）在俄资产的可能性。俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京于9月17日和28日签署法令，将包括法国欧尚（Auchan）和乐玛纳PRO（Lemana PRO，原名乐华梅兰Leroy Merlin）、瑞士雀巢（Nestlé）以及德国麦德龙（Metro AG）在内的欧洲企业的资产无限期置于俄罗斯公司的“临时管理”之下。[14]克里姆林宫很可能试图利用这些所谓的对欧洲资产的临时扣押，将商业实体作为人质，胁迫受影响国家重新考虑其对俄制裁政策，并寻求从被扣押的欧洲资产收入中获得暂时的财政补贴。[15] 克里姆林宫的这一策略可能基于这样的假设：欧洲企业会认为继续在俄罗斯运营的收益大于克里姆林宫扣押其资产的风险。克里姆林宫是否决定扣押在俄罗斯运营的外国资产，完全取决于克里姆林宫与这些公司总部所在国之间的政治局势，因为克里姆林宫试图将外国公司在俄罗斯的资产作为人质，迫使各国解除对俄制裁。

9月29日至30日夜间，俄罗斯对乌克兰发动了大规模的无人机和导弹联合袭击，主要目标是基辅市的能源基础设施，这标志着俄罗斯旨在削弱乌克兰能源安全、迫使乌克兰在2026-2027年冬季投降的打击行动的开始。

值得注意的是，俄罗斯在乌克兰供暖季之前就开始了针对乌克兰基础设施的 2026-2027 年冬季打击行动，因为俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京最近可能采纳了一种修改后的胜利理论，即依靠俄罗斯的远程打击行动迫使乌克兰在 2026-2027 年冬季投降。

9月30日上午，一架疑似俄罗斯无人机侵犯摩尔多瓦领空，在阿内尼诺伊的希尔博瓦特附近坠毁。

克里姆林宫发出信号，表示有意扣押在俄罗斯经营的欧洲公司的资产，并将这些公司的资产扣为人质，以此胁迫欧洲国家重新考虑对俄罗斯的制裁政策。

乌克兰军队最近向苏梅市北部推进。

9月29日至30日夜间，俄罗斯军队向乌克兰发射了数量不明的锆石或缟玛瑙反舰巡航导弹、数量不明的伊斯坎德尔-M或S-400弹道导弹以及188架无人机；9月30日白天，又发射了285架无人机、数量不明的弹道导弹以及数枚班德罗尔或丹-T巡飞弹。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

开源图像提供了近期乌克兰对布良斯克州俄罗斯军事设施发动袭击的最新战场破坏评估 (BDA)。9 月 30 日发布的地理定位图像显示，在 9 月 22 日乌克兰的袭击之后，位于布良斯克州波切普（距前线约 64 公里）的俄罗斯第 144 摩托化步兵师第 20 集团军第 856 近卫自行火炮团（莫斯科军区第 20 集团军）的一个机库、一个泵站以及俄罗斯第 144 摩托化步兵师第 1032 独立后勤营的一栋附属建筑遭到破坏。[16]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心

根据 9 月 29 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近向苏梅市以北推进。[17]

俄罗斯方面持续发布未经证实的关于在苏梅州北部取得进展的说法。俄罗斯国防部于9月30日声称，俄军占领了托夫斯托杜博韦（位于苏梅市西北部）。[18] 俄罗斯北方集团军称，占领托夫斯托杜博韦的行动归因于隶属于北方集团军作战指挥下的俄罗斯车臣第349艾哈迈德-俄罗斯摩托化步兵团（第42摩托化步兵师，第58集团军，南部军区）的部分兵力。[19] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军还在普罗霍迪以南和韦利基普雷基尔（均位于苏梅市以东）推进。[20] 另一位俄罗斯军事博主则声称，尽管俄罗斯此前声称已占领金德拉季夫卡，但该地仍是一个存在争议的灰色地带。[21]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

9月29日至30日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在该地区进行反击，俄军并未取得确切进展。[22] 9月30日，俄罗斯国防部宣称俄军占领了沙别尔内（位于哈尔科夫市东北部）。[23] 俄罗斯北方集团军则将沙别尔内的占领归功于俄军第126摩托化步兵团（隶属于第71摩托化步兵师、第14军、列宁格勒军区）。[24]

9月29日至30日，俄军继续在韦利基布尔鲁克方向进行有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[25]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

9月29日和30日，俄军继续向库皮扬斯克方向发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在该地区进行反击，俄军未能取得进展。[26]

9月29日和30日，俄军继续在博罗瓦方向进行有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[27]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的卢甘斯克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月30日报告称，乌克兰军队于9月29日或9月29日至30日夜间袭击了位于被占领的利西昌斯克（距前线约35公里）的俄罗斯指挥观察哨和位于被占领的斯塔罗比尔斯克（距前线约66公里）的军事维修基地。[28]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

9月29日和30日，俄军继续在莱曼地区进行进攻行动，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在该地区继续进行反击。[29]

俄罗斯方面持续散布关于俄军在莱曼方向进攻行动的虚假信息，拒绝承认乌克兰在“维瓦尔第行动”中取得的反击战胜利。一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，乌克兰方面发布了关于乌克兰在尚德里霍洛夫（​​莱曼西北部）阵地的虚假信息，俄军仍然控制着莱曼的阵地，并且乌克兰军队并未切断俄军在莱曼北部的突出部。[30] 乌克兰军事观察员尤里·布图索夫于9月30日表示，克里姆林宫指示的俄罗斯军事博主正在放大篡改过的视频和虚假信息，以掩盖俄军在乌克兰反击战（包括在诺韦（莱曼北部）的反击战）中遭受的损失。[31] 情报与安全局（ISW）评估认为，乌克兰军队控制着诺韦和尚德里霍洛夫，据评估，距离尚德里霍洛夫最近的俄军阵地距离尚德里霍洛夫至少约16公里，距离诺韦至少约8.5公里。然而，俄罗斯信息界的一些知名人士越来越批评俄罗斯国防部拒绝承认乌克兰的“维瓦尔第行动”以及真正的前线在哪里。[32]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

9月29日和30日，俄军继续在斯拉维扬斯克东北部的皮斯库尼夫卡附近以及斯拉维扬斯克以东向尼古拉耶夫卡方向发动进攻，但并未取得进展。[33] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，乌克兰军队在卡列尼基（尼古拉耶夫卡以东）和瓦休廷斯克（克拉马托尔斯克以东）附近进行了反击。[34]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

9月29日和30日，俄军在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡附近和西南方向以及奥列克谢耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡方向集中进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡北部和西北部进行反击，俄军未能取得进展。[35]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

9月29日至30日，俄军继续在多布罗皮利亚南部和东北部发动进攻，但没有取得进展。[36]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的顿涅茨克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月30日报告称，乌克兰军队于9月29日或9月29日至30日夜间袭击了位于被占领的赫拉尼特涅（距离前线约91或99公里的两个定居点之一）的俄罗斯无人机仓库，以及位于被占领的亚速斯克、曼胡什、新安德里夫卡和沃尔诺瓦哈（均距离前线55至114公里）的物资和技术装备仓库。[37]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

9月30日，俄罗斯和乌克兰军队均未报告在诺沃巴甫利夫卡方向发生地面活动。

9月29日和30日，俄军在奥列克桑德里夫卡东南方向继续进行有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[38]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

9月29日和30日，俄军在胡利亚波列方向进行了有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[39]

俄罗斯国防部持续尝试使用升旗战术来宣称对俄军并未控制的领土拥有主权。根据9月30日公布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯第38独立摩托化步兵旅（隶属东部军区第35合成集团军）的四名俄军士兵在叶戈里夫卡（奥里希夫东北部）升起了国旗。[40] 情报与安全研究所（ISW）评估认为，这些升旗行为是俄罗斯渗透行动的一部分。俄罗斯国防部利用这些视频声称俄军已占领叶戈里夫卡。[41] 情报与安全研究所（ISW）继续评估认为，升旗战术是一种系统性的认知战策略，旨在通过夸大战果和升旗渗透行动来夸大俄军的战果，从而营造一种虚假的军事实力假象。[42]

9月29日或30日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

9月30日，乌克兰外交部长安德烈·西比哈呼吁国际社会关注被占领的奥列什基的人道主义危机。西比哈和赫尔松州军事行政长官奥列克桑德·普罗库金于9月30日报告称，俄罗斯军队在被占领的奥列什基开展信息战，拍摄居民领取食品包裹并赞扬占领该市的俄罗斯军队的视频。[43] 国际社会主义组织（ISW）此前曾报道，奥列什基居民面临食品和药品短缺，俄罗斯军队在通往该镇的道路上埋设地雷，使逃生变得困难，并且俄罗斯军队虐待了当地居民。[44]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的克里米亚境内的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部于9月30日报告称，乌克兰军队于9月29日或9月29日至30日夜间袭击了位于被占领的库莫韦（距前线约107公里）的一个俄罗斯物资和技术装备仓库。[45]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

白俄罗斯的重大活动

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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