Russian Occupation Update, October 1, 2026

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is hearing a case that highlights the longevity of Russia’s policies towards children in occupied Ukraine.

A Luhansk Oblast occupation official claimed that over 14,000 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast alone have taken part in the Russian state-run “Cultural Map 4+85” program, which forcibly brings Ukrainian children to Russian cultural and historical sites with the goal of exposing them to Russian culture and “integrating” them into Russian society.

Russian occupation officials continue to use the population of occupied territories to staff defensive military formations.

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to institutionalize military-patriotic programming for children and youth in occupied areas through cadet and Cossack classes.

The Donetsk Oblast occupation administration confirmed its intent to distribute land plots to Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine as a reward for military service, supporting Russian efforts to repopulate occupied Ukraine with populations loyal to the Kremlin.

Russian occupation officials are increasing the costs of certain essential goods and services in occupied areas, likely reflecting growing fiscal and administrative challenges associated with maintaining occupation governance.

Russian occupation officials are using select foreign media personalities to normalize and legitimize the occupation of Ukraine.

Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is hearing a case that highlights the longevity of Russia’s policies towards children in occupied Ukraine. The ECHR announced on September 22 that it is hearing oral arguments in the case of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) on behalf of ten Ukrainian children versus Russia.[1] The case pertains to ten children who were living in childcare institutions in Crimea in 2014 upon Russia’s illegal invasion and annexation of the peninsula. UHHRU’s initial complaint to the ECHR alleged that Russia imposed Russian nationality on all ten children, who were then put up for adoption and may have since been adopted. UHHRU has noted that the whereabouts of the ten children are unknown as of 2026, despite frequent Ukrainian government requests to Russia for their location and identification. The ECHR case emphasizes that Russia’s policies towards Ukrainian children, namely the forced imposition of Russian nationality and the adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families under purposefully opaque circumstances, have been in place since the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014.[2] Russia has significantly scaled up this process since 2022, but laid much of the groundwork for its current actions towards Ukrainian children in the years between 2014 and 2022. A Luhansk Oblast occupation official claimed that over 14,000 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast alone have taken part in the Russian state-run “Cultural Map 4+85” program. Cultural Map 4+85 is a Russian government program which forcibly brings Ukrainian children to Russian cultural and historical sites with the goal of exposing them to Russian culture and “integrating” them into Russian society.[3] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) occupation Minister of Culture Roman Oleksin claimed on September 25 that over 14,000 schoolchildren from occupied Luhansk Oblast alone have participated in Cultural Map 4+85 since the project’s launch in 2023.[4] ISW has previously reported that around 9,000 children are brought to Russia through Cultural Map 4+85 annually, with around 4,500 participants in 2025 being from occupied Luhansk Oblast.[5] Russian government officials have emphasized that the program is not simply about tourism or cultural education but is an intentional mechanism to integrate the next generation of the occupied territories into the Russian cultural sphere.[6] Ukrainian officials have stated that the program is designed to erase the identity of Ukrainian children by forcibly exposing and connecting them to Russian culture and historical narratives.[7] The Russian government will likely continue to proliferate the reach of Cultural Map 4 + 85 to scale up Russification and forced integration efforts for youth in occupied areas.

Sociocultural Control

Nothing significant to report.

Militarization of Occupied Areas

Russian occupation officials continue to use the population of occupied territories to staff defensive military formations. First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Affairs Viktor Vodolatsky claimed on September 26 that Russian authorities are nearing completion of the formation and training of anti-drone BARS (Combat Army Reserve) units in occupied Ukraine.[8] Vodolatsky further stated that all fighters in BARS-Luhansk and BARS-Donetsk units have completed training. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on September 28 that BARS-Luhansk and other elements of the Russian military have formed a countermeasure line against Ukrainian drones near and directly on the line of contact.[9] Occupation officials have created regional BARS formations in all four occupied oblasts and occupied Crimea with the stated purpose of having BARS formations serve rear-area defensive functions as opposed to frontline combat duties.[10] These regional reserve formations have become increasingly critical to Russian efforts to defend rear areas against the Ukrainian intermediate-range strike campaign throughout 2026.[11] ISW has previously reported that oblast-specific BARS units are offsetting the burden of defending the Russian rear in occupied Ukraine from traditional Russian forces to residents of occupied territories.[12] Residents of occupied areas may also see contracted BARS service, which consists of rear-area defensive work and set contract service, as a way to escape forced mobilization into frontline units. For many residents of occupied Ukraine, the conditions of Russian occupation have also led to a stark decline in living standards and salaries, and the relatively high salary and social benefits offered to BARS volunteers may be an attractive opportunity to improve quality of life under occupation. Regardless of whether BARS formations deploy to the frontline or serve rear-area defensive functions, they are likely in violation of international law, which prohibits a party to an armed conflict from compelling residents of the territory it occupies to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. [13] Russian occupation officials continue efforts to institutionalize military-patriotic programming for children and youth in occupied areas through cadet and Cossack classes. Crimea occupation Minister of Education, Science, and Youth Valentina Lavrik claimed on September 28 that there are 381 cadet and Cossack classes within 137 general education institutions in occupied Crimea, enrolling 8,516 total students across the occupied peninsula.[14] Lavrik emphasized that cadet education is foundational to “the patriotic education system” and generates “a readiness to serve the Fatherland in young people.” Various arms of the Russian federal government, Russian military, and law enforcement agencies oversee cadet and Cossack training in occupied Crimea.[15] The Crimean occupation administration in particular has built a military-patriotic education pipeline via cadet and Cossack programs that runs from preschools all the way through universities.[16] These programs are intended to instill pro-Russian ideals in children and youth while equipping them with basic military training skills that prepare them for potential future service in the Russian military.

Administrative and Bureaucratic Control

The Donetsk Oblast occupation administration confirmed its intent to distribute land plots to Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine as a reward for military service, supporting Russian efforts to repopulate occupied Ukraine with populations loyal to the Kremlin. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on September 30 that his administration will allocate land plots in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine who wish to relocate to the region.[17] Pushilin named the effort “Donbas–Our Land,” and clarified that veterans will receive 15 to 20 acres of land at 2 percent preferential mortgage rates. This program will effectively reward Russian to veterans for their service in Ukraine by facilitating their resettlement in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Donbas–Our Land echoes similar service-for-land schemes in place in occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast, all of which support Russia’s broader effort of resettling occupied Ukraine with loyal Russian expatriates.[18]

Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics

ISW will provide more detailed analysis into the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Oleshky area in a forthcoming special report.

Physical and Legal Repressions

Economic and Financial Control

Russian occupation officials are increasing the costs of certain essential goods and services in occupied areas, likely reflecting growing fiscal and administrative challenges associated with maintaining occupation governance. Mariupol’s occupation department for housing management reported on September 25 that new housing and communal service tariffs will enter into effect on October 1.[19] Water rates are slated to increase by 25 percent, heating costs by 26.9 percent, electricity costs by 49.3 percent, and gas prices by over 26 percent. Garbage removal and sewage prices will also increase. Occupation officials have previously claimed that utility price increases are intended to align prices in occupied Ukraine with the accepted Russian domestic level, but in reality, residents of occupied areas have been forced to pay more for services that occupation authorities often fail to provide.[20] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration approved a decree on September 27 increasing the price of “social bread” (cоциальный хлеб) — a government-subsidized food product intended primarily for low-income communities and pensioners.[21] While subsidized bread products are meant to be inexpensive (typically costing around $0.20 per loaf), the price increase suggests an external driving pressure. Rising utility costs and costs for subsidized products have placed more of the financial burden resulting from the occupation on residents of occupied areas themselves.[22]

Information Space Control

Russian occupation officials are using select foreign media personalities to normalize and legitimize the occupation of Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on September 24 that journalists from 13 foreign media outlets from 11 countries visited occupied Luhansk Oblast to report on conditions in the occupied territories.[23] Russian occupation officials strongly curated the visit to legitimize the occupation, taking the foreign journalists to local history museums which affirm Kremlin narratives about the history of occupied Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin also met with the journalists to discuss the “events that led to the start of the special military operation” (the Russian framing of the invasion of Ukraine) and recent elections for the Russian State Duma.[24] Occupied Donetsk Oblast-based outlet Donetsk News Agency reported on September 24 that the foreign journalists met with the Donetsk Youth Parliament to hear youth perspectives and relay them to audiences in their home countries. [25] TASS also reported on September 24 that occupation officials took foreign journalists to Starobilsk College in occupied Luhansk Oblast, which holds significant narrative weight for Russian occupation officials. Ukrainian forces reported that they had struck headquarters of a military drone and robotics unit near occupied Starobilsk on May 22, while Russian officials claimed that the strike was a targeted attack on civilians.[26] Russian government officials used the alleged Ukrainian strike to justify further Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, despite the reality that Russia would have very likely conducted these strikes anyway.[27] TASS reported that foreign journalists were shown that there were no “military installations” near Starobilsk College to further corroborate the Kremlin’s narrative. Highly controlled media visits by foreign journalists have been a part of a wider Kremlin strategy to control global perception and narratives of the occupation of Ukraine through allegedly independent third parties. Prominent Kremlin-affiliated miblogger Rybar reported that since November 2023, Russia has been regularly organizing press tours to occupied territories for foreign journalists, aimed at countering “Western” narratives that perpetuate “misconceptions” about the occupation.[28] Foreign media representatives are often shown reconstruction sites in temporarily occupied territories, which they record as evidence of how Russian governance benefits the citizens of temporarily occupied territories. Organized tours for foreign media personalities serve to legitimize the occupation and present Russian actions in temporarily occupied territories as positive and mischaracterized by global media, while framing Ukraine as the true aggressor.

Infrastructure and Development Projects

[1] https://www.echr.coe.int/w/ukrainian-helsinki-human-rights-union-on-behalf-of-ten-ukrainian-children-v.-russia-1 [2] https://www.government.nl/latest/weblogs/the-work-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/2025/dna-kits-to-be-used-to-reunite-abducted-ukrainian-children; https://apnews.com/article/ukrainian-children-russia-7493cb22c9086c6293c1ac7986d85ef6 [3] https://culture.gov dot ru/press/news/_kulturnaya_karta_4_85_startuet_vserossiyskaya_programma_kulturno_prosvetitelskikh_marshrutov_dlya_sh/ [4] https://lug-info dot ru/news/bolee-14-tys.-detej-iz-lnr-za-tri-goda-pobyvali-v-puteshestvijah-po-kulturnoj/ [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-2-2026/ [6] https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/kulturnaja-karta-485-rasshirjaet-gorizonty-molodezhi-donbassa-i-novorossii/ [7] https://www.facebook.com/office.ombudsman.ua/posts/pfbid02cBPjvMFJ1SkuQnAQydvCAXCuzhpEbfbKKoL8wqFtZrVmiCoq3BX8oAuYKVrvUo93l [8] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28153597 [9] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28158733 [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025/; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-67454788 [11] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/8722 [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/ [13] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51/commentary/1958 [14] https://cadets.rk.gov dot ru/new/V%20Krymu%20dejstvuet%20381%20kadetskij%20i%20kazachij%20klass [15] https://cadets.rk dot gov.ru/new/V%20Krymu%20dejstvuet%20381%20kadetskij%20i%20kazachij%20klass [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-17-2026/ [17] https://t.me/tass_agency/398094 [18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-resettlement-strategy-in-occupied-ukraine/ [19] https://mrpl dot news/news/novye-tarify-zhkh-v-dnr-s-1-oktyabrya-2026-goda/ [20] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7223; https://www.facebook.com/protydiyadezinformatsiyi.cpd/posts/pfbid024Drv91EUuY1HiZcDsfpARuNg3EgtNbqUDXrVy8KEpwgReoPgFoeiVJFaWc8K99Wxl?rdid=9mRhWsUjPRvbDxEN#; https://t.me/sprotyv_official/6543 [21] https://gov.khogov dot ru/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/09/124-pp-26.pdf; https://xonews dot ru/news/v-hersonskoj-oblasti-podnjali-ceny-na-socialnyj-hleb/ [22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-january-8-2026/ [23] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28147249 [24] https://t.me/dnronline/142027 [25] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/dialog-bez-granic-inostrannye-zhurnalisty-vstretilis-s-molodezhju-dnr/ [26] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28147611 [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/ [28] https://t.me/rybar/69111

欧洲人权法院 (ECHR) 正在审理一起案件，该案件凸显了俄罗斯对被占领乌克兰儿童的政策的长期性。

卢甘斯克州占领当局的一名官员声称，仅来自被占领的卢甘斯克州的 14000 多名儿童就参加了俄罗斯国家运营的“文化地图 4+85”计划，该计划强迫乌克兰儿童前往俄罗斯的文化和历史遗址，目的是让他们接触俄罗斯文化并将他们“融入”俄罗斯社会。

俄罗斯占领当局继续利用被占领土的居民来组建防御性军事部队。

俄罗斯占领当局继续努力通过学员班和哥萨克班，将军事爱国主义教育制度化，以吸引被占领地区的儿童和青少年。

顿涅茨克州占领当局确认，将向参加乌克兰战争的俄罗斯老兵分配土地，作为对其服役的奖励，以支持俄罗斯在被占领的乌克兰重新安置效忠克里姆林宫的人口的努力。

俄罗斯占领当局正在提高被占领地区某些必需品和服务的价格，这可能反映出维持占领统治所面临的日益增长的财政和行政挑战。

俄罗斯占领官员正在利用一些外国媒体人士来使对乌克兰的占领正常化和合法化。

驱逐和强制转移乌克兰公民，包括儿童

欧洲人权法院正在审理一起案件，该案凸显了俄罗斯对被占领乌克兰儿童政策的长期性。欧洲人权法院于9月22日宣布，将就乌克兰赫尔辛基人权联盟（UHHRU）代表十名乌克兰儿童诉俄罗斯一案举行口头辩论。[1] 该案涉及十名儿童，他们在2014年俄罗斯非法入侵并吞并克里米亚半岛时居住在当地的儿童福利机构。UHHRU最初向欧洲人权法院提出的申诉称，俄罗斯强行赋予这十名儿童俄罗斯国籍，随后将他们送养，他们可能已被收养。UHHRU指出，尽管乌克兰政府多次要求俄罗斯提供这些儿童的下落和身份信息，但截至2026年，这十名儿童仍然下落不明。欧洲人权法院的案例强调，俄罗斯针对乌克兰儿童的政策，即强迫乌克兰儿童加入俄罗斯国籍，以及在故意不透明的情况下将乌克兰儿童送入俄罗斯家庭，自2014年入侵乌克兰以来就一直存在。[2] 自2022年以来，俄罗斯显著加大了这一力度，但其目前针对乌克兰儿童的行动的大部分基础工作是在2014年至2022年间奠定的。卢甘斯克州一名占领官员声称，仅来自被占领的卢甘斯克州就有超过14000名儿童参加了俄罗斯国家推行的“文化地图4+85”项目。“文化地图4+85”是俄罗斯政府的一项计划，旨在强迫乌克兰儿童前往俄罗斯的文化和历史遗址，目的是让他们接触俄罗斯文化并“融入”俄罗斯社会。[3]卢甘斯克人民共和国（LNR）占领区文化部长罗曼·奥列克辛于9月25日声称，自2023年“文化地图4+85”项目启动以来，仅来自被占领的卢甘斯克州的14000多名学龄儿童就参与了该项目。[4] 国际声援组织（ISW）此前报道称，每年约有9000名儿童通过“文化地图4+85”项目来到俄罗斯，其中2025年约有4500名参与者来自被占领的卢甘斯克州。[5] 俄罗斯政府官员强调，该项目并非仅仅是旅游或文化教育，而是旨在将被占领土的下一代融入俄罗斯文化领域的一种有意为之的机制。[6] 乌克兰官员则表示，该项目旨在通过强迫乌克兰儿童接触俄罗斯文化和历史叙事，来抹杀他们的身份认同。[7]俄罗斯政府可能会继续扩大“文化地图 4 + 85”的影响范围，以加大对被占领地区青年的俄罗斯化和强制融合力度。

社会文化控制

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

占领区的军事化

俄罗斯占领当局继续利用被占领土上的居民来组建防御性军事部队。乌克兰国家杜马独联体事务委员会第一副主席维克托·沃多拉茨基于9月26日声称，俄罗斯当局在被占领的乌克兰境内即将完成反无人机“战斗预备队”（BARS）的组建和训练。[8] 沃多拉茨基还表示，“战斗预备队-卢甘斯克”和“战斗预备队-顿涅茨克”部队的所有战斗人员均已完成训练。卢甘斯克人民共和国（LNR）领导人列昂尼德·帕谢奇尼克于9月28日声称，“战斗预备队-卢甘斯克”和俄罗斯军队的其他部分已在接触线附近和接触线上构筑了一条针对乌克兰无人机的反制防线。[9]占领当局在所有四个被占领州和被占领的克里米亚地区都组建了区域性后备后勤部队（BARS），其公开目的是让这些部队承担后方防御任务，而非前线作战任务。[10] 这些区域性后备部队对于俄罗斯在2026年全年抵御乌克兰中程打击行动的后方防御工作变得日益重要。[11] 此前，ISW曾报道，各州特有的BARS部队正在将俄罗斯在被占领乌克兰的后方防御负担从传统的俄罗斯军队转移到被占领土居民身上。[12] 被占领土居民也可能将从事后方防御工作和固定合同服务的BARS合同视为一种逃避被强制征召入前线部队的方式。对于许多被占领的乌克兰居民而言，俄罗斯的占领也导致他们的生活水平和工资急剧下降，而BARS志愿者相对较高的工资和社会福利可能成为改善被占领地区生活质量的诱人机会。无论BARS部队部署到前线还是执行后方防御任务，它们都可能违反国际法，因为国际法禁止武装冲突一方强迫其占领领土的居民在其武装部队或辅助部队服役。[13] 俄罗斯占领官员继续努力通过少年军校和哥萨克班，在被占领地区将军事爱国主义教育制度化，以培养儿童和青少年的爱国主义精神。克里米亚占领区教育、科学和青年部长瓦伦蒂娜·拉夫里克于9月28日声称，在被占领的克里米亚的137所普通教育机构中，共有381个少年军校和哥萨克班，在整个被占领半岛共有8516名学生。[14]拉夫里克强调，学员教育是“爱国主义教育体系”的基础，能够培养“青年为祖国服务的意愿”。俄罗斯联邦政府、俄罗斯军队和执法机构的各个部门负责监督被占领的克里米亚地区的学员和哥萨克训练。[15] 特别是克里米亚占领当局，通过学员和哥萨克项目，建立了一条从幼儿园到大学的军事爱国主义教育体系。[16] 这些项目旨在向儿童和青少年灌输亲俄思想，同时为他们提供基本的军事训练技能，为他们将来可能在俄罗斯军队服役做好准备。

行政和官僚控制

顿涅茨克州占领当局确认，将向在乌克兰战争中服役的俄罗斯退伍军人分配土地，以此作为对他们服役的奖励，支持俄罗斯在被占领的乌克兰地区重新安置效忠克里姆林宫的人口。顿涅茨克人民共和国（DNR）领导人丹尼斯·普希林于9月30日表示，他的政府将在被占领的顿涅茨克州向希望迁居该地区的在乌克兰战争中服役的俄罗斯退伍军人分配土地。[17] 普希林将这项计划命名为“顿巴斯——我们的土地”，并明确表示，退伍军人将以2%的优惠抵押贷款利率获得15至20英亩的土地。该计划实际上将通过促进退伍军人在被占领的顿涅茨克州重新定居，来奖励他们在乌克兰的服役。 “顿巴斯——我们的土地”计划与被占领的克里米亚和被占领的赫尔松州的类似以服务换取土地的计划相呼应，所有这些都支持俄罗斯用忠诚的俄罗斯侨民重新安置被占领的乌克兰的更广泛努力。[18]

职业管理不善及内部动态

ISW 将在即将发布的特别报告中对奥列什基地区持续的人道主义危机进行更详细的分析。

身体和法律上的压迫

经济和金融控制

俄罗斯占领当局正在提高被占地区某些必需品和服务的价格，这可能反映出维持占领统治所面临的日益严峻的财政和行政挑战。马里乌波尔住房管理占领部门于9月25日报告称，新的住房和公共服务收费标准将于10月1日生效。[19] 预计水费将上涨25%，供暖费上涨26.9%，电费上涨49.3%，天然气价格上涨超过26%。垃圾清运和污水处理费也将上涨。占领当局官员此前声称，提高公用事业价格旨在使被占领乌克兰的价格与俄罗斯国内的公认水平接轨，但实际上，被占领地区的居民被迫为占领当局经常未能提供的服务支付更多费用。[20]赫尔松州占领当局于9月27日批准了一项法令，提高了“社会面包”（cоциальный хлеб）的价格——这是一种政府补贴的食品，主要面向低收入群体和退休人员。[21] 虽然补贴面包的价格本应低廉（通常每条面包的价格约为0.20美元），但此次价格上涨表明存在外部驱动因素。不断上涨的公共事业成本和补贴产品成本，使得占领造成的更多经济负担转移到了被占领地区的居民身上。[22]

信息空间控制

俄罗斯占领官员正利用部分外国媒体人士来使占领乌克兰的行为正常化和合法化。克里姆林宫通讯社塔斯社9月24日报道称，来自11个国家的13家外国媒体的记者访问了被占领的卢甘斯克州，报道被占领土的情况。[23] 俄罗斯占领官员精心策划了此次访问，以使占领合法化，他们带领外国记者参观了当地历史博物馆，这些博物馆印证了克里姆林宫关于被占领乌克兰历史的叙述。顿涅茨克人民共和国（DNR）领导人丹尼斯·普希林也与记者会面，讨论了“导致特别军事行动开始的事件”（俄罗斯对入侵乌克兰的描述）以及最近举行的俄罗斯国家杜马选举。[24] 位于被占领的顿涅茨克州的顿涅茨克通讯社9月24日报道称，外国记者会见了顿涅茨克青年议会，听取青年们的意见，并将这些意见转达给他们各自国家的受众。 [25] 塔斯社9月24日报道称，占领官员带领外国记者前往位于被占领的卢甘斯克州的斯塔罗比尔斯克学院，该学院对俄罗斯占领官员而言具有重要的叙事分量。乌克兰军队报告称，他们于5月22日袭击了位于被占领的斯塔罗比尔斯克附近的一个军事无人机和机器人部队总部，而俄罗斯官员则声称此次袭击是针对平民的定点清除。[26] 尽管事实上俄罗斯很可能无论如何都会发动这些袭击，但俄罗斯政府官员仍利用所谓的乌克兰袭击为进一步打击基辅民用基础设施辩护。[27] 塔斯社报道称，外国记者被告知斯塔罗比尔斯克学院附近没有“军事设施”，以进一步佐证克里姆林宫的说法。对外国记者进行严格控制的媒体访问是克里姆林宫通过所谓的独立第三方来控制国际社会对乌克兰占领的认知和叙事的更广泛战略的一部分。据与克里姆林宫关系密切的知名博客作者Rybar报道，自2023年11月以来，俄罗斯定期组织外国记者前往被占领土进行考察，旨在反驳西方关于占领的“误解”叙事。[28] 外国媒体代表经常被带到临时占领区的重建工地，并被记录下来，以此证明俄罗斯的治理如何造福于临时占领区的民众。这些为外国媒体人士组织的考察活动旨在使占领合法化，并将俄罗斯在临时占领区的行动描绘成积极的、被全球媒体歪曲的，同时将乌克兰塑造成真正的侵略者。

基础设施和发展项目

[1] https://www.echr.coe.int/w/ukrainian-helsinki-human-rights-union-on-behalf-of-ten-ukrainian-children-v.-russia-1 [2] https://www.government.nl/latest/weblogs/the-work-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/2025/dna-kits-to-be-used-to-reunite-abducted-ukrainian-children; https://apnews.com/article/ukrainian-children-Russia-7493cb22c9086c6293c1ac7986d85ef6 [3] https://culture.gov 点ru/press/news/_kulturnaya_karta_4_85_startuet_vserossiyskaya_programma_kulturno_prosvetitelskikh_marshrutov_dlya_sh/ [4] https://lug-info 点ru/news/bolee-14-tys.-detej-iz-lnr-za-tri-goda-pobyvali-v-puteshestvijah-po-kulturnoj/ [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/Russian-Occupation-update-january-15-2026/ ； https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/Russian-occupation-update-april-2-2026/ [6] https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/kulturnaja-karta-485-rasshirjaet-gorizo​​nty-molodezhi-donbassa-i-novorossii/ [7] https://www.facebook.com/office.ombudsman.ua/posts/pfbid02cBPjvMFJ1SkuQnAQydvCAXCuzhpEbfbKKoL8wqFtZrVmiCoq3BX8oAuYKVrvUo93l [8] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28153597 [9] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28158733 [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025/; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-67454788 [11] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/8722 [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/ [13] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51/commentary/1958 [14] https://cadets.rk.gov.ru/new/V%20Krymu%20dejstvuet%20381%20kadetskij%20i%20kazachij%20klass [15] https://cadets.rk. gov.ru/new/V%20Krymu%20dejstvuet%20381%20kadetskij%20i%20kazachij%20klass [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/Russia-ukraine/Russian-Occupation-update-september-17-2026/ [17] https://t.me/tass_agency/398094 [18] https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/Russias-resettlement-strategy-in-occupied-ukraine/ [19] https://mrpl dot news/news/novye-tarify-zhkh-v-dnr-s-1-oktyabrya-2026-goda/ [20] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7223； https://www.facebook.com/protydiyadezinformatsiyi.cpd/posts/pfbid024Drv91EUuY1HiZcDsfpARuNg3EgtNbqUDXrVy8KEpwgReoPgFoeiVJFaWc8K99Wxl?rdid=9mRhWsUjPRvbDxEN#; https://t.me/sprotyv_official/6543 [21] https://gov.khogov dot ru/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/09/124-pp-26.pdf; https://xonews dot ru/news/v-hersonskoj-oblasti-podnjali-ceny-na-socialnyj-hleb/ [22] https://understandingwar.org/research/rusia-ukraine/ Russian-ocupation-update-january-8-2026/ [23] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28147249 [24] https://t.me/dnronline/142027 [25] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/dialog-bez-granic-inostrannye-zhurnalisty-vstretilis-s-molodezhju-dnr/ [26] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28147611 [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/ [28] https://t.me/rybar/69111