F FEICELL News全球新闻 · 本地动态 · 实时更新
← 返回新闻首页
军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2, 2026

Russia’s advanced its cognitive warfare efforts to persuade the world that European leaders who respond to its threats are the aggressors.

ISWNadia Sleiman查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月2日

Russian President Vladimir Putin advanced Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare efforts to persuade the world that European leaders who respond to Russian threats and continued limited kinetic attacks in Europe are the actual aggressors. Putin used a substantial part of his speech at the Valdai International Discussion Forum on October 1 to claim that Russia “is not threatening anyone” and has no “plans to attack anyone in 2029, 2030, or 2050.”[1] Putin also falsely claimed that the Russian military has never launched a first strike on targets not directly related to military infrastructure. Putin later emphasized, however, that the use of nuclear weapons will “inevitably and immediately” appear on the Russian agenda if Europe attacks Kaliningrad Oblast or other parts of Russia. Kremlin officials, including Putin himself, have repeatedly threatened to attack European countries over the past few years, including many other examples, such as:

Putin said on December 17, 2023, that “there will be problems” with Finland and that Finland’s NATO accession prompted the formation of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and concentration of military units in northwestern Russia.[2]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened a “world catastrophe” as a result of Western involvement in Ukraine and warned of Russian strikes against Washington, Paris, and London on May 6, 2024.[3]

Putin issued a thinly veiled nuclear threat on December 2, 2025, stating that a situation would “quickly arise” should Europe start a war with Russia, in which Russia will “have no one to negotiate with.”[4]

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik called for a nuclear strike on some European capitals in the event of escalation in Kaliningrad Oblast on June 23, 2026.[5]

Putin’s October 1 speech is part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to support baseless pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian arguments amongst some European leaders that discussions of actual Russian threats are manufactured and that Russia is, in fact, a victim of Western aggression.[6] Russian officials, including Putin, have, in fact, been threatening European countries, including with nuclear attacks. The Kremlin has also increasingly conducted limited kinetic attacks against Europe, including deliberate drone incursions into Moldovan and NATO airspace and various sabotage and espionage attempts.[7]

Putin claimed Russian frontline gains in September 2026 so far from reality as to resemble hallucinations. Putin claimed that Russian forces seized 1,301 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in September 2026 alone — 2.5 times more than the claimed Russian gains in previous months.[8] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces suffered a net loss of 80.81 square kilometers in September 2026.[9] Russian forces suffered a net loss of 175.18 square kilometers in September 2026 even when accounting for Russian infiltrations into areas over which Russian forces have not gained control. Putin’s absurd claims continue to present a fictional battlefield reality that supports the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian advances as sweeping across the battlefield.[10] ISW cannot assess whether Putin knows that the figures he is presenting are false or if he is accepting fictional frontline data presented to him as the result of the culture of lying that is deeply ingrained in the Russian military command structure.

Russian forces are likely teaching elements of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) how to integrate some of the most advanced drone and counter-drone systems into land warfare during the Center-2026 exercises. The PRC reportedly sent a “military contingent” to the Russian-hosted Center-2026 Strategic Command and Staff exercise at the Chelyabinsk training ground, Chelyabinsk Oblast, scheduled between September 28 and October 3.[11] Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov stated on October 2 that the exercises involved approximately 700 pieces of equipment, over 600 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and over 60 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), providing the PLA’s military contingent with an opportunity to train using some of the most advanced unmanned technologies in a simulated military environment.[12] Russian and Chinese forces practiced joint deployment and maneuvers during the exercises.[13] Chinese forces previously observed the Zapad 2025 exercises but did not actively participate.[14] The PRC is likely gaining valuable experience during the Center 2026 exercises from launching and defending against first-person view (FPV) drone strikes, using ground robotics systems, observing electronic warfare techniques, and conducting Russian-style small group assault tactics utilized in the war in Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted repeated drone strikes against the Southern Bridge in Kyiv City on October 1 and 2 in order to degrade the bridge’s structural stability and to make life difficult in the Ukrainian capital — as ISW recently forecasted. It remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to continue to sustain the required strike intensity and tempo to render the bridge unrepairable, however. Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported four waves of Russian drone strikes against the Southern Bridge over the Dnipro River in Kyiv City between the afternoon of October 1 and the evening of October 2.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged that Russian forces struck a road-rail bridge across the river in Kyiv City on the night of October 1 to 2.[16] ISW noted on October 1, following the first waves of drone strikes, that Russian efforts to significantly damage large, reinforced structures like the Southern Bridge would require repeated, precise strikes over a short period of time — as Russian forces currently are attempting to do.[17] Repeated strikes against the bridge may also aim to significantly disrupt traffic and civilian life, even if they do not in the end cause significant damage to the actual structure of the bridge.

Ukrainian officials are confirming long-held assessments about Russia’s intent to target Ukraine’s civilian and critical infrastructure, especially in major cities, during its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign. Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russian forces are preparing to intensify strikes on Ukraine’s largest cities, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odesa, in order to isolate them from the rest of the country as winter begins, according to an October 2 Financial Times (FT) article citing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian and European security officials.[18] Zelensky specifically highlighted Russia’s recent strikes against the Southern Bridge as part of wider efforts to sow fear among the Ukrainian population and force them out of big cities. Russian forces also plan to collapse Ukraine’s energy system during the Winter 2026-2027, including by conducting missile strikes near Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants to forcefully disconnect them from the grid, according to New York Times reporting about an unconfirmed intercepted Russian plan.[19] The Russian plan also reportedly intends to widely strike Ukraine’s water infrastructure to ultimately cut off major cities from power, heat, and water supplies. The Russian strikes intended to inflict severe pain on Ukrainian populations in major cities are likely also designed to drive a wedge between frontline soldiers and the Ukrainian populace. The Kremlin may also hope to generate a political crisis for Zelensky over the coming winter. These Russian efforts may distract attention both in Ukraine and in Europe from the need to remain focused on sustaining Ukraine’s current battlefield capabilities and could thus help Russia mitigate the problems that Russian military forces are currently encountering in their efforts to achieve Putin’s aims by force of arms. It remains vital for Ukraine and its supporters to work urgently to defend against the Russian attack on Ukraine’s civilian populations while simultaneously maintaining Ukraine’s current battlefield momentum and to avoid accepting tradeoffs between those two requirements.

Zelensky assessed on October 2 that Putin is focusing on massive strikes against Ukraine because Russian battlefield gains in eastern Ukraine have slowed — in line with ISW’s recent assessment that Putin’s new theory of victory aims to rely on Russia’s Winter 2026-2027 long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender.[20] ISW recently assessed that Ukraine’s 2026 battlefield successes may be forcing Putin to reevaluate his original theory of victory that relied on constant but slow battlefield advances. Putin is instead using Russia’s long-range strikes that heavily leverage jet-powered drones and ballistic missiles that Ukrainian forces have struggled to intercept at high rates in hopes of coercing Ukrainians to demand surrender.[21]

The Russian jet-powered Geran drone advantage is likely to last until Ukrainian forces scale up their interceptor drone production. Zelensky told the FT that Ukrainian forces destroy about 57 percent of Russia’s jet-powered drones and 85 to 90 percent of the conventional drones.[22] Zelensky added that Ukraine is currently testing five interceptor drones and will be able to produce about 400 units of one of the models by the end of October 2026, while the four other models continue testing. Russia has been exploiting Ukrainian challenges with intercepting Russian jet-powered drones by launching a growing number of jet-powered drones in recent weeks and relying less on ballistic missiles.[23] Russian forces are likely aware of Ukraine’s progress toward fielding and scaling its jet-powered drone interceptors and are likely increasingly launching jet-powered drones now while Russia still maintains a technological advantage. Ukraine’s increased jet-powered drone interception rate in the future will render Russia’s technological advantage less effective, at which point Russian forces may shift to launching more ballistic missiles in order to exploit Ukraine’s low Patriot interceptor missile stockpiles. Russian forces are likely stockpiling their ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles in the meantime for more intense future long-range strike packages after Russia’s jet-powered drones have lost their current advantage. Scaling production of interceptors for jet-powered drones must be an urgent priority for all of Ukraine’s supporters alongside continuing efforts to source Patriot interceptors and to field new systems for intercepting ballistic missiles.

Russian President Vladimir Putin advanced Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare efforts to persuade the world that European leaders who respond to Russian threats and continued limited kinetic attacks in Europe are the actual aggressors.

Putin claimed Russian frontline gains in September 2026 so far from reality as to resemble hallucinations.

Russian forces are likely teaching elements of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) how to integrate some of the most advanced drone and counter-drone systems into land warfare during the Center-2026 exercises.

Russian forces conducted repeated drone strikes against the Southern Bridge in Kyiv City on October 1 and 2 in order to degrade the bridge’s structural stability and to make life difficult in the Ukrainian capital — as ISW recently forecasted. It remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to continue to sustain the required strike intensity and tempo to render the bridge unrepairable, however.

Ukrainian officials are confirming long-held assessments about Russia’s intent to target Ukraine’s civilian and critical infrastructure, especially in major cities, during its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign.

Zelensky assessed on October 2 that Putin is focusing on massive strikes against Ukraine because Russian battlefield gains in eastern Ukraine have slowed — in line with ISW’s recent assessment that Putin’s new theory of victory aims to rely on Russia’s Winter 2026-2027 long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender.

The Russian jet-powered Geran drone advantage is likely to last until Ukrainian forces scale up their interceptor drone production.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia. Russia launched 108 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on October 2.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery in Volgograd City, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 472 kilometers from the frontline) and the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 937 kilometers from the international border) on the night of October 1 to 2.[24] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on October 2 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Samara-1 and Samara-2 oil pumping stations near Prosvet.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery processes roughly 15 million tons of oil per year, and that the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station is a reception, storage, and blending facility that mixes Urals oil, which accounts for up to 50 percent of Russia’s total oil exports. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 2 that Ukrainian forces struck airfields, industrial facilities, a missile and space center, oil refineries, and an ammunition depot in Voronezh, Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd, and Samara oblasts; Krasnodar Krai; and the Black Sea.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position north of Pokrovka (east of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 2, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[27] The Russian MoD claimed on October 2 that Russian forces seized Mala Rybytsya (east of Sumy City).[28] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the Chechen 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment with seizing Mala Rybytsya.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian forces advanced into central Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[31]

The Russian MoD continues claiming alleged seizures of settlements as part of the baseless claims of the encirclement of Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City, while a Russian milblogger challenged the existence of the encirclement. The Russian MoD claimed on October 2 that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Hrachivka and Serdobyne (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[32] The Russian Northern GoF credited elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with seizing Serdobyne and elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD], under the operational control of the Northern GoF) with the seizure of Hrachivka.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that the claimed Russian encirclement northeast of Kharkiv City “does not exist in a traditional sense,” and that Russian forces have not completed the encirclement, contrary to Russian MoD claims.[34] The milblogger claimed that the alleged seizures of Rublene and Kreidyanka (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk) are false, that Russian forces do not control Nesterne and Lukashove (both north of Velykyi Burluk), and that Russian forces only control northern Vilkhuvatka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), while the rest of the settlement is a “gray zone.”[35]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on October 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian forces advanced on the western outskirts of Kupyansk and west of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova).[37]

Russian sources continue to publish likely manipulated or AI-altered footage to aggrandize and support Russian claims of advance. Russian forces were purportedly operating in front of the train station in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (north of Kupyansk), according to footage originally published on October 2 and later deleted.[38] ISW has reason to assess that the footage may have been modified or AI-altered.

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Lyman tactical area on October 1 and 2 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian milbloggers and sources acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks east of Slovyansk and southeast of Lyman. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk) and that fighting continued near Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk).[40] Another Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks toward Kryva Luka from the Siverskyi Donets River north of the settlement.[41] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on October 2 that meeting engagements continue near Yampil and along the Zherebets River.[42] Russian milbloggers have repeatedly acknowledged that Ukrainian counterattacks in and near Kalenyky, Kryva Luka, Ozerne (north of Kryva Luka), and Yampil continue to disrupt Russian plans to conduct a frontal assault against the northern Fortress Belt cities — likely the combined result of Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Lyman and east of Slovyansk.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations within, west of, and northwest of Kostyantynivka on October 1 and 2 but did not advance.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and north of Dobropillya and west of Pokrovsk on October 1 and 2 but did not advance.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian forces advanced north of Serhiivka and northwest of Novooleksandrivka (both southwest of Dobropillya).[46]

Russian forces are reportedly attempting to infiltrate into Dobropillya and its surrounding areas, contrary to the Russian MoD’s repeated claims that Russian forces successfully encircled Dobropillya and seized part of the town. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade stated on October 2 that Russian forces are using untrained assault groups, as well as special forces units, including elements of the Russian 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU], reportedly operationally subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces) and the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), to infiltrate Dobropillya and its surroundings.[47] The Russian MoD recently made baseless claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Dobropillya and that Russian forces control eastern Dobropillya, but ISW has not observed evidence to support these claims.[48]

Ukrainian strikes are targeting Russian rail infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian assault regiment posted footage on October 2 showing a Ukrainian drone reconnoitering and potentially striking a Russian train at the Donetsk Railway Station in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[49]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 2.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 1 and 2 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Oleksandrivka.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 1 and 2 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 1 and 2 but did not advance.[52]

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct an intense intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in southern occupied Ukraine as part of battlefield-shaping operations that will likely continue to enable Ukrainian counteroffensives. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct a systematic strike campaign against Russian automotive logistics along the entire M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) in southern occupied Ukraine.[53] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces intensified their strike campaign against the section of the highway in Zaporizhia Oblast and nearby roads over the past 10 days (likely since September 25). Ukrainian forces notably began intensifying their efforts to interdict Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in May 2026, particularly along the T-0509 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway (also called the H-20 highway) and the M-14 highway, which — together with the M-18 Melitopol-Zaporizhzhia City highway — connects Russia with occupied Crimea through the so-called ”land bridge.”[54] The Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian GLOCs has disrupted supplies for Russian forces operating along the entire frontline and degraded Russian logistics at operational depth ahead of Ukrainian maneuvers in the Oleksandrivka and Lyman directions.[55] Data from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) indicates that Ukrainian forces currently maintain a high intensity of strikes against Russian logistics across the frontline. Ukrainian forces damaged, on average, over twice as many Russian logistics vehicles and fuel tankers in the period May 2026 through September 2026 than in the previous five-month period. Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign continues to inhibit Russian troop and supply movement towards the frontline and to catalyze Ukrainian battlefield successes.[56]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 2.

Russia is struggling to reroute its grain exports due to continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian export assets in the Black Sea. Bloomberg reported on October 1 that Russia shipped only about 1.3 million tons of grain and oilseed through five alternative ports from July to September 2026 — approximately one tenth of its Black Sea ports’ export capacity of about 12 million tons during the July to September period.[57] Bloomberg reported that Russia’s daily rail loadings of agricultural products at the Ust-Luga and Vysotsk ports on the Baltic Sea increased by 465 percent between September 1 and 22. Several Russian grain exporters assessed that the Russian government would need to create subsidies to make the alternative route via Murmansk economically viable, however. Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian commercial transport routes in the Black Sea continues to disrupt the Russian government’s ability to earn revenues from its key export commodities, including grain.[58]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [59]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed- (47 of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 88 drones, that Russian drones struck 11 locations, and that downed debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, energy, port, and logistics infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Mykolaiv, and Rivne oblasts.[61] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on October 2 that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[62]

Ukrainian forces are leveraging F-16 fighter jets as a cost-effective method for intercepting Russian jet-powered drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 2 that Ukrainian F-16 fighter jets are intercepting 50 to 60 percent of all Russian jet-powered drones.[63] Sources told Bloomberg on September 30 that the internal 20-millimeter caliber cannon on F-16 jets is the most cost-effective and immediate solution to intercepting drones given the abundance of global F-16 ammunition supplies.[64]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80910 [2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-10/?ct=1790972233967; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/1740 [3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-7/; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/489; https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1787427096320430252 [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78632 [5] https://life dot ru/p/1890902 [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_2-3/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-8/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-6/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-7/ [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ [8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80912 [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/ [11] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1120011 [12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80912 [13] https://topwar dot ru/290926-bojcy-kitaja-i-mongolii-prikryvali-flangi-nastuplenija-vs-rf-poka-na-uchenijah.html [14] https://news.qq dot com/rain/a/20250917A075NV00; https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/09/12/russia-and-belarus-begin-zapad-2025-military-exercises-a90510 [15] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7740; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7743; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7746; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7752 [16] https://t.me/mod_russia/67843 [17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ [18] https://www.ft.com/content/c2ad4cd1-a08a-4f55-8d57-fa83dbfa98af?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [19] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/02/world/europe/russia-ukraine-winter.html [20] https://www.ft.com/content/c2ad4cd1-a08a-4f55-8d57-fa83dbfa98af?syn-25a6b1a6=1 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ [21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/putins-theory-of-victory-in-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-5/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-3/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/ [22] https://www.ft.com/content/c2ad4cd1-a08a-4f55-8d57-fa83dbfa98af?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/ [24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42444 [25] https://t.me/SBUkr/18730 [26] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105940518395900148; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21176 [27] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13103; https://t.me/tro119ua/140 [28] https://t.me/mod_russia/67856 [29] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22346 [30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42439; https://t.me/dva_majors/99872; https://t.me/rybar/83643; https://t.me/severnnyi/9493 [31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34019 [32] https://t.me/mod_russia/67854 [33] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22347 [34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56434 [35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ [36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99872 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37333 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/180678 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19958 [37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56433 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56435 [38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13105 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3632 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2105996971311841765?s=20 [39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42439; https://t.me/dva_majors/99872; https://t.me/wargonzo/37333; https://t.me/grvZapad/19958 [40] https://t.me/dva_majors/99872 [41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48295 [42] https://t.me/grvZapad/19958 [43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ [44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441; https://t.me/dva_majors/99872; https://t.me/wargonzo/37333 [45]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42439 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/29313 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37333 [46] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34025 [47]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1417605-dobropilla-e-golovnou-cillu-armii-rf-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-frontu-oficer-20-brigadi-ngu-lubart/ [48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ [49] https://t.me/polk_210/7291 [50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/5644 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441 [51]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42439 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99872 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37333 [52]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42439; https://t.me/wargonzo/37333; https://t.me/dva_majors/99872 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21386 [53] https://t.me/dva_majors/99876 [54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/ [55] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ [56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/ [57] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-01/russia-s-grain-rerouting-falls-short-as-war-hits-black-sea-ports [58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ [59] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [60] https://t.me/kpszsu/82252 [61] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105922510336225578?s=20; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21168; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/23400; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32303; https://t.me/synegubov/26171 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26167 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26168 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26169 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26170 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26172; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4711 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4707 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4708 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4709 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4710 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4712 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4713; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7752; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid03RXVz1nUfYisjuzcJ1Qi2SefWdgC2uhKbJbroV3pZeQkx75LSMtcMVwF2F4md1Gjl; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/5314; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34860; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/12146; https://www.facebook.com/police.in.Rivne.region/posts/pfbid0yLeZmyE3m7669qkdNZFHphtaBFj7TKMuXKYHSnmzfLuzR4mteWmBucQeuBvpPmcLl?locale=uk_UA [62] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5480 [63] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105992007130689939; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21178 [64] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-30/ukraine-seeks-shells-for-f-16s-to-shoot-down-jet-powered-drones

手机左右滑动，电脑按 ← → 键，也能切换新闻