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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1, 2026

Russian milbloggers are concerned that Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction will hinder RU attempts to assault Slovyansk from the east.

ISWFiona Noonan查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势行动评估，2026年10月1日

Russian milbloggers are expressing concerns that Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction will hinder Russian attempts to assault Slovyansk from the east – suggesting that Operation Vivaldi not only disrupted Russia’s plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from the Lyman and Dobropillya directions but may also hinder Russian plans to assault the northern Fortress Belt cities frontally. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 23 that Ukrainian forces were regularly counterattacking from Ozerne (southeast of Lyman and north of the Siverskyi Donets River) toward Kryva Luka (south of Ozerne and the river), suggesting that Ukrainian forces were crossing or had already crossed the river.[1] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger assessed on September 30 that the situation for Russian forces is deteriorating not only in the Lyman area but also in the Slovyansk direction.[2] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces gained a foothold near Dibrova (north of the river and south of Lyman) and Ozerne and are attempting to cross the Siverskyi Donets River and attack Russian positions near Pyskunivka and Kryva Luka (south of Dibrova and Ozerne and south of the river) from the north. The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking and gradually advancing to prevent Russian forces from accessing Mykolaivka (just east of Slovyansk) from Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Mykolaivka). The milblogger stated that Russian forces’ situation beyond the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal is also worsening, as Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Yurkivka, Malynivka, and Tykhonivka (all east of Kramatorsk), and Russian forces are struggling to strengthen their positions due to challenges they are encountering crossing the canal. The milblogger assessed that these challenges are related to Ukraine’s increased activity in the Lyman area and noted that Russian forces will have to reorganize their logistics and reduce their tempo of attacks toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk due to increased Ukrainian drone strike capabilities from the Lyman area. The Siverskyi Donets River remains a substantial obstacle, however, and it remains unclear that Ukrainian forces have crossed it or will cross it northeast of Slovyansk.

A Ukrainian military officer discussed the establishment of a Ukrainian position in the Slovyansk direction that can serve as the basis for future major Ukrainian operations after Operation Vivaldi. The chief of staff of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on October 1 that Ukrainian forces are in the final stages of forming a position in an unspecified part of the Slovyansk direction that could become the basis for future larger-scale Ukrainian operations.[3] The chief of staff added that Operation Vivaldi may soon generate more noticeable changes in the Slovyansk direction and unspecified neighboring areas. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets similarly reported on September 28 and 29 that the elimination of the Russian salient in the Lyman area during Operation Vivaldi will likely hamper Russian offensive efforts towards Slovyansk from the east.[4] It is unclear if the chief of staff’s comments about the establishment of a Ukrainian position in the Slovyansk direction is related to the Russian milbloggers’ commentary about the situation directly east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Operation Vivaldi disrupted the Russian military command’s plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from the Lyman and Dobropillya areas, and Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman will likely continue generating cascading effects for Russian advances toward Slovyansk.[5]

Russian forces lost control over almost 300 square kilometers between March and September 2026 – a period including Ukraine’s successful Operation Vivaldi, which liberated at least 147 square kilometers over several months. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 175.54 square kilometers but lost 256.35 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in September 2026 for a net loss of 80.81 square kilometers – an average pace of -2.69 square kilometers per day. Russian forces also had negative gains in September when accounting for Russian infiltrations into areas over which Russian forces have not gained control, with Russian forces seizing or infiltrating into 143.2 square kilometers, but losing 318.38 square kilometers of territory for a net loss of 175.18 square kilometers. These September 2026 statistics, however, include Ukrainian liberations of at least 147 square kilometers of territory in the Lyman area after details about Operation Vivaldi began to emerge in September even though Ukrainian forces conducted the operation over the preceding months. Russia’s rate of seizing territory significantly declined in March 2026 and has remained low – or even negative – since. Russian gains have also remained low since March, even when counting areas into which Russian forces have infiltrated. A calculation controlling for Ukrainian gains made during Operation Vivaldi over an unspecified number of months before September 2026 shows that Russian forces have lost control of 293.59 square kilometers net across the entire front since March 2026 and have only gained a presence in a total of 174.44 square kilometers when accounting for Russian infiltrations since March. Ukraine’s effective use of operational security surrounding Operation Vivaldi – and Ukraine’s likely continuation of this practice during future counterattacks – will likely make it hard to determine meaningful month-on-month net assessment about Russian territorial gains and losses.

Russian forces likely at best gained no ground in exchange for over 46,000 casualties in September 2026 – the highest monthly Russian loss rate so far in 2026. It is unclear how many square kilometers exactly Russian forces lost in September 2026 due to the uncertainty about when Ukrainian forces liberated territory near Lyman in and before September. Russian forces likely on net lost territory across the entire front in September due to Operation Vivaldi, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered 46,320 casualties in September 2026 – the third consecutive month that Russian forces suffered over 40,000 casualties in a single month and Russia’s highest monthly casualty rate of 2026 thus far.[6] Russian forces continue to sustain significant personnel losses while achieving extremely limited or even net negative territorial gains, and Russia’s current force generation system continues to recruit fewer soldiers than needed to replace Russian losses.

Russian forces struck the Southern Bridge in Kyiv City as part of their campaign to destroy the Ukrainian economy and to make life difficult in the Ukrainian capital. Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported on October 1 that two Russian drones struck the area near the support structure of the Southern Bridge that spans the Dnipro River and connects the left and right banks of Kyiv City.[7] Klitschko stated that the strikes temporarily suspended metro and surface public transport traffic across the bridge. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces aim to disrupt traffic crossing the bridge and to use repeated strikes against the same area to cause compounding damage to the bridge.[8] The Russian strike against the Southern Bridge is part of Russia’s wider strike campaign targeting civilian facilities and using both daytime and nighttime strikes to make life in Kyiv City difficult and to disrupt daily civilian functions in the city. The strike also aims to degrade the Ukrainian economy by disrupting the movement of people and cargo through the city.[9]

Russian forces may leverage shaped charges on their long-range drones to strike large, reinforced targets like the Southern Bridge, but such efforts would require repeated, precise strikes over a short period of time to cause significant damage. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 30 that Russian forces deployed a 40-kilogram shaped-charge warhead on jet-powered Geran-type drones designed to destroy electricity pylons and steel bridge structures.[10] A shaped charge focuses its explosive energy to enhance penetration of hardened steel and concrete targets, causing more extensive damage to bridges, armored vehicles, fortifications, pylons, and other reinforced structures. Some Russian milbloggers suggested that Russian forces used a Geran-type drone with a shaped-charge warhead to strike the Southern Bridge in Kyiv City, while others claimed Russian forces used the new warhead to strike power lines.[11] The type of drone warhead that Russian forces used to strike the bridge remains unclear at this time. Such technological adaptations to the Geran strike drone could, however, allow Russian forces to repeatedly conduct precise strikes against structural vulnerabilities, which could eventually cause significant damage to infrastructure like the Southern Bridge that Russian forces have struggled to significantly damage or destroy. The metro and bridge traffic reopened on October 1 following the strike on the bridge, and Russian forces would need to conduct repeated strikes on the bridge’s vulnerable points in a short period of time to prevent Ukrainian repairs.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 1 that Ukrainian forces used the new FP-7 tactical ballistic missile for the first time to strike an unspecific target.[13] Zelensky added that the FP-7 will move into production. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point stated that the FP-7 is a ballistic missile with a payload of up to 200 kilograms and a range of up to 250 kilometers.[14] Fire Point added that it is also developing the FP-7 as a ballistic missile interceptor for Ukraine’s Freyja anti-ballistic missile program and that FP-7 will serve as a surface-to-surface missile until its full integration into the Freyja system.[15]

Russian milbloggers are expressing concerns that Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction will hinder Russian attempts to assault Slovyansk from the east – suggesting that Operation Vivaldi not only disrupted Russia’s plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from the Lyman and Dobropillya directions but may also hinder Russian plans to assault the northern Fortress Belt cities frontally.

A Ukrainian military officer discussed the establishment of a Ukrainian position in the Slovyansk direction that can serve as the basis for future major Ukrainian operations after Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces lost control over almost 300 square kilometers between March and September 2026 – a period including Ukraine’s successful Operation Vivaldi, which liberated at least 147 square kilometers over several months.

Russian forces likely at best gained no ground in exchange for over 46,000 casualties in September 2026 – the highest monthly Russian loss rate so far in 2026.

Russian forces struck the Southern Bridge in Kyiv City as part of their campaign to destroy the Ukrainian economy and to make life difficult in the Ukrainian capital.

Russian forces may leverage shaped charges on their long-range drones to strike large, reinforced targets like the Southern Bridge, but such efforts would require repeated, precise strikes over a short period of time to cause significant damage.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 1 that Ukrainian forces used the new FP-7 tactical ballistic missile for the first time to strike an unspecific target.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman tactical area.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia. Russia launched 107 drones against Ukraine overnight on September 30 to October 1 and 97 drones during the day on October 1.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia. Zelensky stated on October 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone launch and storage site in Oryol Oblast, an unspecified oil facility in Samara Oblast, a supply depot in Bryansk Oblast, and a tanker in the Black Sea.[16]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 30 to October 1 but did not advance.[17]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 30 and October 1 but did not make confirmed advances, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[18]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 1 that Russian forces seized Vysoka Yaruha (north of Kharkiv City).[19] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) credited elements of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Vysoka Yaruha.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 1 that Russian forces advanced south of Hoptivka (north of Kharkiv City).[21]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Russian forces conducted a flag raising mission in central Vilkhuvatka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), according to geolocated footage published on September 30, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[22] The Russian MoD claimed on October 1 that Russian forces seized Nesterne (north of Velykyi Burluk) and Rublene (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[23] The Russian Northern GoF credited elements of the Russian 12th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion and the 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) with the claimed seizure of Nesterne, and elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD], under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) with the claimed seizure of Rublene.[24] The Russian claims over Rublene suggest a small encirclement of Ukrainian forces northeast of Velykyi Burluk, but ISW has not observed evidence of these claimed seizures or of a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces, claimed or de facto, in this area.

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 30 and October 1 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[25]

Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions into Kupyansk. A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF claimed on October 1 that the number of Russian infiltration groups in Kupyansk has increased in recent weeks but that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces control Kupyansk.[26]

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on October 1 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north and southeast of Borova but did not advance.[27]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian air defense systems in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in an unspecified area of occupied Luhansk Oblast.[28]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman, while Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in central Lyman. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position northeast of Lyman, according to geolocated footage published on September 26, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[29] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in central Lyman, according to geolocated footage published on October 1, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk on September 30 and October 1 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Kramatorsk.[31]

See topline text for analysis on Ukrainian counterattacks east of Slovyansk.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations within, west of, and northwest of Kostyantynivka on September 30 and October 1 but did not advance.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Dobropillya and west of Pokrovsk on September 30 and October 1 but did not advance.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 30 and October 1 but did not advance.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 30 and October 1 but did not advance.[35]

A Ukrainian military official forecasted that intensified Russian glide bomb strikes near Orikhiv may set conditions for future Russian infiltrations in the area. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast stated on October 1 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over most of Mala Tokmachka (just southeast of Orikhiv) but that Russian forces are increasing their use of guided glide bomb strikes against the settlement, particularly against its southeastern part, which has allowed Russian forces to infiltrate into the settlement’s outskirts.[36] The spokesperson reported that increased guided glide bomb strikes are forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw some observation posts in the area, which would create wider corridors for small Russian infantry groups to infiltrate through. The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces may be able to enter Mala Tokmachka further or even enter Orikhiv in the future. The spokesperson added that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed Russian infiltration groups or took them prisoner but that one or two groups may still be operating on the outskirts of Orikhiv. Russian forces have conducted glide bomb strikes, especially against the Fortress Belt cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, in part to create ruins that Russian infantry can use for cover and concealment during future infiltrations.[37] The increased Russian use of glide bomb strikes near Orikhiv indicates that Russian forces aim to intensify offensive operations in the area.

Intensifications of Russian activity in the Orikhiv direction in the future would indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is still committed to his original theory of victory that demands that Russian forces continue pushing along the entire frontline, even as he starts to adopt a new theory of victory based on Russia’s long-range strike campaign. The theory of victory that Putin articulated in June 2024 was predicated on the assumption that gradual, creeping Russian advances along the entire front will eventually collapse Ukrainian defenses and lead to Ukrainian capitulation.[38] Putin appears to be adopting a new theory of victory that relies on Russia’s technological adaptations in long-range strike and Ukrainian air defense shortages to push Ukraine to surrender after Russia’s Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign.[39] Orikhiv is a secondary sector of the front lower in priority than the Fortress Belt areas, and intensifications in this sector would indicate that the Putin has not lifted his demand that Russian forces push along the entire front at once and that his adoption of an additional theory of victory does not mean that he has abandoned his original one.

Mashovets recently reported that Ukrainian forces have been largely successful in recent weeks at eliminating several Russian infiltration groups in and near Orikhiv.[40] Continued Russian efforts to conduct more waves of infiltrations in the area, even after Ukrainian forces recently successfully cleared previous waves, aim to exhaust Ukrainian forces and force them to expend significant resources to find Russian infiltrators hiding in urban ruins.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 1.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [41]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 30 to October 1 and during the day on October 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 107 Shahed-type (63 of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[42] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 87 drones, that Russian drones struck 11 locations, and that downed debris fell on four locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces subsequently launched 97 drones (66 of which were jet-powered) during the day on October 1 and that Ukrainian forces downed 78 drones, including 55 jet-powered ones.[43] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, commercial, and education infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Rivne oblasts.[44] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on October 1 that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Rivne, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[45]

Russian forces struck the Institute for Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Science in Kyiv City on September 30. The Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate reported that Russian forces struck the Institute for Nuclear Research building in Kyiv City, which houses the Kyiv Research Reactor.[46] The strike caused a fire in the building but did not harm the reactor and critical safety systems. The Institute for Nuclear Research shut down the reactor in 2022 to reduce radiation risks.

Ukrainian forces are leveraging offshore air defense systems on unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea to create more time for Ukrainian forces to intercept Russian drones targeting coastal areas. The New York Times (NYT) reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces are using unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) with surface-to-air missiles to establish air defenses systems in the Black Sea to defend against incoming Russian drones targeting coastal areas such as Odesa Oblast.[47] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on May 20, for example, that the fact that Odessa City sits on the Black Sea makes it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to defend as it is more difficult to place air defenses at sea compared to land-based platforms. Ukrainian forces have more opportunities to intercept Russian drones that have to travel significant distances over land to their targets, whereas Russian strikes against Odesa Oblast via the Black Sea only allow Ukrainian forces to down the drones when they are very near to their targets and entering their terminal dive approaches.[48] Russian forces have previously also innovated their long-range drone strike tactics, including by flying Geran-3 drones at higher altitudes to make them more difficult to intercept, likely limiting Ukrainian forces opportunities to defend Odesa Oblast. Sea-based air defenses give Ukrainian forces more time to intercept Russian drones targeting coastal areas, however.

Ukrainian First Deputy Minister for Recovery, Infrastructure, and Transport Serhiy Derkach stated on October 1 that Ukraine aims to construct shelters at all border crossing points by the end of 2026 amidst Russian strikes against crossings along the Ukrainian borders with Poland, Romania, and Moldova.[49]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56178

[2] https://t.me/rybar/83612

[3] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/10/01/%c2%abnezabarom-vy-cze-vidchuyete%c2%bb-na-slov%e2%80%99yanskomu-napryamku-gotuyut-placzdarm-dlya-masshtabnogo-prosuvannya/ ; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM

[4] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3616; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3617; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ ;

[6] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42436

[7] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7740

[8] https://t.me/arx_spn/31331; https://t.me/rybar/83630; https://t.me/dva_majors/99843; https://t.me/sashakots/64797; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/228020;

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/

[10] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7778

[11] https://t.me/milinfolive/180607; https://t.me/sashakots/64797; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75814; https://t.me/bomber_fighter/26692

[12] https://kyivindependent dot com/russian-drones-once-more-hit-key-bridge-in-central-kyiv-damage-reported/

[13] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105683936907047389

[14] https://firepoint dot technology/en/ballistic-missile-fp-7/; https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2104578946587148770

[15] https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2104578952664617308; https://firepoint dot technology/en/ballistic-missile-fp-7/

[16] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105576994045927569 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21152

[17]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433; https://t.me/dva_majors/99826; https://t.me/wargonzo/37307; https://t.me/severnnyi/9485;

[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433; https://t.me/dva_majors/99826; https://t.me/epoddubny/29297; https://t.me/severnnyi/9485

[19] https://t.me/mod_russia/67814

[20] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22327

[21] https://t.me/divgen/84368

[22] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13082; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22318; https://t.me/Osintpen/3621

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/67814;

[24] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22326

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433; https://t.me/dva_majors/99826; https://t.me/wargonzo/37307; https://t.me/severnnyi/9485; https://t.me/grvZapad/19950

[26] https://t.me/severnnyi/9485

[27] https://t.me/grvZapad/19950

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42438

[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13084; https://t [dot] me/BV25org/3596

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13088; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dd8iegZgQRN

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42429 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433 ; https://t.me/rybar/83612

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42429 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99826; https://t.me/wargonzo/37307;

[33]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42429 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37307 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48255 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56401 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56408

[34]https://t.me/motopatriot78/56401 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42429 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/33635

[35] https://t.me/voin_dv/21363 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42429 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42433 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37307 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48267

[36] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/10/01/okupanty-%c2%abznovu-zahopyly%c2%bb-malu-tokmachku-%e2%80%94-lyshe-u-vlasnyh-fantaziyah/ ; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM

[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/

[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-5/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-3/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/

[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/

[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/

[41] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[42] https://t.me/kpszsu/82077

[43] https://t.me/kpszsu/82167

[44] https://t.me/kyivoda/59461; https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/68387; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7734; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7736; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105582279514902955 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21153; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid0ttoXYEf43NQQXVpZBXmTcbLyMGQAthkYcw8QHQVpVvTCd8aXEuH3cNKGe2yrQf1Fl; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3399 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/64168; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3399; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/12108

[45] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5473

[46] https://snriu dot gov.ua/news/rf-prodovzhuie-iadernyi-teror-zavdano-udaru-bezpilotnykom-po-terytorii-instytutu-iadernykh-doslidzhen-u-kyievi; https://suspilne.media/1416341-v-okremih-regionah-vvodat-grafiki-vidklucenna-svitla-rf-pogrozuvala-nato-adernou-zbroeu-1681-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790855608&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[47] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/30/world/europe/ukraine-naval-drones-russia.html?unlocked_article_code=1.FFE.z0gs.-ppg_LMwymmj&smid=nytcore-ios-share

[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025/

[49] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-ukraina-ukryttia-punkty-propusku/33867798.html

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