Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2026

Russian milbloggers recently acknowledged Ukrainian advances east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, possibly after months of battlefield shaping efforts similar to those which Ukrainian forces conducted in the months leading up to Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction. Russian milbloggers recently stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Ozerne, advanced east of Pyskunivka (southeast of Lyman and east of Slovyansk) towards Kryva Luka (southeast of Pyskunivka), and advanced north of Rai-Oleksandrivka (southwest of Kryva Luka).[1] Russian milbloggers also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces drove Russian forces from Pyskunivka and are counterattacking towards Kryva Luka directly from the west and the northwest from across the Siverskyi Donets River. Recent milblogger claims also indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced immediately east of Mykolaivka (just east of Slovyansk).[2] Russian milbloggers stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Malynivka and advanced in the area between Fedorivka Druha and Holubivka (all east of Kramatorsk), into southern Minkivka, and near Fedorivka (both southeast of Kramatorsk).[3] Ukrainian and Russian positions likely remain intermixed, however, as recent geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Tykhonivka (east of Kramatorsk and near the area where Ukrainian forces recently reportedly advanced), after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[4]

Recent repeated Russian milblogger claims that Ukrainian forces have crossed the Siverskyi Donets River are notable, as the river is a significant natural obstacle.[5] Kryva Luka is a dominant tactical height situated just south of the Siverskyi Donets River, from which Ukrainian forces could launch further counterattacks using such advantageous terrain. Ukrainian forces appear to have pushed Russian forces from both the right and left banks of the Siverskyi Donets River in this area. Russian forces likely consider Mykolaivka a primary tactical objective as its local tactical heights create more favorable conditions for an offensive against Slovyansk, and Ukrainian efforts to push Russian forces from areas northeast and southeast of Mykolaivka are preventing Russian forces from leveraging its terrain.[6] Successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kramatorsk and Slovyansk directions may indicate a broader Ukrainian effort to push Russian forces eastward across a wide area away from the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration toward the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal.

Russian milbloggers are acknowledging that these Ukrainian counterattacks in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions may have cascading effects and implications for Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt. A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Slovyansk direction are making the possibility of Russian advances towards the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration a “distant” reality and that a Russian offensive from Siversk (east of Slovyansk) towards Slovyansk may be “doomed” either to failure or high casualties if Russian forces fail to recapture forests south of Lyman.[7] Ukrainian counterattacks east of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration appear to be supporting Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction to complicate Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt.[8]

Ukrainian forces have evolved their tactics and operational planning throughout 2026 in ways that may have supported recent reported Ukrainian successes east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Ukrainian counterattacks in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions have been ongoing for weeks and appear now to be resulting in more significant advances. ISW has observed reports of Ukrainian counterattacks near Mykolaivka, Rai-Oleksandrivka, and Pyskunivka and towards Kryva Luka over the last several weeks.[9] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets also reported on September 29 that Ukrainian forces were counterattacking east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and in the areas where Russian milbloggers recently acknowledged Ukrainian advances.[10] These ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks are likely building off of months of battlefield shaping efforts to degrade Russian forces’ offensive capabilities and facilitate further Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces conducted extensive battlefield shaping efforts in the months ahead of Operation Vivaldi, including targeting Russian drone operators, which enabled Ukrainian drone overmatch ahead of counteroffensive operations.[11] Ukrainian forces similarly targeted Russian drone operators ahead of their Oleksandrivka counterattacks in early 2026.[12] A Ukrainian military official reported on October 7 that the Russian military command is transferring additional forces, including from Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Spetsnaz elements, from deprioritized areas of the frontline to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction, suggesting that the Russian command may be trying to counteract similar Ukrainian battlefield condition-setting efforts that preceded the recently reported Ukrainian advances east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[13]

Ukraine also restructured and realigned its military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast in early September 2026 to reinforce the defense of the Fortress Belt against Russian attacks, which may also be inhibiting Russian offensive operations east of Slovyansk and undermining Russian efforts to push on Kramatorsk from the east.[14] Ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in the area, alongside the defeat of Russian forces north of the Siverskyi Donets River, could disrupt the Russian offensive from the east toward Slovyansk entirely.

Ongoing Russian efforts to use glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield in the Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt resulted in mass civilian casualties on October 8. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against two passenger buses in Kramatorsk on the morning of October 8, killing at least 30 people and injuring at least 18.[15] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian drones constantly circled over the impact site, repeatedly interrupting the work of first responders and forcing them to seek cover.[16] Russian forces have used glide bomb strikes against Ukraine’s near and operational rear as part of their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign since at least late 2025 and have recently intensified these strikes on Kramatorsk and other Fortress Belt cities in part to prepare the urban battlefield for future infiltration missions that will require ample cover and concealment.[17] Russian glide bomb strikes that result in high casualties, such as the October 8 strike, may also aim to push Ukrainian civilians to flee these cities ahead of future planned Russian attacks.

European officials continue to name Russia as the party responsible for sabotage against European defense industrial enterprises involved in manufacturing and delivering weapons to Ukraine. A Danish National Security and Intelligence Service (PET) official stated on October 7 that Russia attempted to conduct sabotage against Danish companies supplying arms to Ukraine during an unspecified time after Russia failed to deter the West from sending military support to Ukraine.[18] The official stated that Russia is increasingly planning and trying to target European weapons production facilities that have a direct impact on the frontline in Ukraine and noted that this shift reflects a “significant escalation” in Russia’s campaign of kinetic activity against Europe. The PET official statement comes against the backdrop of recent Russian arson and sabotage attacks against defense industrial enterprises in Estonia and Germany. Russia has been intensifying sabotage attacks against European defense industrial companies since at least 2024, however.[19] Russian arson attacks and other sabotage efforts provide the Kremlin a low-cost method of disrupting the production and transportation of Western aid to Ukraine, forcing European companies to spend more time and effort protecting their facilities.[20]

Russian milbloggers recently acknowledged Ukrainian advances east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, possibly after months of battlefield shaping efforts similar to those which Ukrainian forces conducted in the months leading up to Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction.

Russian milbloggers are acknowledging that these Ukrainian counterattacks in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions may have cascading effects and implications for Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt.

Ukrainian forces have evolved their tactics and operational planning throughout 2026 in ways that have likely supported recent reported Ukrainian successes east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.

Ongoing Russian efforts to use glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield in the Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt resulted in mass civilian casualties on October 8.

European officials continue to name Russia as the party responsible for sabotage against European defense industrial enterprises involved in manufacturing and delivering weapons to Ukraine.

Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil refineries with a combined processing capacity of 31 million tons of oil per year on October 8. Russian forces launched 142 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck on October 8 two Russian oil refineries with a combined processing capacity of 31 million tons of oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Gazprom Neftokhim Salavat Oil Refinery in Salavat, Republic of Bashkortostan (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the international border), and the Omsk Oil Refinery in Omsk City (roughly 2,450 kilometers from the international border).[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Salavat Oil Refinery has a processing capacity of over 10 million tons of oil per year and that Omsk Oil Refinery is the largest Russian oil refinery with a processing capacity of over 21 million tons of oil per year. Ukrainian forces previously struck the Omsk Oil Refinery on July 6, 2026, damaging an ELOU-AVT-11 primary oil processing unit that has a processing capacity of 8.4 million tons of oil per year.[22]

Ukrainian forces may have struck a data center supporting internet and AI infrastructure in Russia. Geolocated footage published on October 8 shows fire at the Yandex Sasovo data center in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast (roughly 530 kilometers from the international border).[23] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi reported that the Yandex data center shares its building with the Sasta Machine-Tool Plant, and satellite imagery published on October 8 shows fire damage to the portion of the building housing the Yandex data center.[24] Yandex claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at its data center, suspending operations and causing outages in Yandex services.[25] Russian business outlet RBK reported that users of several major Russian media sources experienced temporary outages.[26] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported that Yandex’s Sasovo data center has a capacity of up to 12 megawatts and houses tens of thousands of servers.[27] Yandex reported in 2021 that two of the supercomputers that Russia uses to train neural network models using Western graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs) were located at the data center in Sasovo.[28] The fire at Yandex Sasovo data center occurred amidst intensifying Russian strikes against Ukrainian data centers as part of Russia’s ongoing long-range strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s economy.[29] Western export controls and sanctions on Russia may prevent Yandex from promptly replacing any advanced semiconductors that may have sustained damage in the fire.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 8 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Sumy City. [31] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on October 8 that the situation in Sumy Oblast remains relatively stable and that Russian forces are attempting to push slightly westward from positions along the international border.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian military officials and milbloggers continue to make baseless claims about Russian advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 8 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Hannopillya (northeast of Kharkiv City and roughly 20 kilometers from the furthest assessed Russian advance).[33] The Northern GoF credited elements of the Russian 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Hannopillya.[34] The Russian MoD has regularly made aggrandized claims in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast, including recent false claims of a large-scale Ukrainian encirclement between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions, despite providing no evidence to support their claims.[35] These intensified claims of encirclement come as Ukrainian forces have made significant advances in priority sectors of the frontline and likely aim to distract from these Ukrainian successes.[36]

A Russian milblogger also claimed on October 8 that Russian forces advanced near Vilkhuvatka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and are expanding their control in the supposed Russian encirclement north of Velykyi Burluk.[37] Such exaggerated milblogger claims of Russian advances north of Velykyi Burluk are likely an attempt to reinforce the Russian MoD‘s claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in this area.[38]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on October 8 that official Russian maps showing the Russian Northern GoF’s area of responsibility (AoR) in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts claim that Russian forces control almost the entire area along the international border up to 15 kilometers deep and show allegedly encircled Ukrainian forces.[39] Trehubov assessed that this is no longer a propaganda tool but is more so reflective of the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are building up their forces in the Velykyi Burluk direction but that it remains one of the least active areas in Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in central Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, according to geolocated footage published on October 7, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[40]

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on October 8 that Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[41]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

See topline text for reports on recent Ukrainian advances south and southeast of Lyman.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 7 and 8 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi.[42] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to counterattack near Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[43]

The Russian military command is reportedly redeploying forces to the AoR of the Russian 20th Guards Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) north of Lyman, likely due to Ukraine’s successes during Operation Vivaldi in recent months. The source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that the Russian military command plans to redeploy “fresh regiments” from unspecified areas of the frontline to the AoR of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) before winter to allow the 488th and 254th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division) to recuperate.[44] It is unclear if the source is referring to the deployment of reinforcements to strengthen the 488th and 254th regiments; the redeployment of some of the maneuver regiments from the 20th CAA’s 144th or 3rd motorized rifle divisions that are currently operating in the Borova direction; or the redeployment of non-20th CAA elements to the area.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

See topline text for reports on recent Ukrainian advances east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and Russian strikes against civilian buses in Kramatorsk.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 4.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Dobropillya as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 8 that Russian forces control only southern Sofiivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and Toretske (the southern of two settlements in this area of the same name and immediately west of Sofiivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Sofiivka.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks in the Novomykolaivka direction (north of Sofiivka and Toretske).[47] Mashovets reported that Russian forces infiltrated into the southwestern outskirts of Dobropillya and in eastern Novohryshyne (southwest of Dobropillya).[48] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces have cleared Russian infantry who had infiltrated Krasnyi Kut, Torske, and Pryiut (all northeast of Dobropillya) on a prior date. Geolocated footage published on October 8 shows a Russian servicemember operating in southern Dobropillya during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[49] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in southwestern Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on October 8, after what ISW assesses was also a Russian infiltration mission.[50]

Descriptions of Russian small group tactics near Dobropillya continue to refute the plausibility of relatively sudden and significant advances in the area as the Russian MoD has recently been claiming. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command continues to deploy additional infantry south of Kucheriv Yar toward Zolotyi Kolodyaz through Nove Shakhove (all east of Dobropillya) despite continuous personnel losses and Ukrainian counterattacks toward Shakhove and Toretske (southeast of Kucheriv Yar).[51] Mashovets stated that individual Russian servicemembers continue infiltration missions near Hannivka (immediately northeast of Dobropillya) and on the southern outskirts of Dobropillya.[52] These reports are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces’ current offensive tactics cannot enable any sudden and dramatic Russian breakthrough in the area, contrary to recent Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces have encircled Dobropillya.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 8 that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka and north of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[54]

Ukrainian forces advanced east of Oleksandrivka and Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the area. Russian milbloggers acknowledged on October 7 and 8 that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Komar (east of Oleksandrivka).[55] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in southern Perebudova (north of Komar), according to geolocated footage published on October 7, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[56]

Ukrainian forces are leveraging tactical heights to support counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Fedorivka, Komar (both east of Oleksandrivka), Nechaivka, and Nove Zaporizhzhia (both south of Oleksandrivka).[57] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are leveraging their drone advantage and high ground near Havrylivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and Ivanivka (east of Havrylivka) to reconnoiter low-lying settlements in the area.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces recently conducted a likely reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on October 2 and 7 shows Russian forces conducting a mechanized assault with at least two armored personnel carriers (APC) southwest of Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces marginally advanced.[59] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault.[60] Russian forces were likely attempting to assault along the road toward Ukrainian positions southeast and southwest of Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Staroukrainka). A Russian milblogger claimed on October 8 that Ukrainian forces advanced in Verkhnya Tersa and Hirke (west of Staroukrainka) and liberated Krynychne (north of Staroukrainka).[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position on the southwestern outskirts of Andriivka (west of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage posted on October 7, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[62]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 7 or 8.

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian State Border Service reported on October 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian heavy equipment storage area and destroyed a T-72 tank, a Tiger armored vehicle, a fuel tanker, and two D-30 howitzers in an unspecified area in the Kherson direction.[63]

Ukrainian strikes are targeting Russian drone infrastructure in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian mesh network repeater in the Black Sea on October 7 or overnight October 7 to 8.[64] Mesh network repeaters extend the range at which Russian drone operators can control strike drones and adjust their trajectory. Signal repeaters in the Black Sea allow Russian forces to conduct more accurate drone strikes against stationary and dynamic targets in Odesa Oblast, Ukrainian border crossings with Moldova and Romania, and the western Black Sea, and Ukrainian strikes against these repeaters degrade this Russian capability.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [65]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 142 Shahed-type (including 82 jet-powered drones) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 126 drones, that an unspecified number of drones struck seven locations, and that debris fell on four locations.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.89516979823467%2C37.795698065885254&z=10; https://t.me/rybar/83778 [2] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.89516979823467%2C37.795698065885254&z=10; https://t.me/rybar/83778; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/ [3] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.89516979823467%2C37.795698065885254&z=10; https://t.me/rybar/83778 [4] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2107864953042743420; https://t.me/stribat33oshp/2293 [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-27/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-27/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-18/ [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/ [7] https://t.me/rybar/83778; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; 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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ [10] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3616; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ [11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/ [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/ [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/ [14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/ [15] https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/28228; 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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-battlefield-ai-revolution-is-not-here-yet-the-status-of-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone-efforts/ [18] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/denmark-says-russia-has-conducted-sabotage-attacks-against-its-defense-firms-2026-10-07/ [19] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west [20] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/ [21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42520; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42522 [22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/ [23] https://t.me/supernova_plus/61021; https://t.me/supernova_plus/61023 [24] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-ukrayiny-urazyly-zavod-sasta-ta-data-tsentr-yandeksa-u-rf/; https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/148 [25] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/28192763 [26] https://www dot rbc.ru/technology_and_media/08/10/2026/6ac790e8d5f217bdc2a150f2?from=main_lines_2 [27] https://t.me/supernova_plus/61021 [28] https://yandex dot ru/company/news/superkompyuter-yandeksa-priznali-samym-moschnym-v-rossii [29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; [30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ [31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42516; https://t.me/wargonzo/37462; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48517; https://t.me/severnnyi/9547; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56599; [32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/08/%c2%abrizni-audytoriyi-%e2%80%94-rizni-mapy%c2%bb-shho-stoyit-za-fantastychnymy-kartamy-rf/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1422285-na-velikoburluckomu-napramku-sposterigaut-pevne-nakopicenna-tregubov/ [33] https://t.me/mod_russia/68038 [34] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22478 [35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/ [36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ [37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48534 [38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; 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https://www.instagram.com/4th_rangers_uasof/reel/DeOFDT7BRV_ [51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3632 [52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3634 [53] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ [54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34071 [55] https://t.me/rybar/83777; https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=47.98510415642069%2C36.64254219638955&z=12 [56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56600 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2107901228378423797?s=20 ; https://x.com/Kharkovsky73765/status/2107897050960437251 [57] https://t.me/rybar/83777 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56580 [58] https://t.me/rybar/83777 [59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13158; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5541; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2107873588741017899; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2107904827045118255 [60] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5541 [61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56606 [62] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13154 ; https://t.me/Ronins_65/1481 [63] https://dpsu dot gov.ua/uk/news/53514-video-fpv-shtraf-za-nezakonnu-parkovku-na-pivdni-prikordonniki-spalili-tank-tigra-benzovoz-ta-dvi-garmati; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/08/fatalna-pomylka-okupanty-shovaly-v-odnomu-misczi-tank-t-72-bbm-%c2%abtygr%c2%bb-benzovoz-ta-dvi-garmaty/ [64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42521 [65] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [66] https://t.me/kpszsu/83855

俄罗斯军事博客作者近日承认，乌克兰军队在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克以东取得了进展，这可能是在数月的战场布局调整之后取得的，类似于乌克兰军队在“维瓦尔第行动”前几个月在莱曼方向所采取的策略。俄罗斯军事博客作者近期声称，乌克兰军队解放了奥泽尔内，向皮斯库尼夫卡（位于莱曼东南，斯拉维扬斯克以东）以东推进至克里瓦卢卡（位于皮斯库尼夫卡东南），并向赖-奥列克桑德里夫卡（位于克里瓦卢卡西南）以北推进。[1] 俄罗斯军事博客作者还承认，乌克兰军队已将俄军逐出皮斯库尼夫卡，并正从西面和西北面（从西顿涅茨河对岸）向克里瓦卢卡发起反击。近期军事博客作者的说法还表明，乌克兰军队已在尼古拉耶夫卡（位于斯拉维扬斯克以东）以东推进。[2]俄罗斯军事博客作者称，乌克兰军队解放了马利尼夫卡，并向费多里夫卡·德鲁哈和霍卢比夫卡（均位于克拉马托尔斯克以东）之间的地区推进，进入南部明基夫卡，以及费多里夫卡附近（均位于克拉马托尔斯克东南）。[3] 然而，乌克兰和俄罗斯的阵地可能仍然混杂在一起，因为最近的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了位于蒂霍尼夫卡中部（克拉马托尔斯克以东，靠近乌克兰军队最近据报道推进的地区）的一个俄罗斯阵地，而ISW评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[4]

近期，俄罗斯军事博客多次声称乌克兰军队已渡过西顿涅茨河，这一说法值得关注，因为该河是一道重要的天然屏障。[5] 克里瓦卢卡是位于西顿涅茨河南岸的一处重要战术高地，乌克兰军队可以利用其有利地形发动进一步的反击。乌克兰军队似乎已将俄军从该地区的西顿涅茨河两岸驱逐出去。俄军可能将尼古拉耶夫卡视为主要战术目标，因为其周边的战术高地为进攻斯拉维扬斯克创造了更有利的条件，而乌克兰军队将俄军从尼古拉耶夫卡东北和东南方向驱逐出去的努力，使得俄军无法利用该地区的地形优势。[6]乌克兰在克拉马托尔斯克和斯拉维扬斯克方向的成功反击可能表明，乌克兰正在采取更广泛的行动，将俄罗斯军队向东推移，穿过斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克聚集区向西顿涅茨-顿巴斯运河方向推进。

俄罗斯军事博客作者指出，乌克兰在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克方向的反击可能会产生连锁反应，并对俄罗斯夺取“要塞带”的努力产生影响。一位俄罗斯军事博客作者表示，乌克兰在斯拉维扬斯克方向的反击使得俄罗斯向斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克地区推进的可能性变得“遥远”，如果俄军未能夺回莱曼以南的森林，那么从锡韦尔斯克（斯拉维扬斯克以东）向斯拉维扬斯克发起的攻势可能“注定”失败或伤亡惨重。[7] 乌克兰在斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克地区以东的反击似乎是为了支持乌克兰在莱曼方向的“维瓦尔第行动”，以阻碍俄罗斯夺取“要塞带”的努力。[8]

2026年全年，乌克兰军队不断调整战术和作战计划，这可能为其近期在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克以东取得的进展提供了支持。乌克兰军队在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克方向的反击已持续数周，目前看来正在取得更显著的进展。据ISW观察，过去几周，乌克兰军队在尼古拉耶夫卡、赖-奥列克桑德里夫卡和皮斯库尼夫卡附近以及克里瓦卢卡方向发动了反击。[9] 乌克兰军事观察员科斯蒂安廷·马绍韦茨也于9月29日报告称，乌克兰军队正在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克以东以及俄罗斯军事博客近期承认乌克兰军队取得进展的地区发动反击。[10] 这些持续不断的乌克兰反击很可能是建立在数月来旨在削弱俄军进攻能力并为乌克兰军队进一步推进而进行的战场布局努力之上的。在“维瓦尔第行动”前的几个月里，乌克兰军队进行了广泛的战场环境塑造工作，包括以俄罗斯无人机操作员为目标，这使得乌克兰无人机在反攻行动前占据了优势。[11] 乌克兰军队在2026年初奥列克桑德里夫卡反击战前也以类似的方式打击了俄罗斯无人机操作员。[12] 10月7日，一名乌克兰军方官员报告称，俄罗斯军方指挥部正在将包括俄罗斯无人系统部队（USF）和特种部队在内的更多兵力从前线非优先区域调往斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克方向，这表明俄罗斯指挥部可能试图反制乌克兰在近期报道的乌克兰军队在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克以东推进之前所做的类似战场环境塑造工作。[13]

2026年9月初，乌克兰还重组并调整了顿涅茨克州及其周边地区的军事指挥安排，以加强对“堡垒带”的防御，抵御俄罗斯的进攻。此举可能也阻碍了俄罗斯在斯拉维扬斯克以东的进攻行动，并削弱了俄罗斯从东部向克拉马托尔斯克推进的努力。[14] 乌克兰在该地区持续的反击，以及俄罗斯军队在西顿涅茨河以北的失败，可能会彻底破坏俄罗斯从东部向斯拉维扬斯克的进攻。

俄罗斯持续使用滑翔炸弹袭击顿涅茨克州要塞带，试图以此塑造战场格局，结果于10月8日造成大量平民伤亡。乌克兰总统泽连斯基报告称，俄罗斯军队于10月8日上午在克拉马托尔斯克对两辆客车发动滑翔炸弹袭击，造成至少30人死亡，至少18人受伤。[15] 乌克兰国家紧急服务部门报告称，俄罗斯无人机不断在袭击地点上空盘旋，反复干扰救援人员的工作，迫使他们寻找掩护。[16] 自2025年底以来，俄罗斯军队一直使用滑翔炸弹袭击乌克兰近后方和作战后方，作为其战场空中封锁（BAI）行动的一部分。最近，俄罗斯加大了对克拉马托尔斯克和其他要塞带城市的袭击力度，部分原因是为未来需要充足掩护和隐蔽的城市渗透任务做准备。[17]俄罗斯滑翔炸弹袭击造成大量人员伤亡，例如 10 月 8 日的袭击，其目的也可能是为了迫使乌克兰平民在俄罗斯未来计划的袭击之前逃离这些城市。

欧洲官员继续指责俄罗斯应对针对欧洲国防工业企业的破坏活动负责，这些企业参与制造武器并向乌克兰运送武器。丹麦国家安全情报局（PET）一名官员于10月7日表示，在俄罗斯未能阻止西方向乌克兰提供军事支持后，俄罗斯曾试图在某个未指明的时间段内破坏向乌克兰供应武器的丹麦公司。[18] 该官员指出，俄罗斯正日益策划并试图袭击对乌克兰前线有直接影响的欧洲武器生产设施，并指出这一转变反映了俄罗斯针对欧洲的军事行动“显著升级”。PET的官方声明是在俄罗斯近期对爱沙尼亚和德国的国防工业企业实施纵火和破坏袭击的背景下发布的。然而，至少从2024年起，俄罗斯就一直在加强对欧洲国防工业企业的破坏袭击。[19]俄罗斯的纵火袭击和其他破坏活动为克里姆林宫提供了一种低成本的方法来扰乱西方对乌克兰援助的生产和运输，迫使欧洲公司花费更多的时间和精力来保护他们的设施。[20]

俄罗斯军事博客作者最近承认乌克兰军队在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克以东取得了进展，这可能是经过数月的战场塑造工作之后的结果，类似于乌克兰军队在莱曼方向的“维瓦尔第行动”之前几个月所做的工作。

俄罗斯军事博客作者承认，乌克兰在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克方向的反击可能会产生连锁反应，并对俄罗斯夺取要塞带的努力产生影响。

2026 年，乌克兰军队不断改进战术和作战计划，这可能有助于乌克兰军队近期在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克以东取得的成功。

10 月 8 日，俄罗斯持续使用滑翔炸弹袭击来塑造顿涅茨克州要塞带的战场，导致大量平民伤亡。

欧洲官员继续指责俄罗斯破坏参与制造和向乌克兰运送武器的欧洲国防工业企业。

俄军最近在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡和扎波罗热州西部取得了进展。

10月8日，乌克兰军队袭击了俄罗斯两座炼油厂，这两座炼油厂的年加工能力合计达3100万吨石油。俄罗斯军队当晚向乌克兰发射了142架无人机。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

10月8日，乌克兰军队袭击了两座俄罗斯炼油厂，两座炼油厂年加工能力合计达3100万吨。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于巴什科尔托斯坦共和国萨拉瓦特市（距国际边界约1300公里）的俄罗斯天然气工业石油化工公司萨拉瓦特炼油厂，以及位于鄂木斯克市（距国际边界约2450公里）的鄂木斯克炼油厂。[21] 乌克兰总参谋部报告称，萨拉瓦特炼油厂年加工能力超过1000万吨，而鄂木斯克炼油厂是俄罗斯最大的炼油厂，年加工能力超过2100万吨。 2026 年 7 月 6 日，乌克兰军队袭击了鄂木斯克炼油厂，损坏了 ELOU-AVT-11 型主炼油装置，该装置每年可加工 840 万吨石油。[22]

乌克兰军队可能袭击了位于俄罗斯境内的一处支持互联网和人工智能基础设施的数据中心。10月8日发布的地理定位视频显示，位于梁赞州萨索沃（距国际边界约530公里）的Yandex萨索沃数据中心发生火灾。[23] 乌克兰国防消息来源Militarnyi报道称，Yandex数据中心与萨斯塔机床厂共用一栋建筑，10月8日发布的卫星图像显示，Yandex数据中心所在的建筑部分遭到火灾破坏。[24] Yandex声称，乌克兰无人机袭击导致其数据中心起火，造成运营暂停和Yandex服务中断。[25] 俄罗斯商业媒体RBK报道称，几家俄罗斯主要媒体的用户遭遇了短暂的服务中断。[26] 一家乌克兰开源情报（OSINT）频道报道称，Yandex萨索沃数据中心的容量高达12兆瓦，容纳了数万台服务器。[27] Yandex 在 2021 年报告称，俄罗斯用于训练神经网络模型的两台超级计算机（使用西方图形处理器 (GPU) 和中央处理器 (CPU)）位于萨索沃数据中心。[28] Yandex 萨索沃数据中心发生火灾之际，正值俄罗斯加大力度打击乌克兰数据中心，这是俄罗斯持续开展的旨在削弱乌克兰经济的远程打击行动的一部分。[29] 西方对俄罗斯的出口管制和制裁可能会阻止 Yandex 及时更换任何在火灾中受损的先进半导体。[30]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心

10月8日，俄军在苏梅州北部继续进行有限的进攻行动，但由于乌克兰军队在苏梅市东北部发动反击，俄军并未取得进展。[31] 乌克兰联合部队发言人维克托·特列胡博夫上校于10月8日报告称，苏梅州局势仍然相对稳定，俄军正试图从国际边界沿线的阵地向西推进。[32]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

俄罗斯军方官员和军事博客作者持续发布毫无根据的关于俄军在哈尔科夫州北部取得进展的说法。俄罗斯国防部于10月8日声称，俄军北方集团军部队占领了汉诺皮利亚（位于哈尔科夫市东北部，距离俄军最远推进点约20公里）。[33] 北方集团军将汉诺皮利亚的占领归功于俄军第128独立摩托化步兵旅（列宁格勒军区第44军）的部分兵力。[34] 俄罗斯国防部经常夸大其在哈尔科夫州东北部的战果，包括最近声称乌克兰军队在沃夫昌斯克和韦利基布尔卢克方向之间进行了大规模包围，但并未提供任何证据支持其说法。[35]乌克兰军队在前线重点区域取得重大进展之际，这些关于包围的说法却愈演愈烈，很可能是为了转移人们对乌克兰这些胜利的注意力。[36]

一位俄罗斯军事博主在 10 月 8 日声称，俄军在维尔胡瓦特卡（大布尔卢克东北部）附近推进，并正在扩大其在大布尔卢克北部所谓的俄军包围圈中的控制范围。[37] 这种夸张的军事博主关于俄军在大布尔卢克北部推进的说法，很可能是为了加强俄罗斯国防部关于俄军已包围该地区乌克兰军队的说法。[38]

乌克兰联合部队发言人维克托·特列胡博夫上校于10月8日报告称，俄罗斯官方地图显示，俄军北方部队在苏梅州和哈尔科夫州的责任区内，俄军几乎控制了沿国际边界纵深达15公里的整个区域，并显示乌克兰军队已被包围。[39] 特列胡博夫评估认为，这不再是宣传手段，而是反映了俄罗斯军队内部普遍存在的撒谎文化。特列胡博夫报告称，俄军正在大布尔卢克方向集结兵力，但该地区仍然是哈尔科夫州内最不活跃的地区之一。

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

俄罗斯军队最近在库皮扬斯克东南方向进行了一次渗透行动。根据10月7日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了库皮扬斯克-武兹洛维市中心的一个俄罗斯阵地，而ISW评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[40]

10 月 8 日，有消息人士称，俄罗斯西部政府军在新谢尔盖夫卡附近的博罗瓦东南方向进行了有限的进攻行动，但 ISW 没有观察到俄罗斯军队推进的证据。[41]

俄罗斯主要目标：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

有关乌克兰军队近期在莱曼以南和东南方向推进的报道，请参阅正文摘要。

10 月 7 日和 8 日，俄军继续向莱曼方向发起进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在莱曼东北部的科洛迪亚齐附近继续反击，俄军未能取得进展。[42] 据俄罗斯西部联邦军消息人士称，乌克兰军队正试图在米尔内（莱曼东北部）附近进行反击。[43]

据报道，由于乌克兰近几个月在“维瓦尔第行动”中取得胜利，俄罗斯军方指挥部正在向位于莱曼以北的俄罗斯第20近卫集团军（莫斯科军区）责任区重新部署兵力。俄罗斯西部战区的消息来源称，俄罗斯军方指挥部计划在冬季到来之前，从前线某些未指明的区域向俄罗斯第144摩托化步兵师（第20近卫集团军，莫斯科军区）责任区重新部署“新兵团”，以便让第144摩托化步兵师的第488和第254摩托化步兵团得以休整。[44] 目前尚不清楚该消息来源是否指的是向第488和第254摩托化步兵团增援；将目前在博罗瓦方向作战的第 20 CAA 第 144 或第 3 摩托化步兵师的部分机动团重新部署到该地区；或者将非第 20 CAA 部队重新部署到该地区。

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

有关乌克兰军队近期在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克以东的推进以及俄罗斯军队对克拉马托尔斯克民用巴士的袭击的报道，请参阅主标题文本。

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

根据 10 月 4 日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯军队最近在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡取得了进展。[45]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

乌克兰军队近期向多布罗皮利亚西南方向推进，与此同时，俄军在多布罗皮利亚东南方向进行了渗透行动。乌克兰军事观察员科斯蒂安廷·马绍韦茨于10月8日报告称，俄军仅控制了索菲伊夫卡南部（位于多布罗皮利亚东北部）和托列茨克（该地区两个同名定居点中较南的一个，位于索菲伊夫卡正西侧），这表明乌克兰军队已向索菲伊夫卡北部推进。[46] 一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者承认，乌克兰军队正在新米科拉伊夫卡方向（位于索菲伊夫卡和托列茨克以北）进行反击。[47] 马绍韦茨报告称，俄军已渗透到多布罗皮利亚西南郊区和新戈里申东部（位于多布罗皮利亚西南部）。[48]马绍韦茨报告称，乌克兰军队已清除此前渗透到克拉斯尼库特、托尔斯克和普留特（均位于多布罗皮利亚东北部）的俄罗斯步兵。10月8日公布的地理定位视频显示，一名俄罗斯军人在多布罗皮利亚南部活动，ISW评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[49] 根据10月8日公布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队袭击了位于比利茨克西南部（多布罗皮利亚东南部）的一栋被俄罗斯占领的建筑物，ISW评估认为这也是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[50]

对俄军在多布罗皮利亚附近小股部队战术的描述，持续驳斥了俄罗斯国防部近期所宣称的在该地区取得相对突然且重大进展的说法。马绍韦茨指出，尽管俄军持续遭受人员损失，且乌克兰军队在沙霍韦和托列茨克（位于库切里夫亚尔东南）方向发动反击，但俄军指挥部仍在库切里夫亚尔以南，经由新沙霍韦向佐洛蒂科洛迪亚兹（均位于多布罗皮利亚以东）方向增派步兵。[51] 马绍韦茨还指出，个别俄军士兵继续在汉尼夫卡（位于多布罗皮利亚东北部）附近以及多布罗皮利亚南部郊区执行渗透任务。[52] 这些报告与ISW的评估一致，即俄军目前的进攻战术无法使其在该地区取得任何突然而重大的突破，这与俄罗斯国防部近期声称俄军已包围多布罗皮利亚的说法相悖。[53]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

10 月 8 日，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄罗斯军队向新巴甫洛夫卡以东、新米科拉伊夫卡以北（新巴甫洛夫卡东北）推进。[54]

乌克兰军队向奥列克桑德里夫卡以东推进，而俄罗斯军队最近在该地区进行了渗透行动。俄罗斯军事博客作者在10月7日和8日承认，乌克兰军队向科马尔以南（奥列克桑德里夫卡以东）推进。[55] 根据10月7日发布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队袭击了佩列布多瓦南部（科马尔以北）的一个俄罗斯阵地，而ISW评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[56]

乌克兰军队正利用战术高地支援奥列克桑德里夫卡方向的反击。俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，乌克兰军队正在费多里夫卡、科马尔（均位于奥列克桑德里夫卡以东）、涅恰伊夫卡和新扎波罗热（均位于奥列克桑德里夫卡以南）附近发动反击。[57] 一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，乌克兰军队正利用其无人机优势和哈夫里利夫卡（位于奥列克桑德里夫卡东北部）和伊万尼夫卡（位于哈夫里利夫卡以东）附近的高地，侦察该地区的低洼居民点。[58]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

俄军近期可能在胡利亚波列方向发动了一次规模较小的排级机械化突击。10月2日和7日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄军至少出动两辆装甲运兵车（APC）在斯塔鲁克赖因卡西南方（胡利亚波列以西）发动机械化突击，表明俄军取得了小幅进展。[59] 一个在胡利亚波列方向作战的乌克兰团报告称，乌克兰军队击退了俄军的进攻。[60] 俄军可能试图沿道路向位于上特尔萨东南和西南方向（斯塔鲁克赖因卡西北方）的乌克兰阵地发起进攻。一位俄罗斯军事博客作者于10月8日声称，乌克兰军队在上特尔萨和希尔克（斯塔鲁克赖因卡以西）取得进展，并解放了克雷尼奇涅（斯塔鲁克赖因卡以北）。[61]

俄罗斯军队最近在扎波罗热州西部取得了进展。根据 10 月 7 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了安德里夫卡（奥里希夫以西）西南郊区的一个俄罗斯阵地，这表明俄罗斯军队最近在该地区取得了进展。[62]

10月7日或8日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的赫尔松州的俄罗斯军事目标发动袭击。乌克兰国家边防局10月8日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了赫尔松方向一处未指明区域的俄罗斯重型装备储存区，摧毁了一辆T-72坦克、一辆虎式装甲车、一辆油罐车和两门D-30榴弹炮。[63]

乌克兰的空袭目标是黑海地区的俄罗斯无人机基础设施。乌克兰总参谋部10月8日报告称，乌克兰军队于10月7日或10月7日至8日夜间袭击了黑海地区的一个俄罗斯网状网络中继器。[64] 网状网络中继器可以扩大俄罗斯无人机操作员控制攻击无人机和调整其飞行轨迹的范围。黑海地区的信号中继器使俄罗斯军队能够对敖德萨州、乌克兰与摩尔多瓦和罗马尼亚的边境口岸以及黑海西部地区的固定和动态目标进行更精确的无人机打击，而乌克兰对这些中继器的打击削弱了俄罗斯的这种能力。

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[65]

10月7日至8日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列无人机袭击。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队从奥廖尔和库尔斯克市、斯摩棱斯克州沙塔洛沃、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔迪斯克方向，发射了142架“沙赫德”型（包括82架喷气式无人机）、“格贝拉”型攻击无人机和“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[66] 乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了126架无人机，另有数量不明的无人机袭击了7个地点，还有4个地点落下了无人机碎片。

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

[1] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.89516979823467%2C37.795698065885254&z=10; https://t.me/rybar/83778 [2] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.89516979823467%2C37.795698065885254&z=10; https://t.me/rybar/83778; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/ [3] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.89516979823467%2C37.795698065885254&z=10; https://t.me/rybar/83778 [4] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2107864953042743420; https://t.me/stribat33oshp/2293 [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-27/ ; 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