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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6, 2026

Russia will significantly increase its purchase of foreign currency and gold between October 7 and November 6, 2026.

ISWStefaniia Bern查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势行动评估，2026年10月6日

Russia will significantly increase its purchase of foreign currency and gold between October 7 and November 6, 2026 in an effort to mitigate the effects of declining oil and gas export revenues. The Russian Ministry of Finance announced on October 5 that Russia will increase the funds allocated for purchasing foreign currency and gold by five times between October 7 and November 6, 2026, compared to the previous month’s allocations, resulting in a 10.2-billion-ruble (about $120.4 million) daily purchase increase.[1] The Ministry of Finance added that the actual Russian oil and gas revenues fell short of the expected baseline by 10.04 billion rubles (about $118.5 million) at the end of September 2026. Russia’s significant increase in the purchase of foreign currency and gold is likely meant to devalue the ruble, helping to offset the declining oil and gas revenues, given that Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure has severely impacted these revenue streams. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on October 5 that Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries have disabled over 51 percent of Russia’s total oil refining capacity.[2] Ukrainian forces have consistently targeted Russian oil refineries since early 2024 but have intensified their campaign against Russian oil refining, production, processing, storage, distribution, and export facilities since March 2026.[3] The increase in Russian purchases of foreign currency and gold is one of the indicators of Russia’s continued economic problems, such as labor and fuel shortages, and rising inflation.[4]

Russia’s recently intensified strike campaign against bridges in major Ukrainian cities has expanded to Zaporizhzhia City. Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Mykhailo Semikin stated on October 6 that Russian forces struck an unspecified bridge over the Dnipro River in Zaporizhzhia City with an unspecified aerial vehicle, temporarily halting traffic along the bridge.[5] Russia has recently intensified long-range drone strikes against Ukrainian bridges across the Dnipro River in Kyiv City and is likely expanding its strike campaign to include other major Ukrainian population centers.[6] Zaporizhzhia City is at the crossroads of multiple critical Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and serves as a critical transportation node for Ukrainian military logistics in Zaporizhia Oblast and southern Ukraine. Russia’s recent intensified strikes against bridges in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities are also intended to complicate civilian life within these major population centers by destroying civilian and residential infrastructure, introducing constant fear and uncertainty to daily life, and degrading the Ukrainian domestic economy.[7]

Russia will significantly increase its purchase of foreign currency and gold between October 7 and November 6, 2026 in an effort to mitigate the effects of declining oil and gas export revenues.

Russia’s recently intensified strike campaign against bridges in major Ukrainian cities has expanded to Zaporizhzhia City.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Orikhiv.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure overnight on October 5 to 6. Russia launched 137 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces appeared to have continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure overnight on October 5 to 6. Geolocated footage published on October 5 shows a large fire at the Volodyarskaya Linear Production and Dispatch Station in Konstantinovo, Moscow Oblast (roughly 442 kilometers from the international border), after a likely Ukrainian drone strike.[8] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Moscow Oblast overnight on October 5 to 6.[9]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances.[10] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 6 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Potapivka (northwest of Sumy City).[11]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

No significant activity in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 6. ISW will consider this axis in more detail in the coming days.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area on October 6, but ISW has not observed evidence of Russian advances.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Rublene (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack against the claimed Russian encirclement in northeast Kharkiv Oblast, where Russian sources previously claimed to have surrounded Ukrainian forces.[14] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian servicemembers are concerned that thinning vegetation will force Russian troops to withdraw to more defensible positions in the Velykyi Burluk direction, likely due to lack of solid concealment to hide from Ukrainian drones.[15]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Recent reporting indicates that Russian forces have intensified fighting in and near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk). [16]

Recent Ukrainian gains north and northeast of Lyman as part of Operation Vivaldi are likely creating cascading effects for Russian operations in the Borova direction (north of Lyman). A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces are struggling to repel Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Borova near Kolodyazi, Myrne, Ivanivka, and Novolyubivka and in the direction of the Zherebets River near Hrekivka, Novomykolaivka, and Katerynivka.[17] The source claimed that at least 8,000 Russian servicemembers have deserted the Western GoF’s area of responsibility (AoR, which spans from Kupyansk to Lyman) and that the Western GoF has been suffering over 1,000 casualties per week for the last six months as a result of Ukrainian counterattacks.[18]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and northwest, northeast, east, southwest, and south of Lyman on October 5 and 6 but did not advance.[19] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to infiltrate toward Yampil (southeast of Lyman) through the area around Myrne (northeast of Lyman) and advance along the Zherebets River using ravines, windbreaks, and terrain features for cover and concealment.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to infiltrate into Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) and claimed that Russian forces eliminated all Ukrainian infiltration groups, despite evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces control the settlement. [21] Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander Petro Horbatenko stated on September 19 that Ukrainian forces cleared Rai-Oleksandrivka, and ISW has observed evidence that Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive actions east of Slovyansk.[22]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Kramatorsk near Tykhonivka on October 5 and 6 but did not advance. [23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Ukrainian forces are reportedly expanding the area of their counterattacks in the Kostyantynivka direction. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on October 5 that Ukrainian forces reportedly began counterattacking towards Rusyn Yar in early October 2026.[24] Ukrainian forces recently began counterattacks in other areas of the Kostyantynivka direction, and the reports of Ukrainian counterattacks near Rusyn Yar indicate that Ukrainian forces are further expanding the area of their operations, likely facilitated by the recent reorganization of the Ukrainian command structure in Donetsk Oblast.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions within and south of Dobropillya amidst continued intensified Russian offensive operations south of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in southern Dobropillya and southern Shevchenko (south of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on October 6, after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novohryshyne, Vasylivka, and Chernihivka (all south of Dobropillya) on October 5 and 6.[27] Russian forces have maintained the highest offensive tempo across the frontline in the Dobropillya direction, demonstrating a continued Russian priority to encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest. Russian forces are likely attempting to advance northward from Pokrovsk (southeast of Dobropillya) to the southern outskirts of Dobropillya to concentrate manpower for a future offensive push toward the city.[28]

Russian milbloggers are using falsified claims of Ukrainian counterattacks northeast of Dobropillya to support the claim that Russian forces have partially encircled Dobropillya. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces fully control Novovodyane (north of Dobropillya) and are concentrating forces in Novovodyane, Maryivka, and Petrivka (both northeast of Novovodyane) in preparation for counterattacks toward Rubizhne (northeast of Dobropillya).[29] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya) and are attempting to cut off an alleged Russian salient that stretches from Toretske (northeast of Dobropillya) to Dobropillya.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed on September 22 that Russian forces had encircled Ukrainian forces in Dobropillya.[31] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian advances are at least 5.5 kilometers from Zolotyi Kolodyaz and at least five kilometers from Rubizhne. Russian milbloggers are likely making these false claims of Ukrainian counterattacks northeast of Dobropillya to uphold baseless claims about the existence of a Russian salient in the area.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military-industrial facilities in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian regiment reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Snizhne Machine Building Plant in occupied Donetsk Oblast, likely in occupied Snizhne (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline).[32] The regiment noted that the plant specializes in producing parts for gas turbine engines.

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

No significant activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 6. ISW will consider this axis in more detail in the coming days.

Russian forces are reportedly utilizing a combination of newly constructed fortified positions and former captured Ukrainian-constructed fortified positions for cover in the Oleksandrivka direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction stated on October 6 that Russian forces are using former Ukrainian fortified positions and are constructing new underground concrete fortifications to strengthen their defenses against Ukrainian counterattacks.[33]

Russian forces are not yet conducting mechanized assaults in the Oleksandrivka direction, but seasonal changes may soon change Russian tactics. The spokesperson for the Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction noted that Russian forces continue to leverage vegetative concealment to conduct infantry infiltration missions, but that soon this leaf cover will disappear, and the movement of these footmobile infantry groups will become more difficult, and Russian forces may rely more on conducting mechanized assaults.[34]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers continue to use likely AI-altered footage to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions. Russian sources published footage on October 6 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags in Holubkove (southwest of Oleksandrivka and northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 19 kilometers from the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances).[35] The Russian MoD subsequently claimed that Russian forces seized Holubkove.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that the seizure of Holubkove primes Russian forces for future advances towards Novomykolaivka (northwest of Holubkove and a major Ukrainian ground line of communication [GLOC]).[37] ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces have advanced near Holubkove. Russian forces may view Novomykolaivka as a key operational objective, as it serves as a major hub for Ukrainian GLOCs to both western Zaporizhia Oblast and Oleksandrivka, but it remains unlikely that Russian forces will be able to meaningfully advance towards, much less seize, this objective any time soon.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently either advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces maintain positions southeast of Novoselivka (west of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on October 5, in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[38] Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in northern Novoandriivka (southwest of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on October 5, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 6 that Russian forces are conducting clearing operations in Novoandriivka, despite this available evidence to the contrary.[40]

Ukrainian strikes have collapsed a key bridge connecting occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source analyzed satellite imagery collected on September 26 and September 30 showing that Ukrainian strikes have collapsed the Chonhar Bridge, which connects occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.[41] The account reported that the satellite imagery from September 26 shows three large holes in the bridge and that the September 30 imagery shows that the bridge had collapsed. A satellite image from mid-August 2026 shows damage to the bridge but shows the bridge intact.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian communications infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck two Russian mobile communications stations along the E-105 Simferopol-Melitopol highway east of Oleksiivka (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on October 5.[42]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [43]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 137 Shahed-type (including 49 jet-powered drones) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and from over the Sea of Azov.[44] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 114 drones, that unspecified air vehicles struck 17 locations, and that debris fell on four locations.

Russia presented ground terminals for the Rassvet satellite internet constellation that will enable Russian forces to increase the range and precision of long-range drone strikes. Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440, which is developing the Russian Rassvet constellation, presented on October 6 three models of ground terminals that allow users to connect to the constellation and access the internet.[45] Bureau 1440 stated that the three models differ in size, connection speeds, and the ability to provide fast-moving vehicles with uninterrupted connection. The lack of mobile ground terminals currently constrains Russian forces’ use of the Rassvet satellite network even during the limited windows of connectivity that occur when flying drones in Ukraine. A broad adoption of mobile Rassvet ground terminals and a further expansion of the existing Rassvet satellite constellation would allow Russian forces to significantly improve their long-range precision strike capabilities and communications on the frontline.[46] The integration of portable Rassvet terminals into tactical and long-range strike drones would enable Russian forces to control and transmit data to drones at a range limited only by the Rassvet satellite constellation’s coverage and increase the drones’ precision and resistance to conventional EW systems. Russian forces currently rely on mesh radio networks to conduct long-range precision drone strikes, which limits the range at which Russian operators can maintain a connection and live operator control over the drones.

Unidentified drones struck three cargo ships off the Bulgarian and Romanian coasts in the Black Sea. The Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that on the morning of October 5 that a fire broke out on a vessel in the Romanian exclusive economic zone, approximately 30 nautical miles south of Sfantul Gheorghe, causing two deaths and sinking the ship.[47] Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev stated on October 6 that unidentified aerial and naval drones struck two merchant ships in the Bulgarian exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, roughly 70 nautical miles east of Byala, sinking one vessel and killing its crew, and injuring two crewmembers aboard the second vessel.[48] An open-source X channel identified the two ships that drones struck off the coast of Bulgaria as the Able (IMO 9001136) and the Alfa Watan (IMO 7510884).[49]

Ukraine continues to develop and produce cost-effective countermeasures to Russian jet-powered drones and small cruise missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 5 that Ukraine is currently sourcing F-16 fighter jet ammunition from across the globe and that F-16 jets are one of the most effective countermeasures to Russian jet-powered Geran drones.[50] Zelensky added that he and French President Emmanuel Macron agreed that Ukrainian pilots will begin training on French Rafale jets. Ukrainian forces rely on internal 20mm rotary cannons and air-to-air missiles to down Russian air targets, particularly jet-powered strike drones.[51] Development, production, and procurement of cost-effective countermeasures to Russian jet-powered drones and small cruise missiles are vital to Ukraine’s efforts to enhance the adaptability and resilience of Ukrainian air defenses against emerging Russian technological adaptations, including those Russia might field after Ukraine develops effective counters to jet-powered drones. These potential Ukrainian measures include propeller-driven and jet-powered drone interceptors, cost-effective surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), automated and manned machine gun turrets, and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), which will allow Ukraine to develop an adaptable and layered air defense capable of effectively countering new Russian weapons.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://minfin.gov dot ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=40664-o_neftegazovykh_dokhodakh_i_provedenii_operatsii_po_pokupkeprodazhe_inostrannoi_valyuty_i_zolota_na_vnutrennem_valyutnom_rynke [2] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/16309 [3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; 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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/ [5] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68144 [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/ ; 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[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/10/06/%c2%abvoda-rozbyvayetsya-ob-zemlyu-suhpaj-%e2%80%94-rozlitayetsya%c2%bb-u-79-j-brygadi-rozpovily-yak-okupanty-zalyshayutsya-bez-postachannya/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM&feature=youtu.be [35] https://t.me/voin_dv/21443 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3656 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2107370491246002182 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2107372405614342283 [36] https://t.me/mod_russia/67981 [37] https://t.me/voin_dv/21443 ; https://t.me/sashakots/64905 [38] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2107199114064896460 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21437 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ [39] https://t.me/zapravdu_1429/3627 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2107181738254549194 [40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56536 [41] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8230 [42] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2107202646381580380; https://x.com/413_raid/status/2107069587254608320 [43] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [44] https://t.me/kpszsu/83263 [45] https://t.me/bureau_1440/174 [46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/ [47] https://www.mai dot gov.ro/structurile-ministerului-afacerilor-interne-misiune-complexa-pentru-salvarea-echipajului-unei-nave-care-s-a-scufundat-in-marea-neagra/ [48] https://www.government dot bg/special/bg/prestsentar/novini/rumen-radev-atakata-sreshtu-dva-targovski-koraba-v-balgarskata-ikonomicheska-zona-e-absolyutno-nedopustima?utm_source=chatgpt.com [49] https://x.com/DefenceGeek/status/2107388556163367184 [50] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/uzhe-ye-paketi-v-dorozi-i-she-bude-dodatkovo-shob-u-nashih-l-106749 [51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/

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