Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 7, 2026俄罗斯攻势评估,2026年10月7日
Russia launched a massive & deadly combined drone & missile strike package across northern, eastern, & western Ukraine on October 6 to 7.

Russia launched a massive and deadly combined drone and missile strike package across northern, eastern, and western Ukraine on the night of October 6 to 7 — killing and wounding at least 128 civilians, including at least five children. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched an unspecified number of anti-ship and ballistic missiles, 48 Kh-101 or Iskander-K or Kalibr cruise missiles, and 130 strike (including 46 jet-powered) and decoy drones against Ukraine on the night of October 6 to 7 — primarily targeting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[1] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes killed 20 and injured 55 in Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast; killed one and injured two in Zaporizhzhia City, Zaporizhia Oblast; killed two and injured three in Oleksandriya, Kirovohrad Oblast; and killed two and injured 41 in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[2] Russian forces also conducted Iskander-M ballistic missile and drone strikes against logistics, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City, Kyiv Oblast, injuring two.[3] Russia’s massive October 6 to 7 strike package purposefully impacted a geographically diverse set of targets across Ukraine as part of Russia’s ongoing effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and maximize civilian harm by targeting civilian, transportation, energy, and logistics infrastructure and further degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and economy ahead of Winter 2026-2027.[4] Russia intends for these strikes to complicate civilian life by increasing brutality and lethality — destroying civilian and residential infrastructure, introducing constant fear and uncertainty to daily life, and degrading the domestic Ukrainian economy.[5] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated that escalated Russian strikes on civilians inflicted more Ukrainian casualties from January to August 2026 than in all of 2025.[6] Russian forces caused at least 15,280 civilian deaths and injuries in Ukraine during the first eight months of 2026, a 55 percent increase compared to the same period in 2025.[7]
Recent Russian technological adaptations to jet-powered Geran-type drones allow Russian forces to focus cruise and ballistic missile strikes on a smaller, more specific target set without significantly increasing missile expenditure. Several Russian milbloggers observed on October 7 that Russian forces are leveraging multiple, high-volume waves of drones and missiles concentrated on a limited number of targets, rather than conducting missile strikes against a larger number of separate targets across a wider geographic area.[8] Russian forces frequently use concentrated drone and missile strikes to overwhelm localized Ukrainian air defenses and destroy urban centers.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces concentrated 30 cruise missiles against Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast, and Oleksandriya and Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast, alone during the October 6 to 7 strike package.[10] Russia’s jet-powered Geran drones can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses at greater operational depths compared to conventional Geran-type drones, partly enabling Russia’s ability to rapidly escalate and concentrate cruise and ballistic missile strike packages launched in multiple waves against priority targets across Ukraine.[11]
Russia will likely leverage this new strike pattern as it prepares to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure during what will likely be a brutal Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign.[12] Russia’s jet-powered drone advantage is contributing to Russia’s increasingly concentrated, brutal, and deadly strike campaign tactics that also increasingly strain Ukrainian air defenses and degrade civilian and critical infrastructure, making civilian life in Ukrainian cities unbearable and degrading the Ukrainian economy. Russia likely intends to use its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign to try and break Ukrainian morale and make daily life in Ukraine untenable such that Ukraine capitulates to Russia’s demands, although these tactics have not worked in the past and are unlikely to work this winter. The development, production, and procurement of cost-effective countermeasures to Russian jet-powered drones and small cruise missiles are vital to Ukraine’s efforts to enhance the adaptability and resilience of its air defense umbrella against emerging Russian technological adaptations, including those Russia might field after Ukraine develops effective counters to jet-powered drones. Russia’s increasingly large strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, with both US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other forms of air defense, for a diverse, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[13]
The Kremlin is consolidating strategic logistics assets under Russian state control. Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom announced on October 7 that it acquired the remaining 51 percent stake in Delo Group (Russia’s largest logistics and transportation operator), combining with Rosatom’s existing 49 percent stake, which it acquired between December 2019 and August 2022, to take 100 percent ownership of Delo Group.[14] Rosatom stated that it plans to consolidate all Rosatom logistics, including Delo Group assets, to create Russia’s largest national logistics company, representing 50 percent of Russia’s total container handling market and 44 percent of its rail container shipping market.[15] Delo Group companies include rail, container, port, multimodal logistics, information technology (IT), and shipping operators, and their combined assets include seven marine container terminals, one grain terminal, 46 railway container terminals, approximately 40,000 container flatcars, and 11 vessels; Delo Group operates strategic port infrastructure in the Baltic and Black Sea basins and in the Russian Far East.[16] Rosatom’s acquisition of Delo stake comes against the backdrop of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, which has significantly disrupted Delo operations in port areas such as Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[17] The Russian government now controls the majority of Russia’s logistics and transportation market through state-owned companies like Rosatom, likely in the hopes of achieving greater control over the cost of shipping and over the defense of the logistics network, amid Ukrainian strikes.
Russia launched a massive and deadly combined drone and missile strike package across northern, eastern, and western Ukraine on the night of October 6 to 7— killing and wounding at least 135 civilians, including at least four children.
Recent Russian technological adaptations to jet-powered Geran-type drones allow Russian forces to focus cruise and ballistic missile strikes on a smaller, more specific target set without significantly increasing missile expenditure.
The Kremlin is consolidating strategic logistics assets under Russian state control.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Oleksandrivka.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck two oil facilities and a training ground in Perm Krai and Samara and Astrakhan oblasts, as well as unspecified targets in the Black Sea.[18] Footage published on October 6 shows a Russian oil tanker on fire in the port of Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, following a likely Ukrainian strike.[19] Russian authorities claimed that Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) struck a Liberian-flagged oil tanker off the Black Sea coast.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck unspecified targets at the Seshcha Air Base in Seshcha, Bryansk Oblast (approximately 148 kilometers from the international border).[21]
Ukrainian sources provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDAs) for recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukraine’s October 2 strike against the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 937 kilometers from the international border), damaged 11 RVS-2000 oil tanks, three RVSPK-50000 oil tanks, a section of pipelines, and an automated petroleum products loading station.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine’s October 4 strike against the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant in Astrakhan City, Astrakhan Oblast (roughly 810 kilometers from the frontline), damaged elements of two gas purification units and the U-1731 secondary distillation unit.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 7 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[23] Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced near Korenok (northwest of Sumy City), Korchakivka (north of Sumy City), and Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City).[24]
Ukrainian forces continued their short- and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian electronic warfare (EW) station near Grinevo, Bryansk Oblast (approximately 21 kilometers from the international border), and a Russian radar station in Yelionka, Bryansk Oblast (approximately 12 kilometers from the international border) — all on October 6 or overnight into October 7.[25]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission east of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) as Russian milbloggers continue to exaggerate claims of Russian advances near the seam between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Bulruk directions. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember southeast of Khrypuny (east of Vovchansk), according to geolocated footage published on October 6, after a likely Russian infiltration mission.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 6 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Loshakove (east of Vovchansk) and east of Vilkhuvatka (southeast of Vovchansk and northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[27] Russian milbloggers continue to make increasingly exaggerated claims of Russian advances northeast of Kharkiv City, likely in an attempt to reinforce the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in this area.[28]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Kupyansk and southeast of Kupyansk near Kivsharivka and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on October 6 and 7 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in northern Kupyansk.[29]
Russian forces are increasingly using reconnaissance drones in the Kupyansk direction. The commander of a Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on October 7 that Russian forces are using reconnaissance drones, including the Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone, at scale in the Kupyansk direction.[30] The commander noted that specialized Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) units were previously the primary operators of the reconnaissance drones and that Russian forces are using navigator-pilot pairs and spotter groups to more effectively operate new reconnaissance drones in the Kupyansk direction.
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on October 7 that Ukrainian forces control Novoplatonivka (north of Borova) and Hrekivka and Druzhelyubivka (both southeast of Borova) contrary to Russian claims of control over the settlements.[31]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks toward the eastern bank of the Zherebets River northeast of Lyman, as Russian forces struggle to contain Ukrainian gains from Operation Vivaldi. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks along the Zherebets River.[32] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian manpower and drone superiority are preventing Russian forces from consolidating positions around Lyman itself. The milblogger’s claims are consistent with recent reports of continued successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction that ISW has observed.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian forces are reportedly redeploying personnel to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion reported on October 7 that the Russian military command is transferring additional forces, including USF and Spetsnaz elements, from deprioritized areas of the front line to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction to create conditions for combined arms operations and the attempted seizure of the agglomeration before the onset of winter.[34] The current Russian rate of advance precludes Russian forces from completing the Russian military command’s delusional goal of seizing the Fortress Belt by this deadline, even with additional personnel in the area.
Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission east of Kramatorsk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in western Malynivka (east of Kramatorsk), according to geolocated footage published on October 7, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian forces continued offensive operations within and west of Kostyantynivka on October 6 and 7 but did not advance.[36]
Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against frontline settlements north of Kostyantynivka to set conditions for future offensives. The Russian MoD claimed on October 7 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against purported Ukrainian positions near Molocharka (north of Kostyantynivka).[37] Russian forces regularly conduct glide bomb strikes against settlements in the near rear, in part to create ruins that Russian infantry can use for cover and concealment during subsequent ground offensive operations.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian forces continued offensive operations within and east to southwest of Dobropillya on October 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Dobropillya.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing west along the Vodyana River to reach Novofedorivka and Kryvorizhzhya (both west of Dobropillya).[40]
The Russian MoD is continuing to falsely claim that Russian forces are operating within Dobropillya despite continued Ukrainian reporting about the lack of Russian positions in the town and about Ukrainian advances near Dobropillya. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Dobropillya area reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces cleared tens of Russian positions near Hruzke and Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Dobropillya) over an unspecified timeframe.[41] The Russian MoD claimed on October 7 that Russian forces captured the park area, the community center, and two production facilities at the mine in Dobropillya.[42] ISW has not observed any evidence to suggest that Russian forces have advanced into Dobropillya beyond limited infiltration efforts that do not constitute doctrinal control of terrain. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly refuted Russian claims that Russian forces have consolidated positions in Dobropillya.[43]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 7.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Oleksandrivka. Russian forces struck Ukrainian servicemembers north of Komar (east of Oleksandrivka), according to geolocated footage published on October 6.[44] Russian milbloggers previously acknowledged that Ukrainian forces liberated Perebudova (just north of Komar) and contested Russian control over the settlement.[45]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 6 and 7 but did not advance.[46]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6 and 7, likely as part of efforts to envelop Orikhiv from the west and east, but did not advance.[47]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 7.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [48]
See topline text for reports on Russia’s overnight strikes against Ukraine.
Russian forces continue to strike civilian vessels in national and international waters of the Black Sea, posing an increased risk to civilian freedom of navigation in this area. Zelensky confirmed on October 6 that Russian forces conducted a combined drone and USV strike against two vessels in the Bulgarian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Black Sea on October 6, sinking one vessel and severely damaging the other.[49] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 6 that Russian strikes against civilian vessels in international waters represent the expansion of Russian aggressive behavior and are increasingly posing a risk to civilian freedom of navigation.[50]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/83516
[2] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107732058978046439?s=20 ; https://www.facebook.com/UA.National.Police/posts/pfbid027FYzNE6jeT6hoM2zGeLaCUAHTnWfdxejJoxtRPkEJoZo1C7DAqevQmXdpR6Fd5XSl?__cft__[0]=AZh74bAJLthsrLfoa_KB5j_ciBZa7u-BWKweQ_ctUAu4ZJe5W8ygiAL09cSl60275Xi9CuAOBHsl2o6JGjmGfhnU5rtEayCLXnttfVozCkxXd2tvmeiaOWsIoaQsKQKQRP_fCdSiMvlAOPM69lXolz2N8Gw3Zz0yLozHuyUo_9pISDuDd88qHAeTbCooK0P_1_bF3CBbkJ0mXy4HUY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-y-R ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68148 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68156 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68164 ; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/27302 ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34962 ; https://www.facebook.com/sergio.fedorenko/posts/pfbid02GZACocFAikUV2ycUo8RDdnbAqLAo3nce41j8Fd2fRnkwFq8dDpix1LdRLj2M9XW6l?rdid=iMp0uQ6KJGUo27FE ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34936 ; https://poltava.to/news/88492/ ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34936
[3] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2999 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/3001 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/60428 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7777 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7778 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/778 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7783 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7785 ; https://suspilne dot media/culture/1421255-rosijska-ataka-na-kiiv-ulamki-poskodili-paviljoni-kinostudii-dovzenka/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026 /; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/
[6] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/12750
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/
[8] https://t.me/wargonzo/37452; https://t.me/dva_majors/100111
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-26/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-5/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/
[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/100111
[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-inexpensive-quasi-cruise-missiles-an-emerging-threat-for-ukraines-air-defenses/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/
[14] https://atommedia dot online/press-releases/zayavlenie-generalnogo-direktora-goskorporatsii-rosatom-o-priobretenii-stoprotsentnoy-doli-v-gk-delo/ ; https://www.rbc dot ru/business/18/02/2026/699488f49a79479b935715c2 ; https://www.delo-group dot com/news/801/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[15] https://www.delo-group dot com/news/801/
[16] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/9008103
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2025/
[18] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107739631206768705?s=20
[19] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2107499481063436492; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2107498484253511875 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2107498197564440791?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2107467835253399859?s=20
[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/399089 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399090 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399091 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399092
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42497
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42498 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445; https://t.me/severnnyi/9536
[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/severnnyi/9536; https://t.me/z_arhiv/34046
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42497
[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13146 ; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/4594
[27] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34052
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/grvZapad/20012; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445
[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/07/vtrachayut-polkovnykiv-fsb-yaki-pilotuyut-drony-ahilles-rozpoviv-pro-polyuvannya-na-pilotiv-novitnih-orlaniv-10/; https://youtu.be/lmGmAk4bAvU?t=782
[31] https://t.me/grvZapad/20012
[32] https://t.me/rybar/83751
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/
[34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1421357-rf-perekidae-specpidrozdili-j-operatoriv-droniv-na-kramatorskij-napramok-67-ombr/
[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13151; https://t.me/stribat33oshp/2293
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445
[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/68014
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/rybar/83750 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445
[40] https://t.me/rybar/83750
[41] https://t.me/skala425/1005; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGUxhDV4Zn4&t=1s; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/06/azov-ta-skelya-vidkynuly-rosijski-vijska-v-rajoni-dobropillya/
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/68023
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-updates-september-2026-present/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/
[44] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2107474630403412156; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13147 ; https://t.me/btr80/41853
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/
[46]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21455
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445; https://t.me/voin_dv/21455
[48] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[49] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107542545848787104?s=20; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21253; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ye-onovlena-informaciya-vid-rozvidki-pro-pidgotovku-rosiyana-106769 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/
[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/06/%c2%abde-ta-mezha-yaku-rosiya-ne-mozhe-perestupaty%c2%bb-udary-po-sudnah-u-vidkrytomu-mori-rozshyryuyut-geografiyu-agresiyi/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
10月6日至7日夜间,俄罗斯对乌克兰北部、东部和西部发动了大规模的无人机和导弹联合袭击,造成至少128名平民伤亡,其中包括至少5名儿童。乌克兰空军报告称,俄罗斯于10月6日至7日夜间向乌克兰发射了数量不明的反舰导弹和弹道导弹、48枚Kh-101或“伊斯坎德尔-K”或“口径”巡航导弹,以及130架攻击无人机(包括46架喷气式无人机)和诱饵无人机,主要目标是基辅、哈尔科夫、波尔塔瓦和第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州。[1] 乌克兰官员报告称,俄罗斯的袭击造成切尔尼戈夫州普里卢基20人死亡、55人受伤;扎波罗热州扎波罗热市1人死亡、2人受伤;基洛沃格勒州奥列克桑德里亚2人死亡、3人受伤;在波尔塔瓦州克列缅丘格,俄罗斯军队发动空袭,造成两人死亡,41人受伤。[2] 俄罗斯军队还在基辅州基辅市使用“伊斯坎德尔-M”弹道导弹和无人机袭击了后勤、工业和民用基础设施,造成两人受伤。[3] 10月6日至7日,俄罗斯发动大规模空袭,旨在打击乌克兰境内地理位置分散的目标,这是俄罗斯持续打击乌克兰防空系统、通过袭击民用、交通、能源和后勤基础设施来最大程度地伤害平民,并在2026-2027年冬季之前进一步削弱乌克兰能源基础设施和经济的行动的一部分。[4] 俄罗斯意图通过增加残酷性和致命性来加剧平民生活的困境——摧毁民用和住宅基础设施,给日常生活带来持续的恐惧和不确定性,并削弱乌克兰国内经济。[5]乌克兰人权监察员德米特罗·卢比涅茨表示,俄罗斯对平民的袭击升级,2026 年 1 月至 8 月造成的乌克兰伤亡人数超过了 2025 年全年的伤亡人数。[6] 2026 年前八个月,俄罗斯军队在乌克兰造成至少 15280 名平民伤亡,比 2025 年同期增加了 55%。[7]
俄罗斯近期对喷气式“格朗”无人机的技术改进,使得俄军能够在不显著增加导弹消耗的情况下,将巡航导弹和弹道导弹的打击目标范围缩小至更小、更具体的区域。多位俄罗斯军事博主于10月7日指出,俄军正利用多波高密度无人机和导弹集中打击有限数量的目标,而非像以往那样对更广阔地理区域内的众多独立目标进行导弹打击。[8] 俄军经常使用集中式无人机和导弹打击来压制乌克兰局部防空系统并摧毁城市中心。[9] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称,在10月6日至7日的打击行动中,俄军仅在克列缅丘格、波尔塔瓦州以及基洛沃格勒州的奥列克桑德里亚和斯维特洛沃茨克就集中发射了30枚巡航导弹。[10]与传统的格朗型无人机相比,俄罗斯的喷气式格朗无人机能够更可靠地突破乌克兰的防空系统,并进入更大的作战纵深,这在一定程度上使俄罗斯能够迅速升级并集中对乌克兰境内重点目标进行多波次巡航导弹和弹道导弹打击。[11]
俄罗斯很可能利用这种新的打击模式,准备在2026-2027年冬季对乌克兰能源基础设施发动一场残酷的打击行动。[12] 俄罗斯在喷气式无人机方面的优势,使其打击行动日益集中、残酷且致命,这不仅加剧了乌克兰防空系统的压力,也破坏了民用和关键基础设施,使乌克兰城市居民的生活苦不堪言,并损害了乌克兰经济。俄罗斯很可能打算利用2026-2027年冬季的打击行动,试图摧毁乌克兰的士气,使乌克兰的日常生活难以为继,从而迫使乌克兰屈服于俄罗斯的要求。然而,这些策略过去并未奏效,而且今年冬天也不太可能奏效。开发、生产和采购经济有效的反制俄罗斯喷气式无人机和小型巡航导弹的措施,对于乌克兰增强其防空体系的适应性和韧性,以应对俄罗斯不断涌现的技术变革至关重要,包括俄罗斯在乌克兰研发出有效反制喷气式无人机的手段后可能部署的技术。俄罗斯日益大规模的打击行动不断凸显西方援助在加强乌克兰防空能力方面的关键作用,这包括美国制造的“爱国者”防空系统(能够有效应对俄罗斯弹道导弹)以及其他形式的防空系统,从而构建一个多样化、装备精良的防空体系。[13]
克里姆林宫正在将战略物流资产整合到俄罗斯国家控制之下。俄罗斯国家原子能公司(Rosatom)于10月7日宣布,已收购德洛集团(Delo Group,俄罗斯最大的物流和运输运营商)剩余的51%股份,加上Rosatom在2019年12月至2022年8月期间收购的49%股份,从而100%控股德洛集团。[14] Rosatom表示,计划整合所有Rosatom物流业务,包括德洛集团的资产,以打造俄罗斯最大的国家物流公司,该公司将占据俄罗斯集装箱处理市场50%的份额和铁路集装箱运输市场44%的份额。[15] 德洛集团旗下公司涵盖铁路、集装箱、港口、多式联运物流、信息技术(IT)和航运运营商,其合并资产包括7个海运集装箱码头、1个粮食码头、46个铁路集装箱码头、约4万节集装箱平板车和11艘船舶;德洛集团在波罗的海和黑海盆地以及俄罗斯远东地区运营战略港口基础设施。[16] 俄罗斯国家原子能公司收购德洛集团股份的背景是乌克兰的长期打击行动,这场行动严重扰乱了德洛集团在克拉斯诺达尔边疆区新罗西斯克等港口地区的运营。[17] 俄罗斯政府现在通过俄罗斯国家原子能公司等国有企业控制着俄罗斯大部分的物流和运输市场,这可能是希望在乌克兰打击行动中更好地控制航运成本和物流网络的安全。
10月6日至7日夜间,俄罗斯对乌克兰北部、东部和西部发动了大规模致命的无人机和导弹联合打击行动,造成至少135名平民伤亡,其中包括至少4名儿童。
俄罗斯最近对喷气式“格朗”型无人机进行的技术改进,使得俄罗斯军队能够在不大幅增加导弹支出的情况下,将巡航导弹和弹道导弹打击集中在更小、更具体的目标集上。
克里姆林宫正在将战略后勤资产整合到俄罗斯国家控制之下。
乌克兰军队最近向奥列克桑德里夫卡以东推进。
乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯石油基础设施发动远程打击行动。
我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行,因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道,而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响,特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行,尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。
乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动
乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯石油基础设施和军事目标发动远程打击。乌克兰总统泽连斯基于10月7日报告称,乌克兰军队袭击了彼尔姆边疆区、萨马拉州和阿斯特拉罕州的两处石油设施和一个训练场,以及黑海的未指明目标。[18] 10月6日公布的视频显示,一艘俄罗斯油轮在克拉斯诺达尔边疆区索契港起火,很可能是遭到乌克兰军队的袭击。[19] 俄罗斯当局声称,乌克兰无人水面艇(USV)在黑海沿岸袭击了一艘悬挂利比里亚国旗的油轮。[20] 乌克兰总参谋部于10月7日报告称,乌克兰军队袭击了布良斯克州谢恰的谢恰空军基地(距国际边界约148公里)的未指明目标。[21]
乌克兰方面提供了近期乌克兰对俄罗斯油气基础设施发动袭击的最新战场损失评估报告。乌克兰总参谋部10月7日报告称,乌克兰10月2日对位于萨马拉州普罗斯韦特附近(距国际边界约937公里)的萨马拉线性生产和调度站的袭击,造成11个RVS-2000型油罐、3个RVSPK-50000型油罐、一段管道和一个自动化石油产品装载站受损。[22] 乌克兰总参谋部还报告称,乌克兰10月4日对位于阿斯特拉罕州阿斯特拉罕市(距前线约810公里)的阿斯特拉罕天然气处理厂的袭击,造成两套天然气净化装置和U-1731型二次蒸馏装置的部件受损。
俄罗斯的支持行动:北方轴心国
10 月 7 日,俄军在苏梅州北部继续进行有限的进攻行动,但由于乌克兰军队的反击,俄军并未取得确切进展。[23] 俄罗斯军事博客作者和有关俄罗斯北方部队的消息来源声称,俄军在科列诺克(苏梅市西北部)、科尔恰基夫卡(苏梅市北部)和新米特里夫卡(苏梅市东南部)附近推进。[24]
乌克兰军队继续对布良斯克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行短程和中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部于10月7日报告称,乌克兰军队袭击了布良斯克州格里涅沃附近的一个俄罗斯电子战站(距国际边界约21公里)和布良斯克州叶利翁卡的一个俄罗斯雷达站(距国际边界约12公里)——所有这些袭击均发生在10月6日或10月7日夜间。[25]
俄罗斯的支持行动:哈尔科夫州
俄罗斯军队近期在沃夫昌斯克(哈尔科夫市东北部)以东地区进行了一次渗透行动,与此同时,俄罗斯军事博客作者不断夸大俄军在沃夫昌斯克和韦利基布尔鲁克方向交界处附近取得的进展。根据10月6日发布的地理定位视频显示,在一次疑似俄军渗透行动之后,乌克兰军队在赫里普尼(沃夫昌斯克以东)东南部袭击了一名俄罗斯军人。[26] 10月6日,一名俄罗斯军事博客作者声称,俄军在洛沙科夫(沃夫昌斯克以东)西南方向和维尔胡瓦特卡(沃夫昌斯克东南部,韦利基布尔鲁克东北部)以东推进。[27] 俄罗斯军事博客作者不断夸大俄军在哈尔科夫市东北部的进展,这很可能是为了佐证俄罗斯国防部关于俄军已包围该地区乌克兰军队的说法。[28]
俄罗斯的支持行动:奥斯基尔河
10 月 6 日和 7 日,俄军在库皮扬斯克附近以及库皮扬斯克东南部的基夫沙里夫卡和库皮扬斯克-武兹洛维附近继续进行有限的进攻行动,但并未取得进展,因为乌克兰军队在库皮扬斯克北部进行了反击。[29]
俄罗斯军队在库皮扬斯克方向越来越多地使用侦察无人机。10月7日,一名在库皮扬斯克方向作战的乌克兰无人系统部队(USF)旅指挥官报告称,俄罗斯军队正在库皮扬斯克方向大规模使用侦察无人机,包括“奥兰-10”侦察无人机。[30] 该指挥官指出,此前俄罗斯联邦安全局(FSB)的特种部队是侦察无人机的主要操作单位,而现在俄罗斯军队正在使用导航员-飞行员组合和观察员小组,以便在库皮扬斯克方向更有效地操作新型侦察无人机。
10 月 7 日,有消息人士称,俄罗斯西部部队 (GoF) 控制了新普拉托尼夫卡(博罗瓦以北)以及赫雷基夫卡和德鲁热柳比夫卡(均位于博罗瓦东南),这与俄罗斯声称控制这些定居点的说法相悖。[31]
俄罗斯主要目标:夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领
俄军下属主要行动一:从西北方向包围要塞带
乌克兰军队继续向莱曼东北部的杰列贝茨河东岸发起反攻,而俄军则努力遏制乌克兰军队在“维瓦尔第行动”中取得的进展。一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博主声称,乌克兰军队继续沿杰列贝茨河发起反攻。[32] 该博主指出,乌克兰军队的人力和无人机优势阻止了俄军在莱曼附近巩固阵地。该博主的说法与ISW观察到的近期关于乌克兰军队在莱曼方向持续成功反攻的报告相符。[33]
俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带
据报道,俄军正在向斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克地区重新部署人员。一名乌克兰营长于10月7日报告称,俄军指挥部正将包括美国驻俄部队和特种部队在内的更多兵力从前线非优先区域调往斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克方向,以创造联合兵种作战条件,并在冬季来临前试图夺取该地区。[34] 即使向该地区增派兵力,俄军目前的推进速度也无法实现俄军指挥部在此期限内夺取“要塞带”的妄想目标。
俄罗斯军队在克拉马托尔斯克以东进行了一次渗透行动。根据 10 月 7 日发布的地理定位视频,乌克兰军队袭击了位于克拉马托尔斯克以东马利尼夫卡西部的俄罗斯阵地,而 ISW 评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[35]
俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进
10 月 6 日和 7 日,俄军继续在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡及其以西地区发动进攻,但并未取得进展。[36]
俄军持续对科斯蒂扬蒂尼夫卡以北的前线居民点进行滑翔炸弹袭击,为未来的进攻创造条件。俄罗斯国防部于10月7日声称,俄军对莫洛恰尔卡(科斯蒂扬蒂尼夫卡以北)附近的所谓乌克兰阵地进行了FAB-500滑翔炸弹袭击。[37] 俄军经常对近后方居民点进行滑翔炸弹袭击,部分原因是制造废墟,以便俄军步兵在随后的地面进攻行动中利用这些废墟作为掩护和隐蔽。[38]
俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带
10月6日和7日,俄军继续在多布罗皮利亚境内及东南部发动进攻,但由于乌克兰军队在多布罗皮利亚东北部进行反击,俄军并未取得确切进展。[39] 一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者声称,俄军正沿沃迪亚纳河向西推进,目标是新费多里夫卡和克里沃里日亚(均位于多布罗皮利亚以西)。[40]
尽管乌克兰方面持续报告称,俄军在多布罗皮利亚镇内没有阵地,且乌克兰军队在多布罗皮利亚附近取得进展,但俄罗斯国防部仍继续错误地声称俄军在多布罗皮利亚镇内作战。10月6日,一个在多布罗皮利亚地区作战的乌克兰团报告称,乌克兰军队在一段未指明的时间内清除了赫鲁兹克和新米科拉伊夫卡(均位于多布罗皮利亚东北部)附近的数十个俄军阵地。[41] 10月7日,俄罗斯国防部声称俄军占领了多布罗皮利亚矿区的公园、社区中心和两处生产设施。[42] 国际安全观察组织(ISW)没有发现任何证据表明俄军已推进到多布罗皮利亚镇内,其行动仅限于有限的渗透,并不构成对地形的理论控制。乌克兰军队也多次驳斥俄罗斯关于俄军已巩固在多布罗皮利亚阵地的说法。[43]
俄罗斯支援行动:进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州
10 月 7 日,俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告新巴甫洛夫卡方向有地面活动。
乌克兰军队最近向奥列克桑德里夫卡以东推进。根据 10 月 6 日发布的地理定位视频显示,俄罗斯军队袭击了科马尔(奥列克桑德里夫卡以东)以北的乌克兰军人。[44] 俄罗斯军事博客作者此前承认,乌克兰军队解放了佩列布多瓦(就在科马尔以北),并对俄罗斯对该定居点的控制权提出异议。[45]
俄罗斯的支持行动:南方轴心
10月6日和7日,俄军继续向胡利亚波列方向发起进攻,但并未取得进展。[46]
10 月 6 日和 7 日,俄军在扎波罗热州西部进行了有限的进攻行动,这很可能是为了从东西两面包围奥里希夫,但俄军并未取得进展。[47]
10月7日,俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。
俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动
注:自 8 月 11 日起,乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[48]
请参阅新闻摘要,了解有关俄罗斯连夜袭击乌克兰的报道。
俄罗斯军队持续袭击黑海国家水域和国际水域的民用船只,对该地区民用航行自由构成日益严重的威胁。泽连斯基于10月6日证实,俄罗斯军队于10月6日在保加利亚专属经济区内对两艘船只发动了无人机和无人水面艇联合袭击,击沉一艘船只,并严重损坏另一艘。[49] 乌克兰海军发言人德米特罗·普列琴丘克上校于10月6日表示,俄罗斯对国际水域民用船只的袭击代表着俄罗斯侵略行为的扩张,并日益对民用航行自由构成威胁。[50]
白俄罗斯的重大活动
没有什么重大事项需要报告。
注:ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料,仅使用公开信息,并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体,以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。
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[15] https://www.delo-group.com/news/801/
[16] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/9008103
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[18] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107739631206768705?s=20
[19] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2107499481063436492; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2107498484253511875 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2107498197564440791?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2107467835253399859?s=20
[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/399089;https://t.me/tass_agency/399090;https://t.me/tass_agency/399091;https://t.me/tass_agency/399092
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42497
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42498;https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445; https://t.me/severnnyi/9536
[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/severnnyi/9536; https://t.me/z_arhiv/34046
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42497
[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13146 ; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/4594
[27] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34052
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[30] https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/10/07/vtrachayut-polkovnykiv-fsb-yaki-pilotuyut-drony-ahilles-rozpoviv-pro-polyuvannya-na-pilotiv-novitnih-orlaniv-10/; https://youtu.be/lmGmAk4bAvU?t=782
[31] https://t.me/grvZapad/20012
[32] https://t.me/rybar/83751
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/
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[46]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492;https://t.me/wargonzo/37445;https://t.me/voin_dv/21455
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