Russian Occupation Update, October 8, 2026俄罗斯占领最新进展,2026年10月8日
Russian forces claim to have evacuated over 4,000 Ukrainian civilians from frontline settlements in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian forces claim to have evacuated over 4,000 Ukrainian civilians from frontline settlements in Donetsk Oblast, highlighting how wartime population displacement may facilitate Russia’s administrative and political integration of occupied populations in ways that raise concerns under international law.
The Russian Ministry of Education announced its intent to launch a state-controlled television service in schools in occupied Ukraine in 2027.
The Russian occupation leadership of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is conducting outreach with children as young as kindergarten-aged in order to promote service in the Russian nuclear industry.
The Mariupol occupation administration’s housing seizure and redistribution policy continues to disenfranchise Ukrainian residents.
The Russian information space appears to have coalesced around a single narrative line intended to deflect from Russia’s responsibility for the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the occupied Oleshky area.
Russia’s new three-year federal budget contains continued funding provisions for the occupation of Ukraine, signaling an overall shift in focus towards long-term occupation and integration projects.
Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children
Russian forces claim to have evacuated over 4,000 Ukrainian civilians from frontline settlements in Donetsk Oblast, highlighting how wartime population displacement may facilitate Russia’s administrative and political integration of occupied populations in ways that raise concerns under international law . The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 29 that soldiers of the 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps, Southern Military District) evacuated civilians, including one minor, from Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[1] The Russian MoD claimed that soldiers took evacuees to an unspecified “safe area,” presumably deeper within Russian-occupied territory in Donetsk Oblast. Russian Senator and member of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Natalia Nikonorova told Kremlin newswire TASS on September 29 that Russian forces evacuated 4,500 civilians from Donetsk Oblast frontline settlements in an unspecified period, including 971 people from near Kostyantynivka and 52 children.[2] Nikonorova claimed that Russian forces took evacuees to temporary accommodation shelters (TACs) and that civilians quickly began the process of obtaining Russian citizenship upon their arrival at the TAC. While military evacuations themselves are permissible under international law in conditions of intense danger or acute humanitarian necessity, Russia’s treatment of civilians after the evacuation may raise questions. ISW previously assessed that Russia has used TACs to facilitate the “filtration” of Ukrainian civilians, effectively holding Ukrainian citizens in these facilities, interrogating them about their potential loyalties to Ukraine, and then beginning the administrative processes of preparing them for transfer deeper into occupied territories or outright deportation to Russia.[3] Nikonorova’s statement about the process of individuals at TACs quickly receiving Russian passports suggests that the TACs are continuing to fulfill some filtration-type administrative functions. The issue of Russian citizenship also suggests that Russia views these military evacuations as the start of a permanent process intended to turn Ukrainian citizens into Russians, which may violate the Fourth Geneva Convention’s considerations of evacuations as a temporary removal and shift the process into the realm of forced removal or deportation under international law.[4]
Sociocultural Control
The Russian Ministry of Education announced its intent to launch a state-controlled television service in schools in occupied Ukraine in 2027. Russian Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov stated on September 30 that the Ministry plans to launch a unified television service in all schools in Russia and in occupied Ukraine in 2027.[5] Kravtsov claimed that the television service will include educational films and videos to be shown during class and breaks. The service will first launch with 15 unspecified pilot regions and then expand to the rest of Russia and occupied Ukraine in 2027. The Russian Ministry of Education has already captured and co-opted all aspects of education in occupied areas, and the integration of this state-controlled television will allow for even deeper proliferation of pro-Russian ideologies into the school system.
Militarization of Occupied Areas
The Russian occupation leadership of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is conducting outreach with children as young as kindergarten-aged in order to promote service in the Russian nuclear industry. ZNPP occupation authorities announced on September 29 the start of the “Atom for Children” competition for kindergarten teachers in occupied Enerhodar.[6] The competition encourages teachers to “promote the nuclear industry and the ZNPP” to kindergarten students, and includes versions such as “Nuclear Literacy from the Cradle.” ZNPP occupation leadership emphasized on October 2 that it is critical to train nuclear operators for the ZNPP from a very young age and noted that it has many programs in place to train school-aged children via internships and special training courses. Russian state nuclear power operator Rosenergoatom, which controls the ZNPP, has become deeply ingrained in the school system and social fabric of Enerhodar since 2022, facilitating efforts to militarize Ukrainian children as young as preschool-aged in order to prepare them for future careers in the Russian nuclear industry.[7]
Administrative and Bureaucratic Control
The Mariupol occupation administration’s housing seizure and redistribution policy continues to disenfranchise Ukrainian residents. An occupied Mariupol-based Telegram channel posted footage on October 1 of an apparent altercation over a redistributed apartment in Mariupol.[8] The Telegram channel alleged that representatives of the Mariupol occupation administration registered two apartments belonging to a Mariupol resident with Rosreestr (Russia’s federal real estate registration agency) in September 2025, after which another individual identified only as “Tsybulko” took ownership of the properties. The post noted that the original owner did not re-register the properties under Russian law following the occupation of Mariupol in 2022. The footage shows four self-identified representatives of the new owner trying to gain access to the apartments, despite another resident trying to prove ownership of the property using Ukrainian legal documents. The incident captured in the October 1 footage is not an isolated instance of Russian housing policy in occupied Ukraine but rather is consistent with a broader trend of apartment seizures and redistributions that is particularly evident in occupied Mariupol. Occupation authorities identify property as “ownerless” based on a set of generally abstract criteria, including the absence of updated Russian-standard real estate documents or unpaid utility bills; they then enter the property into the register of “ownerless property,” after which the owner has 30 days to physically come prove their ownership of the property; after which the property is entered into the municipal housing fund and is from there redistributed via the “compensation queue,” with priority given to Russian citizens or individuals loyal to the occupation regime.[9]
Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics
The Russian information space appears to have coalesced around a single narrative line intended to deflect from Russia’s responsibility for the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the occupied Oleshky area. Russian officials and media sources began narratively engaging with Oleshky following Ukraine’s September 27 covert operation to airdrop food and supplies into the area using drones, suggesting that the operation was a particular pain point for the wider Russian information space.[10] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 5 that Ukrainian forces are preventing people from leaving the Oleshky area and are using drones to disrupt food and water supplies, despite visual evidence that the Ukrainian 34th Marine Brigade was able to conduct another drone drop of critical humanitarian supplies into Oleshky on October 4.[11] Various Kherson Oblast occupation officials made a series of statements between September 30 and October 5 claiming that Ukraine is the sole actor responsible for the humanitarian crisis and that Russian forces and officials are powerless to address critical supply shortages because of Ukrainian interference.[12] Russian state television program Vesti interviewed a resident of occupied Oleshky and a servicemember of the 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) who amplified similar claims.[13] Russian responses to the crisis in Oleshky have significantly intensified in the past week, which is noteworthy considering the relative informational silence on the issue despite widespread reports of humanitarian decline since late 2025 and early 2026. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) warned on October 7 that Russia was preparing a series of “informational and psychological operations” to deflect blame for the situation in Oleshky onto Ukraine.[14] Russia is the sole party blocking the supply of aid and humanitarian rescue efforts in the Oleshky area.[15] Ukraine has made at least three formal attempts to establish a localized ceasefire for Oleshky in order to provide some basic relief to blockaded citizens, but Russia has ignored all proposals, forcing Ukrainian troops to engage in a risky operation to provide supplies via drone drop.[16] The intensification of the Russian information operation surrounding Oleshky appears intended to deflect from the fact that the Kremlin likely views any tangible response to conditions in Oleshky as a display of weakness.[17]
Physical and Legal Repressions
Nothing significant to report.
Economic and Financial Control
Information Space Control
See the “Sociocultural control” section for more information about Russian plans to institute a state television program in schools in occupied Ukraine.
Infrastructure and Development Projects
Russia’s new three-year federal budget contains continued funding provisions for the occupation of Ukraine, signaling an overall shift in focus towards long-term occupation and integration projects. The Russian government submitted a draft federal budget for 2027-2029 to the State Duma on September 30.[18] The draft budget contains 865 billion rubles (10 billion USD) for the financing of the state program on “Restoration and Socioeconomic Developments of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Kherson Oblast, “broken down into 293 billion rubles (3.4 billion USD) for 2027, 290 billion rubles (3.4 billion USD) for 2028, and 282 billion rubles (3.3 billion USD) for 2029.[19] The previous three-year budget for 2024-2026 allocated around 900 billion rubles ($10.5 billion) to the same program.[20] The Russian government first established the state program on the restoration and socioeconomic development of occupied Ukraine in 2023 with the intention of “overcoming the socioeconomic backwardness” of occupied areas and bringing them up to the “level of average Russian indicators of quality of life of citizens of the Russian Federation.” The relatively stable federal budget allocations for the occupation of Ukraine suggest that Russia continues to view investment in the occupation as a lucrative and necessary federal priority because it facilitates the forced integration of occupied territories into Russia.[21]
[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/67742 [2] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28161473 [3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-19-2026/ [4] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49 [5] https://xonews dot ru/news/minprosveschenija-edinoe-shkolnoe-televidenie-pojavitsja-vo-vseh-shkolah-s-2027-goda/ [6] https://t.me/nashenergodar/15006; https://t.me/znppofficial/1858 [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-11-2025/ [8] https://t.me/BLMariupol/42421 [9] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-ca98fa24-29a3-4c74-aa7d-ce38f756270d; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/mariupol-rozdayut-bezkhazyayne-zhytlo/33868941.html; https://totinsights.org/research.html; https://t.me/mariupolz/98610 [10] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/15572 [11] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1767143411280703; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/04/%c2%abvoroga-ne-goduyemo-ale-i-svoyih-ne-kydayemo%c2%bb-morpihy-provodyat-v-oleshkah-masshtabnu-gumanitarnu-misiyu/ [12] https://ria dot ru/20261005/kiev-2122230515.html; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28186231; https://tass dot ru/politika/28160487 [13] https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/nichego-ne-bylo-zhitelnica-aleshek-rasskazala-o-strashnom-golode; https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/boec-s-pozyvnym-reks-rasskazal-pochemu-lyudi-ne-khotyat-pokidat-aleshki [14] https://t.me/SBUkr/18760 [15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-russia-governs-through-humanitarian-decline/ [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-russia-governs-through-humanitarian-decline/ [17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-russia-governs-through-humanitarian-decline/ [18] http://duma.gov dot ru/news/64184/ [19] https://ria dot ru/20261001/donbass-2121448462.html [20] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/01/23/moscow-to-slash-funding-for-occupied-ukrainian-territories-forbes-a83815 [21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-march-19-2026/
俄罗斯军队声称已从顿涅茨克州的前线定居点撤离了 4000 多名乌克兰平民,这凸显了战时人口流离失所如何可能促进俄罗斯对被占领人口进行行政和政治整合,从而引发国际法方面的担忧。
俄罗斯教育部宣布计划于 2027 年在被占领的乌克兰的学校开通国家控制的电视服务。
俄罗斯占领扎波罗热核电站(ZNPP)的领导层正在对幼儿园年龄段的儿童进行宣传,以鼓励他们投身俄罗斯核工业。
马里乌波尔占领当局的住房没收和重新分配政策继续剥夺乌克兰居民的权利。
俄罗斯的信息空间似乎已经围绕着一条单一的叙事路线凝聚起来,旨在转移人们对俄罗斯在被占领的奥列什基地区持续人道主义危机中所应承担的责任的注意力。
俄罗斯新的三年期联邦预算继续为占领乌克兰提供资金,这标志着俄罗斯的重点总体上转向了长期占领和一体化项目。
驱逐和强制转移乌克兰公民,包括儿童
俄罗斯军队声称已从顿涅茨克州的前线定居点撤离了4000多名乌克兰平民,这凸显了战时人口迁移如何可能以某种方式促进俄罗斯对占领区人口的行政和政治整合,而这种整合方式引发了国际法方面的担忧。俄罗斯国防部于9月29日报告称,第51合成集团军(原顿涅茨克人民共和国第1军,南部军区)的士兵从比利茨克(波克罗夫斯克以北)撤离了包括一名未成年人在内的平民。[1] 俄罗斯国防部声称,士兵们将撤离人员带到了一个未指明的“安全区”,据推测该区域位于顿涅茨克州俄罗斯占领区的更深处。俄罗斯联邦委员会国际事务委员会委员、联邦参议员娜塔莉娅·尼科诺罗娃9月29日告诉克里姆林宫通讯社塔斯社,俄罗斯军队在一段未指明的时间内从顿涅茨克州前线居民点撤离了4500名平民,其中包括来自科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡附近的971人和52名儿童。[2] 尼科诺罗娃声称,俄罗斯军队将撤离人员安置在临时安置点,平民抵达安置点后迅速开始办理俄罗斯公民身份。虽然在高度危险或紧急人道主义需要的情况下,军事撤离本身在国际法上是允许的,但俄罗斯在撤离后对待平民的方式可能会引发质疑。 ISW此前评估认为,俄罗斯利用临时援助中心(TAC)对乌克兰平民进行“筛选”,实际上是将乌克兰公民关押在这些设施中,审问他们对乌克兰的潜在忠诚度,然后启动行政程序,准备将他们转移到被占领土更深处或直接驱逐到俄罗斯。[3] 尼科诺罗娃关于临时援助中心人员迅速获得俄罗斯护照的声明表明,这些临时援助中心仍在继续履行某种筛选性质的行政职能。俄罗斯公民身份问题也表明,俄罗斯将这些军事撤离视为一项旨在将乌克兰公民转变为俄罗斯公民的永久性进程的开始,这可能违反《日内瓦第四公约》关于撤离是临时性移除的规定,并将该进程转变为国际法意义上的强制移除或驱逐。[4]
社会文化控制
俄罗斯教育部宣布计划于2027年在被占领的乌克兰地区的学校开通国家控制的电视服务。俄罗斯教育部长谢尔盖·克拉夫佐夫于9月30日表示,教育部计划于2027年在俄罗斯和被占领的乌克兰的所有学校开通统一的电视服务。[5] 克拉夫佐夫声称,该电视服务将包括课堂和课间播放的教育影片和视频。该服务将首先在15个未指明的试点地区推出,然后于2027年扩展到俄罗斯其他地区和被占领的乌克兰。俄罗斯教育部已经控制并渗透了被占领地区教育的各个方面,而此次开通国家控制的电视服务将进一步加剧亲俄意识形态在学校系统中的传播。
占领区的军事化
俄罗斯占领扎波罗热核电站(ZNPP)的领导层正在开展面向幼儿园儿童的宣传活动,旨在鼓励他们投身俄罗斯核工业。9月29日,ZNPP占领当局宣布在被占领的恩涅尔霍达尔市启动面向幼儿园教师的“儿童原子能”竞赛。[6] 该竞赛鼓励教师向幼儿园学生“宣传核工业和ZNPP”,并设有“从摇篮开始的核能素养”等主题。10月2日,ZNPP占领领导层强调,从小培养ZNPP的核电操作员至关重要,并指出他们已制定多项计划,通过实习和专门培训课程来培养学龄儿童。俄罗斯国家核电运营商 Rosenergoatom 控制着 ZNPP,自 2022 年以来,该公司已深深融入 Enerhodar 的学校系统和社会结构中,推动乌克兰儿童从学龄前就开始接受军事训练,以便为他们将来在俄罗斯核工业的职业生涯做好准备。[7]
行政和官僚控制
马里乌波尔占领当局的住房征用和重新分配政策持续剥夺乌克兰居民的权利。一个位于马里乌波尔的Telegram频道于10月1日发布了一段视频,视频显示马里乌波尔一套被重新分配的公寓引发了一场争执。[8] 该Telegram频道声称,马里乌波尔占领当局的代表于2025年9月在俄罗斯联邦房地产登记局(Rosreestr)登记了一名马里乌波尔居民的两套公寓,之后另一名仅被称为“Tsybulko”的人获得了这些房产的所有权。该帖子指出,原业主在2022年马里乌波尔被占领后并未根据俄罗斯法律重新登记这些房产。视频显示,四名自称是新业主代表的人试图进入公寓,尽管另一名居民试图用乌克兰法律文件证明自己拥有这些房产的所有权。 10月1日拍摄的视频所记录的事件并非俄罗斯在被占领的乌克兰推行住房政策的孤立案例,而是与更广泛的公寓没收和重新分配趋势相符,这种趋势在被占领的马里乌波尔尤为明显。占领当局根据一系列通常较为抽象的标准来认定房产为“无主房产”,例如缺少符合俄罗斯标准的更新版房产证或拖欠水电费;然后,他们将房产登记在“无主房产”名录中,之后房主有30天的时间亲自前来证明其所有权;之后,该房产将被纳入市政住房基金,并通过“补偿队列”进行重新分配,优先分配给俄罗斯公民或效忠占领政权的个人。[9]
职业管理不善及内部动态
俄罗斯的信息空间似乎围绕着一条单一的叙事路线展开,旨在转移人们对俄罗斯在被占领的奥列什基地区持续人道主义危机中所应承担的责任的关注。在乌克兰于9月27日秘密使用无人机向该地区空投食品和物资后,俄罗斯官员和媒体开始就奥列什基问题展开叙事,这表明该行动是俄罗斯信息空间的一个痛点。[10] 克里姆林宫发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫于10月5日声称,乌克兰军队阻止人们离开奥列什基地区,并使用无人机破坏食品和水的供应,尽管有视觉证据表明,乌克兰第34海军陆战旅于10月4日再次使用无人机向奥列什基空投了重要的人道主义物资。[11] 9月30日至10月5日期间,赫尔松州占领当局的多名官员发表了一系列声明,声称乌克兰是造成人道主义危机的唯一责任方,并称由于乌克兰的干预,俄罗斯军队和官员无力解决关键物资短缺问题。[12] 俄罗斯国家电视台的《新闻报》(Vesti)节目采访了一名被占领的奥列什基居民和一名隶属于第98空降师第331空降团的军人,他们也表达了类似的说法。[13] 过去一周,俄罗斯对奥列什基危机的反应显著加强,考虑到自2025年底和2026年初以来,尽管有大量报道称人道主义状况恶化,但俄罗斯此前对该问题一直保持相对沉默,这一点尤其值得关注。乌克兰安全局(SBU)于10月7日警告称,俄罗斯正在准备一系列“信息和心理战行动”,试图将奥列什基局势的责任推卸给乌克兰。[14]俄罗斯是唯一阻挠向奥列什基地区提供援助和人道主义救援行动的一方。[15] 乌克兰至少三次正式尝试在奥列什基地区建立局部停火,以便为被封锁的民众提供一些基本救济,但俄罗斯无视所有提议,迫使乌克兰军队冒险开展无人机空投物资行动。[16] 俄罗斯加强围绕奥列什基的信息战似乎是为了转移人们的注意力,因为克里姆林宫可能将对奥列什基局势的任何实际回应都视为软弱的表现。[17]
身体和法律上的压迫
没有什么重大事项需要报告。
经济和金融控制
信息空间控制
有关俄罗斯计划在被占领的乌克兰学校推行国家电视节目的更多信息,请参阅“社会文化控制”部分。
基础设施和发展项目
俄罗斯新的三年期联邦预算继续为占领乌克兰提供资金,这标志着俄罗斯的重点总体上转向长期占领和一体化项目。俄罗斯政府于9月30日向国家杜马提交了2027-2029年联邦预算草案。[18] 该预算草案包含8650亿卢布(100亿美元)用于资助“顿涅茨克人民共和国、卢甘斯克人民共和国、扎波罗热州和赫尔松州恢复和社会经济发展”国家计划,其中2027年为2930亿卢布(34亿美元),2028年为2900亿卢布(34亿美元),2029年为2820亿卢布(33亿美元)。[19]此前2024-2026年三年预算为同一项目拨款约9000亿卢布(105亿美元)。[20] 俄罗斯政府于2023年首次制定了关于被占领乌克兰的恢复和社会经济发展的国家计划,旨在“克服被占领地区的社会经济落后状况”,使其达到“俄罗斯联邦公民生活质量指标的平均水平”。相对稳定的联邦预算拨款用于占领乌克兰表明,俄罗斯仍然将对占领区的投资视为一项有利可图且必要的联邦优先事项,因为它有助于将占领区强行并入俄罗斯。[21]
[1] https://t.me/mod_Russia/67742 [2] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28161473 [3] https://understandingwar.org/research/Russia-ukraine/Russian-occupation-update-february-19-2026/ [4] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49 [5] https://xonews dot ru/news/minprosveschenija-edinoe-shkolnoe-televidenie-pojavitsja-vo-vseh-shkolah-s-2027-goda/ [6] https://t.me/nashenergodar/15006; https://t.me/znppofficial/1858 [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-11-2025/ [8] https://t.me/BLMariupol/42421 [9] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-ca98fa24-29a3-4c74-aa7d-ce38f756270d; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/mariupol-rozdayut-bezkhazyayne-zhytlo/33868941.html; https://totinsights.org/research.html; https://t.me/mariupolz/98610 [10] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/15572 [11] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1767143411280703; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/04/%c2%abvoroga-ne-goduyemo-ale-i-svoyih-ne-kydayemo%c2%bb-morpihy-provodyat-v-oleshkah-masshtabnu-gumanitarnu-misiyu/ [12] https://ria dot ru/20261005/kiev-2122230515.html; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/28186231; https://tass dot ru/politika/28160487 [13] https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/nichego-ne-bylo-zhitelnica-aleshek-rasskazala-o-strashnom-golode; https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/boec-s-pozyvnym-reks-rasskazal-pochemu-lyudi-ne-khotyat-pokidat-aleshki [14] https://t.me/SBUkr/18760 [15] https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-Russia-governs-through- humanarian-decline/ [16] https://understandwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-Russia-governs-through- humanarian-decline/ [17] https://understandingwar.org/research/rusia-ukraine/oleshky-how-Russia-governs-through- humanarian-decline/ [18] http://duma.gov dot ru/news/64184/ [19] https://ria dot ru/20261001/donbass-2121448462.html [20] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/23/moscow-to-slash-funding-for-occupied-ukrainian-territories-forbes-a83815 [21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-march-19-2026/