Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2026

Ukrainian forces reportedly regained unrestricted access to SpaceX’s Starshield on October 15, following in-motion speed restrictions on Starshield communications network over Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources stated on October 15 that Ukrainian units are reporting the resumption of unrestricted Starshield access, following October 14 speed restrictions of 100 miles per hour (roughly 160 kilometers per hour) for the terminals connected to the Starshield communications network operating in Ukraine.[1] Starshield is a more secure, jam-resistant, and military-oriented version of the Starlink satellite network that SpaceX designed for government use, while Starlink serves civilian and commercial purposes.[2] Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or any Starlink services over Russia as SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to just within Ukraine’s international borders.[3] Ukraine therefore relies on alternative communication methods and point-to-point navigation to strike targets in Russia.

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that there is and was no energy ceasefire agreement, rejecting any meaningful concept of a ceasefire proposal. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on October 15 that “there will be no ceasefire” in response to a journalist question about Russia’s willingness to make any concessions toward peace negotiations.[4] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov additionally claimed that Ukraine did not adhere to a strikes moratorium against Russian energy facilities, amidst numerous reports that Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure while Ukrainian forces refrained from striking Russian energy infrastructure between October 11 and October 14.[5] Peskov falsely claimed that Ukraine’s and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations is thwarting US peace negotiations efforts, attempting to paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in all wider peace efforts.[6] High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have not offered any concessions in peace negotiations and have rejected numerous compromise proposals that both the US and Ukraine have offered, demonstrating the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to compromise on any terms that fall short of fulfilling Russia’s maximalist demands of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[7]

Ukrainian forces struck six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers at the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield in Voronezh Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Navy reported that Ukrainian forces used Neptune cruise missiles to strike the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield in Voronezh Oblast (roughly 267 kilometers from the international border) overnight on October 14 to 15, damaging six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers and technical equipment.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukraine’s strike against the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield destroyed four Su-34 fighter jets and damaged two more.[9] Satellite imagery published on October 15 shows damage to four Su-34 fighter jets at the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield following a Ukrainian Neptune missile strike.[10] A Russian milblogger responded to the strike by emphasizing that Russian forces need layered ground- and air-based air defenses to protect Russian aircraft close to Ukraine’s border.[11] The milblogger noted that Russian forces can preserve their aircraft assets only by temporarily withdrawing all frontline, long-range, and military transport aviation beyond a 400-kilometer radius from Ukraine’s international border. Russian forces routinely use Su-34M fighter-bombers to conduct missile and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine.[12] The basing of Su-34M aircraft in close proximity to Ukraine’s border allows Russian forces to conduct more sorties during strike series, prolonging the aircraft’s engine life and consuming less jet fuel. Ukraine’s ability to force Russian aviation farther away from the international border will increase Ukraine’s ability to detect Russian sorties sooner and mobilize air defenses faster, potentially helping to mitigate the more devastating impacts of cruise missile strikes.

Likely Russian drones struck four civilian vessels in the Black Sea, including two commercial tankers in Romanian territorial waters on October 14 and 15. Romanian Foreign Minister Toiu Oana stated on October 15 that unspecified drones struck four commercial vessels, including within Romanian territorial waters and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and noted that “Russia bears full responsibility” for those strikes.[13] Reuters reported on October 15 that unnamed actors struck the San Marino-flagged Wine Trader tanker 13 nautical miles (roughly 24 kilometers) southeast of the Romanian Sulina Canal (one nautical mile outside of Romanian territorial waters) and the Comoros-flagged Yara J chemical and oil tanker eight to 10 nautical miles (roughly 15 to 19 kilometers) southeast of the canal within Romanian territorial waters on October 14.[14] An unnamed NATO official told Reuters that the drones that struck the vessels “were of Russian origin.”[15] A NATO statement added that unspecified drones also struck the Marshall Islands-flagged Sea Destiny bulk carrier within Romanian waters and the Tanzanian-flagged Dania J tanker, reportedly moored in Ukraine’s Izmail Port.[16] Automatic identification system (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that Sea Destiny is currently anchored off the coast of Romania and Dania J was near the Izmail Port as of six days ago. The strikes caused fires on board the Wine Trader and the Yara J tankers, leading to in-depth search missions and the ultimate rescue of five sailors, with seven sailors still missing. Territorial waters extend up to 12 nautical miles (about 22 kilometers) from the nation’s shoreline, compared to the EEZ which extends up to 200 nautical miles (roughly 370 kilometers) from the baseline, and states have sovereignty and jurisdiction over their territorial waters.[17] Russian drone strikes against vessels in Romania’s territorial sea violate Romania’s territorial integrity. Romanian President Nicusor Dan declined to comment on Russia’s involvement in the strikes as of October 15. The October 14 and 15 drone strikes come against the backdrop of recent escalating Russian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea, including strikes against civilian vessels in the Bulgarian EEZ overnight on October 12 to 13.[18] These strikes demonstrate Russia’s increasing willingness to pursue strike tactics that may directly impact the territory of NATO or NATO-aligned states.[19]

Ukrainian forces reportedly regained unrestricted access to Starshield on October 15, following in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield communications network over Ukraine.

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that there is and was no energy ceasefire agreement, rejecting any meaningful concept of a ceasefire proposal.

Ukrainian forces struck six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers at the Borisoglebsk Military Airfield in Voronezh Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15.

Likely Russian drones struck four civilian vessels in the Black Sea, including two commercial tankers in Romanian territorial waters on October 14 and 15.

Ukrainian forces likely struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. Russia launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles and 580 drones against Ukraine overnight on October 14 to 15 and 138 drones during the day on October 15.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk and southwest of Orikhiv.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast overnight on October 14 to 15. The Russian MoD claimed on October 15 that Ukrainian forces “attempted” a combined drone and missile strike against an oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast (roughly 485 kilometers from the international border) and that drone debris caused a fire at the refinery.[20] A Russian milblogger noted that it is extremely rare for the Russian MoD to publish information about Ukrainian strikes in Russia and speculated that its October 15 report aims to achieve a political effect and portray Ukraine in a bad light against the backdrop of the Russian-US diesel fuel deal and opaque ceasefire discussions.[21] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov also acknowledged the fire at the refinery following Ukrainian strikes, and open-source imagery shows the fire.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[23]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 14 and 15 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kharkiv City.[24]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 14 and 15 but did not make confirmed advances.[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Nefedivka and Chorne (both north of Velykyi Burluk).[26] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the seizure of Nefedivka and Chorne.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of the settlements.[28] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 15 that Ukrainian forces are still present in Nefedivka.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Holubivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 14.[30] Russian forces concentrated assaults toward Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[31]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 15.

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

The Russian military command has seemingly still not internalized the extent of Ukrainian military successes in the Lyman direction as part of Operation Vivaldi. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on October 15 that Russian sources continue to falsely claim seizures of settlements that Ukrainian forces liberated during Operation Vivaldi and that the Russian military command has not yet realized the full scale of Ukrainian advances in the area.[32] The spokesperson stressed that there are large discrepancies between the Russian official maps of the Lyman direction and the true situation on the frontline. Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi collapsed the Russian salient north of Lyman, completely disrupting the Russian military command’s plan to conduct a wide encirclement of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.[33] The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military inhibited Russian forces’ ability to respond to Ukrainian counterattacks and to bring in reinforcements, as the Russian military leadership has a completely unrealistic understanding of where the forward line of contact is.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continue infiltration missions east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers northeast of Nykonorivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 15, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and in Kostyantynivka and along the east (left) bank of the Kazenyi Torets River on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Dobropillya. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 15 that Ukrainian forces control Lidyne, contrary to previous Russian claims.[37] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Marivka (northeast of Dobropillya).

Russian forces conducted a motorized assault toward Dobropillya and are intensifying offensive operations in the area ahead of Winter 2026-2027. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on October 15 that Russian forces have intensified assaults toward Dobropillya in an effort to consolidate positions on the outskirts of the city in dense urban areas before winter.[38] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed roughly two Russian infantry platoons and nine motorized vehicles in the last day. Russian efforts toward Dobropillya are critical for Russian offensive prospects against the Fortress Belt, and Russian offensives around Dobropillya are still aimed at conducting a wide encirclement of the entire Fortress Belt, cutting key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), and covering the western flank of the Kramatorsk push.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 14 and 15 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Oleksandrivka.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.[42]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Orikhiv. The Ukrainian 17th Army Corps reported on October 15 that Ukrainian forces control Novoandriivka, refuting previous Russian claims.[43]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies manpower concentration near Novokostyantynivka (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) on October 14 or overnight on October 14 to 15.[44]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 15.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) drone operator training center and its instructors’ residence in Khorly, Kherson Oblast (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[45]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[46]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 14 to 15 and during the day on October 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles from over the Black Sea and 580 Shahed-type and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[47] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 536 drones, that Russian drones struck 31 locations, and that drone debris fell on 11 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces subsequently launched 138 drones (90 of which were jet-powered) during the day on October 15 and that Ukrainian forces downed 125 drones, including 79 jet-powered ones.[48]

Russian forces conducted the largest drone strike against Kirovohrad Oblast thus far in the war. Kirovohrad Oblast Military Administration Head Andriy Raykovych reported on October 15 that Russian forces struck Kirovohrad Oblast with 360 drones, marking the largest Russian strike on the oblast since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[49] Raykovych stated that Russian forces deliberately targeted critical infrastructure, transport companies, logistics facilities, and residential buildings, striking 26 locations and killing three people and injuring six.

Ukrainian forces have depleted their stock of Patriot ballistic missile interceptor missiles, which will allow Russia to inflict maximum damage on Ukraine’s infrastructure until Ukraine receives or can develop effective anti-ballistic missile defenses. An unnamed source familiar with the matter told CNN on October 15 that Ukraine has run out of Patriot interceptors.[50] Russian forces intensified their ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in Summer 2026, taking advantage of global Patriot interceptor shortages.[51] Russian forces will very likely continue to leverage ballistic missiles in their Winter 2026-2027 strike packages against Ukraine alongside jet-powered drones in order to inflict substantial damage on Ukrainian cities in ways that disproportionately hurt civilians.[52]

Russian forces continue to rapidly expand their jet-powered drone launch capacity. Reuters published satellite imagery on October 15 showing that Russia has nearly finished building a new jet-powered droneport near Millerovo, Rostov Oblast (roughly 176 kilometers from the frontline) featuring eight platforms for launch rails.[53] Reuters reported that Russia began the construction of the drone base sometime after August 31 and that the site would be capable of launching jet-powered drones. Russian forces have been expanding their jet-powered drone launch capacity since Fall 2026, including at the Tsimbulova Droneport in Oryol Oblast, as Russian forces are heavily relying on jet-powered drones to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses at greater operational depths.[54]

Significant Activity in Belarus

The Belarusian MoD reportedly deployed a military communications system designed to facilitate Russian advances along Russia’s international borders with Belarus, Ukraine, and European states. A Belarusian outlet reported on October 12 that Russia is building a new secure military-technical communications network along the Russian-Belarusian border and towards international borders with Ukraine and NATO member states in order to ensure the deployment of Russian troops to NATO borders.[55] The network comprises radio relay lines and directional antennas of both Russian and Belarusian cellular operators, which allow data to be transmitted over a radio channel with minimal risk of external interception or eavesdropping. The report suggests that the geography and the architecture of the network indicate its subordination to the Russian military needs, as its only command center is located in Russia.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/27673 [50] https://www.cnn.com/2026/10/15/europe/ukraine-us-patriot-interceptor-missiles-run-out-intl [51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ [52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ [53] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-war/russia-builds-major-new-drone-attack-base-six-weeks-satellite-images-show-2026-10-15/ [54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/; https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/42335; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/articles/2026/10/01/8055931/ [55] https://belpol dot pro/militarizacziya-belarusi-doklad-belpol/

据报道，乌克兰军队于10月15日恢复了对SpaceX“星盾”（Starshield）卫星网络的完全访问，此前SpaceX对乌克兰境内的“星盾”通信网络实施了移动速度限制。乌克兰国防部消息人士于10月15日表示，乌克兰各部队报告称，在10月14日对连接乌克兰境内“星盾”通信网络的终端实施了100英里/小时（约160公里/小时）的速度限制后，乌克兰方面已恢复了对“星盾”网络的完全访问。[1] “星盾”是SpaceX为政府用途设计的更安全、抗干扰能力更强、更偏向军事用途的“星链”（Starlink）卫星网络，而“星链”则用于民用和商业用途。[2] 由于SpaceX已将乌克兰的访问权限限制在乌克兰国际边界内，因此乌克兰军队无法在俄罗斯境内访问“星盾”或任何“星链”服务。[3] 因此，乌克兰只能依靠其他通信方式和点对点导航来打击俄罗斯境内的目标。

克里姆林宫高级官员继续强调，不存在也从未存在过任何能源停火协议，并拒绝任何有意义的停火提议。10月15日，俄罗斯外长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫在回答记者关于俄罗斯是否愿意在和平谈判中做出任何让步的问题时表示，“不会停火”。[4] 克里姆林宫发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫还声称，乌克兰没有遵守对俄罗斯能源设施的打击暂停令。此前有大量报道称，10月11日至14日期间，俄罗斯军队继续打击乌克兰能源基础设施，而乌克兰军队则没有对俄罗斯能源基础设施进行打击。[5] 佩斯科夫错误地声称，乌克兰及其总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基不愿参与和平谈判，阻碍了美国的和平谈判努力，试图将乌克兰描绘成所有更广泛和平努力中的顽固一方。[6]包括俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在内的克里姆林宫高级官员在和平谈判中没有做出任何让步，并拒绝了美国和乌克兰提出的许多妥协方案，这表明克里姆林宫仍然不愿意在任何低于满足俄罗斯要求乌克兰完全投降的最高条件的情况下做出妥协。[7]

10月14日至15日夜间，乌克兰军队袭击了位于沃罗涅日州鲍里索格列布斯克军用机场的六架俄罗斯苏-34M战斗轰炸机。乌克兰海军报告称，乌克兰军队使用“海王星”巡航导弹袭击了位于沃罗涅日州（距国际边界约267公里）的鲍里索格列布斯克军用机场，造成六架俄罗斯苏-34M战斗轰炸机及相关技术设备受损。[8] 乌克兰总统泽连斯基证实，乌克兰对鲍里索格列布斯克军用机场的袭击摧毁了四架苏-34战斗机，并击伤了另外两架。[9] 10月15日公布的卫星图像显示，乌克兰“海王星”导弹袭击后，鲍里索格列布斯克军用机场的四架苏-34战斗机受损。[10]一位俄罗斯军事博主就此次袭击事件回应称，俄军需要多层地面和空中防空体系来保护靠近乌克兰边境的俄军飞机。[11] 该博主指出，俄军只有暂时将所有前线、远程和军用运输机撤出乌克兰国际边界400公里半径范围之外，才能保护其飞机资产。俄军经常使用苏-34M战斗轰炸机对乌克兰进行导弹和滑翔炸弹袭击。[12] 将苏-34M飞机部署在靠近乌克兰边境的地方，可以让俄军在打击行动中执行更多架次的飞行任务，从而延长飞机发动机寿命并减少燃油消耗。乌克兰迫使俄军飞机远离国际边界的能力，将提高乌克兰更早发现俄军飞机并更快地调动防空力量的能力，从而可能有助于减轻巡航导弹袭击造成的更严重的破坏性影响。

10月14日和15日，疑似俄罗斯无人机在黑海袭击了四艘民用船只，其中包括两艘位于罗马尼亚领海内的商用油轮。罗马尼亚外交部长托尤·奥纳于10月15日表示，不明无人机袭击了四艘商船，其中包括位于罗马尼亚领海和专属经济区内的船只，并指出“俄罗斯对这些袭击负全部责任”。[13] 路透社10月15日报道称，10月14日，不明身份的无人机袭击了悬挂圣马力诺国旗的“葡萄酒贸易商”号油轮，该油轮位于罗马尼亚苏利纳运河东南13海里（约24公里）处（罗马尼亚领海外1海里），以及悬挂科摩罗国旗的“雅拉J”号化学品和石油油轮，该油轮位于运河东南8至10海里（约15至19公里）处，均在罗马尼亚领海内。[14]一位不愿透露姓名的北约官员告诉路透社，袭击这些船只的无人机“来自俄罗斯”。[15] 北约的一份声明补充说，不明无人机还袭击了悬挂马绍尔群岛国旗的“海洋命运号”（Sea Destiny）散货船（位于罗马尼亚水域）和悬挂坦桑尼亚国旗的“达尼亚J号”（Dania J）油轮（据报道停泊在乌克兰伊兹梅尔港）。[16] 来自Starboard Maritime Intelligence船舶追踪平台的自动识别系统（AIS）数据显示，“海洋命运号”目前停泊在罗马尼亚海岸附近，“达尼亚J号”六天前位于伊兹梅尔港附近。袭击导致“葡萄酒贸易商号”（Wine Trader）和“亚拉J号”（Yara J）油轮起火，引发了大规模搜救行动，最终救出了五名船员，但仍有七名船员失踪。领海从海岸线向外延伸至12海里（约22公里），而专属经济区则从基线向外延伸至200海里（约370公里）。各国对其领海拥有主权和管辖权。[17] 俄罗斯无人机袭击罗马尼亚领海内的船只侵犯了罗马尼亚的领土完整。截至10月15日，罗马尼亚总统尼库索尔·丹拒绝就俄罗斯参与此次袭击发表评论。10月14日和15日的无人机袭击发生在俄罗斯近期不断升级的黑海船只袭击事件的背景下，其中包括10月12日至13日夜间对保加利亚专属经济区内民用船只的袭击。[18] 这些袭击表明，俄罗斯越来越倾向于采取可能直接影响北约或北约盟国领土的打击策略。[19]

据报道，在对SpaceX的“星盾”通信网络在乌克兰上空的移动速度进行限制后，乌克兰军队于10月15日重新获得了对“星盾”的无限制访问权限。

克里姆林宫高级官员继续强调，过去和现在都没有能源停火协议，并拒绝任何有意义的停火提议。

10 月 14 日至 15 日夜间，乌克兰军队在沃罗涅日州鲍里索格列布斯克军用机场击落了 6 架俄罗斯苏-34M 战斗轰炸机。

10 月 14 日和 15 日，疑似俄罗斯无人机在黑海袭击了四艘民用船只，其中包括罗马尼亚领海内的两艘商用油轮。

乌克兰军队可能在10月14日至15日夜间袭击了梁赞州的梁赞炼油厂。俄罗斯在10月14日至15日夜间向乌克兰发射了两枚Kh-59巡航导弹和580架无人机，并在10月15日白天发射了138架无人机。

乌克兰军队最近向库皮扬斯克以北和奥里希夫西南方向推进。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

乌克兰军队很可能在10月14日至15日夜间袭击了位于梁赞州的梁赞炼油厂。俄罗斯国防部于10月15日声称，乌克兰军队“企图”对梁赞州（距国际边界约485公里）的一家炼油厂发动无人机和导弹联合袭击，无人机残骸导致炼油厂起火。[20] 一位俄罗斯军事博主指出，俄罗斯国防部极少发布有关乌克兰在俄罗斯境内发动袭击的信息，并推测其10月15日的报告旨在达到某种政治目的，并在俄美柴油燃料协议和不透明的停火谈判的背景下，抹黑乌克兰。[21] 梁赞州州长帕维尔·马尔科夫也承认了乌克兰袭击后炼油厂起火，开源图像显示了火灾情况。[22]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心国

10月14日和15日，俄军继续在苏梅州北部进行进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[23]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

10 月 14 日和 15 日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部进行进攻行动，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在哈尔科夫市北部进行了反击。[24]

10月14日至15日，俄军继续在韦利基布尔卢克方向进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得确切进展。[25] 俄罗斯国防部声称俄军占领了涅费迪夫卡和乔尔内（均位于韦利基布尔卢克以北）。[26] 一位俄罗斯军事博主称，俄军第127摩托化步兵团（隶属于列宁格勒军区第14军近卫第71摩托化步兵师）的部分兵力占领了涅费迪夫卡和乔尔内。[27] 另一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军向这些定居点以南推进。[28] 10月15日，一份关于俄罗斯北方部队的消息来源称，乌克兰军队仍然驻扎在涅费迪夫卡。[29]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

根据 10 月 14 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近向库皮扬斯克以北推进。[30] 10 月 14 日和 15 日，俄罗斯军队集中力量向拉德基夫卡（库皮扬斯克以北）发起进攻，但并未取得进展。[31]

10 月 15 日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告博罗瓦方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

俄罗斯军方指挥部似乎仍未充分认识到乌克兰在“维瓦尔第行动”中于莱曼方向取得的军事胜利。10月15日，在莱曼方向作战的乌克兰旅发言人报告称，俄方继续错误地声称占领了乌克兰军队在“维瓦尔第行动”中解放的定居点，并且俄罗斯军方指挥部尚未意识到乌克兰在该地区取得的进展规模。[32] 该发言人强调，俄罗斯官方绘制的莱曼方向地图与前线实际情况存在巨大差异。乌克兰的“维瓦尔第行动”瓦解了俄罗斯在莱曼以北的突出部，彻底破坏了俄罗斯军方对乌克兰“要塞带”进行全面包围的计划。[33]俄罗斯军队内部普遍存在的撒谎文化阻碍了俄罗斯军队对乌克兰反击和增援部队的反应能力，因为俄罗斯军事领导层对前线接触线的位置完全没有现实的认识。[34]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

俄罗斯军队继续在斯拉维扬斯克以东进行渗透行动。根据 10 月 15 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了尼科诺里夫卡东北部的俄罗斯军人，而 ISW 评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[35]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

10 月 14 日和 15 日，俄军继续在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡附近和科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡以及卡泽尼托列茨河东岸（左岸）沿线发动进攻，但并未取得进展。[36]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

乌克兰军队近期在多布罗皮利亚东北部推进或维持了阵地。一位俄罗斯军事博主于10月15日声称，乌克兰军队控制了利迪涅，这与俄罗斯此前的说法相悖。[37] 该军事博主还声称，俄军占领了马里夫卡（位于多布罗皮利亚东北部）。

俄军对多布罗皮利亚发动了摩托化突击，并在2026-2027年冬季前加强了该地区的攻势。10月15日，在多布罗皮利亚方向作战的乌克兰旅发言人报告称，俄军已加强对多布罗皮利亚的进攻，试图在冬季到来前巩固该市郊区人口稠密城区的阵地。[38] 该发言人报告称，乌克兰军队在过去一天中摧毁了大约两个俄军步兵排和九辆摩托化车辆。俄军在多布罗皮利亚的行动对其针对“要塞带”的进攻前景至关重要，俄军在多布罗皮利亚周围的攻势仍然旨在对整个“要塞带”进行全面包围，切断乌克兰的关键地面交通线，并掩护克拉马托尔斯克推进的西翼。[39]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

10 月 14 日和 15 日，俄军继续向新巴甫洛夫卡方向发起进攻，但并未取得进展。[40]

10 月 14 日和 15 日，俄军继续向奥列克桑德里夫卡方向发起进攻，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在奥列克桑德里夫卡以东发动了反击。[41]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

10月14日和15日，俄军继续向胡利亚波列方向发起进攻，但并未取得进展。[42]

乌克兰军队最近向奥里希夫西南方向推进。乌克兰第17军于10月15日报告称，乌克兰军队控制了新安德里夫卡，驳斥了俄罗斯此前的说法。[43]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的扎波罗热州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部于 10 月 15 日报告称，乌克兰军队于 10 月 14 日或 10 月 14 日至 15 日夜间袭击了位于新科斯蒂扬蒂尼夫卡（距前线约 100 公里）附近的俄罗斯鲁比孔先进无人技术中心的人员集结地。[44]

10月15日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的赫尔松州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰军事情报总局（GUR）10月15日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于赫尔松州霍尔利（距前线约75公里）的俄罗斯第18合成集团军（南部军区）无人机操作员训练中心及其教官住所。[45]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[46]

10月14日至15日夜间以及10月15日白天，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列无人机和导弹袭击。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队从黑海上空发射了两枚Kh-59巡航导弹，并从奥廖尔、布良斯克和库尔斯克等城市；罗斯托夫州米列罗沃；斯摩棱斯克州沙塔洛沃；克拉斯诺达尔边疆区滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克；被占领的顿涅茨克市；以及克里米亚的赫瓦尔季斯克等地，发射了580架“沙赫德”型和“格贝拉”型攻击无人机以及“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[47] 乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了536架无人机，俄罗斯无人机袭击了31个地点，无人机残骸落在11个地点。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队随后在 10 月 15 日当天发射了 138 架无人机（其中 90 架为喷气式无人机），乌克兰军队击落了 125 架无人机，其中包括 79 架喷气式无人机。[48]

俄军对基洛沃格勒州发动了战争以来规模最大的无人机袭击。基洛沃格勒州军事管理局局长安德烈·雷科维奇于10月15日报告称，俄军动用了360架无人机袭击了基洛沃格勒州，这是自俄军全面入侵以来对该州发动的最大规模袭击。[49] 雷科维奇表示，俄军蓄意袭击了关键基础设施、运输公司、物流设施和居民楼，共袭击了26处目标，造成3人死亡，6人受伤。

乌克兰军队的“爱国者”弹道导弹拦截器库存已告罄，这将使俄罗斯得以对乌克兰的基础设施造成最大程度的破坏，直到乌克兰获得或能够研发出有效的反弹道导弹防御系统。一位不愿透露姓名的知情人士于10月15日告诉CNN，乌克兰的“爱国者”拦截器已经耗尽。[50] 俄罗斯军队利用全球“爱国者”拦截器短缺的局面，在2026年夏季加大了对乌克兰的弹道导弹打击力度。[51] 俄罗斯军队很可能在2026-2027年冬季继续利用弹道导弹和喷气式无人机对乌克兰发动打击，以对乌克兰城市造成重大破坏，并造成平民不成比例的伤害。[52]

俄罗斯军队正持续快速提升其喷气式无人机发射能力。路透社10月15日发布的卫星图像显示，俄罗斯已基本建成位于罗斯托夫州米列罗沃附近（距前线约176公里）的一座新的喷气式无人机发射场，该发射场设有八个发射轨道平台。[53] 路透社报道称，俄罗斯于8月31日之后开始建设该无人机基地，该基地将具备发射喷气式无人机的能力。自2026年秋季以来，俄罗斯军队一直在扩建其喷气式无人机发射能力，包括在奥廖尔州的齐姆布洛瓦无人机发射场。俄罗斯军队正大力依赖喷气式无人机在更大的作战纵深上突破乌克兰的防空系统。[54]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

据报道，白俄罗斯国防部部署了一套军事通信系统，旨在协助俄罗斯沿其与白俄罗斯、乌克兰和欧洲国家的国际边界推进。一家白俄罗斯媒体于10月12日报道称，俄罗斯正在沿俄白边境以及向与乌克兰和北约成员国的国际边界方向建设一个新的安全军事技术通信网络，以确保俄军能够部署到北约边界。[55] 该网络由俄罗斯和白俄罗斯移动运营商的无线电中继线路和定向天线组成，能够以最小的外部拦截或窃听风险通过无线电信道传输数据。报道指出，该网络的地理位置和架构表明其服务于俄罗斯的军事需求，因为其唯一的指挥中心位于俄罗斯境内。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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