Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2026

Russia and Ukraine have not agreed to a ceasefire against energy infrastructure as of October 12, as Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on October 11 to 12. Russian and Ukrainian sources acknowledged that Russian forces struck a combined heat and power plant west of Kharkiv City, gas production infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, and an oil depot in Sarny, Rivne Oblast overnight on October 11 to 12.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck six Ukrainian energy facilities just on October 12.[2] Ukrainian forces notably did not strike Russian energy infrastructure overnight. Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine is ready to engage in a full energy ceasefire and continue refraining from striking Russian energy infrastructure if Russia reciprocates and formalizes an agreement.[3] An unnamed White House official told Axios on October 11 that US President Donald Trump’s October 11 statement about an energy ceasefire on Truth Social referred to a “potential deal,” not an agreement or established ceasefire, indicating that neither Russia nor Ukraine agreed to any ceasefire.[4] The White House official added that Trump’s ceasefire proposal specifically refers to a moratorium on strikes against oil refineries, which could expand to protect other types of energy infrastructure later. This ceasefire proposal in its current form would grant Russia a major concession without granting Ukraine anything in exchange, as Russia has scores of operational oil refineries, whereas Ukraine only has one. The ceasefire as proposed would also allow Russia to freely continue its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian electrical stations, as such stations are not protected. Such an arrangement would prohibit Ukraine from striking Russia’s most sensitive energy facilities while allowing Russia to continue striking Ukraine’s.

Senior Russian officials confirmed that there is no ceasefire agreement as of October 12 and outright rejected any ceasefire proposal that would allow Ukraine to hold elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on October 12 that Zelensky is trying to secure a ceasefire to reconstitute the Ukrainian military and stated that he does not believe Zelensky has “earned a respite” from the war.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 12 that the Kremlin has no interest in Zelensky’s October 11 proposal for a 60-day ceasefire that would enable Ukraine to organize and hold elections.[6] Peskov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is prepared to order a one-day pause in strikes for Ukraine to hold elections but reiterated the consistent Kremlin rejection of a broader ceasefire. A one-day ceasefire is an unserious proposal and serves as the Kremlin’s effective rejection of any ceasefire that would allow Ukraine to organize and hold legitimate elections.[7] The Kremlin’s statements in conjunction with an overnight strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on October 11-12 confirm that no ceasefire exists and that Moscow has so far rejected the terms of the proposed ceasefire that Trump announced on October 11. The Kremlin regularly rejects compromise proposals that do not unilaterally benefit Russia, and Russia likely will refuse to agree to halt its strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of winter.

A Russian State Duma deputy and a Russian ultranationalist mouthpiece supported the Kremlin’s rejection of an energy ceasefire proposal and openly stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries are not the primary driver of global diesel shortages. Russian State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov claimed on October 10 that “everyone understands perfectly” that the war in the Middle East is the primary cause of global diesel shortages.[8] Zhuravlyov celebrated Trump partially lifting sanctions on Russian diesel exports and described efforts to present Ukrainian strikes as the driver of the global diesel shortage, when it in fact is not, as a significant win for Russia. A Russian milblogger also expressed that it is not in Russia’s interest to accept an energy ceasefire, as agreeing to refrain from striking Ukrainian electrical stations would “deprive [Russia] of one of the main levers of pressure which we have achieved through protracted strikes,” and that Russian strikes against Ukrainian airfields and factories are not nearly as effective as against Ukrainian energy facilities.[9] This lower-ranking Russian official and a milblogger are openly explaining Russia’s strategic rationale for rejecting any meaningful ceasefire agreement that does not allow Russia to maximize the damage it inflicts against Ukraine. This discourse is reflective of how the Kremlin expects nothing less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine and makes zero compromises on this objective.

Russia and Ukraine have not agreed to a ceasefire against energy infrastructure as of October 12, as Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on October 11 to 12.

Senior Russian officials confirmed that there is no ceasefire agreement as of October 12 and outright rejected any ceasefire proposal that would allow Ukraine to hold elections.

A Russian State Duma deputy and a Russian ultranationalist mouthpiece supported the Kremlin’s rejection of an energy ceasefire proposal and openly stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries are not the primary driver of global diesel shortages.

Ukrainian forces delayed a Russian strike package by striking Russian ballistic missile launchers located in Russia.

Ukrainian forces did not strike Russian oil refineries on October 11 to 12 due to President Trump’s energy ceasefire announcement on October 11. Russian forces launched 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces delayed a Russian strike package by striking Russian ballistic missile launchers located in Russia. Ukrainian Minister of Defense Yevheniy Khmara stated on October 11 that Ukrainian forces struck eight Russian ballistic missile launchers for Iskander tactical and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in September 2026, significantly damaging five launchers and causing Russian forces to postpone planned massive strikes against Ukraine.[10] Extending Ukraine’s access to Starlink technology in Russia likely will augment Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian ballistic missile launchers and alleviate pressure on Ukraine’s air defenders.

Ukraine’s strike campaign against Yandex (Russia’s closest analogue to Google) data centers is imposing cascading effects on Russian consumer transactions, as Yandex executives and Russian officials are attempting to mitigate negative effects from Ukrainian strikes. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 12 that Yandex Pay (a mobile digital wallet and payment service) users are complaining to the Russian Central Bank as they are unable to withdraw funds from their bank cards following Ukrainian strikes.[11] The Yandex Press Service reported on October 11 that Yandex services are gradually returning to normal operations following four days of Ukrainian strikes but noted that some features remain unavailable.[12] The Yandex Press Service stated that it decided to limit some Yandex 360 features, including Yandex Disk Cloud Storage, in order to reduce the operational load and preserve the functionality of its services.[13] The Yandex Press Service stated that Yandex reached an agreement with other Russian cloud providers VK Cloud, Selectel, and K2Cloud to expedite the hosting of customer data and services.[14] Russian Minister of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media Maksut Shadayev stated that his ministry and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are working on protecting Russian data centers following Ukrainian strikes against Yandex data center facilities.[15]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions northwest and southeast of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position northwest of Kharkivka (northwest of Sumy City) and in southwestern Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 11 and 12, after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions.[16]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 11 and 12 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and east of Kharkiv City.[17]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces concentrated attacks north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka, Radkivka, and Kindrashivka on October 11 and 12 but did not advance. [18] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Radkivka.[19] ISW has observed increasing reports over the last week regarding Ukrainian counterattacks near Radkivka.[20]

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova on October 12, but ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces advanced. [21]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman tactical area on October 11 and 12 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and south of Lyman.[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continue to decrease the intensity of attacks in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions amid ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks. The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not report any ground activity in the Slovyansk or Kramatorsk directions on October 11 or 12.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff did report limited fighting near Yampil (southeast of Lyman), which ISW assesses to be part of a separate operational effort on the north of the Siverskyi Donets River and under the Russian Western GoF area of responsibility (AoR). The Russian Southern GoF is separately responsible for offensive operations south of the Siverskyi Donets River, attacking directly toward Slovyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not report any attacks in the Fortress belt areas of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk south of the Siverskyi Donets River. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces averaged around 14 attacks per day in the Slovyansk direction (which, in the General Staff’s reporting convention, includes settlements on both sides of the Siverskyi Donets River) in August 2026, five in September 2026, and three per day thus far in October 2026. Russian forces averaged around three attacks per day in the Kramatorsk direction in August 2026, one in September 2026, and only an average of 0.3 thus far in October 2026. The reporting pattern indicates a significant decrease in Russian offensive operations near the Fortress Belt’s immediate eastern and northeastern environs. Ukrainian forces have increased counterattacks along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and near Rai-Oleksandrivka east of Slovyansk in recent weeks and further south near Vasyutynske, Tykhonivka, and Malynivka.[24] A Russian milblogger most recently claimed on October 12 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vasyutynske and Minkivka (both east of Kramatorsk).[25] Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions for several weeks, likely building off of months of battlefield shaping efforts to degrade Russian forces’ offensive capabilities, likely contributing to the decrease in Russian offensive tempo over the last few weeks.[26] The slowing of Russia’s offensive tempo in the area is likely also in part due to Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which is having cascading effects on neighboring sectors.[27] Ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in the area, alongside the defeat of Russian forces north of the Siverskyi Donets River, could disrupt the Russian offensive from the east toward Slovyansk entirely. Russian forces may have also reduced their operational tempo ahead of resuming offensive operations as part of Russia’s Fall 2026 offensive.

Ukrainian forces maintain positions south of Pyskunivka (northeast of Slovyansk), according to geolocated footage published on October 11, in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations near Kostyantynivka itself and southwest of Druzhkivka along the Kazenyi Torets River on October 11 and 12 but did not advance.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck one Russian servicemember in southern Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on October 12, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[30]

The Russian MoD continues to peddle false claims of advances around Dobropillya to further its cognitive warfare effort, exaggerating Russian battlefield successes and portraying Ukrainian defenses as collapsing, particularly as Ukrainian counterattacks have thwarted the Russian effort around Lyman aimed at encircling the Fortress Belt. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central GoF seized Lidyne (northeast of Dobropillya and roughly 13.5 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[31] This is the third settlement northeast of Dobropillya that the Russian MoD has claimed to have seized since October 11.[32] ISW has not observed any evidence to indicate that these claims are true. These claims are part of both a Russian cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian forces’ defense as collapsing and to reinforce lies within the Russian military itself.[33] The Russian MoD is likely reporting false claims due to the Russian military‘s systemic problems concerning dishonest reporting about tactical progress, and to create the false appearance that Russian forces are rapidly advancing across the theater.

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions as Russian infiltrators retain limited positions in Novopavlivka itself. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 12 that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks on both banks of the Mokryi Yaly River and recently advanced east of Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka) and from Shevchenko (southeast of Oleksandrivka) to the outskirts of Burlatske (southeast of Shevchenko) and Vilne Pole (south of Shevchenko).[34] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have advanced to the Mokryi Yaly River in several places and continue counterattacks along the river. Mashovets noted that the pace of Ukrainian counterattacks remains slow, giving Russian forces time to fortify their positions, however. Mashovets stated that one Russian infiltration group retains positions in northern Novopavlivka.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 11 and 12 but did not make confirmed advances.[35] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern GoF seized Mykilske (northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 18 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[36] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, under the operational command of the Eastern GoF) with the claimed seizure of Mykilske.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and west of Orikhiv on October 11 and 12 but did not advance. [38] A Russian milblogger reiterated claims that Russian forces are fighting in central Orikhiv.[39]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 12.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[40]

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine overnight on October 11 to 12, including striking energy facilities. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59 air-launched missile from over the Black Sea and 121 Shahed-type (including 76 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[41] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 drones (including 55 jet-powered), drones and missiles struck 15 locations, and debris fell on four locations. Russian forces struck enterprises and commercial facilities in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and a shopping center in Ivano-Frankivsk City.[42] Russian forces also struck a Naftogas production facility, a thermal power plant, an agricultural facility, and residential facilities in Kharkiv City and Oblast, injuring at least 22 and killing at least three civilians.[43] Russian forces also struck residential areas in Kyiv City and Nova Poshta post office terminals in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[44] Russian sources admitted that Russian forces also hit a Ukrainian oil depot in Rivne Oblast.[45]

The Russian MoD continues to prioritize strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck four Ukrainian locomotives near Odesa City, Odesa Oblast, and Kryvyi Rih and Pyatykhatky, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[46] Russian strikes against Ukrainian locomotives have caused significant shortages in Ukraine, likely in part due to Russian drone adaptations that have improved speed and maneuverability.[47]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive [34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3642 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3643 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100353 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21547 [36] https://t.me/mod_russia/68134 [37] https://t.me/voin_dv/21548 [38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551; https://t.me/dva_majors/100353 [39] https://t.me/wargonzo/37551 [40] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [41] https://t.me/kpszsu/85472 [42] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/32282; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1425245-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-dnipru-zaginula-ludina/; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29142 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32546 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32570 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32573; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32556 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32555 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32574 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32554 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29147; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32566 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32569 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29147; https://t.me/martsinkiv_ONLINE/15479 ; https://t.me/martsinkiv_ONLINE/15466 ; https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1424003-rf-atakuvala-ivano-frankivsk-reaktivnim-bpla-pracuvali-pidrozdili-ppo/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/12/udar-vorozhyh-bezpilotnykiv-po-ivano-frankivsku-troye-zagyblyh/; https://t.me/onyshchuksvitlana/34940 ; [43] https://t.me/synegubov/26565 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26556; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1425071-rf-vdarila-dronom-po-bagatopoverhivci-u-harkovi-terehov/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/26565 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26551 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26541 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26540 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26539 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26538 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26537 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26536 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26534 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4757 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4758 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4759 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4760 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4761 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4762 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4763 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1425115-vnoci-rf-atakuvala-pidpriemstvo-u-kupanskomu-rajoni-zajnalasa-pozeza-foto/; https://t.me/NaftogazUA/2991 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1425315-rf-reaktivnim-dronom-atakuvala-obekt-gazovidoburnoi-infrastrukturi-na-harkivsini-aki-naslidki/ [44] https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1425027-poraneno-zinku-poskodzeno-budinki-armia-rf-atakuvala-portovu-ta-civilnu-infrastrukturu-mikolaivsini/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21731; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7839 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7838 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7836 [45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48686 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/229350 [46] https://t.me/mod_russia/68122 [47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/

截至10月12日，俄罗斯和乌克兰尚未就针对能源基础设施的停火达成一致。10月11日至12日夜间，俄军继续袭击乌克兰的能源基础设施。俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均证实，俄军在10月11日至12日夜间袭击了哈尔科夫市西部的一座热电联产厂、哈尔科夫州的天然气生产设施以及罗夫诺州萨尔尼的一个油库。[1] 乌克兰总统泽连斯基报告称，仅在10月12日一天，俄军就袭击了乌克兰的六处能源设施。[2] 值得注意的是，乌克兰军队当晚并未袭击俄罗斯的能源基础设施。泽连斯基强调，如果俄罗斯做出对等回应并正式签署协议，乌克兰准备全面停火，并继续避免袭击俄罗斯的能源基础设施。[3]一位不愿透露姓名的白宫官员10月11日告诉Axios，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普10月11日在Truth Social上发表的关于能源停火的声明指的是“潜在的协议”，而非已达成的协议或已确立的停火，这表明俄罗斯和乌克兰均未同意任何停火。[4] 这位白宫官员补充说，特朗普的停火提议具体指的是暂停对炼油厂的袭击，未来可能会扩大范围，保护其他类型的能源基础设施。目前的停火提议将给予俄罗斯重大让步，而乌克兰却没有任何补偿，因为俄罗斯拥有数十座运营中的炼油厂，而乌克兰只有一座。根据提议，停火还将允许俄罗斯继续其在2026-2027年冬季对乌克兰电站的袭击行动，因为这些电站没有得到保护。这样的安排将禁止乌克兰袭击俄罗斯最敏感的能源设施，同时却允许俄罗斯继续袭击乌克兰的设施。

俄罗斯高级官员证实，截至10月12日，双方尚未达成停火协议，并断然拒绝任何允许乌克兰举行选举的停火提议。俄罗斯外长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫于10月12日声称，泽连斯基试图通过停火来重建乌克兰军队，并表示他不认为泽连斯基“有资格”从战争中“喘息”。[5] 克里姆林宫发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫于10月12日表示，克里姆林宫对泽连斯基10月11日提出的为期60天的停火提议不感兴趣，该提议旨在使乌克兰能够组织和举行选举。[6] 佩斯科夫声称，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京准备下令暂停一天的空袭，以便乌克兰举行选举，但他重申了克里姆林宫一贯拒绝更广泛的停火。一天的停火提议毫无诚意，实际上是克里姆林宫拒绝任何允许乌克兰组织和举行合法选举的停火提议。[7]克里姆林宫的声明，以及10月11日至12日夜间对乌克兰能源基础设施的袭击，证实了停火并不存在，莫斯科迄今为止拒绝了特朗普10月11日宣布的停火提议。克里姆林宫一贯拒绝那些对俄罗斯没有单方面利益的妥协方案，而且俄罗斯很可能在冬季来临前拒绝同意停止对乌克兰能源基础设施的袭击。

俄罗斯国家杜马一名议员和一位俄罗斯极端民族主义喉舌支持克里姆林宫拒绝能源停火提议，并公开宣称乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击并非全球柴油短缺的主要原因。俄罗斯国家杜马国防委员会第一副主席阿列克谢·茹拉夫廖夫10月10日声称，“人人都清楚”中东战争才是全球柴油短缺的主要原因。[8] 茹拉夫廖夫对特朗普部分解除对俄罗斯柴油出口的制裁表示欢迎，并称将乌克兰袭击描绘成全球柴油短缺的罪魁祸首（而事实并非如此）是俄罗斯的重大胜利。一位俄罗斯军事博主也表示，接受能源停火不符合俄罗斯的利益，因为同意不打击乌克兰的发电站将“剥夺（俄罗斯）通过长期打击所取得的主要施压手段之一”，而且俄罗斯对乌克兰机场和工厂的打击远不如对乌克兰能源设施的打击有效。[9] 这位级别较低的俄罗斯官员和一位军事博主公开解释了俄罗斯拒绝任何实质性停火协议的战略理由，因为这些协议不允许俄罗斯最大限度地对乌克兰造成破坏。这种论调反映出克里姆林宫期望在乌克兰取得全面胜利，并且在此目标上绝不妥协。

截至 10 月 12 日，俄罗斯和乌克兰尚未就针对能源基础设施的停火达成一致，俄罗斯军队在 10 月 11 日至 12 日夜间继续袭击乌克兰的能源基础设施。

俄罗斯高级官员证实，截至10月12日，双方尚未达成停火协议，并断然拒绝任何允许乌克兰举行选举的停火提议。

一位俄罗斯国家杜马议员和一位俄罗斯极端民族主义喉舌支持克里姆林宫拒绝能源停火提议，并公开表示乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击并非全球柴油短缺的主要原因。

乌克兰军队袭击了位于俄罗斯境内的俄罗斯弹道导弹发射装置，从而延缓了俄罗斯的打击行动。

由于特朗普总统于10月11日宣布能源停火，乌克兰军队在10月11日至12日期间没有袭击俄罗斯炼油厂。俄罗斯军队连夜向乌克兰发射了121架无人机。

乌克兰军队最近向奥列克桑德里夫卡方向推进。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

乌克兰军队通过打击位于俄罗斯境内的俄制弹道导弹发射装置，延缓了俄罗斯的打击行动。乌克兰国防部长叶夫根尼·赫马拉于10月11日表示，乌克兰军队于2026年9月打击了俄罗斯的8个“伊斯坎德尔”战术导弹和S-400防空导弹系统的弹道导弹发射装置，其中5个发射装置严重受损，导致俄军推迟了原定对乌克兰的大规模打击。[10] 延长乌克兰在俄罗斯使用“星链”技术的权限，很可能增强乌克兰打击俄罗斯弹道导弹发射装置的能力，并减轻乌克兰防空部队的压力。

乌克兰针对Yandex（俄罗斯最接近谷歌的公司）数据中心的罢工行动正在对俄罗斯消费者的交易产生连锁反应，Yandex高管和俄罗斯官员正试图减轻乌克兰罢工带来的负面影响。俄罗斯反对派媒体Verstka于10月12日报道称，由于乌克兰罢工，Yandex Pay（一款移动数字钱包和支付服务）用户无法从银行卡取款，他们已向俄罗斯中央银行投诉。[11] Yandex新闻服务部于10月11日发布消息称，在乌克兰罢工四天后，Yandex服务正在逐步恢复正常运营，但指出部分功能仍然无法使用。[12] Yandex新闻服务部表示，为了减轻运营负担并维持服务功能，公司决定限制部分Yandex 360功能，包括Yandex Disk云存储。[13] Yandex 新闻服务处表示，Yandex 已与其他俄罗斯云服务提供商 VK Cloud、Selectel 和 K2Cloud 达成协议，以加快客户数据和服务的托管。[14] 俄罗斯数字发展、通信和大众传媒部长马克苏特·沙达耶夫表示，在乌克兰袭击 Yandex 数据中心设施后，他的部门和俄罗斯国防部正在努力保护俄罗斯的数据中心。[15]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心国

俄罗斯军队最近在苏梅市西北部和东南部进行了渗透行动。根据10月11日和12日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了哈尔科夫卡西北部（苏梅市西北部）和里亚斯内西南部（苏梅市东南部）的俄罗斯阵地，而ISW评估认为，这两次袭击都是俄罗斯渗透行动的结果。[16]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

10 月 11 日和 12 日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部和韦利基布尔卢克方向发动进攻，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在哈尔科夫市北部和东部进行了反击。[17]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

10月11日至12日，俄军集中兵力在库皮扬斯克以北的库特基夫卡、拉德基夫卡和金德拉希夫卡附近发动进攻，但并未取得进展。[18] 据俄罗斯西部部队（GoF）消息人士称，乌克兰军队正在拉德基夫卡附近进行反击。[19] 过去一周，ISW观察到有关乌克兰军队在拉德基夫卡附近进行反击的报道越来越多。[20]

有报道称，俄罗斯西部政府军于 10 月 12 日袭击了博罗瓦东南部，但 ISW 没有观察到任何证据表明俄罗斯军队取得了进展。[21]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

10 月 11 日和 12 日，俄军继续在莱曼战术区发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在莱曼南北两方发起反击，俄军未能取得进展。[22]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

在乌克兰持续反击的情况下，俄军继续降低在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克方向的进攻强度。值得注意的是，乌克兰总参谋部并未报告10月11日或12日在斯拉维扬斯克或克拉马托尔斯克方向发生任何地面行动。[23] 乌克兰总参谋部确实报告了在扬皮尔（莱曼东南）附近发生的有限战斗，ISW评估认为这是在西顿涅茨河北岸、俄罗斯西部边境责任区（AoR）内进行的一项独立作战行动的一部分。俄罗斯南部边境责任区则负责西顿涅茨河南岸的进攻行动，直接向斯拉维扬斯克方向发起进攻。值得注意的是，乌克兰总参谋部并未报告在西顿涅茨河南岸的斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克要塞带地区发生任何袭击。乌克兰总参谋部报告显示，2026年8月，俄军在斯拉维扬斯克方向（根据总参谋部的报告惯例，该方向包括西顿涅茨河两岸的居民点）平均每天发动约14次袭击；9月平均每天5次；10月至今平均每天3次。俄军在克拉马托尔斯克方向，2026年8月平均每天发动约3次袭击；9月平均每天1次；10月至今平均每天仅0.3次。报告显示，俄军在要塞带东部和东北部近邻地区的进攻行动显著减少。近几周，乌克兰军队加强了在西顿涅茨河南岸和斯拉维扬斯克以东的赖-奥列克桑德里夫卡附近以及更南部的瓦休廷斯克、季霍尼夫卡和马利尼夫卡附近的反击。[24]一位俄罗斯军事博客作者最近于10月12日声称，乌克兰军队在瓦休廷斯克和明基夫卡（均位于克拉马托尔斯克以东）附近发动了反击。[25] 乌克兰军队已在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克方向进行了数周的反击，这很可能是数月来旨在削弱俄军进攻能力的战场布局努力的结果，也可能是俄军近几周进攻节奏放缓的原因之一。[26] 俄军在该地区进攻节奏的放缓，也可能部分归因于乌克兰在莱曼方向发起的“维瓦尔第行动”，该行动对邻近地区产生了连锁反应。[27] 乌克兰在该地区持续不断的反击，加上俄军在西顿涅茨河以北的溃败，可能会彻底瓦解俄军从东部向斯拉维扬斯克方向的攻势。作为俄罗斯 2026 年秋季攻势的一部分，俄罗斯军队可能也降低了作战节奏，准备恢复进攻行动。

根据 10 月 11 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队在皮斯库尼夫卡（斯拉维扬斯克东北部）以南地区保持阵地，而此前俄罗斯方面声称俄军在这些地区保持阵地。[28]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

10 月 11 日和 12 日，俄军在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡附近以及德鲁日基夫卡西南部的卡泽尼托列茨河沿岸集中开展进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[29]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

俄罗斯军队最近在多布罗皮利亚进行了一次渗透行动。根据 10 月 12 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队在多布罗皮利亚南部袭击了一名俄罗斯军人，而 ISW 评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[30]

俄罗斯国防部持续散布关于多布罗皮利亚周边战事进展的虚假消息，以推进其认知战策略，夸大俄军战场战果，并渲染乌克兰防御体系崩溃的假象，尤其是在乌克兰反击挫败了俄军在莱曼附近旨在包围要塞带的行动之后。俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军中央政府​​军部分兵力占领了利迪涅（位于多布罗皮利亚东北部，距离俄军最远推进点约13.5公里）[31]。这是自10月11日以来，俄罗斯国防部声称占领的第三个位于多布罗皮利亚东北部的定居点[32]。国际战略研究所（ISW）尚未发现任何证据表明这些说法属实。这些说法既是俄罗斯认知战策略的一部分，旨在渲染乌克兰军队防御体系崩溃的假象，也是为了强化俄军内部的谎言[33]。由于俄罗斯军方在战术进展报告方面存在系统性不诚实问题，俄罗斯国防部很可能发布了虚假声明，目的是制造俄罗斯军队正在战区快速推进的假象。

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

乌克兰军队继续在诺沃帕夫利夫卡和奥列克桑德里夫卡方向发起反击，而俄罗斯渗透者则在诺沃帕夫利夫卡镇内保持着有限的阵地。乌克兰军事观察员科斯蒂安廷·马绍韦茨于10月12日报告称，乌克兰军队继续在莫克雷亚利河两岸发起反击，并于近期向扎波罗热以东（诺沃帕夫利夫卡以南）以及从舍甫琴科（奥列克桑德里夫卡东南）推进至布尔拉茨克（舍甫琴科东南）和维尔涅波列（舍甫琴科以南）郊区。[34] 马绍韦茨指出，乌克兰军队已在多处推进至莫克雷亚利河沿岸，并继续沿河发起反击。然而，马绍韦茨也注意到，乌克兰军队的反击速度仍然缓慢，这给了俄罗斯军队巩固阵地的时间。马绍韦茨表示，一个俄罗斯渗透小组仍然在诺沃巴甫利夫卡北部占据阵地。

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

10月11日和12日，俄军继续向胡利亚波列方向发起进攻，但并未取得确切进展。[35] 俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军东部军区部队占领了米基尔斯克（位于胡利亚波列西北方向，距离俄军推进的最远点约18公里）。[36] 一位俄罗斯军事博客作者称，占领米基尔斯克的行动是由俄军第40海军陆战旅（太平洋舰队，隶属东部军区作战指挥）的部队完成的。[37]

10月11日和12日，俄军继续在奥里希夫西北部和西部发动进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[38] 一位俄罗斯军事博客作者重申了俄军正在奥里希夫中部作战的说法。[39]

10月12日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[40]

10月11日至12日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰境内多地发动导弹和无人机袭击，其中包括袭击能源设施。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队从黑海上空发射了一枚Kh-59空射导弹，并从奥廖尔和库尔斯克市、克拉斯诺达尔边疆区的滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及克里米亚的赫瓦尔季斯克方向，发射了121架“沙赫德”型（其中76架为喷气式）和“格贝拉”型攻击无人机、“班德罗尔”或“丹-T”巡飞弹以及“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[41] 乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了89架无人机（其中55架为喷气式），无人机和导弹袭击了15个地点，另有4个地点落有碎片。俄军袭击了切尔尼戈夫州和第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州的企业和商业设施，以及伊万诺-弗兰科夫斯克市的一个购物中心。[42] 俄军还袭击了哈尔科夫市和哈尔科夫州的一家乌克兰国家石油天然气公司（Naftogas）生产设施、一座火力发电厂、一个农业设施和居民区，造成至少22人受伤，至少3名平民死亡。[43] 俄军还袭击了基辅市的居民区以及尼古拉耶夫州和敖德萨州的“新邮政”（Nova Poshta）邮局。[44] 俄罗斯方面承认，俄军还袭击了里夫诺州的一个乌克兰石油仓库。[45]

俄罗斯国防部继续将打击乌克兰铁路基础设施列为优先事项。俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军在敖德萨州敖德萨市附近以及第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州克里维里赫和皮亚特哈茨基附近袭击了四台乌克兰机车。[46] 俄罗斯对乌克兰机车的袭击已造成乌克兰铁路严重短缺，部分原因可能是俄罗斯无人机进行了改进，提高了速度和机动性。[47]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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