Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2026

Ukrainian officials reported in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield communications network over Ukraine overnight on October 13 to 14 that will significantly disrupt Ukraine’s jet-powered drone interception efforts and intermediate-range strike campaign. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov and former adviser to the Ukrainian defense minister Serhii Sternenko reported on October 14 that SpaceX implemented a speed limit of 100 miles per hour (roughly 160 kilometers per hour) for the terminals connected to the Starshield communications network operating in Ukraine.[1] Starshield is a more secure, jam-resistant, and military-oriented version of a Starlink satellite network that SpaceX designed for government use, while Starlink serves civilian and commercial purposes.[2] Unrestricted Starshield access allowed Ukrainian forces to fly their drones over 100 miles per hour before the October 14 restriction. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk reported on October 14 that the US military and ultimately US President Donald Trump are responsible for decisions related to Starshield’s speed and usage limits but that Starlink is a commercial service that SpaceX controls.[3] Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov responded to Musk and stated that SpaceX restored the connectivity of Ukrainian Starlink terminals up to speeds of 160 kilometers per hour, adding that entirely removing Starshield’s speed limit is critical for Ukraine’s defense.[4] Standard Starlink plans already restrict the Starlink terminals’ connectivity for aerial vehicles exceeding 100 miles per hour.[5] It remains unclear whether the Starshield speed restrictions remain in place as of this writing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 14 that the Kremlin did not receive official statements from Musk about the SpaceX speed limits for Ukrainian forces.[6]

The October 14 Starshield speed restrictions come against the backdrop of recent Russian-attributed arson attacks against Starlink infrastructure in Europe. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev reported on October 14 that Bulgarian authorities are investigating a reported arson attack against Starlink communications antennas in Sofia, Bulgaria.[7] Polish Member of the Council of Ministers and Coordinator of Special Services Tomasz Siemoniak stated that Russian intelligence services are likely behind the September 23 arson attack against Starlink infrastructure in Wola Krobozska, Poland.[8]

Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or Starlink services over Russia, such that the latest Starshield in-motion speed restrictions cannot affect Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against targets in Russia. SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to both Starlink and Starshield to Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces rely on alternative methods of communication and point-to-point navigation to strike targets in Russia. The Starshield speed restrictions are unrelated and will not prevent Ukrainian forces from striking Russian oil refineries, data centers, and other stationary targets within Russia.

The speed restrictions on Starshield could have major implications for Ukraine’s interception efforts against Russia’s faster jet-powered drones . Beskrestnov reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces leverage Starlink (likely referring to Starshield) for jet-powered drone interceptions — Ukraine’s most effective solution for countering Russian jet-powered Geran drones.[9] Ukraine has been urgently pursuing domestic production of jet-powered drone interceptors to combat Russia’s increasing use of jet-powered drones, and the Starshield speed restrictions risk disrupting Ukraine’s progress and allowing Russian forces to continue terrorizing Ukraine’s population ahead of and into Winter 2026-2027.[10] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 14 that there is a “window of opportunity” that the Starlink (likely referring to Starshield) speed restrictions created during which Russian forces can inflict maximum damage on Ukraine’s infrastructure.[11] Data from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) between September 24 and October 14 suggests that the Starshield speed restrictions degraded Ukraine’s fixed-wing drone interception efforts as well, further hampering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities on the tactical and operational levels.

The Starshield restrictions will significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to conduct the intermediate-range strikes that have facilitated Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations in key frontline sectors throughout 2026. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces stated on October 14 that Ukrainian forces in the Hulyaipole direction reported drone connection disruptions when flying at speeds of 110 to 120 kilometers per hour, which makes drone control difficult.[12] The corps stated that the Starshield connection restrictions complicated the launch of intermediate-range drones that require rapid acceleration at high speed. The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps has since deleted its original announcement without issuing a subsequent explanation. Starshield-enabled drones, including US-made Hornet drones, serve as the backbone of Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, since Starshield connection allows Ukrainian drone operators to maintain live control at high speeds across Ukraine, including over Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. The Hornet drone’s maximum speed and dive speed exceed the imposed Starshield speed limit, preventing Ukrainian forces from effectively deploying them as strike vehicles.[13] The Starshield speed restrictions will deprive Ukrainian drones from targeting moving Russian vehicles and other dynamic targets in occupied Ukraine. Data from the Ukrainian USF indicates that the intensity of Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics vehicles across the frontline significantly decreased on October 14, very likely as a result of the restrictions on Starshield.[14] The Ukrainian intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) has been a key element of battlefield-shaping efforts that facilitated Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Oleksandrivka and Lyman directions in 2026, and the October 14 Starshield restrictions risk jeopardizing Ukraine’s contesting of the operational initiative.[15]

The Starshield speed restrictions come as Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized more details on Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which has heavily relied on a coordinated, months-long intermediate-range strike campaign to facilitate successful Ukrainian ground advances. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces liberated an additional 101 square kilometers of territory in the operation’s fourth phase, for a total of 277 square kilometers and 16 settlements over Operation Vivaldi’s four phases so far.[16] Biletskyi reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, and Kolodyazi (all north of Lyman) and added that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian forces from bypassing the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the flanks and controlling the E-40 Kharkiv City-Slovyansk highway (also known as the M-03). The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps conducted a months-long intermediate-range strike campaign to shape the battlefield as part of Operation Vivaldi, heavily targeting Russian logistics, fuel supplies, and drone operators, which subsequently degraded Russian forces’ offensive capabilities and facilitated later Ukrainian advances.[17]

Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi continues to generate cascading effects on neighboring sectors immediately north and south of the Lyman area. Biletskyi reported that Ukrainian counterattacks forced the command of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) to redeploy elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) from the Kupyansk direction to the Lyman direction, easing the pressure on Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) — as ISW recently forecasted.[18] ISW has also observed evidence that Ukraine’s successes during Operation Vivaldi are creating cascading effects for Russian operations north of Lyman in the Borova direction while also hampering Russian efforts to advance toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from the east.[19] The Russian Southern GoF has slowed its offensive tempo toward Slovyansk from the east, potentially to regroup its forces. The Russian military command likely intended for offensive operations east of Slovyansk to synergize with the Russian Western GoF’s efforts against Slovyansk from the northeast — the effort that Ukrainian forces thwarted during Operation Vivaldi.[20] Ukrainian forces have also been counterattacking east of Slovyansk, which, combined with the defeat of Russian forces north of the Siverskyi Donets River, could further halt the Russian drive toward Slovyansk from the east entirely.[21]

Ukrainian officials reported in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield communications network over Ukraine overnight on October 13 to 14 that will significantly disrupt Ukraine’s jet-powered drone interception efforts and intermediate-range strike campaign.

Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or Starlink services over Russia, such that the latest Starshield in-motion speed restrictions cannot affect Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against targets in Russia.

The speed restrictions on Starshield could have major implications for Ukraine’s interception efforts against Russia’s faster jet-powered drones.

The Starshield restrictions will significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to conduct the intermediate-range strikes that have facilitated Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations in key frontline sectors throughout 2026.

The Starshield speed restrictions come as Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized more details on Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which has heavily relied on a coordinated, months-long intermediate-range strike campaign to facilitate successful Ukrainian ground advances.

Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi continues to generate cascading effects on neighboring sectors immediately north and south of the Lyman area.

Ukrainian forces struck a data center of the Russian state-owned bank Sberbank in Saratov Oblast and industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast on the night of October 13 to 14. Russian forces launched 39 Iskander-M, KN-23, and S-400 ballistic missiles, Zircon and Onyx anti-ship missiles, and 128 drones and loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on October 14.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck a data center of Russian state-owned bank Sberbank in Saratov Oblast on the night of October 13 to 14 as part of their new long-range strike campaign against Russian data centers and digital infrastructure. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Sberbank data center.[22] Geolocated imagery published on October 14 shows damage to Sberbank’s data center in Balakovo, Saratov Oblast (roughly 734 kilometers from the international border) following a reported Ukrainian strike.[23] First Deputy Chairperson of Sberbank’s Management Board Alexander Vedyakhin acknowledged on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck one of Sberbank’s data processing centers but claimed that all bank systems and services are operating normally.[24] Several Russian opposition media sources reported, however, that users of apps from Sberbank and Tochka Banka (another prominent Russian bank); popular websites and apps like Mail.ru, Kontur, Ozon, Megafon, and VKontakte; and internet service provider SkyNet St. Petersburg experienced outages or disruptions in banking services after the Ukrainian strike.[25] The Ukrainian strike against the Sberbank data center is part of Ukraine’s recent long-range strike campaign against Yandex (Russia’s closest analogue to Google) data centers aimed at degrading Russian digital infrastructure, denying Russia the ability to fund its war in Ukraine, and responding to Russian strikes against Ukrainian data centers.[26]

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast. Ukrainian forces likely struck the Aksaykardandetal industrial plant in Aksay (roughly 209 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on October 13 showing a large fire at the plant.[27] Russian opposition source Astra reported on October 13 that the fire spread to two warehouses covering an area of roughly 9,000 square meters.[28] A Russian milblogger acknowledged the strike and claimed that the plant specializes in the production of driveshafts, joints, transmission assemblies, and components for specialized machinery.[29]

Russian officials are urging data centers to decentralize their digital infrastructure in order to more easily mitigate service disruptions following Ukrainian strikes. The deputy president and chairperson of the Management Board of Russian state telecommunications operator Rostelecom, Valery Ermakov, claimed on October 14 that Russian companies need to develop backup sites or “doomsday” data centers in order to restore services amid Ukrainian strikes against Yandex data centers.[30] Ermakov stated that a centralized structure of Russian data centers has become a vulnerability and called for Russian digital companies to distribute services across multiple sites and physical locations in order to improve the resilience of Russian digital infrastructure assets. Russian Minister of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media Maksut Shadayev stated on October 14 that Ukrainian strikes against data centers are more complex than strikes against oil refineries or other industrial facilities because data centers require uninterrupted power supply, cooling, and the operation of sensitive server equipment.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on October 11 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces east of Myropillya, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City).[33]

Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian helicopter near the border area of Belgorod Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on October 14 showing a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone striking and damaging a Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopter, and geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that the strike occurred southeast of Ustinka, Belgorod Oblast (approximately five kilometers from the international border).[34]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 13 and 14 but did not advance.[35]

Russian officials and milbloggers continue to make unsubstantiated claims about an alleged encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 13 on its Max channel that Russian forces are destroying allegedly encircled Ukrainian forces in Mykolaivka, Varvarivka and Nefedivka (all east of Vovchansk).[36] A Russian milblogger posted a map on October 14 that claimed that Russian forces have closed the pocket between Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk and have encircled Varvarivka and an area between Chorne (east of Vovchansk) and Nefedivka.[37] ISW continues to assess that Russian sources are misrepresenting the situation on the ground, as there is no evidence of an encirclement in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 14, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[39] The Russian MoD claimed on October 13 on its Max channel that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Hrushivka, Blahodativka, Berezivka, Maliivka, and Osynove (all east and southeast of Kupyansk and between roughly four and 14 kilometers from what ISW assesses is the furthest Russian advance).[40]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 14, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[41] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Vovchyi Yar (south of Borova and roughly 17 kilometers from what ISW assesses is the furthest Russian advance).[42]

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-type drone strike against Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast, on the night of October 13 and 14, in an effort to degrade Ukrainian logistics in the Borova and Lyman directions. The Izyum Raion Military Administration reported that Russian forces conducted a series of strikes, including a Shahed-type drone strike, against residential and commercial infrastructure in Izyum, injuring two people.[43] Izyum serves as a logistics hub for Ukrainian forces operating in the Borova and Lyman directions, and a Russian milblogger previously claimed that Russian forces are increasingly striking Izyum in response to recent Ukrainian advances north of Lyman.[44]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

See topline text for reports about Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction as part of Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman on October 13 and 14 but did not advance.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, Mykolaivka, Pyskunivka, and Kalenyky on October 13 and 14 but did not advance.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Ukrainian forces stopped counterattacking across the Siverskyi Donets River from Ozerne (east of Slovyansk on the northern bank of the river) toward Kryva Luka (on the southern bank of the river) but are still counterattacking toward other unspecified areas from Ozerne.[47]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in areas far west of the current frontline east of the Fortress Belt, likely as part of Russia’s cognitive warfare campaign to exaggerate battlefield advances. The Russian MoD claimed on its Max channel that the Russian Southern GoFs are conducting offensive operations near Semenivka (directly east of Slovyansk), Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk — all areas far from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances.[48] The Russian MoD’s reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian advances and falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to available evidence.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Kostyantynivka on October 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[50] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pryiut (west of Kostyantynivka).[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continue efforts to reach the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border from the Pokrovsk area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 13 that Russian forces reprioritized their efforts away from Udachne and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) to Serhiivka (northwest of Udachne and south of the E-50 Pokrovsk-Slovyanka highway) after assessing that Serhiivka would be the best area in which to establish a foothold for further offensive operations toward the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are operating in the Dobropillya direction, according to a Russian milblogger.[53] ISW last observed elements of the Russian 234th VDV Regiment operating in the Zaporizhia direction in February 2026.[54] Elements of the 234th VDV Regiment were operating near Pokrovsk as of November 2025, therefore, elements of the regiment may be split between the two areas.

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

The Russian MoD is claiming that fighting is ongoing unfeasibly far from the frontline as part of its cognitive warfare campaign to exaggerate battlefield advances in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions. The Russian MoD claimed on October 13 that the Russian Eastern GoFs conducted offensive operations near Tarasivka (northwest of Novopavlivka and roughly 16 kilometers from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances in the Novopavlivka direction) and near Havrylivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly 15 kilometers from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances in the area).[55] The Russian MoD notably published these claims on its Max channel, and not its Telegram channel, suggesting that the Russian MoD aims to present these exaggerated battlefield successes to the domestic Russian audience.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

The Russian MoD, with co-opted Russian milblogger support, also continues its cognitive warfare campaign to exaggerate battlefield advances in the Hulyaipole direction. The Russian MoD claimed on October 13 on its Max channel that the Russian Eastern GoFs conducted offensive operations near Zalivne and Volnyanka (both northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 19 kilometers from the furthest assessed Russian advances in the area).[57] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger made similarly exaggerated claims on October 13, alleging that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations near and west of Zelena Dibrova (northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 14 kilometers from the furthest assessed Russian advances).[58]

The Russian military command is reportedly accumulating forces in the Hulyaipole direction in anticipation of future intensified offensive operations. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Response Corps Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi reported on October 14 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces in the Hulyaipole direction, in particular along the Verkhnya Tersa River delta where there are leafy areas – likely referring to the Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) area.[59] Russian forces reportedly now have a five-to-one quantitative personnel advantage over Ukrainian forces in the Hulyaipole direction and are building up armored vehicles. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Verkhnya Tersa (immediately south of Vozdvyzhivka).[60]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 13 and 14 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[61]

Russian milbloggers continue to disagree over the control of terrain in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that fighting continues for Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) and strongholds north of the settlement.[62] Another prominent Russian milblogger claimed on October 14, however, that Russian forces firmly control Mali Shcherbaky as well as areas four kilometers north of the settlement.[63] A third Russian milblogger complained that Russian sources are amplifying unreliable reports from individual frontline soldiers who do not have a full understanding of the actual situation and are thus creating discord in the Russian information environment.[64]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 14.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[65]

Russia launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 39 missiles, including Iskander-M, KN-23, and S-400 ballistic missiles and Zirkon and Onyx anti-ship missiles, from Kursk, Bryansk, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 128 Shahed-type (including 77 jet-powered), Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones; Parodiya-type decoy drones; and Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Oryol City; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed four unspecified missiles and 119 drones (including 59 jet-powered drones), that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 22 locations, and that debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials noted that the Russian drone and missile strikes primarily targeted civilian and energy infrastructure in Kyiv City, Kyiv Oblast, and Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian ballistic missiles struck all three combined heating and power plants in Kyiv City.[68] Russian forces also struck railway infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Ternopil oblasts.[69] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Lutsk, Volyn Oblast and Rivne Oblast, killing at least six people and injuring at least 21.[70]

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukraine again did not receive early warnings ahead of some of the Russian overnight missile strikes against Ukraine on October 13 to 14. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, initially reported on the evening of October 13 that Ukrainian forces did not receive information about Russian ballistic missile launches from their NATO or US partners.[71] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated later on October 14that Ukrainian forces initially did not receive early warning of the first wave of incoming Russian strikes against Kyiv City but that Ukraine’s partners warned about the following three waves of Russian strikes.[72]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/ [22] https://t.me/firepointofficial/413 [23] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13592; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2110226505070465295; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2110219081521811968 [24] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1122291?utm_source=top [25] https://t.me/istories_media/13871; https://t.me/istories_media/13872; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/10/14/polzovateli-nachali-zhalovatsya-na-sboi-v-rabote-servisov-sbera-posle-ataki-ukrainskih-bespilotnikov-na-data-tsentr-kompanii; https://t.me/astrapress/128094 [26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/; [27] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2110007783194046503/history; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/32512; https://kyivindependent [dot] com/massive-fire-at-industrial-plant-in-russias-rostov-oblast-spreads-to-9-000-square-meters/ [28] https://t.me/astrapress/128031 [29] https://t.me/dva_majors/100451 [30] https://www.rbc dot ru/technology_and_media/14/10/2026/6acf53309d639a84aaba2c5f [31] https://segodnia dot ru/news/315026 [32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13221 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6992 [33] https://t.me/wargonzo/37594 [34] https://t.me/ZSU_115OMBr/3678 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2110259143567081597 ; https://x.com/ElBendico/status/2110273071772811684 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42585 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42587 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37594 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9606 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100453 [36] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1122063 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/229520 [37] https://t.me/divgen/84582 ; https://divgen dot ru/ [38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/ [39] https://t.me/grvZapad/20080; https://t.me/wargonzo/37594 [40] https://www dot interfax.ru/amp/1122064 [41] https://t.me/grvZapad/20080; [42] https://www dot interfax.ru/amp/1122064 [43] https://t.me/izyum_official/46353 [44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75141 [45]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42587 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42585 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37594 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20080 [46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42587; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42585; https://t.me/wargonzo/37594; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56819 [47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56819 [48] https://www.interfax dot ru/amp/1122064 [49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ [50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42587; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42585; https://t.me/wargonzo/37594 [51] https://t.me/rybar/83918 [52] https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/13/udachne-j-kotlyne-vidhodyat-na-drugyj-plan-chomu-rosiyany-zoseredylysya-na-sergiyivczi/ [53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56820 [54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/ [55] https://www.interfax dot ru/amp/1122064 [56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/ [57] https://www.interfax dot ru/amp/1122064 [58] https://t.me/rybar/83917 [59] https://youtu.be/MgSMWGzP1cE?t=1172; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/14/%c2%abbronya-gulyaye-po-40-hvylyn-na-poli-boyu%c2%bb-u-dshv-poperedyly-pro-zagrozu-na-fronti/ [60] https://t.me/rybar/83917 [61] https://t.me/wargonzo/37594; https://t.me/rybar/83917; https://www.interfax dot ru/amp/1122064 [62] https://t.me/rybar/83917 [63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56845 [64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48765 [65] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [66] https://t.me/kpszsu/86369 [67] https://t.me/kpszsu/86369 [68] https://t.me/Koretskyi_official/826 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/86210 [69]https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskyi/posts/pfbid025isst1ekCundWAtapq91o2UwsCT1mYnGZ7dGEFo9UjP8iXiqvTDRSVkhEwciQqsbl [70] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21371 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2110393253933539736 ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/12637 [71] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2110104163967246529?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2110104163967246529%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url= ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-i-mark-karni-obgovorili-rosijskij-udar-b-106881 ; https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/udar-balistikoyu-po-kiyevu-13-zhovtnya-ukrajina-ne-otrimala-poperedzhennya-vid-partneriv-litvin-50649773.html [72] https://suspilne dot media/1427039-partneri-spersu-ne-povidomili-pro-balistiku-ale-pro-tri-nastupni-hvili-atak-vze-poperedzali-ignat/

乌克兰官员报告称，SpaceX公司在10月13日至14日夜间对乌克兰境内的“星盾”（Starshield）通信网络实施了移动速度限制，这将严重干扰乌克兰的喷气式无人机拦截行动和中程打击行动。乌克兰总统国防技术顾问谢尔盖·“闪电”·别斯克列斯特诺夫（Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov）和乌克兰前国防部长谢尔盖·斯特年科（Serhii Sternenko）于10月14日报告称，SpaceX公司对连接到乌克兰境内“星盾”通信网络的终端实施了100英里/小时（约160公里/小时）的速度限制。[1] “星盾”是SpaceX公司为政府用途设计的更安全、抗干扰且更偏向军事用途的“星链”（Starlink）卫星网络，而“星链”则用于民用和商业用途。[2] 在10月14日限制实施之前，乌克兰军队可以不受限制地使用“星盾”网络，使其无人机飞行速度超过100英里/小时。 SpaceX首席执行官埃隆·马斯克于10月14日表示，美国军方以及最终由美国总统唐纳德·特朗普负责制定与“星盾”（Starshield）的速度和使用限制相关的决策，但“星链”（Starlink）是一项由SpaceX控制的商业服务。[3] 乌克兰前国防部长米哈伊洛·费多罗夫回应马斯克称，SpaceX已恢复乌克兰“星链”终端的连接，最高速度可达每小时160公里，并补充说，彻底取消“星盾”的速度限制对乌克兰国防至关重要。[4] 标准的“星链”套餐已经限制了飞行速度超过每小时100英里的飞行器使用“星链”终端。[5] 截至本文撰写之时，“星盾”的速度限制是否仍然有效尚不清楚。克里姆林宫发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫于10月14日声称，克里姆林宫没有收到马斯克关于SpaceX对乌克兰军队速度限制的正式声明。[6]

10月14日，Starshield 的速度限制措施出台之际，正值近期欧洲发生多起据称由俄罗斯策划的针对 Starlink 基础设施的纵火袭击事件。保加利亚总理鲁门·拉德夫于10月14日报告称，保加利亚当局正在调查一起据称发生在保加利亚首都索非亚的针对 Starlink 通信天线的纵火袭击事件。[7] 波兰部长会议成员兼特别事务协调员托马什·谢莫尼亚克表示，俄罗斯情报机构很可能是9月23日发生在波兰沃拉克罗博兹卡的针对 Starlink 基础设施的纵火袭击事件的幕后黑手。[8]

乌克兰军队无法在俄罗斯境内使用“星盾”（Starshield）或“星链”（Starlink）服务，因此最新的“星盾”飞行速度限制不会影响乌克兰对俄罗斯境内目标进行远程打击的能力。SpaceX已将乌克兰对“星链”和“星盾”服务的访问范围限制在乌克兰境内，乌克兰军队依靠其他通信方式和点对点导航来打击俄罗斯境内的目标。“星盾”的速度限制与此无关，不会阻止乌克兰军队打击俄罗斯境内的炼油厂、数据中心和其他固定目标。

对“星盾”卫星的限速措施可能对乌克兰拦截俄罗斯高速喷气式无人机的行动产生重大影响。贝斯克列斯特诺夫10月14日报道称，乌克兰军队利用“星链”（可能指“星盾”）拦截喷气式无人机——这是乌克兰对抗俄罗斯“格朗”喷气式无人机的最有效方案。[9] 乌克兰一直在紧急推进国产喷气式无人机拦截器的研发，以应对俄罗斯日益增多的喷气式无人机，而“星盾”的限速措施可能会阻碍乌克兰的研发进程，并使俄罗斯军队得以在2026-2027年冬季之前及之后继续恐吓乌克兰民众。[10] 一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博主10月14日承认，“星链”（可能指“星盾”）的限速措施创造了一个“机会窗口”，在此期间，俄罗斯军队可以对乌克兰的基础设施造成最大程度的破坏。[11]乌克兰无人系统部队 (USF) 9 月 24 日至 10 月 14 日的数据显示，星盾行动的速度限制也削弱了乌克兰固定翼无人机的拦截能力，进一步阻碍了乌克兰在战术和作战层面的防空能力。

“星盾”计划的限制将严重影响乌克兰在2026年全年关键前线地区开展中程打击的能力，而这些打击行动一直是乌克兰反攻行动的重要支柱。乌克兰空降突击部队第七快速反应军于10月14日表示，在胡利亚伊波列方向，乌克兰部队报告称，无人机在以每小时110至120公里的速度飞行时，连接出现中断，导致无人机难以操控。[12] 该军指出，“星盾”计划的连接限制使得需要高速快速加速的中程无人机的起飞变得更加复杂。此后，第七快速反应军删除了最初的声明，但未给出任何后续解释。配备“星盾”系统的无人机，包括美国制造的“大黄蜂”无人机，是乌克兰针对俄罗斯后勤力量开展中程打击行动的中坚力量，因为“星盾”计划的连接允许乌克兰无人机操作员在乌克兰境内（包括俄罗斯占领的乌克兰领土上空）高速飞行时保持实时控制。 “大黄蜂”无人机的最大速度和俯冲速度均超过了“星盾”系统设定的速度限制，导致乌克兰军队无法有效地将其部署为打击载具。[13] “星盾”系统的速度限制将使乌克兰无人机无法打击被占领乌克兰境内移动的俄罗斯车辆和其他动态目标。乌克兰联合部队的数据显示，10月14日乌克兰对前线俄罗斯后勤车辆的打击强度显著下降，这很可能是由于“星盾”系统受到限制所致。[14] 乌克兰针对俄罗斯地面交通线的中程打击行动一直是塑造战场格局的关键要素，为乌克兰在2026年于奥列克桑德里夫卡和莱曼方向的反攻行动提供了支持，而10月14日“星盾”系统的限制措施可能会危及乌克兰在作战主动权上的争夺。[15]

在乌克兰第三军公布了更多关于莱曼方向“维瓦尔第行动”的细节之际，星盾行动实施了限速。该行动主要依靠持续数月的协调中程打击行动，以推进乌克兰地面部队的推进。乌克兰第三军军长安德烈·比列茨基准将10月14日报告称，在行动的第四阶段，乌克兰军队又解放了101平方公里的领土，使得“维瓦尔第行动”四个阶段至今共解放了277平方公里和16个居民点。[16] 比列茨基报告称，乌克兰军队解放了泽莱纳多利纳、利波韦和科洛迪亚齐（均位于莱曼以北），并补充说，乌克兰军队阻止了俄军从侧翼绕过斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克地区，并控制了E-40哈尔科夫市-斯拉维扬斯克公路（也称为M-03公路）。作为“维瓦尔第行动”的一部分，乌克兰第3军进行了长达数月的中程打击行动，以塑造战场格局，重点打击俄罗斯的后勤、燃料供应和无人机操作员，从而削弱了俄罗斯军队的进攻能力，并为乌克兰后来的推进提供了便利。[17]

乌克兰的“维瓦尔第行动”持续对莱曼地区南北两侧的邻近地区产生连锁反应。比列茨基报告称，乌克兰的反击迫使俄罗斯西部部队指挥部将俄罗斯近卫第1坦克集团军（莫斯科军区）的部分兵力从库皮扬斯克方向调往莱曼方向，从而缓解了库皮扬斯克-武兹洛维（库皮扬斯克东南部）的压力——正如ISW近期预测的那样。[18] ISW还观察到，乌克兰在“维瓦尔第行动”中取得的成功对俄罗斯在莱曼以北博罗瓦方向的军事行动产生了连锁反应，同时也阻碍了俄罗斯从东部向斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克推进的努力。[19] 俄罗斯南部部队已放缓了从东部向斯拉维扬斯克推进的步伐，可能是为了重新集结兵力。俄罗斯军方指挥部可能计划在斯拉维扬斯克以东发动进攻行动，以配合俄罗斯西部军区从东北方向对斯拉维扬斯克的进攻——乌克兰军队在“维瓦尔第行动”中挫败了这一进攻。[20] 乌克兰军队也在斯拉维扬斯克以东进行反击，这与俄军在北顿涅茨河以北的战败相结合，可能会进一步彻底阻止俄罗斯从东部向斯拉维扬斯克推进。[21]

乌克兰官员报告称，SpaceX 的 Starshield 通信网络在 10 月 13 日至 14 日夜间对乌克兰上空的移动速度进行了限制，这将严重干扰乌克兰的喷气式无人机拦截行动和中程打击行动。

乌克兰军队无法通过俄罗斯获得星盾或星链服务，因此最新的星盾移动速度限制不会影响乌克兰对俄罗斯境内目标进行远程打击的能力。

对“星盾”无人机的速度限制可能会对乌克兰拦截俄罗斯速度更快的喷气式无人机的行动产生重大影响。

“星盾”计划的限制将严重影响乌克兰在2026年全年开展中程打击的能力，而中程打击一直是乌克兰在关键前线地区开展反攻行动的重要手段。

星盾导弹的限速措施出台之际，乌克兰第三军公布了更多关于莱曼方向“维瓦尔第行动”的细节。该行动严重依赖于长达数月的协调中程打击行动，以促进乌克兰地面部队的成功推进。

乌克兰的“维瓦尔第行动”继续对莱曼地区南北两侧的邻近地区产生连锁反应。

10月13日至14日夜间，乌克兰军队袭击了位于萨拉托夫州的俄罗斯国有银行俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行的数据中心和罗斯托夫州的工业基础设施。俄罗斯军队当晚向乌克兰发射了39枚“伊斯坎德尔-M”、“KN-23”和“S-400”弹道导弹、“锆石”和“缟玛瑙”反舰导弹，以及128架无人机和巡飞弹。

10月14日，俄乌双方军队均未取得进展。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

10月13日至14日夜间，乌克兰军队袭击了位于萨拉托夫州的俄罗斯国有银行俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行（Sberbank）的数据中心，这是其针对俄罗斯数据中心和数字基础设施的新一轮远程打击行动的一部分。乌克兰国防公司Fire Point于10月14日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行的数据中心。[22] 10月14日发布的地理定位图像显示，在据称遭到乌克兰袭击后，位于萨拉托夫州巴拉科沃（距国际边界约734公里）的俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行数据中心遭到破坏。[23] 俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行管理委员会第一副主席亚历山大·韦迪亚欣于10月14日承认，乌克兰军队袭击了俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行的一个数据处理中心，但他声称所有银行系统和服务均正常运行。[24] 然而，一些俄罗斯反对派媒体报道称，俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行和另一家俄罗斯知名银行——圆点银行（Tochka Banka）的应用程序用户；乌克兰发动袭击后，Mail.ru、Kontur、Ozon、Megafon 和 VKontakte 等热门网站和应用程序，以及互联网服务提供商 SkyNet St. Petersburg 的银行服务均出现中断或故障。[25] 乌克兰对俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行数据中心的袭击是乌克兰近期针对 Yandex（俄罗斯最接近谷歌的公司）数据中心发起的远程打击行动的一部分，旨在削弱俄罗斯的数字基础设施，切断俄罗斯为其在乌克兰的战争提供资金的能力，并回应俄罗斯对乌克兰数据中心的袭击。[26]

乌克兰军队可能继续对罗斯托夫州的工业基础设施发动远程打击。根据10月13日发布的定位视频显示，位于阿克赛（距前线约209公里）的阿克赛卡尔丹德塔尔工业厂发生大火，乌克兰军队可能对其进行了袭击。[27] 俄罗斯反对派媒体阿斯特拉（Astra）10月13日报道称，火势蔓延至两个仓库，过火面积约9000平方米。[28] 一位俄罗斯军事博主承认了此次袭击，并声称该厂专门生产传动轴、接头、变速器总成和专用机械零部件。[29]

俄罗斯官员敦促数据中心分散其数字基础设施，以便在乌克兰袭击后更容易地缓解服务中断。俄罗斯国家电信运营商Rostelecom副总裁兼管理委员会主席瓦列里·叶尔马科夫(Valery Ermakov)于10月14日表示，俄罗斯公司需要建立备份站点或“末日”数据中心，以便在乌克兰袭击Yandex数据中心期间恢复服务。[30] 叶尔马科夫指出，俄罗斯数据中心的集中式结构已成为一个弱点，并呼吁俄罗斯数字公司将服务分布在多个站点和物理位置，以提高俄罗斯数字基础设施资产的韧性。俄罗斯数字发展、通信和大众传媒部长马克苏特·沙达耶夫(Maksut Shadayev)于10月14日表示，乌克兰对数据中心的袭击比对炼油厂或其他工业设施的袭击更为复杂，因为数据中心需要不间断的电力供应、冷却以及敏感服务器设备的运行。[31]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心国

乌克兰军队近期在苏梅市东北部推进或维持了阵地。10月11日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄军在米罗皮利亚以东袭击了乌克兰军队，此前俄罗斯方面声称俄军在该地区设有阵地。[32] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，乌克兰军队正在伊沃尔然斯克（苏梅市北部）附近进行反击。[33]

乌克兰军队最近在别尔哥罗德州边境地区附近击落了一架俄罗斯直升机。10月14日，一个乌克兰旅发布了一段视频，显示一架乌克兰第一人称视角（FPV）无人机击中并损坏了一架俄罗斯米-28NM攻击直升机。10月14日发布的带有地理位置信息的视频显示，此次袭击发生在别尔哥罗德州乌斯廷卡东南方向（距离国际边界约5公里）。[34]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

10 月 13 日和 14 日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部进行进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[35]

俄罗斯官员和军事博客作者继续就所谓乌克兰军队在哈尔科夫州东北部被包围一事发表未经证实的说法。俄罗斯国防部10月13日在其Max频道声称，俄军正在摧毁据称在尼古拉耶夫卡、瓦尔瓦里夫卡和涅费迪夫卡（均位于沃夫昌斯克以东）被包围的乌克兰军队。[36] 一位俄罗斯军事博客作者于10月14日发布了一张地图，声称俄军已经封锁了沃夫昌斯克和韦利基布尔卢克之间的包围圈，并包围了瓦尔瓦里夫卡以及乔尔内（位于沃夫昌斯克以东）和涅费迪夫卡之间的区域。[37] 国际安全观察组织（ISW）继续评估认为，俄罗斯方面歪曲了实地情况，因为没有证据表明哈尔科夫州东北部存在包围。[38]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

10 月 14 日，俄军继续在库皮扬斯克方向进行有限的进攻行动，但 ISW 没有观察到俄军推进的证据。[39] 10 月 13 日，俄罗斯国防部在其 Max 频道上声称，俄军在赫鲁希夫卡、布拉霍达季夫卡、别列济夫卡、马利夫卡和奥西诺韦附近（均位于库皮扬斯克以东和东南方向，距离 ISW 评估的俄军最远推进点约 4 至 14 公里）进行了进攻行动。[40]

10 月 14 日，俄军继续在博罗瓦方向进行有限的进攻行动，但 ISW 没有观察到俄军推进的证据。[41] 俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军在沃夫奇亚尔附近（博罗瓦以南，距离 ISW 评估的俄军最远推进点约 17 公里）进行了进攻行动。[42]

10月13日至14日夜间，俄罗斯军队对哈尔科夫州伊久姆市发动了一次“沙赫德”式无人机袭击，旨在削弱乌克兰在博罗瓦和莱曼方向的后勤保障。伊久姆区军事管理局报告称，俄罗斯军队对伊久姆市的居民区和商业基础设施进行了一系列袭击，其中包括一次“沙赫德”式无人机袭击，造成两人受伤。[43] 伊久姆是乌克兰军队在博罗瓦和莱曼方向作战的后勤枢纽，此前一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄罗斯军队对伊久姆的袭击日益频繁，是为了回应乌克兰军队近期在莱曼以北的推进。[44]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

请参阅主标题文本，了解有关乌克兰在莱曼方向发起的反击的报道，这是“维瓦尔第行动”的一部分。

10 月 13 日和 14 日，俄军继续在莱曼东北和东南方向发动进攻，但并未取得进展。[45]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

10 月 13 日和 14 日，俄军继续在斯拉维扬斯克以东的克里瓦卢卡、尼古拉耶夫卡、皮斯库尼夫卡和卡列尼基附近发动进攻，但没有取得进展。[46] 10 月 13 日，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，乌克兰军队已停止从奥泽尔内（位于斯拉维扬斯克以东，在顿涅茨河北岸）向克里瓦卢卡（位于顿涅茨河南岸）对岸发起反击，但仍在从奥泽尔内向其他未指明的地区发起反击。[47]

俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军正在堡垒带以东、当前前线以西的地区开展进攻行动，这很可能是俄罗斯认知战策略的一部分，旨在夸大战场上的推进。俄罗斯国防部在其Max频道宣称，俄军南方部队正在谢梅尼夫卡（位于斯拉维扬斯克正东）、斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克附近开展进攻行动——所有这些地区都远在已评估的俄军推进最远距离之外。[48] 俄罗斯国防部的这种报道模式与克里姆林宫系统性的认知战策略相符，该策略旨在捏造俄军推进的说法，并错误地将前线描绘成正在崩溃，这与现有证据相悖。[49]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

10 月 13 日和 14 日，俄军继续在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡及其附近地区发动进攻，但并未取得确切进展。[50] 一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军已向普留特以北（科斯佳蒂尼夫卡以西）推进。[51]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

俄罗斯军队继续努力从波克罗夫斯克地区向第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州边界推进。10月13日，在波克罗夫斯克方向作战的乌克兰旅发言人报告称，俄罗斯军队在评估后认为谢尔盖夫卡是建立据点、进一步向第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州行政边界发起进攻的最佳地点后，将作战重点从乌达奇涅和科特利涅（波克罗夫斯克西南部）转移到谢尔盖夫卡（乌达奇涅西北部，E-50波克罗夫斯克-斯拉维扬卡公路以南）。[52]

作战序列：据一位俄罗斯军事博主称，俄罗斯第234空降团（第76空降师）的部分兵力正在多布罗皮利亚方向作战。[53] ISW最后一次观察到俄罗斯第234空降团的部分兵力在扎波罗热方向作战是在2026年2月。[54] 截至2025年11月，第234空降团的部分兵力在波克罗夫斯克附近作战，因此，该团的部分兵力可能分散在这两个区域。

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

俄罗斯国防部声称战斗仍在远离前线的地方进行，这显然是其认知战策略的一部分，旨在夸大新巴甫洛夫卡和奥列克桑德里夫卡方向的战场进展。10月13日，俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军东部部队在塔拉西夫卡附近（位于新巴甫洛夫卡西北方向，距离俄军在新巴甫洛夫卡方向的最远推进点约16公里）和哈夫里利夫卡附近（位于奥列克桑德里夫卡东北方向，距离俄军在该地区的最远推进点约15公里）开展了进攻行动。[55] 值得注意的是，俄罗斯国防部是在其Max频道而非Telegram频道上发布了这些声明，这表明俄罗斯国防部旨在向俄罗斯国内受众展示这些被夸大的战场胜利。[56]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

俄罗斯国防部在其收买的俄罗斯军事博客作者的支持下，继续开展认知战，夸大在胡利亚伊波列方向的战场进展。10月13日，俄罗斯国防部在其Max频道声称，俄军东部军区在扎利夫内和沃尔尼扬卡附近（均位于胡利亚伊波列西北方向，距离该地区俄军最远推进点约19公里）开展了进攻行动。[57] 一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者也在10月13日发表了类似的夸大言论，声称俄军正在泽列纳迪布罗瓦附近及其以西（位于胡利亚伊波列西北方向，距离该地区俄军最远推进点约14公里）开展进攻行动。[58]

据报道，俄军指挥部正在胡利亚伊波列方向集结兵力，以应对未来可能加强的进攻行动。乌克兰第七快速反应军发言人弗拉基米尔·波列维上校于10月14日报告称，俄军指挥部正在胡利亚伊波列方向集结兵力，尤其是在上特尔萨河三角洲植被茂密的地区——很可能指的是沃兹德维日夫卡（位于胡利亚伊波列西北部）地区。[59] 据报道，俄军目前在胡利亚伊波列方向的兵力是乌克兰军队的五倍，并且正在增援装甲车辆。一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者于10月13日声称，乌克兰军队在上特尔萨附近（沃兹德维日夫卡正南方）发动了反击。[60]

俄罗斯方面声称，10 月 13 日和 14 日，俄军在扎波罗热州西部继续发动进攻行动，而乌克兰军队在该地区进行了反击，但 ISW 没有观察到俄军推进的证据。[61]

俄罗斯军事博客作者们对扎波罗热州西部地区的控制权仍存在分歧。一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者于10月13日声称，马里谢尔巴基（奥里希夫以西）及其北部据点的战斗仍在继续。[62] 然而，另一位知名的俄罗斯军事博客作者于10月14日声称，俄军已牢牢控制马里谢尔巴基以及该定居点以北四公里的区域。[63] 第三位俄罗斯军事博客作者抱怨说，俄罗斯方面正在放大一些不可靠的、来自前线士兵的报告，这些士兵并不完全了解实际情况，从而在俄罗斯的信息环境中制造混乱。[64]

10月14日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[65]

10月13日至14日夜间，俄罗斯对乌克兰发动了一系列无人机和导弹袭击。乌克兰空军报告称，俄军从库尔斯克、布良斯克、沃罗涅日和罗斯托夫州发射了39枚导弹，其中包括“伊斯坎德尔-M”、“KN-23”和“S-400”弹道导弹以及“锆石”和“缟玛瑙”反舰导弹。[66] 乌克兰空军报告称，俄军还从罗斯托夫州米列罗沃、奥廖尔市、被占领的顿涅茨克市和被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向发射了128架“沙赫德”型（其中77架为喷气式）、“格贝拉”型和“伊塔尔马斯”型攻击无人机；“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机；以及“班德罗尔”或“丹-T”巡飞弹。[67]乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了4枚未指明的导弹和119架无人机（包括59架喷气式无人机），数量不明的无人机和导弹袭击了22个地点，另有8个地点落有碎片。乌克兰官员指出，俄罗斯的无人机和导弹袭击主要针对基辅市、基辅州和哈尔科夫州的民用和能源基础设施，俄罗斯弹道导弹击中了基辅市的全部三座热电联产厂。[68] 俄罗斯军队还袭击了哈尔科夫州、基辅州、文尼察州、赫梅利尼茨基州和捷尔诺波尔州的铁路基础设施。[69] 乌克兰官员报告称，俄罗斯军队袭击了卢茨克州、沃伦州和罗夫诺州的民用和住宅基础设施，造成至少6人死亡，至少21人受伤。[70]

乌克兰官员报告称，乌克兰在10月13日至14日俄罗斯夜间对乌克兰发动导弹袭击前，再次未收到预警。包括乌克兰总统泽连斯基在内的乌克兰官员最初在10月13日晚间报告称，乌克兰军队没有从北约或美国伙伴那里收到有关俄罗斯弹道导弹发射的信息。[71] 乌克兰空军发言人尤里·伊格纳特随后在10月14日表示，乌克兰军队最初没有收到俄罗斯对基辅市第一波袭击的预警，但乌克兰的伙伴警告了接下来的三波俄罗斯袭击。[72]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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