Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13, 2026

Senior Russian officials explicitly stated that the war in Iran — not Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries — is the primary driver of global diesel shortages, while simultaneously using the October 9 fuel agreement to convince the US to support its negotiation position . Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak stated on October 12 that “problems in the Strait of Hormuz” have caused a general reduction in global oil refining capacity, destabilizing US and global diesel fuel markets.[1] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko similarly stated on October 12 that the key to stable US fuel supplies is “a resolution of the conflict around Iran.”[2] Kremlin officials’ acknowledgement of the war in Iran as a key driver of US and global diesel fuel shortages follows recent lower-ranking Russian officials’ and ultranationalist voices’ statements that Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries are not responsible for high diesel prices globally.[3] Kremlin officials meanwhile continued efforts to frame the October 9 agreement as a diplomatic overture to the United States. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev stated on October 12 that some Western officials are opposing the Russian-US diesel agreement because they understand its major benefit for the “world and for peace.”[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 13 that the agreement is a mutually beneficial aspect of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and explicitly denied its direct connection to Russia’s negotiating position on Ukraine.[5] Moscow has repeatedly offered the United States economic incentives that it claims are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in order to extract concessions from the U.S. regarding the war.[6] Russia heavily relies on oil revenues to fund its war in Ukraine and would disproportionately benefit from convincing the U.S. to force Ukraine to stop striking its oil refineries.[7]

Russian officials are meanwhile attempting to assuage the Russian domestic populace’s fears of domestic fuel shortages. Novak stated on October 12 that Russian diesel fuel exports to the US under the new agreement will not disrupt the Russian domestic fuel market situation, likely to ease any concern within Russian society of potential future diesel shortages and associated public discontent, following months of fuel shortages across Russia throughout Summer 2026.[8] Novak held a meeting with the Russian Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Transport, and oil companies on October 13 on the Russian fuel market situation and instructed relevant agencies and fuel companies to intensify additional measures to ensure ample regional fuel supplies and respond to fuel price fluctuations.[9] Russia has suffered from severe fuel shortages in recent months, which caused low levels of public discontent across the country, and the Kremlin is likely attempting to preemptively calm fears about potential effects of the fuel agreement with the U.S.[10] Russia will likely prioritize fulfilling its diesel agreement with the U.S. over ensuring the stability of the Russian domestic fuel market, however, as the Kremlin is hoping to exploit the diesel agreement to advance its interests in the war in Ukraine.

Likely Russian drones struck two civilian vessels in the Bulgarian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the southwestern Black Sea overnight on October 12 to 13. The Bulgarian Security Council reported on October 13 that three unspecified aerial drones struck the Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3 cargo ship approximately 18 nautical miles (roughly 33 kilometers and within the Bulgarian EEZ) east of Byala, Bulgaria and sank another vessel approximately 17 nautical miles (roughly 31 kilometers and within the Bulgarian EEZ) east of Krapets, Bulgaria.[11] Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev stated that the strike is “absolutely unacceptable” and noted that the outcome of such strikes “benefits Russia”.[12] Radev did not directly attribute the strike to Russia but summoned Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria Eleonora Mitrofanova and spoke with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte following the strikes.[13] Russian forces previously struck two additional civilian vessels in Bulgaria’s EEZ on October 6.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that there have been nine strikes against cargo ships off the coasts of Bulgaria and Romania in the southwestern Black Sea area in recent months.[15] These recent strikes in the Bulgarian EEZ demonstrate Russia’s increasing acceptance of risk in its strike packages, expanding risk tolerance from aerial incursions into European airspace to maritime kinetic events.[16]

French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Indian Ocean on October 12. French President Emmanuel Macron reported that the French Navy boarded and seized the Russian shadow fleet DF Peak oil tanker more than 450 nautical miles (roughly 833 kilometers) south of the French Reunion Island (east of Madagascar) in the Indian Ocean on the morning of October 12.[17] Automatic identification systems (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the DF Peak was sailing under a Benin flag without a specified departure port toward the Cruz Grande Port, Chile. The DF Peak is under US, EU, UK, and Ukrainian sanctions.[18] French authorities previously seized five Russian shadow fleet vessels, most recently on June 25 off the coast of Sicily, Italy.[19] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued European efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil.[20] The Kremlin has also used Russian shadow fleet vessels operating in international waters as launch and recovery platforms for drone incursions into NATO airspace.[21]

Senior Russian officials explicitly stated that the war in Iran — not Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries — is the primary driver of global diesel shortages, while simultaneously using the October 9 fuel agreement to convince the US to support its negotiation position.

Russian officials are meanwhile attempting to assuage the Russian domestic populace’s fears of domestic fuel shortages.

Likely Russian drones struck two civilian vessels in the Bulgarian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the southwestern Black Sea overnight on October 12 to 13.

French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Indian Ocean on October 12.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Sumy City.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia’s critical and ballistic missile infrastructure. Russian forces launched five Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles, 108 drones, and nine Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian critical and ballistic missile infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a repair base for Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers and loader vehicles near Kondrinka, Kursk Oblast (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline) on October 12 or overnight from October 12 to 13.[22]

Satellite imagery provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian fuel infrastructure. Satellite imagery published on October 12 shows that Ukraine’s October 10 strikes against the NZNP oil-loading terminal in Rostov-on-Don (roughly 210 kilometers from the frontline) damaged at least seven out of the twelve oil storage tanks.[23]

Ukraine’s ongoing long-range strike campaign is exploiting systemic deficiencies in Russia’s air defense network, while persistent institutional failures are hindering Russian adaptation efforts. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Russian facility-level air defenses are ineffective against Ukrainian drone strikes because Ukrainian forces can penetrate Russian air defense lines in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts and approach their targets from different directions to bypass the more localized air defenses.[24] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders routinely fail to employ counter-drone systems to protect and complement Russia’s higher-tier air defenses in border areas, allowing Ukrainian drones to strike these higher-tier systems and penetrate the Russian rear.[25] The Russian milblogger argued that Russian air defenses are capable of intercepting advanced missiles and aviation, but do not adequately employ lower-tier air defense systems against combined Ukrainian drone and missile strikes.[26] Russian defense company Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center General Director Alexey Chadayev stated on October 13 that Yandex officials relied on outdated assumptions about Ukrainian strike patterns despite witnessing Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Wildberries and Ozon warehouses and only instituted facility-level protections at their data centers.[27] Ukrainian forces have struck three Yandex data centers since October 8, causing temporary internet and telecommunications disruption.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 12.[29]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian radar station near Shkryabino, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 31 kilometers from the international border) on October 12 or overnight on October 12 to 13.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 12 and 13 but did not advance. [31]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 13.

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces are attempting to maintain their bridgehead on the left bank (east) of the Oskil River to continue supporting operations near Kupyansk. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on October 13 that Russian forces are attempting to maintain their bridgehead on the western side of the Oskil River and are conducting localized attacks in the area.[32] Trehubov stated that loss of the bridgehead near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) or separation of this bridgehead from Russian forces would significantly degrade Russian efforts in Kupyansk.

Russian forces continue to use Ukrainian civilians as human shields to facilitate retreat efforts near Kupyansk in a direct violation of international humanitarian law. The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps published footage on October 13 showing Russian soldiers leading civilians, including children, into the Shebelinka-Ostrohozk gas pipeline near Kupyansk, as Russian artillery fire covered the retreat.[33] The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps previously reported on September 27 that Russian forces conducted a similar mission disguised as civilians.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of civilians as human shields is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and maximize civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[35]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova on October 13, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced. [36]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces concentrated attacks toward Lyman itself and north of Lyman toward Kolodyazi on October 12 and 13 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Chasiv Yar. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in eastern Klynove, according to geolocated footage published on October 12, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Klynove.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and west of Kostyantynivka and southwest of Druzhkivka on October 12 and 13 but did not advance. [40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions south of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers in western Matyasheve and western Svitle (both south of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on October 12, after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions.[41]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to falsely claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Dobropillya, despite extensive evidence to the contrary. The Russian MoD claimed on October 12 that Russian forces thwarted a Ukrainian attempt to use a platoon-sized force and armored vehicles to break out of the claimed encirclement in Dobropillya and that the Russian Central GoF is advancing in central and northwestern Dobropillya and clearing western parts of the town.[42] ISW only observed evidence of limited Russian infiltration missions into southern Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly refuted Russian claims that Russian forces have consolidated positions in Dobropillya or have encircled Ukrainian forces there.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 12 or 13.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 12 and 13 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Fedorivka (east of Oleksandrivka). [44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Fedorivka and Komar through Perebudova and across the Mokryi Yaly River (all east of Oleksandrivka).[45] Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Fedorivka, as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks toward the Mokryi Yaly River.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 11 and 12 but did not advance. [47]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations aimed at enveloping Orikhiv from the west and northwest on October 12 and 13, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced. [48]

Russian forces recently unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Dnipro River in an inflatable watercraft and secure positions on the right (west) bank of the river near Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City), according to geolocated footage published on October 12.[49]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[50]

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine overnight on October 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; and 108 Shahed-type (including 74 jet-powered drones) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and nine Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[51] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 88 drones (including 58 jet-powered drones), that unspecified drones and missiles struck 17 locations, and that air vehicle debris fell on seven locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Banderol loitering munitions against Kharkiv City.[52]

Ukrainian forces reportedly did not receive early warnings ahead of Russian forces’ October 12 to 13 overnight ballistic missile strikes that targeted Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces did not receive information regarding Russian ballistic missile launches and only detected Russian ballistic missiles launched against Ukraine overnight via radar.[53] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 13 that US and NATO satellite-derived intelligence regarding Russian missile activity failed to reach Ukraine in time, likely due to technical failures or other unspecified issues.[54] Ihnat noted that this is not the first time Ukrainian forces have failed to receive this intelligence from their NATO or US intelligence partners. Russian forces predominantly launch their surface-to-surface ballistic missiles from seven regions that are mostly within the 200-kilometer range from Ukraine, giving Ukraine limited reaction time to detect Russian launches and for Ukrainian air defenses to respond.[55]

Rivne Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Koval reported on October 13 that a Russian drone struck a university building in Rivne City, causing extensive damage and injuries .[56] The Rivne Oblast State Emergency Service reported that the strike injured 30 people.[57]

Russia may be developing a new Geran-6 strike drone that could incorporate elements that would make it similar to a ballistic missile. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on October 13 that Russia tasked unspecified military-industrial design bureaus with developing a new Geran-6 jet-powered strike drone.[58] The source stated that the new Geran-6 would have the ability to fly along a ballistic trajectory and have two variants with either a 300- or 600-kilogram warhead. The source stated that the operational range of Geran-6 would extend over the entire territory of Ukraine and that Russia has reportedly scheduled its full-scale production for mid-2028, with first possible deployment as soon as June 2027. If true, this unconfirmed report indicates that the Geran-6 would emulate the characteristics of a quasi-ballistic missile, given its payload and flight path, and suggests that Russia may be aiming to develop a cost-efficient ballistic missile to more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces have increasingly relied since Summer 2026 on ballistic missiles to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and exploit Ukraine’s anti-ballistic missile interceptor shortage.[59]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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俄罗斯高级官员明确表示，伊朗战争而非乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击才是全球柴油短缺的主要原因，同时利用10月9日达成的燃料协议来说服美国支持其谈判立场。俄罗斯副总理兼经济部长亚历山大·诺瓦克于10月12日表示，“霍尔木兹海峡问题”导致全球炼油能力普遍下降，破坏了美国和全球柴油市场的稳定。[1] 俄罗斯副外长格奥尔基·鲍里先科也在10月12日表示，确保美国燃料供应稳定的关键在于“解决伊朗冲突”。[2] 此前，一些俄罗斯低级别官员和极端民族主义者曾表示，乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击并非造成全球柴油价格高企的原因。[3] 克里姆林宫官员承认伊朗战争是美国和全球柴油短缺的主要原因，而与此同时，克里姆林宫官员继续努力将10月9日的协议包装成向美国示好的外交姿态。俄罗斯直接投资基金（RDIF）首席执行官基里尔·德米特里耶夫10月12日表示，一些西方官员反对俄美柴油协议，因为他们认为该协议对“世界和和平”具有重大意义。[4] 克里姆林宫发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫10月13日表示，该协议是美俄双边合作中互惠互利的一部分，并明确否认该协议与俄罗斯在乌克兰问题上的谈判立场有直接联系。[5] 莫斯科多次向美国提供经济激励措施，声称这些措施与乌克兰战争无关，目的是迫使美国在战争问题上做出让步。[6] 俄罗斯严重依赖石油收入来资助其在乌克兰的战争，如果能够说服美国迫使乌克兰停止袭击其炼油厂，俄罗斯将从中受益匪浅。[7]

与此同时，俄罗斯官员正试图安抚国内民众对燃料短缺的担忧。诺瓦克于10月12日表示，根据新协议，俄罗斯向美国出口柴油不会扰乱俄罗斯国内燃料市场，这有望缓解俄罗斯社会对未来可能出现的柴油短缺及其引发的公众不满。此前，俄罗斯在2026年夏季经历了数月的燃料短缺。[8] 10月13日，诺瓦克与俄罗斯能源部、交通部和各石油公司举行会议，讨论俄罗斯燃料市场形势，并指示相关机构和燃料公司加大力度，确保区域燃料供应充足，并应对燃料价格波动。[9]近几个月来，俄罗斯遭受了严重的燃料短缺，导致全国范围内民众不满情绪低落。克里姆林宫可能正试图先发制人地平息人们对与美国达成的燃料协议可能产生的影响的担忧[10]。然而，俄罗斯可能会优先履行与美国的柴油协议，而不是确保俄罗斯国内燃料市场的稳定，因为克里姆林宫希望利用柴油协议来推进其在乌克兰战争中的利益。

10月12日至13日夜间，疑似俄罗斯无人机在保加利亚西南黑海专属经济区内袭击了两艘民用船只。保加利亚安全委员会于10月13日报告称，三架身份不明的无人机在保加利亚比亚拉以东约18海里（约33公里，位于保加利亚专属经济区内）袭击了悬挂马耳他国旗的“切尔西3号”货轮，并在保加利亚克拉佩茨以东约17海里（约31公里，位于保加利亚专属经济区内）击沉了另一艘船只。[11] 保加利亚总理鲁门·拉德夫表示，此次袭击“绝对不可接受”，并指出此类袭击的结果“有利于俄罗斯”。[12] 拉德夫没有直接指责俄罗斯发动了此次袭击，但在袭击发生后，他召见了俄罗斯驻保加利亚大使埃莱奥诺拉·米特罗法诺娃，并与欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩和北约秘书长马克·吕特进行了通话。[13]此前，俄罗斯军队于 10 月 6 日在保加利亚专属经济区袭击了两艘民用船只。[14] 10 月 13 日，一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，近几个月来，在黑海西南部地区，保加利亚和罗马尼亚沿海的货船遭到了九次袭击。[15] 这些最近在保加利亚专属经济区发生的袭击表明，俄罗斯在其打击行动中越来越接受风险，其风险承受能力从空中入侵欧洲领空扩展到海上军事行动。[16]

10月12日，法国当局在印度洋扣押了一艘俄罗斯影子舰队的油轮。法国总统马克龙报告称，法国海军于10月12日上午在印度洋法属留尼汪岛（马达加斯加以东）以南450多海里（约833公里）处登船并扣押了俄罗斯影子舰队的“DF Peak”号油轮。[17] 来自Starboard Maritime Intelligence船舶追踪平台的自动识别系统（AIS）数据显示，“DF Peak”号悬挂贝宁国旗，没有指定出发港口，驶往智利克鲁斯格兰德港。“DF Peak”号受到美国、欧盟、英国和乌克兰的制裁。[18] 法国当局此前已扣押了五艘俄罗斯影子舰队船只，最近一次是在6月25日，地点位于意大利西西里岛附近海域。[19] ISW 继续评估认为，俄罗斯的石油销售能力部分取决于其运输能力，而欧洲继续打击俄罗斯影子舰队的努力将削弱俄罗斯的石油运输能力。[20] 克里姆林宫还利用在国际水域活动的俄罗斯影子舰队船只作为无人机入侵北约空域的发射和回收平台。[21]

俄罗斯高级官员明确表示，伊朗战争（而非乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击）才是全球柴油短缺的主要原因，同时利用 10 月 9 日的燃料协议来说服美国支持其谈判立场。

与此同时，俄罗斯官员正试图缓解俄罗斯国内民众对国内燃料短缺的担忧。

10 月 12 日至 13 日夜间，疑似俄罗斯无人机在保加利亚西南黑海专属经济区 (EEZ) 内袭击了两艘民用船只。

10月12日，法国当局在印度洋扣押了一艘俄罗斯影子舰队的油轮。

乌克兰军队最近向苏梅市东北方向推进。

乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯的关键弹道导弹基础设施发动远程打击。俄罗斯军队连夜向乌克兰发射了5枚“伊斯坎德尔-M”或S-400弹道导弹、108架无人机和9枚“班德罗尔”或“丹-T”巡飞弹。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯的关键弹道导弹基础设施进行远程打击。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，乌克兰军队于10月12日或10月12日至13日夜间袭击了库尔斯克州孔德林卡附近（距前线约150公里）的伊斯坎德尔-M弹道导弹发射车和装载车的维修基地。[22]

卫星图像提供了乌克兰近期对俄罗斯燃料基础设施发动袭击的最新战场破坏评估 (BDA)。10 月 12 日发布的卫星图像显示，乌克兰 10 月 10 日对顿河畔罗斯托夫的 NZNP 石油装卸码头（距离前线约 210 公里）的袭击至少破坏了 12 个储油罐中的 7 个。[23]

乌克兰持续不断的远程打击行动正在利用俄罗斯防空网络的系统性缺陷，而持续存在的制度性失误则阻碍了俄罗斯的适应性调整。一位俄罗斯军事博主于10月13日声称，俄罗斯的设施级防空系统无法有效抵御乌克兰无人机的袭击，因为乌克兰军队可以突破布良斯克州和库尔斯克州的俄罗斯防空线，并从不同方向接近目标，从而绕过局部防空系统。[24] 该军事博主还声称，俄罗斯指挥官经常未能使用反无人机系统来保护和补充俄罗斯在边境地区的高级防空系统，这使得乌克兰无人机能够攻击这些高级系统并渗透到俄罗斯后方。[25] 该俄罗斯军事博主认为，俄罗斯的防空系统能够拦截先进的导弹和飞机，但未能充分利用低级防空系统来应对乌克兰的无人机和导弹联合袭击。[26]俄罗斯国防公司 Ushkuynik 科学生产中心总经理 Alexey Chadayev 于 10 月 13 日表示，尽管目睹了乌克兰对 Wildberries 和 Ozon 仓库的远程打击行动，Yandex 的官员仍然依赖于对乌克兰打击模式的过时假设，并且只在其数据中心实施了设施级别的保护。[27] 自 10 月 8 日以来，乌克兰军队袭击了三个 Yandex 数据中心，导致互联网和电信暂时中断。[28]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心国

根据 10 月 12 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近向苏梅市东北方向推进。[29]

乌克兰军队继续对布良斯克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，乌克兰军队于10月12日或10月12日至13日夜间袭击了布良斯克州什克里亚比诺附近（距国际边界约31公里）的一个未指明的俄罗斯雷达站。[30]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

10月12日和13日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部发动进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[31]

10 月 13 日，乌克兰和俄罗斯方面均未报告大布尔鲁克方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

俄军正试图保住奥斯基尔河左岸（东岸）的桥头堡，以继续支援库皮扬斯克附近的军事行动。乌克兰联合部队发言人维克托·特列胡博夫上校于10月13日报告称，俄军正试图保住奥斯基尔河西岸的桥头堡，并在该地区进行局部攻击。[32] 特列胡博夫表示，如果失去德沃里奇纳（库皮扬斯克以北）附近的桥头堡，或者该桥头堡与俄军失去联系，将严重削弱俄军在库皮扬斯克的军事行动。

俄罗斯军队继续利用乌克兰平民作为人肉盾牌，在库皮扬斯克附近撤退，这直接违反了国际人道主义法。乌克兰第二哈尔提亚军于10月13日公布了一段视频，显示俄罗斯士兵带领包括儿童在内的平民进入库皮扬斯克附近的谢别林卡-奥斯特罗霍兹克天然气管道，俄罗斯炮火掩护撤退。[33] 乌克兰第二哈尔提亚军此前曾在9月27日报告称，俄罗斯军队曾伪装成平民执行过类似的任务。[34] 国际安全观察组织（ISW）持续评估认为，俄罗斯利用平民作为人肉盾牌的做法，表明俄罗斯军队内部存在一种普遍的文化，即试图将对平民的伤害武器化并最大化，以此作为战争的手段。[35]

有消息人士称，俄罗斯西部部队（GoF）于 10 月 13 日继续在博罗瓦东南方向进行进攻行动，但 ISW 没有观察到俄罗斯军队推进的证据。[36]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

10 月 12 日和 13 日，俄军集中兵力向莱曼城及其以北的科洛迪亚齐方向进攻，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在该地区继续进行反击。[37]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

俄罗斯军队最近在恰西夫亚尔西北部进行了一次渗透行动。根据10月12日发布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队袭击了克利诺韦东部的一个俄罗斯阵地，ISW评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[38] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄罗斯军队已推进到克利诺韦中部。[39]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

10月12日和13日，俄军继续在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡及其以西地区以及德鲁日基夫卡西南地区发动进攻，但没有取得进展。[40]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

俄罗斯军队最近在多布罗皮利亚以南进行了渗透行动。根据 10 月 12 日发布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队袭击了马蒂亚舍韦西部和斯维特莱西部（均在多布罗皮利亚以南）的俄罗斯军人，而 ISW 评估认为，这两次袭击都是俄罗斯的渗透行动。[41]

尽管有大量证据表明事实并非如此，俄罗斯国防部仍继续错误地声称俄军已包围多布罗皮利亚的乌克兰军队。10月12日，俄罗斯国防部声称，俄军挫败了乌克兰军队试图使用一个排级兵力和装甲车辆突破多布罗皮利亚包围圈的企图，并称俄军中央部队正在多布罗皮利亚中部和西北部推进，并肃清该镇西部地区。[42] 然而，ISW仅观察到俄军向多布罗皮利亚南部进行有限渗透行动的证据。乌克兰军队已多次驳斥俄罗斯关于俄军已巩固在多布罗皮利亚的阵地或已包围乌克兰军队的说法。[43]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

10月12日或13日，俄罗斯和乌克兰军队均未报告在诺沃巴甫利夫卡方向发生地面活动。

10月12日至13日，俄军继续在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向发起进攻，但并未取得进展，乌克兰军队则向费多里夫卡（位于奥列克桑德里夫卡以东）发起反击。[44] 一位俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，乌克兰军队经由佩列布多瓦，并跨过莫克雷亚利河（均位于奥列克桑德里夫卡以东），向费多里夫卡和科马尔方向发起反击。[45] 近期，乌克兰军队在费多里夫卡西南方向推进，并继续向莫克雷亚利河方向发起反击。[46]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

10月11日和12日，俄军继续向胡利亚波列方向发起进攻，但没有取得进展。[47]

一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，10 月 12 日和 13 日，俄罗斯军队继续从西部和西北部发起进攻行动，意图包围奥里希夫，但 ISW 没有观察到俄罗斯军队推进的证据。[48]

根据 10 月 12 日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯军队最近试图乘坐充气船渡过第聂伯河，并在普里德尼普罗夫斯克（赫尔松市以东）附近的第聂伯河右岸（西岸）占据阵地，但未能成功。[49]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[50]

10月12日至13日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰境内发动了导弹和无人机袭击。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队从布良斯克州发射了5枚“伊斯坎德尔-M”或S-400弹道导弹；并从奥廖尔和库尔斯克市、克拉斯诺达尔边疆区滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向发射了108架“沙赫德”型（包括74架喷气式无人机）和“格贝拉”型攻击无人机、“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机以及9枚“班德罗尔”或“丹-T”巡飞弹。[51] 乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了88架无人机（包括58架喷气式无人机），不明无人机和导弹袭击了17个地点，飞行器残骸散落在7个地点。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队向哈尔科夫市发射了九枚“班德罗尔”巡飞弹。[52]

据报道，乌克兰军队在10月12日至13日夜间俄罗斯军队对基辅市发动弹道导弹袭击前，并未收到预警。乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队没有收到有关俄罗斯弹道导弹发射的信息，仅通过雷达探测到俄罗斯夜间向乌克兰发射的弹道导弹。[53] 乌克兰空军发言人尤里·伊格纳特上校于10月13日表示，美国和北约通过卫星获取的有关俄罗斯导弹活动的情报未能及时送达乌克兰，可能是由于技术故障或其他未指明的问题。[54] 伊格纳特指出，这并非乌克兰军队首次未能从其北约或美国情报伙伴处获得此类情报。俄罗斯军队主要从七个区域发射地对地弹道导弹，这些区域大多位于乌克兰200公里范围内，这使得乌克兰反应时间有限，难以探测到俄罗斯的发射，也难以让乌克兰防空系统做出反应。[55]

10 月 13 日，罗夫内州军事管理局局长奥列克桑德·科瓦尔报告称，一架俄罗斯无人机袭击了罗夫内市的一所大学建筑，造成大面积破坏和人员伤亡。[56] 罗夫内州国家紧急情况部门报告称，此次袭击造成 30 人受伤。[57]

俄罗斯可能正在研发一种新型的“格朗-6”（Geran-6）攻击无人机，其设计可能包含类似弹道导弹的元素。10月13日，一位乌克兰开源情报（OSINT）消息人士透露，俄罗斯已委托未指明的军工设计局研发新型“格朗-6”喷气式攻击无人机。[58] 该消息人士称，新型“格朗-6”将具备弹道飞行能力，并有两种型号，分别搭载300公斤或600公斤的弹头。消息人士称，格朗-6导弹的作战范围将覆盖乌克兰全境，俄罗斯据称已计划于2028年中期开始全面生产，最早可能于2027年6月进行首次部署。如果消息属实，这份未经证实的报告表明，鉴于其有效载荷和飞行轨迹，格朗-6导弹将具有准弹道导弹的特性，并暗示俄罗斯可能旨在研发一种成本效益高的弹道导弹，以便更可靠地突破乌克兰的防空系统。自2026年夏季以来，俄罗斯军队越来越多地依赖弹道导弹来突破乌克兰的防空系统，并利用乌克兰反弹道导弹拦截器的短缺。[59]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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