Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 11, 2026

US President Donald Trump unilaterally announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to an “energy ceasefire” on October 11. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has officially announced or recognized an energy ceasefire as of this writing. Trump stated that both Russia and Ukraine agreed to an energy ceasefire, effective immediately.[1] There is no clear consensus on the proclaimed ceasefire, however. A senior Ukrainian official close to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated to the Financial Times ( FT ) that Ukraine had no information about the ceasefire at the time of the announcement.[2] Zelensky responded that the proclaimed ceasefire was “news for [him]” but that Ukraine supports the ceasefire if Russia does as well.[3] Zelensky met with NATO officials to discuss the energy ceasefire and reiterated Ukraine’s commitment to all genuine de-escalatory measures to end the war.[4] Zelensky reported later on October 11 that Russian forces struck the Kharkiv City Thermal Power Plant No. 5 and caused significant power outages just hours after Trump’s ceasefire announcement.[5] The Kremlin has not issued a public reaction to Trump’s announcement as of this writing.

Some Russian milbloggers questioned the veracity of the energy ceasefire that Trump announced. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 11 that it is odd that the news about the ceasefire came from Washington instead of the Kremlin or Ukraine.[6] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Trump made a similar announcement of a Russia-Ukraine energy ceasefire on September 14, 2026, which did not materialize, implying that Trump’s October 11 ceasefire announcement is similarly premature or unsubstantiated.[7] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers represent an important part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s constituency, often amplifying Kremlin narratives and illuminating key aspects of Russian geostrategic thinking. The milbloggers’ skepticism of the ceasefire suggests that the Russian state is not preparing to engage in an energy ceasefire. The Kremlin has continually postured since 2025 that it has no desire to conclude or adhere to any ceasefire in Ukraine that does not result in a full Russian victory.[8]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reaffirmed his willingness to hold elections in Ukraine in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution, which would require a comprehensive ceasefire. Zelensky stated on October 11 that he is ready to organize elections in Ukraine if Russia agrees to a 60-day comprehensive ceasefire, which would allow Ukraine to ensure election security.[9] Zelensky has repeatedly offered concessions to hold elections, as long as Ukraine receives the security guarantees to ensure the safety of the electoral process.[10] Ukraine’s constitution and national laws prohibit elections under martial law.[11] Securing a peace deal or a long-term ceasefire is thus a prerequisite for elections in Ukraine. Russian forces launch hundreds of drones and missiles against Ukraine daily, intentionally targeting civilians and critical infrastructure, preventing Ukraine from lifting martial law and organizing elections.[12]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to continuing the war, thereby denying Ukraine the prerequisite ceasefire necessary to hold elections. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on October 11 that Russian forces on the battlefield and ballistic weapons are the only tools bringing Russia closer to victory in Ukraine.[13] Russian strikes killed over 150 civilians in the last week (between October 4 and 11), and Medvedev’s statement demonstrates how Russia sees victory in Ukraine through the lens of inflicting maximum damage to Ukraine’s strategic rear such that Ukraine will capitulate to Russia’s demands.[14] Russian officials’ claims regarding negotiations and elections come as Ukraine has significant momentum on the battlefield and are likely intended to fracture Western support for Ukraine, which has contributed to recent Ukrainian military successes.[15] The Kremlin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to regain lost momentum on the battlefield from recent Ukrainian counterattacks and continue the war if it can convince Western states to pull support from Ukraine. The temporary US suspension of intelligence sharing in March 2025 enabled Russian advances in Kursk Oblast, for example, and Moscow likely seeks a repeat shutoff of critical US intelligence sharing.[16] The Kremlin is therefore attempting to perpetuate the false narrative that Ukraine is the obstacle to peace, shifting Russia’s responsibility for undermining good faith negotiations to Ukraine, while insisting on its maximalist demands and refusing to compromise.[17] Russia deliberately leverages Ukraine’s constitutional inability to hold elections due to Russia’s war to manipulate the negotiations process and protract the war. Russia can enable Ukraine to hold elections at any point by agreeing to a ceasefire that the United States and Ukraine have offered numerous times.

The Russian government partially lifted its internally imposed ban on Russian diesel fuel exports on October 10. However, Russia’s ability to supply and deliver the quantities of diesel fuel within the timeframe to which Russia and the United States agreed remains unclear. The Kremlin announced on October 10 that it partially lifted its ban on diesel fuel exports, allowing Russia to export 500,000 tons of diesel fuel to the global market.[18] Trump announced on October 9 that he had reached an agreement with Putin, under which Russia will immediately supply over 300,000 tons of diesel to the US and global markets, another 500,000 tons in November 2026, and significantly larger amounts depending on Russia’s oil refining capacity thereafter.[19] It remains unclear whether Russia has diesel to export at scale. The Kremlin banned exports of Russian diesel fuel in July 2026, following Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure that had degraded as much as 45 percent of Russia’s oil processing capacity and had caused nationwide gasoline shortages.[20] Russia reportedly imported 176,000 tons of petroleum products, mostly diesel, from South Korean ports in July and August 2026.[21] FT reported on October 11, citing industry experts, that Russian refineries can currently produce roughly 5.8 million tons of diesel a month, with between 1.2 million and 2 million tons likely available for export, assuming Russian refineries will resume normal operations.[22] FT also noted that even if Russia exported 500,000 tons of diesel in November 2026, such an export would supply less than four percent of global demand. Russia’s ability to meet the announced diesel fuel volumes in its new agreement with the United States depends upon its ability to physically deliver the fuel under adverse conditions and the Kremlin’s willingness to export large amounts of diesel fuel at the expense of Russia’s domestic fuel market stability.

Ukrainian forces are conducting a targeted long-range strike campaign against Russian data centers to degrade Russia’s telecommunications and digital infrastructure and deny Russia the ability to fund its war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces struck a Yandex (Russia’s closest analogue to Google) data center in Vladimir City, Vladimir Oblast (roughly 600 kilometers from the international border) overnight on October 10 to 11, Ukraine’s third strike against Yandex data centers in the past four days.[23] The strike caused a fire and significant internet service disruptions across various Yandex services, temporarily affecting businesses, internet service consumers, and Russia’s critical infrastructure in Russia, as well as users in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Serbia.[24] The Yandex Press Service confirmed that the Ukrainian strike completely halted the Vladimir data center’s operations and that Yandex shifted the data center’s operations into an unstable emergency mode.[25] Ukrainian forces previously struck two of Yandex’s largest data centers in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast (roughly 530 kilometers from the international border), on October 8 and one in Kaluga City, Kaluga Oblast (roughly 373 kilometers from the international border), on October 9.[26] A Russian opposition outlet reported on October 11 that Ukrainian strikes likely disabled three out of Yandex’s five largest supercomputers.[27] Data provided by the Internet Outage Detection and Analysis research organization indicates that Yandex’s Cloud network lost approximately 78 percent of its response capacity to external connections since October 8, following Ukrainian strikes.[28] Russia has thus far managed to offset widespread internet disruptions caused by the strikes, and Russia’s telecommunications networks have only experienced temporary disruptions.[29] It remains unclear whether Ukraine will be able to successfully continue its long-range strike campaign against Russian Yandex data centers or the extent to which Russia will be able to defend against Ukrainian strikes and mitigate potential further damage.

An unidentified, likely Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace on the evening of October 10, as Russia continues to normalize its increasing violations of European airspace. Moldovan authorities reported on October 11 that an unidentified drone flew over Anenii Noi, Moldova (about 10 kilometers from the Moldovan-Ukrainian border), before the drone crashed in a forest outside of Germana (southwest of Anenii Noi and about 20 kilometers from the international border).[30] Moldovan authorities have not publicly attributed the incursion to Russia, but the incident is consistent with a pattern of Russian drones entering Moldovan and NATO airspace amidst Russian long-range strikes against far western areas of Ukraine.[31] The October 11 incident likely falls within the Kremlin’s continued kinetic activity and efforts to normalize increasingly intense and frequent European airspace violations.[32]

US President Donald Trump unilaterally announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to an “energy ceasefire” on October 11. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has officially announced or recognized an energy ceasefire as of this writing.

Some Russian milbloggers questioned the veracity of the energy ceasefire that Trump announced.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reaffirmed his willingness to hold elections in Ukraine in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution, which would require a comprehensive ceasefire.

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to continuing the war, thereby denying Ukraine the prerequisite ceasefire necessary to hold elections.

Russia deliberately leverages Ukraine’s constitutional inability to hold elections due to Russia’s war to manipulate the negotiations process and protract the war. Russia can enable Ukraine to hold elections at any point by agreeing to a ceasefire that the United States and Ukraine have offered numerous times.

The Russian government partially lifted its internally imposed ban on Russian diesel fuel exports on October 10. However, Russia’s ability to supply and deliver the quantities of diesel fuel within the timeframe to which Russia and the United States agreed remains unclear.

Ukrainian forces are conducting a targeted long-range strike campaign against Russian data centers to degrade Russia’s telecommunications and digital infrastructure and deny Russia the ability to fund its war in Ukraine.

An unidentified, likely Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace on the evening of October 10, as Russia continues to normalize its increasing violations of European airspace.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Sochi Airport overnight on October 10 to 11. Russia launched 116 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against a data center in Vladimir Oblast.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Sochi Airport overnight on October 10 to 11. Ukrainian forces likely struck an administrative building at the Sochi Airport overnight on October 10 to 11, according to images published on October 11 showing a fire at an administrative building at the airport.[33] The Krasnodar Krai Task Force claimed on October 11 that drone fragments struck an unspecified area of the Sochi Airport, causing a fire.[34]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian radar systems. Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian air defense system near Adler, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 560 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on October 10.[35]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian oil infrastructure, causing ongoing damage to Russia’s oil refining capacity. Open-source satellite imagery published on October 11 shows a large fire at the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station (LPDS) near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 937 kilometers from the international border), after a likely Ukrainian strike.[36] The imagery reportedly shows damage to all of the RVSPK-50000 tanks and about 40 percent of the RVS-20000 tanks at the Samara LPDS. Ukrainian forces conducted several strikes against the Samara LPDS in October 2026.[37] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source published satellite imagery and claimed on October 10 that a Ukrainian strike against the Volgograd Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery in Volgograd City, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 472 kilometers from the frontline), on October 2 seriously damaged equipment at the refinery’s primary facilities.[38] The same OSINT source claimed on October 10 that the Syzran Oil Refinery (roughly 805 kilometers from the frontline) is yet to resume operations after repeated Ukrainian strikes since August 2026.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Sumy City. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 11 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from Mala Rybytsya into forested areas east of Velykyi Prykil (both east of Sumy City), implying that Ukrainian forces maintain positions between Mala Rybytsya and Velykyi Prykil, contrary to Russian claims.[40] The Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced southwards toward Nova Sich (northeast of Sumy City).

Russian forces are reportedly conducting fewer assault operations east of Sumy City, as lower leaf density in forested areas offers less concealment for Russian forces. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on October 11 that Russian forces are conducting fewer assault missions in forested areas east of Krasnopillya (east of Sumy City), as a reduction in leaf density in these forests from seasonal changes offers less concealment to attacking Russian forces.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 10 and 11 but did not advance.[42]

Ukrainian forces recently either advanced or maintained positions northeast of Velykyi Burluk, as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the area. Three Ukrainian tanks on the T-2104 Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway west of Anyskyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and southwest of the settlement struck Russian positions, according to geolocated footage published on October 11.[43] The footage demonstrates that Ukrainian forces advanced to the highway and that Russian forces have infiltrated southwest of Anyskyne. Ukrainian forces appear to be using a new protection tactic involving the use of drone escorts to intercept Russian drones attempting to strike Ukrainian tanks.[44]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 11 that Russian forces seized Riznykove and Kupyne (both north of Velykyi Burluk).[45] The Russian Northern GoF credited elements of the 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD], under the operational control of the Northern GoF) with the claimed seizure of Riznykove and Kupyne. ISW previously expanded Russian claims over Kupyne on August 22 after a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kupyne.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces concentrated attacks southeast of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on October 10 and 11 and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kupyansk near Radkivka.[47]

Russian forces reportedly struck a Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) over the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on October 11 that Russian forces struck a bridge over the Oskil River near Petrivka (south of Kupyansk).[48]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Borova on October 10 and 11 but did not advance.[49]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman tactical area on October 10 and 11 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and south of Lyman.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 10 that Russian forces maintained positions in central Zarichne (northeast of Lyman) but continued to defend from Ukrainian counterattacks both north and south of Zarichne.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations east of Slovyansk along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River on October 10 and 11 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks near Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk).[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations near Kostyantynivka itself and southwest of Druzhkivka along the Kazenyi Torets River on October 10 and 11 but did not advance.[53] Ukrainian forces either advanced or maintained positions in western Kostyantynivka contrary to Russian claims, according to geolocated footage published on October 10.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

The Russian MoD continues to use artificial intelligence (AI) -altered footage of flag-raising missions to make false claims of advance. Russian sources published footage on October 11 purportedly showing a Russian servicemember raising a flag in Petrivka (northeast of Dobropillya and roughly 10 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[55] The Russian MoD used this footage to subsequently claim that Russian forces seized Petrivka and Novotroitske (just northeast of Petrivka).[56] Russian sources continue to use AI-generated and -altered videos to assert territorial control over areas of Ukraine that Russian forces have not seized, as both a cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian forces’ defense as collapsing and to reinforce lies within the Russian military itself.[57] These continued claims are particularly notable in the Dobropillya direction, as the Russian MoD continues to assert false claims that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Dobropillya, contrary to all available evidence.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 11.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Oleksandrivka on October 10 and 11, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured southern Fedorivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and are conducting clearing operations in Yalta and Myrne (both northwest of Fedorivka).[60] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Komar (immediately north of Fedorivka).[61]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole on October 10 and 11 but did not advance.[62]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Orikhiv as Russian forces continued efforts to envelop Orikhiv from the northwest and northeast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on October 10.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Novopavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv). [64]Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to reach Tavriiske (northwest of Orikhiv and along the H-08 Zaporizhzhia City-Orikhiv highway) and Yurkivka (southwest of Tavriiske on the opposite bank of the Kinska River).[65] A milblogger complained about the slow Russian rate of advance in the Orikhiv direction due to Russia’s inability to sustain offensive operations and claimed that Russian forces are suffering from personnel shortages in the area.[66]

Russian forces continue to hunt civilians using human safari tactics in Kherson City. Geolocated footage published on October 10 shows a Russian drone dropping grenades on a civilian and a likely civilian vehicle driving in Kherson City.[67] Russian forces in the Kherson direction have long employed human safari tactics, in which Russian drone operators purposefully hunt civilians as part of the broader effort to institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a tool of war.[68]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[69]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 10 to 11, causing power outages in Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 11 that Russian forces launched 116 Shahed-type (including 95 jet-powered drones) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 94 drones (including 74 jet-powered drones), that an unspecified number of drones struck seven locations, and that debris fell on nine locations. Russian strikes against a residential building in Zaporizhzhia City killed at least 23 civilians, including four children, and injured at least 32 civilians, including three children.[71] Ukrainian energy companies Ukrenergo and DTEK introduced emergency power outages in Kyiv City and Oblast.[72]

Zelensky stated on October 11 that Russian forces conducted 196 strikes against Ukrainian electrical infrastructure and 20 strikes against oil infrastructure this week (from about October 4 to 11), killing 153 civilians.[73]

Russian forces continue their long-range strike campaign targeting Ukrainian data centers. Ukrainian telecommunications company TENET reported on October 10 that Russian forces struck and significantly damaged the company’s technological facilities, causing internet service disruptions.[74] TENET reported that it is unclear whether it will be able to continue operating the damaged site. The Russian MoD acknowledged that Russian forces struck the TENET data center in Odesa Oblast.[75] Russian forces have intensified their strikes against Ukrainian data centers in mid-September 2026 to degrade the Ukrainian economy and force the Ukrainian populace to surrender.[76]

Significant Activity in Belarus

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) began conducting two exercises in Belarus as of October 11. The Indestructible Brotherhood-2026 command staff exercise involving CSTO Peacekeeping Forces is ongoing in Vitebsk, and the Barrier-2026 exercise involving Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical defense forces is ongoing in Starye Dorogi.[77] Military contingents from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan are participating in the exercises.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117422699218841250 [2] https://x.com/ChristopherJM/status/2109291090092167567 [3] https://www.axios.com/2026/10/11/trump-russia-ukraine-energy-ceasefire-zelensky [4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21315 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2109307644846444808 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21319 [5] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ukrayina-gotova-ne-zavdavati-udariv-po-rosijskij-energetici-106845 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21317 [6] https://t.me/sashakots/65036 [7] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/76293 [8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ ; 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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ [33] https://t.me/andriyshTime/68757; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2109160590614618141?s=20 [34] https://t.me/tass_agency/399749 [35] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2108849080726081760; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2108928652851208575; https://x.com/ServiceSsu/status/2108845005561295158/video/1 [36] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/157 [37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/ [38] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8247; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ [39] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8248; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ [40] https://t.me/rybar/83873 [41] https://t.me/severnnyi/9580 [42]https://t.me/tass_agency/399769 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9580 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42561 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42559 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100306 [43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13192 ; https://youtu.be/ctVYPaOotzA?si=vNHPY2nWLkxWmHPk ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38849 [44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13192; https://youtu.be/ctVYPaOotzA?si=vNHPY2nWLkxWmHPk [45] https://t.me/tass_agency/399769 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399770 [46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22552 [47] https://t.me/wargonzo/37532 ; 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美国总统唐纳德·特朗普于10月11日单方面宣布，俄罗斯和乌克兰已同意“能源停火”。截至本文撰写之时，俄罗斯和乌克兰均未正式宣布或承认该能源停火。特朗普声称，俄罗斯和乌克兰已同意立即生效的能源停火。[1] 然而，对于这项已宣布的停火，各方并未达成明确共识。一位与乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基关系密切的乌克兰高级官员向《金融时报》表示，乌克兰在宣布停火时对此毫不知情。[2] 泽连斯基回应称，这项已宣布的停火对他来说也是“新闻”，但如果俄罗斯也支持停火，乌克兰也支持。[3] 泽连斯基会见了北约官员，讨论了能源停火问题，并重申乌克兰致力于采取一切真正缓和局势的措施来结束战争。[4]泽连斯基随后于 10 月 11 日报告称，在特朗普宣布停火后几个小时，俄罗斯军队袭击了哈尔科夫市 5 号火力发电厂，造成大面积停电。[5] 截至本文撰写之时，克里姆林宫尚未对特朗普的声明作出公开回应。

一些俄罗斯军事博客作者质疑特朗普宣布的能源停火协议的真实性。一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博客作者于10月11日声称，停火消息来自华盛顿而非克里姆林宫或乌克兰，这令人费解。[6] 另一位俄罗斯军事博客作者则声称，特朗普曾在2026年9月14日宣布过类似的俄乌能源停火协议，但该协议并未兑现，这暗示特朗普10月11日的停火声明同样为时过早或缺乏依据。[7] 俄罗斯极端民族主义军事博客作者是俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京的重要支持者，他们经常放大克里姆林宫的叙事，并阐明俄罗斯地缘战略思维的关键方面。这些军事博客作者对停火协议的质疑表明，俄罗斯政府并未做好实施能源停火的准备。自 2025 年以来，克里姆林宫一直表示，它无意在乌克兰达成或遵守任何不以俄罗斯取得全面胜利为结果的停火协议。[8]

乌克兰总统泽连斯基重申，他愿意根据乌克兰宪法在乌克兰举行选举，但这需要全面停火。泽连斯基于10月11日表示，如果俄罗斯同意为期60天的全面停火，他准备在乌克兰组织选举，这将使乌克兰能够确保选举安全。[9] 泽连斯基曾多次表示愿意做出让步以举行选举，前提是乌克兰获得安全保障，以确保选举过程的安全。[10] 乌克兰宪法和国家法律禁止在戒严状态下举行选举。[11] 因此，达成和平协议或长期停火是乌克兰举行选举的先决条件。俄罗斯军队每天向乌克兰发射数百架无人机和导弹，蓄意攻击平民和关键基础设施，阻止乌克兰解除戒严状态并组织选举。[12]

克里姆林宫持续展现其继续战争的决心，从而拒绝给予乌克兰举行选举所必需的停火。俄罗斯联邦安全会议主席德米特里·梅德韦杰夫10月11日表示，战场上的俄军和弹道武器是俄罗斯在乌克兰取得胜利的唯一途径。[13] 在过去一周（10月4日至11日），俄罗斯的空袭造成超过150名平民丧生。梅德韦杰夫的声明表明，俄罗斯对乌克兰胜利的理解是，要最大限度地摧毁乌克兰的战略后方，迫使乌克兰屈服于俄罗斯的要求。[14] 俄罗斯官员发表有关谈判和选举的言论之际，乌克兰在战场上正处于强势地位，其目的很可能是为了削弱西方对乌克兰的支持，而西方的支持正是乌克兰近期军事胜利的重要因素。[15] 克里姆林宫可能认为，如果能够说服西方国家撤回对乌克兰的支持，俄军​​就能从近期乌克兰的反击中重新夺回战场优势，并继续战争。例如，2025年3月美国暂时中止情报共享，使得俄罗斯得以在库尔斯克州取得进展，而莫斯科很可能寻求再次切断与美国的关键情报共享。[16] 因此，克里姆林宫试图继续散布乌克兰是和平障碍的虚假叙事，将俄罗斯破坏善意谈判的责任推卸给乌克兰，同时坚持其最高要求，拒绝妥协。[17] 俄罗斯蓄意利用乌克兰因俄罗斯发动的战争而无法举行选举的宪法限制，操纵谈判进程，拖延战争。俄罗斯可以通过同意美国和乌克兰多次提出的停火协议，随时让乌克兰举行选举。

10月10日，俄罗斯政府部分解除了其内部实施的柴油出口禁令。然而，俄罗斯能否在俄美双方约定的时间内供应和交付相应数量的柴油仍不明朗。克里姆林宫于10月10日宣布部分解除柴油出口禁令，允许俄罗斯向全球市场出口50万吨柴油。[18] 特朗普于10月9日宣布，他已与普京达成协议，根据该协议，俄罗斯将立即向美国和全球市场供应超过30万吨柴油，并在2026年11月再供应50万吨，此后还将根据俄罗斯的炼油能力供应更多柴油。[19] 目前尚不清楚俄罗斯是否有足够的柴油可供大规模出口。 2026年7月，乌克兰对俄罗斯石油基础设施发动袭击，导致俄罗斯石油加工能力下降高达45%，并造成全国汽油短缺。此后，克里姆林宫禁止俄罗斯柴油出口。[20] 据报道，俄罗斯在2026年7月和8月从韩国港口进口了17.6万吨石油产品，其中大部分是柴油。[21] 英国《金融时报》10月11日援引业内专家的话报道称，俄罗斯炼油厂目前每月可生产约580万吨柴油，假设俄罗斯炼油厂恢复正常运营，其中约有120万至200万吨可用于出口。[22] 《金融时报》还指出，即使俄罗斯在2026年11月出口50万吨柴油，也仅能满足全球需求的不到4%。俄罗斯能否履行与美国新协议中宣布的柴油燃料供应量，取决于其在不利条件下实际交付燃料的能力，以及克里姆林宫是否愿意以牺牲俄罗斯国内燃料市场稳定为代价出口大量柴油燃料。

乌克兰军队正对俄罗斯数据中心进行有针对性的远程打击行动，旨在削弱俄罗斯的电信和数字基础设施，并切断俄罗斯为其在乌克兰的战争提供资金的能力。10月10日至11日夜间，乌克兰军队袭击了位于弗拉基米尔州弗拉基米尔市（距国际边界约600公里）的Yandex（俄罗斯最接近谷歌的公司）数据中心，这是乌克兰在过去四天内对Yandex数据中心的第三次打击。[23] 此次打击引发火灾，并导致Yandex多项服务出现严重的互联网服务中断，暂时影响了俄罗斯境内的企业、互联网用户和关键基础设施，以及白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、亚美尼亚和塞尔维亚的用户。[24] Yandex新闻处证实，乌克兰的打击完全停止了弗拉基米尔数据中心的运营，Yandex已将该数据中心的运营切换到不稳定的紧急模式。[25]乌克兰军队此前于10月8日袭击了位于梁赞州萨索沃（距国际边界约530公里）的Yandex两座最大的数据中心，并于10月9日袭击了位于卡卢加州卡卢加市（距国际边界约373公里）的一座数据中心。[26] 俄罗斯反对派媒体于10月11日报道称，乌克兰的袭击可能导致Yandex五台最大的超级计算机中的三台瘫痪。[27] 互联网中断检测与分析研究机构提供的数据显示，自10月8日乌克兰袭击以来，Yandex云网络对外部连接的响应能力下降了约78%。[28] 俄罗斯迄今为止已成功抵消了袭击造成的广泛互联网中断，俄罗斯的电信网络仅经历了短暂中断。[29]目前尚不清楚乌克兰能否成功继续对俄罗斯 Yandex 数据中心发动远程打击，也不清楚俄罗斯能在多大程度上防御乌克兰的打击并减轻潜在的进一步损害。

10月10日晚，一架身份不明、疑似俄罗斯无人机进入摩尔多瓦领空。俄罗斯持续推进其日益频繁侵犯欧洲领空的行为，并使其正常化。摩尔多瓦当局于10月11日报告称，一架身份不明的无人机飞越摩尔多瓦阿内尼诺伊（距摩尔多瓦-乌克兰边境约10公里），随后坠毁在杰尔马纳（位于阿内尼诺伊西南，距国际边界约20公里）附近的一片森林中。[30] 摩尔多瓦当局尚未公开将此次入侵事件归咎于俄罗斯，但该事件与俄罗斯无人机在对乌克兰西部地区进行远程打击期间进入摩尔多瓦和北约领空的模式相符。[31] 10月11日的事件很可能属于克里姆林宫持续的军事行动，以及其为使日益频繁和严重的侵犯欧洲领空行为正常化所做的努力的一部分。[32]

美国总统唐纳德·特朗普于10月11日单方面宣布，俄罗斯和乌克兰已同意“能源停火”。截至本文撰写之时，俄罗斯和乌克兰均未正式宣布或承认该能源停火协议。

一些俄罗斯军事博客作者质疑特朗普宣布的能源停火协议的真实性。

乌克兰总统泽连斯基重申，他愿意按照乌克兰宪法在乌克兰举行选举，但这需要全面停火。

克里姆林宫继续表明其继续战争的决心，从而剥夺了乌克兰举行选举所必需的停火条件。

俄罗斯蓄意利用乌克兰因俄军入侵而无法举行选举的宪法限制，操纵谈判进程并拖延战争。俄罗斯随时可以通过接受美国和乌克兰多次提出的停火协议，使乌克兰能够举行选举。

10月10日，俄罗斯政府部分解除了其内部对俄罗斯柴油出口的禁令。然而，俄罗斯能否在俄美双方约定的时间内供应和交付相应数量的柴油，目前仍不明朗。

乌克兰军队正在对俄罗斯数据中心进行有针对性的远程打击行动，以削弱俄罗斯的电信和数字基础设施，并阻止俄罗斯为其在乌克兰的战争提供资金。

10 月 10 日晚，一架身份不明、很可能是俄罗斯的无人机进入摩尔多瓦领空。与此同时，俄罗斯继续将其日益增多的侵犯欧洲领空的行为正常化。

10月10日至11日夜间，乌克兰军队对索契机场发动了无人机袭击。俄罗斯当晚向乌克兰发射了116架无人机。

乌克兰军队最近在苏梅州北部和韦利基布尔卢克方向取得了进展。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

请参阅有关乌克兰袭击弗拉基米尔州数据中心的新闻摘要。

10月10日至11日夜间，乌克兰军队对索契机场发动了无人机袭击。根据10月11日公布的图片显示，索契机场一栋行政楼起火，乌克兰军队可能在10月10日至11日夜间袭击了索契机场的一栋行政楼。[33] 克拉斯诺达尔边疆区特遣部队于10月11日声称，无人机碎片击中了索契机场的某个未指明区域，引发了火灾。[34]

乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯雷达系统进行远程打击。根据 10 月 10 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近袭击了克拉斯诺达尔边疆区阿德勒附近的一个俄罗斯防空系统（距离前线约 560 公里）。[35]

乌克兰军队持续袭击俄罗斯石油基础设施，对俄罗斯炼油能力造成持续破坏。10月11日公布的开源卫星图像显示，萨马拉州普罗斯韦特附近（距国际边界约937公里）的萨马拉线性生产和调度站（LPDS）发生大火，很可能是乌克兰军队发动的袭击。[36] 据报道，图像显示萨马拉LPDS的所有RVSPK-50000型储罐和约40%的RVS-20000型储罐均遭到破坏。乌克兰军队在2026年10月对萨马拉LPDS进行了多次袭击。[37] 10 月 10 日，一位乌克兰开源情报 (OSINT) 消息人士公布了卫星图像，并声称乌克兰军队于 10 月 2 日对位于伏尔加格勒州伏尔加格勒市（距前线约 472 公里）的伏尔加格勒卢克石油-伏尔加格勒石油炼油厂发动袭击，严重损坏了该炼油厂主要设施的设备。[38] 同一天，该 OSINT 消息人士还声称，自 2026 年 8 月以来，乌克兰军队多次袭击锡兹兰炼油厂（距前线约 805 公里），该炼油厂至今仍未恢复运营。[39]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心国

乌克兰军队近期向苏梅市以东推进。一位俄罗斯军事博主于10月11日承认，乌克兰军队正从马拉雷比察（Mala Rybytsya）向大普雷基尔（Velykyi Prykil）以东的森林地区（均位于苏梅市以东）发起反击，这意味着乌克兰军队在马拉雷比察和大普雷基尔之间驻扎，这与俄罗斯的说法相悖。[40] 这位俄罗斯军事博主还声称，俄军向南推进至新西奇（Nova Sich，位于苏梅市东北部）。

据报道，由于森林地区树叶密度降低，俄军在苏梅市以东的进攻行动有所减少。10月11日，有消息人士援引俄罗斯北方部队（GoF）的消息称，由于季节性变化导致克拉斯诺皮利亚（苏梅市以东）森林地区的树叶密度降低，俄军在该地区（苏梅市以东）的进攻行动有所减少，因为这些森林的树叶密度降低，俄军进攻的隐蔽性变差。[41]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

10月10日和11日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部进行进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[42]

近期，乌克兰军队在韦利基布尔卢克东北部推进或巩固了阵地，与此同时，俄罗斯军队在该地区进行了渗透行动。根据10月11日公布的地理定位视频显示，三辆乌克兰坦克在阿尼斯基涅以西（韦利基布尔卢克东北部）的沃夫昌斯克-丘胡尼夫卡T-2104公路上，以及该定居点西南方向，袭击了俄军阵地。[43] 视频显示，乌克兰军队已推进至该公路，而俄罗斯军队已渗透至阿尼斯基涅西南方向。乌克兰军队似乎正在使用一种新的防御战术，即利用无人机护航拦截试图攻击乌克兰坦克的俄罗斯无人机。[44]

俄罗斯国防部于10月11日宣称，俄军占领了里兹尼科韦和库皮涅（均位于大布尔卢克以北）。[45] 俄罗斯北方军区政府将里兹尼科韦和库皮涅的占领归功于第344摩托化步兵团（隶属第6集团军第6合成集团军）和第34独立摩托化步兵旅（隶属第49集团军，南部军区，由北方军区政府指挥）。此前，在一位俄罗斯军事博主声称俄军占领库皮涅后，ISW于8月22日扩大了俄罗斯对库皮涅的占领范围。[46]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，10 月 10 日和 11 日，俄罗斯军队集中攻击库皮扬斯克东南部的库皮扬斯克-武兹洛维附近，而乌克兰军队则在库皮扬斯克东北部的拉德基夫卡附近进行了反击。[47]

据报道，俄军袭击了位于库皮扬斯克方向奥斯基尔河上的乌克兰地面交通线。俄罗斯西部政府军10月11日援引消息称，俄军袭击了佩特里夫卡（库皮扬斯克以南）附近奥斯基尔河上的一座桥梁。[48]

10月10日和11日，俄军继续在博罗瓦东北部进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[49]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

10 月 10 日和 11 日，俄军在莱曼战术区继续进行进攻行动，但由于乌克兰军队在莱曼南北两侧的反击，俄军未能取得进展。[50] 10 月 10 日，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军在扎里奇内中部（莱曼东北部）保持阵地，但继续抵御乌克兰军队在扎里奇内南北两侧的反击。[51]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

10 月 10 日和 11 日，俄军在斯拉维扬斯克以东的西维尔斯基顿涅茨河南岸集中发动进攻，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在赖奥列克桑德里夫卡（斯拉维扬斯克以东）附近继续反击。[52]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

10 月 10 日和 11 日，俄军在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡附近以及德鲁日基夫卡西南部的卡泽尼托列茨河沿岸集中开展进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[53] 根据 10 月 10 日发布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡西部推进或保持了阵地，这与俄罗斯的说法相反。[54]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

俄罗斯国防部继续利用人工智能（AI）篡改的升旗仪式视频，散布虚假的推进信息。10月11日，俄罗斯方面发布了一段视频，据称显示一名俄罗斯军人在佩特里夫卡（位于多布罗皮利亚东北部，距离俄军推进的最远点约10公里）升起了一面国旗。[55] 俄罗斯国防部随后利用这段视频声称俄军占领了佩特里夫卡和新特罗伊茨克（位于佩特里夫卡东北部）。[56] 俄罗斯方面继续利用人工智能生成和篡改的视频，宣称对俄军尚未占领的乌克兰地区拥有领土控制权，这既是一种认知战策略，旨在将乌克兰军队的防御描绘成崩溃，也是为了强化俄军内部的谎言。[57]这些持续不断的说法在多布罗皮利亚方向尤其值得注意，因为俄罗斯国防部继续声称俄罗斯军队已经包围了多布罗皮利亚的乌克兰军队，这与所有现有证据相悖。[58]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

10 月 11 日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告新巴甫洛夫卡方向有地面活动。

10月10日至11日，俄军继续在奥列克桑德里夫卡东北部发动进攻，乌克兰军队在该地区进行反击。[59] 俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，俄军重新夺回了费多里夫卡南部（位于奥列克桑德里夫卡东北部），并在雅尔塔和米尔内（均位于费多里夫卡西北部）进行清剿行动。[60] 一位军事博客作者声称，乌克兰军队向科马尔（位于费多里夫卡正北）方向发动了反击。[61]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

10月10日和11日，俄军继续在胡利亚波列西北至西南方向进行进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[62]

乌克兰军队近期向奥里希夫以南推进，而俄罗斯军队则继续从西北和东北方向包围奥里希夫。根据10月10日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队近期向诺沃达尼利夫卡（奥里希夫以南）东北方向推进。[63] 一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄罗斯军队向诺沃帕夫利夫卡（奥里希夫西北部）西北方向推进。[64] 另一位军事博主声称，俄罗斯军队正试图抵达塔夫里斯克（奥里希夫西北部，沿扎波罗热市-奥里希夫H-08公路）和尤尔基夫卡（塔夫里斯克西南部，金斯卡河对岸）。[65] 一位军事博主抱怨俄罗斯军队向奥里希夫方向推进缓慢，原因是俄罗斯无法维持进攻行动，并声称该地区的俄罗斯军队面临人员短缺。[66]

俄罗斯军队继续在赫尔松市使用“人肉狩猎”战术猎杀平民。10月10日公布的地理定位视频显示，一架俄罗斯无人机向赫尔松市一名平民和一辆疑似民用车辆投掷手榴弹。[67] 长期以来，驻扎在赫尔松方向的俄罗斯军队一直采用“人肉狩猎”战术，即俄罗斯无人机操作员蓄意猎杀平民，这是将故意伤害平民制度化为战争手段的更广泛努力的一部分。[68]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[69]

10月10日至11日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列无人机袭击，导致基辅市和基辅州停电。乌克兰空军于10月11日报告称，俄罗斯军队从奥廖尔市和库尔斯克市、克拉斯诺达尔边疆区滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克市、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向，发射了116架“沙赫德”型（包括95架喷气式无人机）、“格贝拉”型攻击无人机和“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[70] 乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了94架无人机（包括74架喷气式无人机），另有数量不明的无人机袭击了7个地点，还有9个地点落下了无人机碎片。俄罗斯对扎波罗热市一栋居民楼的袭击造成至少 23 名平民死亡，其中包括 4 名儿童；另有至少 32 名平民受伤，其中包括 3 名儿童。[71] 乌克兰能源公司 Ukrenergo 和 DTEK 在基辅市和基辅州实施了紧急停电。[72]

泽连斯基在 10 月 11 日表示，俄罗斯军队本周（大约从 10 月 4 日至 11 日）对乌克兰电力基础设施进行了 196 次袭击，对石油基础设施进行了 20 次袭击，造成 153 名平民死亡。[73]

俄罗斯军队继续对乌克兰数据中心发动远程打击。乌克兰电信公司TENET于10月10日报告称，俄罗斯军队袭击并严重破坏了该公司的技术设施，导致互联网服务中断。[74] TENET表示，目前尚不清楚受损站点是否能够继续运营。俄罗斯国防部承认，俄军袭击了位于敖德萨州的TENET数据中心。[75] 2026年9月中旬，俄罗斯军队加大了对乌克兰数据中心的打击力度，旨在削弱乌克兰经济并迫使乌克兰民众投降。[76]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

集体安全条约组织（集安组织）于10月11日开始在白俄罗斯举行两项演习。集安组织维和部队参与的“坚不可摧的兄弟情谊-2026”指挥参谋演习正在维捷布斯克举行，核生化防御部队参与的“屏障-2026”演习正在旧多罗吉举行。[77] 来自白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯和塔吉克斯坦的军事分遣队正在参加演习。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ [40] https://t.me/rybar/83873 [41] https://t.me/severnnyi/9580 [42]https://t.me/tass_agency/399769 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9580 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42561 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42559 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100306 [43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13192；https://youtu.be/ctVYPaOotzA?si=vNHPY2nWLkxWmHPk；https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38849 [44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13192；https://youtu.be/ctVYPaOotzA?si=vNHPY2nWLkxWmHPk [45] https://t.me/tass_agency/399769；https://t.me/tass_agency/399770 [46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/； https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22552 [47] https://t.me/wargonzo/37532；https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48638；https://t.me/grvZapad/20052；https://t.me/severnnyi/9580 [48] https://t.me/grvZapad/20052 [49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42561；https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42559；https://t.me/grvZapad/20052 [50]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42561；https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42559；https://t.me/wargonzo/37532； https://t.me/dva_majors/100306；https://t.me/motopatriot78/56738；https://t.me/grvZapad/20052；https://t.me/motopatriot78/56738 [51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56738 [52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42561；https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42559；https://t.me/wargonzo/37532；https://t.me/motopatriot78/56738 [53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42561； https://t.me/wargonzo/37532 [54] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2108997279508058483; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/36988 [55] https://t.me/btr80/41964; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13190; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2109321235196682359?s=20; https://t.me/Osintpen/3676 https://t.me/Osintpen/3674 [56] https://t.me/mod_russia/68103 [57] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/geospatial-intelligence/russia-is-integrating-ai-models-into-its-cognitive-warfare-campaign-against-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; [58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; [59] https://t.me/voin_dv/21514; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56771 [60] https://t.me/voin_dv/21514; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56771 [61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56771 [62] ttps://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42561; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42559; https://t.me/wargonzo/37532; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56757; https://t.me/voin_dv/21514 [63] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2109031436153971079; https://t.me/rogozin_do/9129 [64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56738; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56762 [65] https://t.me/wargonzo/37532 [66] https://t.me/wargonzo/37532 [67] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2109010056108736622; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/38389; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2108981310048047275; https://t.me/zona_Red/1924 [68] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/ [69] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/ Russian-offective-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [70] https://t.me/kpszsu/85091 [71] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/77245 ； https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21313； https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2109209224865587210 [72] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4600 ； https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1424593-u-kievi-ta-oblasti-zaprovadili-ekstreni-vimknenna-elektroenergii/； https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1424835-u-kievi-cerez-rosijsku-ataku-zafiksovani-avarijni-vidklucenna-svitla/； https://t.me/dtek_ua/4604； https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5519 [73] https://abcnews.com/Politics/week-transcript-10-11-26-ukrainian-president-volodymyr/story?id=137165082 [74] https://t.me/tenet_official/1053 [75] https://t.me/mod_ Russia/68097 [76] https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/ Russian-offective-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ ； https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/；https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/；https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ [77] https://t.me/modmilby/59338；https://www.interfax.ru/world/1121667； https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/uchastniki-ucheniy-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2026-i-barer-2026-napravlyayutsya-v-respubliku-belarus/