Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2026

The Ukrainian military demonstrated, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged, the falsity of one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s more outrageous claims of fictitious Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) Commander Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi published a video on September 7 showing himself calmly speaking in Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk), demonstrating unchallenged Ukrainian control over that settlement contrary to Putin’s September 1 claims that Russian forces had seized it.[1] Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces comfortably control Svyatohirsk and that Ukraine considers the settlement to be in its “rear area.” ISW has observed evidence to assess that the closest Russian forces were 13 kilometers away from Svyatohirsk in late Spring/early Summer 2026, and numerous reports indicate that the current Russian line is even further away amidst ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. A Russian source published archival and doctored footage on September 5 purporting to show Russian control over Svyatohirsk, presumably to support Putin’s false claims, but a Russian milblogger responded to this footage on the same day and denied that Russian forces maintain positions even close to Svyatohirsk.[2]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on September 7 that Biletskyi’s video was a clear demonstration of Ukrainian control over Svyatohirsk and observed that the Russian military command and the agencies responsible for Russian cognitive warfare efforts should have realized how easy it would be for Ukrainian forces to dispel Putin’s grossly exaggerated claims in this area.[3] The milblogger noted that false reports of captured settlements such as Svyatohirsk create operational risks for Russian forces because they cannot call for strikes on locations they claim to control and because units in adjacent sectors may plan operations based on this inaccurate battlefield picture. The milblogger noted that Russia’s failure to impose accountability for such dishonesty will increase deceptive reporting and may produce even strategic consequences.

The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces paradoxically both damages Russian forces’ ability to fight effectively and supports exaggerated Kremlin claims that Putin weaponizes to enhance Russia’s negotiation position. Russian milbloggers continue to highlight the consequences of Russia’s pervasive culture of lying, which Russian milbloggers speak of as generating “beautiful reports” that exaggerate the extent of Russian advances so much that they harm military operations.[4] The Kremlin continues to insist, however, on its delusional depiction of the current battlefield as the basis for negotiations, demanding Ukraine’s full capitulation and its withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including large and heavily populated areas that Russian forces have never occupied.[5] Putin has shown that he is sensitive to the accusation that he is detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine by claiming on September 1 that his understanding of the battlefield is ”quite objective,” yet he continues to make absurd claims of fictional Russian gains. [6] The Kremlin’s continued willingness to tolerate and seek to benefit from the pervasive lying of the Russian military continues to both damage its own ability to fight effectively and to fuel Putin’s insistence on his ability to achieve all his aims by military force. Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.

The Ukrainian military demonstrated, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged, the falsity of one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s more outrageous claims of fictitious Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast.

The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces paradoxically both damages Russian forces’ ability to fight effectively and supports exaggerated Kremlin claims that Putin weaponizes to enhance Russia’s negotiation position.

Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russia launched 92 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of September 6 to 7.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of September 6 and 7. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck oil refineries in the Republic of Tatarstan and Perm Krai, a Russian storage and launch site for strike drones in Kursk Oblast, and an unspecified target in the Black Sea.[7] A Ukrainian source that frequently reports on Ukrainian strikes in Russia reported that Russian forces struck the Lukoil Permnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Perm Krai and published footage of a strike reportedly near the refinery.[8] Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin confirmed Ukrainian strikes in Perm Krai.[9] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from September 7 shows heat anomalies at the Taganrog Airbase, Rostov Oblast (roughly 160 kilometers from the frontline) following reports of Ukrainian strikes in the area.[10]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City) contrary to Russian claims, according to geolocated footage published on September 4.[11]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[12]

Russian forces are intensifying operations in the Vovchansk direction ahead of a seasonal shift. An officer of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Vovchansk direction stated on September 7 that Russian forces are intensifying attacks in the area ahead of a seasonal change, as they are aware that upcoming green cover loss in the fall will preclude Russian infiltrators from hiding from Ukrainian drones and hinder Russian advances.[13]

Russian milbloggers continue to baselessly claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions, contrary to all available evidence. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on September 6 and 7 that Ukrainian forces are attempting to break through the encirclement that Russian forces have supposedly completed between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions.[14] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 7 that Russian forces did not even reach the southern outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and advanced only between three and five kilometers from the international border in the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions, indirectly but clearly refuting Russian claims.[15] Trehubov stated that Russian officials present ”absolutely strange information” about claims of seizing Bilyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City) and Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) that do not correspond to reality.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[16]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[17] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on September 7 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dvorichna and Zapadne (both north of Kupyansk).[18]

Russian forces are reportedly postponing their objective of seizing Kupyansk until Spring 2027, according to a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF), likely due to recent successful Ukrainian counterattacks and advances near Kupyansk .[19]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[20]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian command posts in occupied Nyzhnii Naholchyk (roughly 109 kilometers from the frontline) and Dovzhanske (roughly 142 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot near occupied Teple (roughly 95 or 118 kilometers from the frontline).[21] Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that the ammunition depot near occupied Teple supplied units of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]).[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[23] Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southeastern and southeast of Lyman in areas where Russian forces previously infiltrated and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces maintained positions, according to geolocated footage published on September 6.[24]

Russian sources are increasingly acknowledging Ukrainian counterattacks around Lyman. ISW is not prepared to assess the extent or results of these counterattacks at this time, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Stavky (north of Lyman) and toward Zarichne (southeast of Stavky); from Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) and Novoselivka (northwest of Drobysheve) toward Myrne and Kolodyazi (both east of Novoselivka); and infiltrating toward Ivanivka, Yampolivka, and Terny (all north of Zarichne).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also pressing toward Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) from Novomykhailivka (northwest of Novolyubivka), Terny, and Olhivka (north of Novomykhailivka).[26] A Ukrainian military source noted, however, that while individual reports include some Ukrainian success around Lyman, it is premature to draw final conclusions regarding the situation.[27]

ISW’s mapping methodology underestimates the extent of likely Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counterattacks in the Lyman direction, and additional collection will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction in Fall 2026. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Druzhkivka. Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Stepanivka (south of Druzhkivka) and maintain positions in Stepanivka, according to geolocated footage published on August 30.[28]

Russian sources continue to heavily exaggerate the extent of Russian advances in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, contrary to all available evidence. A Telegram channel associated with the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) published footage on September 5 claiming to show a strike against a Ukrainian position in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka), but the Ukrainian position was geolocated to northwestern Kostyantynivka.[29] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously claimed that Russian forces had seized Kostyantynivka as of July 3.[30] The Russian channel likely lied about the location of the Ukrainian position to avoid contradicting Putin’s claim that Russian forces had seized all of Kostyantynivka and to continue aggrandizing Russian advances in the area. Russian forces still have not seized all of Kostyantynivka as of September 7, over two months after Putin’s claim.

Russian forces are interdicting Ukrainian logistics in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on September 7 that Russian forces are constantly using first-person view (FPV) drones around Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, which prevents Ukrainian forces from using conventional transport in the area.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[32]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 7 that Russian forces are using Msta-S self-propelled howitzers to interdict Ukrainian logistics and disrupt personnel rotations in the Dobropillya direction.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that Russian forces advanced northeast of and into central Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[35]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[36]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics infrastructure and military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian truck along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway, according to geolocated footage published on September 5.[37] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov posted footage on September 6 showing Ukrainian drones striking 15 pieces of Russian military equipment along the Donetsk Ring Road.[38] Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Osa-AKM anti-aircraft missile system near Vodyane (roughly 45 kilometers from the front line) likely in mid-August 2026, according to geolocated footage published on September 6.[39]

Ukrainian special services recently assassinated a Russian officer responsible for the assassination of Ukrainian intelligence officers in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian special services sources told a Ukrainian news agency on September 7 that Ukrainian forces planted an improvised explosive device (IED) that killed an employee of occupied Donetsk Oblast State Security Ministry Center for Special Operations, Oleg Shutov, on July 27, 2026, in occupied Donetsk City.[40] Shutov reportedly supported the assassinations of Ukrainian Major General Maksym Shapoval on June 27, 2017, and Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) counterintelligence officer Colonel Oleksandr Kharaberyush on March 31, 2017.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[42]

Russian forces continue to actively operate in small infantry groups in the Hulyaipole direction while predominantly using radio-controlled drones. A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion commander operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on September 7 that trees and other challenging terrain features prevent Russian forces from effectively using fiber-optic drones in the area, forcing them to rely on radio-controlled drones instead.[43]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 7, but ISW did not observe evidence of Russian advances.[44]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in occupied Azovske (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline).[45]

Ukrainian drones are reportedly freely flying over the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway), contrary to Russian occupation officials’ claims of securing the highway. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration council member Vladimir Rogov claimed on September 7 that Ukrainian drones are operating along the entire section of the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and criticized Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky for claiming that the highway is safe.[46] ISW has previously observed Russian milbloggers repeatedly rejecting Russian occupation officials’ claims that the M-14 highway is safe from Ukrainian drones.[47]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 7.

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Ukrainian Kherson City officials reported on September 7 that Russian forces struck a public transportation stop in Kherson City, injuring one person.[48] Russian forces dropped grenades using rotary drones on two civilians in Kherson City and one in Antonivka (just east of Kherson City), according to geolocated footage published on September 7.[49]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge across the North Crimean Canal near occupied Vladyslavivka (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline), which Russian forces used for logistics.[50] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Department of Active Operations reported on September 7 that GUR drone operators struck and damaged a Russian aircraft, reportedly a Su-24 tactical bomber, in occupied Crimea overnight on September 6 to 7.[51]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[52]

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 7 that Russian forces launched 92 Shahed-type strike drones (including jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[53] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 71 drones, that aerial vehicles hit 12 locations, and that debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and logistics infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[54] Russian forces struck a helicopter in Zhulyany, the Vasylkiv Airbase, and the Alutech logistics center in Kyiv Oblast, according to geolocated footage published on September 7.[55]

Russian forces are reportedly increasingly using glide bombs to strike southern Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that Russian forces are increasingly using glide bombs alongside Geran-type strike drones to support their long-range strike packages against Ukrainian shipping and logistics infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[56] The milblogger claimed that Ukraine’s degraded air defenses in the region and modernizations to Russian glide bombs are allowing Russian forces to use them in strikes against Odesa and Zaporizhia oblasts, presumably from airspace over the Black and Azov seas.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://x.com/blinzka/status/2096898974980440346 ; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2096890631289176407 [40]https://lb dot ua/society/2026/09/07/764076_dzherela_ukrayinski_spetssluzhbi.html ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/07/ukrayinski-speczsluzhby-likviduvaly-v-doneczku-vbyvczyu-rozvidnyka-maksyma-shapovala/ [41] https://lb dot ua/news/2019/04/17/424780_sbu_ustanovila_imya_muzhchini.html [42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36747 ; [43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/07/vorog-nablyzhayetsya-do-pozyczij-ale-ye-nyuans-shho-zadumaly-okupanty-pid-gulyajpolem/ ; https://youtu.be/pqouOydYZ4w [44] https://t.me/wargonzo/36747 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98615 ; https://t.me/divgen/83728 [45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42154 [46] https://t.me/vrogov/25922 [47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80309 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/177025 [48] https://www.facebook.com/miskrada.ks/posts/972422409215430?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1397154-udar-rf-po-zupinci-v-centralnomu-rajoni-hersona-poranena-zinka/ [49] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2096893219657204131 ; https://t.me/zona_Red/1291 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2096903457231806515 ; https://t.me/zona_Red/1283 [50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42154 [51] https://t.me/risk_dept/704 ; https://militarnyi dot om/uk/news/dron-gur-urazyv-rosijskyj-su-24-u-krymu/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/07/svyatkovyj-podarunok-okupantam-dronari-gur-urazyly-rosijskyj-su-24-u-krymu/ [52] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [53] https://t.me/kpszsu/76967 [54] https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1397070-rosijski-vijska-fpv-dronami-ta-z-minometiv-atakuvali-tri-prikordonni-gromadi-na-cernigivsini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/policechernigivshchini/posts/pfbid02TQxVUDrWtM8KDncPxCyjMJCfygan14DVeKWtJ5UHodgMUcwA4jX39NhrbQDgaxyGl? cft [0]=AZgawpgOurXBqHFq1-v-sYmGQFDirAecA9aRL8MhQyJn3k03J8lICU6dQHanUTcK9KldlarUqIpb298ZDLFtWHRJRoy9Kn8DYzqMSmZaedUKO2qmYGiBrRjiCfBv7fRcDW-o9_fIWMtfWafF0muDzt8C1Q& tn =%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31871 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31880 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1396992-rf-pocilila-dronom-po-civilnomu-avto-poblizu-svitlicnogo-na-harkivsini-v-akomu-stani-pasaziri/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1397352-za-ves-period-vijni-ce-vperse-rf-dva-dni-pospil-atakuvala-sahnovsinu-reaktivnimi-sahedami/ ; https://t.me/vkarabanov/2760 ; https://www.facebook.com/miskrada.ks/posts/971952445929093?ref=embed_post ; https://t.me/kyivoda/56331 ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSODE/posts/pfbid02HAJpfTga5DTNtMZ2LC61MraEkEBm6ytKn9W7v8WooQiaMUshZp7ewpFK5JKuYEwSl?cft[0]=AZiBvpqtPKIrWvrF14DUDf7rjR5NdKFtOgNV0YSuHrLY0hwmlin67AD4EaSD2bZ-7fSMXJLcPxROsGf2-At0Y3HahxcV3JVBpy5_BbywZ9DuGcnWTR97x1wfPPJZo1KY6PIovxxBngg3KKBhDPs7i2LZpmvZPXh_& tn =%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19723 ; https://t.me/police_zp_news/31294 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/47835 [55] https://t.me/Osintpen/3496; https://t.me/Osintpen/3497; https://t.me/Osintpen/3498; https://t.me/Osintpen/3499; https://t.me/Osintpen/3500; https://t.me/Osintpen/3501; https://t.me/Osintpen/3502; https://t.me/Osintpen/3503; https://t.me/Osintpen/3504 [56] https://t.me/arx_spn/30965

乌克兰军方已证实，一位与克里姆林宫有关联的军事博主也承认，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京关于俄罗斯在顿涅茨克州取得虚假战果的说法纯属捏造。乌克兰第三军军长安德烈·比列茨基准将于9月7日发布了一段视频，视频中他平静地在斯维亚托希尔斯克（位于斯拉维扬斯克以北）发表讲话，表明乌克兰对该定居点拥有绝对控制权，这与普京9月1日声称俄军已占领该地的说法截然相反。[1] 比列茨基表示，乌克兰军队完全控制着斯维亚托希尔斯克，乌克兰认为该定居点位于其“后方”。 ISW观察到的证据表明，2026年春夏之交，距离斯维亚托希尔斯克最近的俄军阵地距离为13公里。大量报告显示，在乌克兰持续反攻行动中，俄军目前的防线甚至更远。9月5日，一位俄罗斯消息人士发布了一段经过篡改的档案视频，声称俄军控制了斯维亚托希尔斯克，其目的显然是为了支持普京的虚假声明。但当天，一位俄罗斯军事博主就对此视频做出回应，否认俄军在斯维亚托希尔斯克附近驻扎。[2]

一位与克里姆林宫有关联的军事博主于9月7日承认，比列茨基的视频清晰地展示了乌克兰对斯维亚托希尔斯克的控制，并指出俄罗斯军方指挥部和负责俄罗斯认知战的机构本应意识到，乌克兰军队很容易就能驳斥普京在该地区严重夸大的说法。[3] 该军事博主指出，关于斯维亚托希尔斯克等定居点被占领的虚假报道会给俄军带来作战风险，因为他们无法对声称控制的地点发动打击，而且邻近地区的部队可能会根据这种不准确的战场态势制定作战计划。该军事博主指出，俄罗斯未能追究此类不诚实行为的责任，将导致虚假报道的增加，甚至可能产生战略后果。

俄罗斯军队内部普遍存在的撒谎文化，矛盾地既损害了俄军的有效作战能力，又助长了克里姆林宫夸大其词的说法，而普京则利用这些说法来增强俄罗斯的谈判地位。俄罗斯军事博客作者不断强调俄罗斯普遍存在的撒谎文化的后果，他们称之为制造“精美报告”，这些报告夸大了俄军取得的进展，以至于损害了军事行动。[4] 然而，克里姆林宫仍然坚持其对当前战场的妄想描述，并将其作为谈判的基础，要求乌克兰完全投降，并从卢甘斯克、顿涅茨克、扎波罗热和赫尔松州全部撤军，其中包括俄军从未占领过的大片人口稠密地区。[5]普京在9月1日声称他对乌克兰战场局势的理解“相当客观”，这表明他很在意外界指责他脱离乌克兰战场实际情况的说法，但他却继续编造俄罗斯取得所谓战果的荒谬论调。[6] 克里姆林宫持续容忍并试图从俄罗斯军方的谎言中获利，这既损害了其自身的有效作战能力，也助长了普京坚持认为他可以通过武力实现所有目标的信念。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普所追求的持久和平谈判不能建立在俄罗斯的谎言之上，而只能建立在战场的实际情况和战争的真实走向之上，而这些对俄罗斯不利。

乌克兰军方证明了俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京关于俄罗斯在顿涅茨克州取得虚构战果的诸多荒谬说法之一纯属捏造，一位与克里姆林宫有关联的军事博主也承认了这一点。

俄罗斯军队中普遍存在的撒谎文化，矛盾地既损害了俄罗斯军队的有效作战能力，又助长了克里姆林宫夸大其词的说法，而普京则利用这些说法来增强俄罗斯的谈判地位。

美国总统唐纳德·特朗普曾表示，他致力于实现持久和平，而旨在确保和平的谈判不能建立在俄罗斯的谎言之上。谈判只能基于战场上的实际情况和战争的真实走向，而这些对俄罗斯不利。

乌克兰军队最近向斯拉维扬斯克方向和科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡-德鲁日基夫卡战术区推进。

俄罗斯连夜向乌克兰发射了92架无人机。9月6日至7日夜间，乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯军事目标和石油基础设施发动远程打击。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

9月6日夜间至7日凌晨，乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯军事目标和石油基础设施发动远程打击。乌克兰总统泽连斯基于9月7日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了鞑靼斯坦共和国和彼尔姆边疆区的炼油厂、库尔斯克州一处俄罗斯无人机储存和发射基地，以及黑海一处未指明的目标。[7] 一家经常报道乌克兰对俄罗斯发动袭击的乌克兰媒体报道称，俄罗斯军队袭击了位于彼尔姆边疆区的卢克石油彼尔姆石油合成炼油厂，并发布了据称发生在炼油厂附近的袭击视频。[8] 彼尔姆边疆区州长德米特里·马霍宁证实了乌克兰军队对彼尔姆边疆区的袭击。[9]美国国家航空航天局 (NASA) 9 月 7 日的火灾信息资源管理系统 (FIRMS) 数据显示，在乌克兰对该地区进行空袭的报道之后，罗斯托夫州塔甘罗格空军基地（距前线约 160 公里）出现了热异常。[10]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心

根据9月4日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近在苏梅州北部推进或维持了阵地。与俄罗斯的说法相反，乌克兰军队在伊沃尔然斯克（苏梅市以北）以北维持着阵地。[11]

俄罗斯主要行动：乌克兰东部

俄罗斯下属主要行动#1——哈尔科夫州

9月6日和7日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部发动进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[12]

在季节更替之前，俄罗斯军队正在加强沃夫昌斯克方向的军事行动。9月7日，一名在沃夫昌斯克方向作战的乌克兰部队军官表示，俄罗斯军队正在加强该地区的进攻，因为他们意识到，秋季即将到来的植被覆盖减少将使俄罗斯渗透者无法躲避乌克兰无人机的侦察，并阻碍俄罗斯的推进。[13]

尽管所有现有证据均与事实相悖，但一些俄罗斯军事博客作者仍然毫无根据地声称，俄军已在沃夫昌斯克和韦利基布尔卢克方向包围了乌克兰军队。9月6日和7日，一些俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，乌克兰军队正试图突破俄军据称已在沃夫昌斯克和韦利基布尔卢克方向完成的包围圈。[14] 乌克兰联合部队特遣部队发言人维克托·特列胡博夫上校于9月7日表示，俄军甚至没有到达沃夫昌斯克（哈尔科夫市东北部）的南部郊区，在沃夫昌斯克和韦利基布尔卢克方向仅推进了距离国际边界三到五公里，这间接但明确地驳斥了俄方的说法。[15]特列胡博夫表示，俄罗斯官员提出的关于占领比利科洛迪亚兹（哈尔科夫市东北部）和科扎恰洛潘（哈尔科夫市北部）的说法“完全奇怪”，与事实不符。

9月6日和7日，俄军继续在韦利基布尔鲁克方向进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[16]

俄罗斯下属主要行动#2——奥斯基尔河

9月6日和7日，俄军继续在库皮扬斯克方向进行有限的进攻行动，但由于乌克兰军队的反击，俄军未能取得进展。[17] 9月7日，有消息人士称，俄罗斯西部部队（GoF）在德沃里奇纳和扎帕德内（均位于库皮扬斯克以北）附近发动了反击。[18]

据俄罗斯西部部队（GoF）消息人士透露，俄罗斯军队据称将占领库皮扬斯克的目标推迟到 2027 年春季，这可能是由于乌克兰最近在库皮扬斯克附近成功进行了反击和推进。[19]

9月6日和7日，俄军继续在博罗瓦方向进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[20]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的卢甘斯克州境内的俄罗斯军事基础设施进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月7日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于被占领的尼日尼·纳霍尔奇克（距前线约109公里）和多夫赞斯克（距前线约142公里）的俄罗斯指挥所，以及位于被占领的捷普莱附近（距前线约95或118公里）的一个弹药库。[21] 乌克兰特种作战部队（SSO）报告称，位于被占领的捷普莱附近的弹药库向俄罗斯第八集团军（南方军区）的部队提供补给。[22]

俄罗斯下属主要行动#3——顿涅茨克州

9月6日和7日，俄军继续向斯拉维扬斯克方向发起进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在该地区继续反击，俄军未能取得进展。[23] 乌克兰军队在莱曼东南部和东南部地区保持阵地，这些地区此前曾被俄军渗透。根据9月6日发布的地理定位视频，俄罗斯方面声称俄军保持了阵地。[24]

俄罗斯方面越来越多地承认乌克兰军队在莱曼附近发动了反击。然而，ISW目前尚不准备评估这些反击的规模或结果。俄罗斯军事博客作者声称，乌克兰军队正在斯塔夫基（莱曼北部）附近以及扎里奇涅（斯塔夫基东南部）方向发动反击；从德罗比舍韦（莱曼西北部）和新谢利夫卡（德罗比舍韦西北部）向米尔内和科洛迪亚齐（均位于新谢利夫卡东部）方向推进；并向伊万尼夫卡、扬波利夫卡和捷尔尼（均位于扎里奇涅北部）渗透。[25] 俄罗斯军事博客作者还声称，乌克兰军队正从新米哈伊利夫卡（新谢利夫卡西北部）、捷尔尼和奥尔希夫卡（新谢利夫卡北部）向新柳比夫卡（莱曼东北部）推进。[26]然而，一位乌克兰军方消息人士指出，虽然个别报道称乌克兰在莱曼附近取得了一些胜利，但现在就此局势得出最终结论还为时过早。[27]

ISW的测绘方法低估了乌克兰在莱曼方向持续反击中可能取得的进展，更多情报收集工作有望在2026年秋季揭示乌克兰在莱曼方向取得的全部进展。随着更多证据的出现，ISW将继续更新其评估。

根据 8 月 30 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近向德鲁日基夫卡以南推进。乌克兰军队向斯捷潘尼夫卡东北（德鲁日基夫卡以南）推进，并在斯捷潘尼夫卡保持阵地。[28]

与所有现有证据相悖，俄罗斯方面继续严重夸大俄军在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡-德鲁日基夫卡战术区域的推进程度。一个与俄罗斯第三集团军（南部军区）相关的Telegram频道于9月5日发布了一段视频，声称视频显示了对奥列克西耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡（科斯佳蒂尼夫卡西北部）乌克兰阵地的打击，但该乌克兰阵地的地理位置被确定为科斯佳蒂尼夫卡西北部。[29] 俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京此前声称，俄军已于7月3日占领科斯佳蒂尼夫卡。[30] 该俄罗斯频道很可能谎报了乌克兰阵地的位置，以避免与普京关于俄军已占领整个科斯佳蒂尼夫卡的说法相矛盾，并继续夸大俄军在该地区的推进。截至9月7日，在普京宣布占领科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡两个多月后，俄罗斯军队仍未完全占领该地区。

俄罗斯军队正在奥列克西耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡地区封锁乌克兰的后勤补给。9月7日，在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡-德鲁日基夫卡战术区作战的乌克兰旅报告称，俄罗斯军队不断在奥列克西耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡地区使用第一人称视角（FPV）无人机，这阻止了乌克兰军队在该地区使用常规运输工具。[31]

9月6日和7日，俄军继续向多布罗皮利亚方向发起进攻，但并未取得进展。[32]

俄罗斯国防部于 9 月 7 日声称，俄罗斯军队正在使用 Msta-S 自行榴弹炮切断乌克兰的后勤补给，并扰乱多布罗皮利亚方向的人员轮换。[33]

9月6日和7日，俄军继续向波克罗夫斯克方向发动进攻，但并未取得确切进展。[34] 9月7日，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军向东北方向推进，进入谢尔盖夫卡（波克罗夫斯克西北部）中部。[35]

9月6日和7日，俄军继续在诺沃巴甫利夫卡和奥列克桑德里夫卡方向进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[36]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的顿涅茨克州境内的俄罗斯后勤基础设施和军事目标进行中程打击。根据9月5日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队在顿涅茨克市至科斯佳季尼夫卡的H-20公路沿线击中了一辆俄罗斯卡车。[37] 乌克兰军事观察员尤里·布图索夫于9月6日发布了一段视频，显示乌克兰无人机在顿涅茨克环城公路沿线击中了15件俄罗斯军事装备。[38] 根据9月6日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队可能在2026年8月中旬在沃迪亚内附近（距前线约45公里）击中了一套俄罗斯Osa-AKM防空导弹系统。[39]

乌克兰特勤部门近日暗杀了一名俄罗斯军官，此人应对在被占领的顿涅茨克州暗杀乌克兰情报人员负责。乌克兰特勤部门消息人士于9月7日向一家乌克兰通讯社透露，乌克兰部队于2026年7月27日在被占领的顿涅茨克市埋设了一枚简易爆炸装置（IED），炸死了顿涅茨克州国家安全部特种作战中心的一名雇员奥列格·舒托夫。[40] 据报道，舒托夫曾参与暗杀乌克兰少将马克西姆·沙波瓦尔（Maksym Shapoval，2017年6月27日）和乌克兰安全局（SBU）反间谍官员奥列克桑德·哈拉贝留什上校（Oleksandr Kharaberyush，2017年3月31日）。[41]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

9月6日和7日，俄军继续向胡利亚波列方向发起进攻，但并未取得进展。[42]

俄罗斯军队继续以小规模步兵群在胡利亚伊波列方向积极开展行动，主要使用无线电遥控无人机。9月7日，一名在胡利亚伊波列方向作战的乌克兰无人系统营指挥官报告称，树木和其他复杂的地形特征阻碍了俄罗斯军队在该地区有效使用光纤无人机，迫使他们转而依赖无线电遥控无人机。[43]

俄罗斯方面声称，俄军于9月7日继续在扎波罗热州西部进行进攻行动，但ISW没有观察到俄军推进的证据。[44]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的扎波罗热州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月7日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于被占领的亚速斯克（距前线约95公里）的一个俄罗斯指挥所。[45]

据报道，乌克兰无人机正在M-14罗斯托夫州-克里米亚公路（俄罗斯占领当局称之为R-280公路）上空自由飞行，这与俄罗斯占领当局声称已确保该公路安全的声明相悖。扎波罗热州占领当局行政委员会成员弗拉基米尔·罗戈夫于9月7日声称，乌克兰无人机正在被占领的扎波罗热州境内的M-14罗斯托夫州-克里米亚公路全段上空活动，并批评扎波罗热州占领当局负责人叶夫根尼·巴利茨基声称该公路安全的说法。[46] 此前，ISW曾注意到俄罗斯军事博客作者多次驳斥俄罗斯占领当局关于M-14公路不受乌克兰无人机影响的说法。[47]

9月7日，俄罗斯和乌克兰军队均未报告在赫尔松方向发生地面行动。

俄罗斯军队继续在赫尔松市使用“猎杀平民”战术，蓄意猎杀平民。乌克兰赫尔松市官员于9月7日报告称，俄罗斯军队袭击了赫尔松市的一个公共交通站点，造成一人受伤。[48] 根据9月7日公布的地理定位视频，俄罗斯军队使用旋转无人机向赫尔松市的两名平民和安东尼夫卡（赫尔松市以东）的一名平民投掷手榴弹。[49]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的克里米亚境内的俄罗斯军事资产和后勤基础设施进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月7日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于被占领的弗拉迪斯拉夫卡附近（距前线约230公里）的北克里米亚运河上的一座铁路桥，该桥被俄罗斯军队用于后勤运输。[50] 乌克兰军事情报总局（GUR）行动部9月7日报告称，GUR无人机操作员于9月6日至7日夜间在被占领的克里米亚境内袭击并损坏了一架俄罗斯飞机，据报道是一架苏-24战术轰炸机。[51]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[52]

9月6日至7日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列无人机袭击。乌克兰空军9月7日报告称，俄罗斯军队从奥廖尔市、克拉斯诺达尔边疆区滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向发射了92架“沙赫德”型攻击无人机（包括喷气式）、“格贝拉”型攻击无人机、“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机和S8000“班德罗尔”型巡飞弹。[53] 乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了71架无人机，无人机袭击了12个地点，另有一处地点有碎片落下。乌克兰官员报告称，俄罗斯军队袭击了切尔尼戈夫州、第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州、哈尔科夫州、赫尔松州、基辅州、敖德萨州和扎波罗热州的民用和后勤基础设施。[54]根据 9 月 7 日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯军队袭击了位于基辅州朱利亚尼的直升机、瓦西里科夫空军基地和阿鲁泰克后勤中心。[55]

据报道，俄罗斯军队越来越多地使用滑翔炸弹袭击乌克兰南部。一位俄罗斯军事博主于9月7日声称，俄罗斯军队越来越多地将滑翔炸弹与“格朗”型攻击无人机配合使用，以支援其针对敖德萨州乌克兰航运和后勤基础设施的远程打击行动。[56] 该军事博主声称，乌克兰在该地区防空能力的下降以及俄罗斯滑翔炸弹的现代化改造，使得俄罗斯军队能够利用这些炸弹对敖德萨州和扎波罗热州发动袭击，据推测，袭击是从黑海和亚速海上空进行的。

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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