The fiscal risks of bringing US troops out of Europe

A line of military Heavy Equipment Transport line-haul trucks is staged at Coleman work site in Mannheim, Germany. (U.S. Army Photo by Maj. Allan Laggui)

The Pentagon is in the final weeks of a 6-month review of the US military footprint overseas, and is reportedly considering major cuts to American forces based in Europe. Cutting the number of US troops based in Europe could be risky for several reasons — it could undermine the extended US nuclear deterrent, send the wrong signal to Moscow and ultimately weaken the stability and security of a region vital to US prosperity.

But there is also a serious fiscal concern that would come with such realignment. Finding space to house tens of thousands of redeployed US troops and their families somewhere across the 50 states won’t be easy, quick or cheap. Meanwhile, future US power projection would become more expensive as military facilities are vacated and returned to our European allies.

In short, even if one overlooks the strategic risks of backing away from Europe while Russia appears more aggressive than ever, the fiscal costs could be too large to ignore.

The unfolding posture review undertaken by the Department of Defense is expected to wrap up in early November. Reportedly, dramatic cuts to the number of US troops based in and/or rotated to Europe are under consideration . In comparison to the height of the Cold War — when the United States maintained nearly half a million troops in Europe — today there are about 80,000 US troops there. Roughly 65,000 of these are in Europe on typical 3-year assignments with dependents, while about 15,000 are in Europe on shorter heel-to-toe rotational deployments without dependents.

Rotationally-deployed troops are typically sent to Europe for nine months, after which they are replaced by another unit of similar size and capability for the next nine months. These persistent rotational deployments started as a response to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and have been used primarily to augment the forward-stationed troops in Europe, ensuring a routine American presence across NATO’s eastern allies, which are those most exposed to Russia’s aggression.

The Department of Defense has already trimmed the number of US troops on the ground in Europe, announcing late last year the elimination of a rotationally-deployed infantry brigade (about 4,000 troops) to Romania and southeastern Europe. That deployment was relatively easy to turn off, given the process the Pentagon has used to renew it periodically and the fact that those forces were not accompanied by dependents.

Earlier this year, the Defense Department attempted to cancel another deployment, this one a rotationally-deployed armored brigade typically sent to Poland and northeastern Europe. After Poland’s president weighed in with President Donald Trump, the decision was reversed.

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Shortly thereafter, news broke that there were plans inside the department to implement even deeper cuts to US presence in Europe, without conducting any kind of a study or review along the lines of what Congress requires of the administration if it seeks to reduce US troops levels below 76,000. In the wake of the Poland misstep, the more formal process that is now nearing its end was announced, apparently with an eye on fulfilling at least one of the Congressional requirements.

Another is coordination with allies, and in August the administration sent a questionnaire to other members of NATO on their support for US basing and American foreign policy more broadly. When considered alongside the recent call by the Pentagon for state leaders to bid on hosting a new military base – necessary if thousands of US troops and dependents relocate from Europe to America – it seems clear that deep cuts are not merely possible, but rather likely.

There are a number of ways that removing forces out of Europe could hit taxpayers in their wallets.

First, there are geopolitical realities. A significant downsizing of US forces in Europe at a time when Russia’s war in Ukraine rages and its hybrid attacks against the West ramp up is likely to only incentivize Moscow in its efforts to undermine security and stability in Europe. If Moscow succeeds, a destabilized, insecure Europe – still America’s most important trade and investment partner – will inevitably impact the livelihoods of average Americans.

However, there are other, more immediate costs to consider. Based on historic data of what the Pentagon paid between 2005 and 2011 to expand Fort Bliss so that it could accommodate an additional 25,000 troops, building additional facilities to host 15-25,000 US troops, plus their dependents, is likely to cost at least $8 billion, in inflation-adjusted terms.

Additionally, if US troops depart Europe, Washington will likely give up the European facilities that hosted them, which means losing access to bases that enable cheaper power projection.

Take for example the attacks on Iran in recent months. Roundtrip bombing missions from the United States to Iran take about 36 hours , while bombing missions from the United Kingdom take as little as 15 hours roundtrip. Given the cost of operating B-1 and B-52 bombers ( $97,600/hour and $66,700/hour , respectively), flying from the UK saved the US taxpayer $2.05 million for each B-1 sortie and $1.4 million for each B-52 sortie. By early April, the United States had conducted 62 bombing missions against Iran , only 18 of which had left from North America. If we assume the remainder flew from Europe, which seems likely, the American taxpayer saved about $75 million in just the first five weeks of the war against Iran by having access to bases in Europe.

Reducing US force posture in Europe – for example, to shift some assets to the Pacific – may make sense. But doing so now carries significant strategic risk vis-à-vis Russia and the security of a continent that remains vital to American prosperity. Moreover, it also likely means higher fiscal cost at a time when US debt already seems insurmountable.

John R. Deni is a research professor at the US Army War College, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a nonresident senior fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own.

在德国曼海姆的科尔曼工地，一排军用重型装备运输卡车整齐列队。（美国陆军少校艾伦·拉吉摄）

五角大楼正在进行为期六个月的美国海外军事部署评估，目前已进入最后几周，据报道，五角大楼正在考虑大幅削减驻欧美军人数。削减驻欧美军人数可能存在多方面的风险——它可能会削弱美国的延伸核威慑力量，向莫斯科发出错误信号，并最终削弱对美国繁荣至关重要的地区的稳定与安全。

但这种调整也会带来严重的财政问题。在全美50个州各地找到安置数万名重新部署的美军士兵及其家属的地方并非易事，既不快捷也不便宜。与此同时，随着军事设施的撤离和归还给欧洲盟友，美国未来的军事力量投射成本也将增加。

简而言之，即使忽略了在俄罗斯显得比以往任何时候都更具侵略性的情况下，从欧洲撤退所带来的战略风险，财政成本也可能太大而无法忽视。

美国国防部正在进行的态势评估预计将于11月初完成。据报道，目前正在考虑大幅削减驻欧和/或轮换部署到欧洲的美军人数。与冷战高峰时期——当时美国在欧洲驻扎了近50万军队——相比，如今驻欧美军人数约为8万人。其中约6.5万人以典型的三年期任务驻扎在欧洲，并可携带家属；另有约1.5万人以较短的轮换部署方式驻扎在欧洲，不携带家属。

轮换部署的部队通常会被派往欧洲驻扎九个月，之后由另一支规模和能力相近的部队接替，再驻扎九个月。这种持续的轮换部署始于2014年俄罗斯首次入侵乌克兰之后，其主要目的是加强驻扎在欧洲的前沿部队，确保美国在北约东部盟国保持常规存在，而这些盟国正是最容易受到俄罗斯侵略的国家。

美国国防部此前已削减了驻欧美军人数，去年底宣布撤回一个轮换部署到罗马尼亚和东南欧的步兵旅（约4000人）。鉴于五角大楼定期更新部署的程序，以及这些部队没有家属随行，取消这项部署相对容易。

今年早些时候，美国国防部曾试图取消另一项部署计划，这次是向波兰和东北欧轮换部署的装甲旅。在波兰总统向美国总统唐纳德·特朗普施压后，该决定被撤销。

欧洲的军事优势取决于其对实际情况的主权掌控。

随着北约和欧洲各国政府加快对天基情报的投资，决策优势将取决于主权能力和商业能力能够多快地融合到一个可信的作战图景中。

此后不久，便有消息爆出，国防部内部计划进一步削减美国在欧洲的驻军，而没有按照国会要求进行任何形式的研究或审查（如果政府希望将美军人数减少到7.6万人以下）。在波兰事件失策之后，一项更为正式的程序宣布启动，目前该程序已接近尾声，显然是为了满足国会至少一项要求。

另一个方面是与盟友的协调。今年8月，美国政府向北约其他成员国发送了一份问卷，询问他们对美国军事基地以及更广泛的美国外交政策的支持情况。考虑到五角大楼最近呼吁各国领导人竞标建设新的军事基地——如果数千名美军士兵及其家属要从欧洲迁往美国，那么新建军事基地势在必行——大幅削减军费开支不仅可能，而且极有可能发生。

从欧洲撤军可能会以多种方式影响纳税人的钱包。

首先，要考虑地缘政治现实。在俄罗斯乌克兰战争愈演愈烈、针对西方的混合攻击不断升级之际，美国大幅缩减驻欧兵力，很可能只会刺激莫斯科破坏欧洲安全与稳定的企图。如果莫斯科得逞，一个动荡不安、缺乏安全的欧洲——它仍然是美国最重要的贸易和投资伙伴——势必会对普通美国民众的生计造成影响。

然而，还有其他更直接的成本需要考虑。根据五角大楼在2005年至2011年间为扩建布利斯堡以容纳额外25000名士兵而支付的历史数据，建造更多设施来安置15000至25000名美军士兵及其家属，经通货膨胀调整后，可能至少需要80亿美元。

此外，如果美军撤离欧洲，华盛顿很可能会放弃驻扎他们的欧洲设施，这意味着将失去能够以更低成本进行力量投射的基地。

以近几个月来对伊朗的袭击为例。从美国飞往伊朗的轰炸任务往返大约需要36小时，而从英国起飞的轰炸任务往返只需15小时。考虑到B-1和B-52轰炸机的运营成本（分别为每小时97,600美元和66,700美元），从英国起飞为美国纳税人节省了每次B-1飞行任务205万美元，每次B-52飞行任务140万美元。到4月初，美国已对伊朗进行了62次轰炸任务，其中只有18次是从北美起飞的。如果我们假设其余任务是从欧洲起飞的（这似乎很有可能），那么仅在对伊朗战争的头五个星期，美国纳税人就因为可以使用欧洲基地而节省了约7500万美元。

减少美国在欧洲的兵力部署——例如，将部分兵力转移到太平洋地区——或许有其合理性。但这样做会带来巨大的战略风险，不仅关系到与俄罗斯的关系，也关系到对美国繁荣至关重要的欧洲大陆的安全。此外，在当前美国债务似乎已难以偿还的情况下，此举很可能意味着更高的财政成本。

约翰·R·德尼是美国陆军战争学院的研究教授、大西洋理事会非常驻高级研究员和北约国防学院非常驻高级研究员。文中观点仅代表他个人立场。