Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2026

Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction demonstrates Ukraine’s recent progress in restoring elements of tactical maneuver on the battlefield, enabled in part by Ukraine’s shaping operations and intermediate-range strike campaign that degrades Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi stated on September 17 that a Ukrainian counteroffensive against the Russian salient north of Lyman — Operation Vivaldi — thwarted Russia’s plan to encircle the Fortress Belt from the north through Lyman and Svyatohirsk and the south through Dobropillya.[1] Biletskyi stated that Russian forces intended northern and southern pincers to converge in Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast, thereby seizing the whole of Donetsk Oblast. Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces operationally defeated the Russian northern pincer in the Lyman direction and that the Vivaldi Operation continues.

The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on September 17 that Ukraine’s systematic intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast has degraded Russian fuel supplies to the frontline and strained Russia’s ability to use drones and EW to protect against Ukrainian drones.[2] EW systems have significant power-consumption requirements, and Russian forces rely on diesel-powered generators to power EW systems to counter Ukrainian drones. Ukraine’s campaign targeting Russian logistics and energy supplies directly supported the suppression of Russian EW systems, aiding Ukrainian efforts to achieve tactical drone overmatch in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances in the Lyman direction.

Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise by leveraging rigorous operational security (OPSEC) and counter-drone operations to degrade Russian forces’ operational awareness. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Deputy Commander Major Maksym Zhorin stated on September 16 that Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction was successful due to strict adherence to informational silence and a lack of reporting on the ongoing counteroffensive, which misled Russian military leadership and facilitated Ukrainian advances. Zhorin stated that Ukrainian forces managed to keep their advances secret thanks in part to a “Protective Drone” system, which consists of various EW systems and helped Ukrainian forces neutralize around 20,000 Russian drones.[3] Ukrainian forces previously leveraged OPSEC to achieve operational surprise during Ukraine’s Spring 2026 Oleksandrivka Counteroffensive, when Ukrainian forces intentionally conducted flag-raising missions at safe distances to conceal the true extent of Ukrainian positions.[4] Ukrainian forces have notably achieved operational surprise during two recent counteroffensives by using rigorous OPSEC. The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military likely further degrades Russian operational awareness and leads to tactical and operational mistakes due to inaccurate assessments of the real battlefield situation.[5]

Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for future mechanized assaults in Fall 2026. Ukraine’s 1st Corps (Azov National Guard) Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko stated on September 11 that the Russian 51st and 8th Combined Arms Armies (CAAs, both Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are preparing for future mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya direction in the fall, seeking to exploit seasonal weather changes that are more conducive to mechanized assaults.[6] Prokopenko stated that roughly 1,200 drone crews from Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems — about one-third of Rubikon’s total force — are operating in the Dobropillya direction, indicating that Russian forces likely intend to use drones to support battlefield air interdiction to shape the battlefield as well as enable Russian mechanized attacks.[7] Prokopenko added that Russian forces will likely begin reinforcing their existing assault units, which consist roughly of 200 infantry personnel, with mechanized columns of roughly 50 armored vehicles to divert the attention of Ukrainian forces and raise the probability of a successful breakthrough. Prokopenko assessed that the Russian offensive campaign would culminate in September 2026 and that Russian forces would begin to shift their tactics towards attempting mechanized breakthroughs by October 2026, with Russian forces attempting to seize at least one Fortress Belt settlement by the end of their fall campaign to create a bridgehead for further offensives.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have been experimenting with reintroducing limited elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level to break out of positional warfare and restore maneuver on the battlefield, with Ukrainian efforts being significantly more effective so far.[8] Russia’s accumulation of armored assets in the Dobropillya direction indicates that the Russian military command may intend to expand the role of mechanized assaults amid fall weather in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough in the Dobropillya direction and envelop the Fortress Belt from the south.[9]

Ukrainian forces are intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, including by conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on September 17 that it struck two Russian An-26 and one An-12 military transport aircraft and three helicopters at the Rostov-Central Airfield in Rostov Oblast (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline).[10] Geolocated footage published on September 16 shows a large explosion at the Rostov Airbase in Rostov Oblast after the Ukrainian strike.[11] Ukrainian forces have been increasingly striking Russian military assets in Rostov Oblast since at least June 2026, including airfields, air bases, and air defense systems, in an effort to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities.[12]

Russia continues to rely on North Korea to wage war against Ukraine and alleviate Russian labor shortages. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 17 that North Korea sent between 30,000 and 50,000 soldiers to Russia to receive military training and work with Russian drone operators.[13] Zelensky stated that North Korea decided not to deploy North Korean soldiers to Ukraine in order to avoid taking on a large number of casualties comparable to what North Korean soldiers suffered during Ukraine’s operations in Kursk.[14] Zelensky stated on August 8, 2026, that Russia was preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops but did not specify where or when these troops would deploy.[15] The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) — an international coalition formed to monitor and report on violations and evasions of United Nations sanctions against North Korea — reported on September 16 that between 15,000 and 30,000 North Koreans worked at drone factories in Russia, including at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, as of the end of 2025.[16] The MSMT reported that the Russian government has created a special student visa scheme that camouflages North Korean workers as students. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s efforts to grant fake student visas to North Koreans or otherwise relax Russian visa requirements in an effort to alleviate Russian labor shortages.[17]

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda publicly acknowledged on September 16 that Russia may be deliberately allowing Russian drones to deviate from their intended course and enter NATO airspace in order to punish countries supporting Ukraine. Nauseda stated on September 16 that recent drone incursions into European airspace indicate that Russia is engaging in increasingly aggressive behavior, following his recent statement that a Russian drone entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.[18] Nauseda stated that Russia may be deliberately allowing its drones to “deviate” from their intended course and enter the airspace of the Baltic states. Nauseda stated that Russia benefits from the ambiguity of its actions against Europe, regardless of whether Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional, as this ambiguity keeps Baltic societies “in suspense.” Nauseda’s statement echoes Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s August 18 statement that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace.[19] ISW continues to assess that such drone incursions are part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO, including through Russian false flag provocations, sabotage, EW interference, and overflights.[20]

The US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16, which authorizes the US to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.[21] US President Donald Trump will need to sign the bill before it comes into force.

Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction demonstrates Ukraine’s recent progress in restoring elements of tactical maneuver on the battlefield, enabled in part by Ukraine’s shaping operations and intermediate-range strike campaign that degrades Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.

Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise by leveraging rigorous operational security (OPSEC) and counter-drone operations to degrade Russian forces’ operational awareness.

Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for future mechanized assaults in Fall 2026.

Ukrainian forces are intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, including by conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast.

Russia continues to rely on North Korea to wage war against Ukraine and alleviate Russian labor shortages.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda publicly acknowledged on September 16 that Russia may be deliberately allowing Russian drones to deviate from their intended course and enter NATO airspace in order to punish countries supporting Ukraine.

The US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16, which authorizes the US to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.

Russia launched 157 drones, 10 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and an unspecified number of missiles at Ukraine overnight.

ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to better reflect the Russian campaign to seize Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt. ISW will analyze the Russian campaign in Donetsk Oblast in more detail in a forthcoming special edition.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Yaroslavl Oblast on the night of September 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City (roughly 700 kilometers from the international border) overnight, causing a fire at the AVT-3 primary refining unit.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery is one of the largest oil refineries in Russia, with an annual capacity of about 15 million tons of oil. Geolocated images published on September 17 show fires and plumes of smoke at the refinery and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows multiple heat anomalies at the refinery.[23] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev acknowledged on September 17 the Ukrainian strike against the refinery.[24]

See topline text for additional reports on Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces hold positions in northwestern Zapsillya (northeast of Sumy City) — in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions — according to geolocated footage published on September 14.[25]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces struck two S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in Vygonychiv Raion, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 83 kilometers from the international border).[26] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian armored vehicle near Bondarev, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kharkiv City.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Mala Vovcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[29] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) credited elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of the settlement.[30]

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kharkiv Oblast. Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on September 17 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck and killed a civilian near a public transport stop near Kotivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike mainly civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[32]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized assault northeast of Velykyi Burluk. A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF claimed on September 17 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilkhuvatka using armored vehicles.[33] The sources claimed that Vasylivka, Blahodatne, and Chorne (all northwest of Vilkhuvatka) are contested gray zone, with both Ukrainian and Russian forces operating in the settlements.

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 16.[34] Russian sources subsequently posted footage on September 17 purportedly taken in the area east of Zapadne to allege Russian control over the area despite evidence to the contrary.[35] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on September 17 that Russian forces abandoned several positions east of Zapadne and that Ukrainian forces advanced slightly along the P-79 Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway that runs just north and east of Zapadne.[36]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Borova on September 16 and 17 but did not advance . [37] The source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that fighting in the Borova direction has become highly positional, with deteriorating weather conditions and reduced foliage making it difficult for small infiltration groups to move discreetly.[38]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration in Druzhne (roughly 143 kilometers from the frontline) on September 16 or on the night of September 16 to 17.[39]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Lyman itself on September 16 to 17 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[40]

See topline text for more information about ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman tactical effort.

Russian forces may be attempting to intensify strikes against Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to inhibit continued Ukrainian offensive operations north of Lyman. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are increasing glide bomb strikes against Izyum in response to recent Ukrainian advances north of Lyman, conducting around 40 strikes on September 16.[41]

Russian forces conducted five FAB-500 guided glide bombs against Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman along the T-05-14 Lyman-Slovyansk highway), according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, southeast of Slovyansk toward Yurkivka, and southeast of Kramatorsk near Fedorivka on September 16 and 17 but did not advance.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and southwest of Kostyantynivka on September 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 17 that Russian forces advanced north of Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka).[45]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger contested official Russian claims of advances around Kostyantynivka.[46] The milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain an extensive presence in the area between Kostyantynivka and Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and that Russian forces will not be able to conduct an offensive north of Kostyantynivka and towards Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka and east of Chasiv Yar) without consolidating control over Stinky, Chervone, Mykolaivka, and Podilske (all just northeast of Kostyantynivka). The milblogger also refuted Russian claims that Russian forces control parts of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (just northwest of Kostyantynivka), stating that Russian forces are only present in the areas surrounding Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and have no presence in Druzhkivka. The milblogger also acknowledged that Russian forces do not have a concentrated presence near Raiske, Petrivka, Novohryhorivka, or Novoandriivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka) and that only scattered infiltration groups operating with drone support are present in the area. Russian official sources, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have claimed as early as June 2026 that Russian forces maintain a presence in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, and the Russian MoD has claimed that Russian forces seized several settlements north and northwest of Kostyantynivka, despite ISW observing no evidence to assess that Russian forces have any presence in those areas.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission south of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position west of Hryshyne (south of Dobropillya) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 17.[48]

See toplines for Ukrainian disruption of Russian efforts to envelop the fortress belt through Dobropillya.

Russian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on September 16 and 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline) as well as material and technical warehouses in Kurakhivka (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) and Nova Maryivka (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) on September 16 or on the night of September 16 to 17.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 17.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Berezove and Rybne on September 16 and 17 but did not advance.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[51]

The Russian MoD continues to make exaggerated claims of advances in the Hulyaipole direction. The Russian MoD claimed on September 17 that Russian forces seized Rozivka (northwest of Hulyaipole and at least 13 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[52] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 5th Separate Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of the settlement.[53] The Russian MoD’s and Russian milbloggers’ reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to available evidence.[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations west and south of Orikhiv on September 16 and 17 but did not advance.[55]

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported on September 17 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a passenger bus in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring five civilians.[56]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian electrical substation in occupied Melitopol (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 17.

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast Military Administration head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on September 17 that Russian forces struck and killed a civilian riding a moped in Inhulets (northeast of Kherson City).[58]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration in occupied Strilkove (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline) on September 16 or overnight on September 16 to 17.[59]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[60]

Russian forces launched a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast; an unspecified number of Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Voronezh oblasts; four Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea; 10 Banderol-type/Dan-T loitering munitions from the airspace over the Sea of Azov; and 157 Shahed-type (including jet-powered) strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[61] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed seven Banderol-type//Dan-T loitering munitions and 124 drones, that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 36 locations, and that drone and missile debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, residential, energy, industrial, railway, and logistics infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[62]

Russian forces continue to strike civilian vessels in the Black Sea. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on September 17 that Russian forces struck a Tanzania-flagged civilian vessel in the Black Sea, killing the captain of the vessel and injuring three crew members.[63]

Ukrainian interceptor drones reportedly intercepted a Russian Shahed-type jet-powered drone overnight on September 16 to 17. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 17 that Ukrainian forces successfully intercepted a Russian Shahed-type jet-powered drone using Ukrainian drone interceptors overnight on September 16 to 17 as Ukraine has continued to develop its drone interception capabilities.[64] Jet-powered drones fly significantly faster than non-jet-powered drones, up to 600 kilometers per hour, making it much more difficult for interceptor drones to down as interceptor drones need to be around 25 percent faster than their target.[65]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2100506388606677497 [28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42261 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99107 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36989 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9343 [29] https://t.me/mod_russia/67406 [30] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/21999 [31] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30615 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1405618-u-vovcanskij-gromadi-fpv-dron-vbiv-colovika-jogo-tilo-namagautsa-evakuuvati/ [32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/ [33] https://t.me/severnnyi/9343 [34] https://t.me/rug_international/531; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2100240901930987768; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12980 [35] GRAPHIC CONTENT https://t.me/Osintpen/3566; https://t.me/rashepilo/4930 [36] https://t.me/grvZapad/19795 [37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42261 [38] https://t.me/grvZapad/19795 [39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42268 [40]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42261; https://t.me/rybar/83205; https://t.me/dva_majors/99107; https://t.me/wargonzo/36989; https://t.me/grvZapad/19795; [41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75141 [42] https://x.com/Volodimyrovich_/status/2100527222616379407; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/31159 [43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42261 [44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42261 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99107 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47680 [45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33918 [46] https://t.me/rybar/83233 [47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ [48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12983 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2823 [49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42268 [50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42261 [51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42261 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21152 [52] https://t.me/mod_russia/67407 [53] https://t.me/voin_dv/21154 ; https://t.me/sashakots/64496 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75154 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47698 [54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/ [55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42264 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99107 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36989 [56] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67693 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67692 [57] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2100496494440702124 ; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/1167 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2100490384044405124 [58] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/67722; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/15349 [59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42268 [60] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [61] https://t.me/kpszsu/78627 [62] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20902; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1403972-poskodzeni-budinki-ta-linii-elektroperedaci-so-vidomo-pro-dronovu-ataku-rf-na-cerkasini/; . https://t.me/synegubov/25753; https://t.me/synegubov/25755; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4644; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4646 ; https://www.facebook.com/andriy.raykovich/posts/pfbid02GQQoS3bUnQ53ec4VhdGcpqkJ1ttSg98aDHSzeFPorTGtPAeCh7VC2vXLLqSugWGhl?rdid=UONUVq79Zrz2OXLd; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74885; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8507; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7522; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7523; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7529; https://www.facebook.com/UA.KyivPolice/posts/pfbid013obZkGfCaCTRTo8LtgSQUp5CYrLsfv7beZm364NuTmWxycEaQ8Zyj3pWTm5FxFDl? cft %5B0%5D=AZisNT3mWFUt1XUgYYiHKwMRKj68pEbp-l5eWPcFMulg2d6PtkxhsrCCVjd1nBuPbhPi8W56LCADLdDoYK4_IaHvcA6vprD7ITRJWiHEUOJdb6fMtwEGt49Q1OzyMkeh7mKAypDNll2Wpzj2EBUN15sk88sW9GxS& tn =%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7542; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7532; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20240 ; https://od dot npu.gov.ua/news/na-odeshchyni-vnaslidok-vorozhoi-ataky-postrazhdalo-semero-liudei-sered-nykh-dvoie-ditei-politseiski-fiksuiut-voiennyi-zlochyn-rosii; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20240; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3274; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67670; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67670; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/18441 [63] https://t.me/odeskaODA/20265 [64] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20919 [65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/

乌克兰在莱曼方向发起的“维瓦尔第行动”表明，乌克兰近期在恢复战场战术机动能力方面取得了进展，这部分得益于乌克兰的战略部署行动和中程打击行动，这些行动削弱了俄罗斯的电子战能力。乌克兰第三军军长安德烈·比列茨基准将于9月17日表示，乌克兰针对莱曼北部俄军突出部的反攻——“维瓦尔第行动”——挫败了俄罗斯从北部经莱曼和斯维亚托希尔斯克、南部经多布罗皮利亚包围“要塞带”的计划。[1] 比列茨基指出，俄军意图在哈尔科夫州巴尔文科韦形成南北钳形攻势，从而占领整个顿涅茨克州。比列茨基表示，乌克兰军队在莱曼方向击败了俄军的北部钳形攻势，“维瓦尔第行动”仍在继续。

乌克兰第三军于9月17日报告称，乌克兰对被占领的卢甘斯克州俄军后勤设施发起的系统性中程打击行动，削弱了俄军前线的燃料供应，并削弱了俄军使用无人机和电子战系统防御乌克兰无人机的能力。[2] 电子战系统耗电量巨大，而俄军依靠柴油发电机为电子战系统供电，以对抗乌克兰无人机。乌克兰针对俄军后勤和能源供应的打击行动直接支持了俄军电子战系统的瘫痪，帮助乌克兰在莱曼方向的机械化推进中取得战术无人机优势。

乌克兰军队通过严格的作战安全措施（OPSEC）和反无人机行动，削弱了俄军的作战感知能力，从而实现了作战上的出其不意。乌克兰第三军副司令马克西姆·佐林少校于9月16日表示，乌克兰在莱曼方向发起的“维瓦尔第行动”之所以取得成功，是因为乌克兰严格遵守了信息保密原则，并且没有对正在进行的反攻行动进行任何报道，这误导了俄军领导层，并为乌克兰的推进提供了便利。佐林指出，乌克兰军队之所以能够将推进行动保密，部分原因在于其“保护性无人机”系统，该系统由多种电子战系统组成，帮助乌克兰军队摧毁了约2万架俄罗斯无人机。[3] 此前，乌克兰军队曾在2026年春季的奥列克桑德里夫卡反攻行动中利用作战安全措施实现了作战上的出其不意，当时乌克兰军队故意在安全距离外进行升旗仪式，以掩盖乌克兰阵地的真实规模。[4]乌克兰军队在最近的两次反攻中，通过严格的行动安全措施，取得了显著的行动奇袭。俄罗斯军队中普遍存在的撒谎文化可能进一步削弱了俄罗斯的作战意识，并由于对战场真实情况的评估不准确而导致战术和作战失误。[5]

俄罗斯军队正在向多布罗皮利亚方向转移装甲和无人机支援资产，以备在 2026 年秋季发动机械化进攻。乌克兰第一军（亚速国民警卫队）司令杰尼斯·普罗科彭科准将于 9 月 11 日表示，俄罗斯第 51 集团军和第 8 集团军（均隶属于南部军区）以及第 41 集团军（隶属于中央军区）正在为秋季在多布罗皮利亚方向发动机械化进攻做准备，试图利用更有利于机械化进攻的季节性气候变化。[6]普罗科彭科指出，俄罗斯精锐的“红宝石”先进无人系统中心约有1200个无人机小组（约占该中心总兵力的三分之一）正在多布罗皮利亚方向作战，这表明俄军很可能计划利用无人机支援战场空中封锁，从而塑造战场态势并为俄军的机械化进攻提供支持。[7] 普罗科彭科补充说，俄军很可能会开始用约50辆装甲车组成的机械化纵队加强其现有的突击部队（约200名步兵），以分散乌克兰军队的注意力，提高突破成功的概率。普罗科彭科评估认为，俄军的攻势将于2026年9月达到顶峰，俄军将在2026年10月开始转变战术，尝试以机械化力量突破防线，并力图在秋季战役结束前夺取至少一个“要塞带”定居点，为进一步的进攻建立桥头堡。

乌克兰和俄罗斯军队都在尝试在战术层面重新引入有限的机械化机动元素，以打破阵地战，恢复战场机动性，迄今为止，乌克兰的努力明显更为有效。[8] 俄罗斯在多布罗皮利亚方向集结装甲力量表明，俄罗斯军方指挥部可能打算在秋季扩大机械化突击的作用，以期在多布罗皮利亚方向取得突破，并从南部包围要塞带。[9]

乌克兰军队正在加强对俄罗斯军事目标的远程打击行动，包括在罗斯托夫州开展压制和摧毁敌方防空系统（SEAD/DEAD）行动。乌克兰安全局（SBU）于9月17日报告称，其在罗斯托夫州罗斯托夫中央机场（距前线约200公里）击落了两架俄罗斯安-26和一架安-12军用运输机以及三架直升机。[10] 9月16日公布的定位视频显示，乌克兰军队发动袭击后，罗斯托夫州罗斯托夫空军基地发生剧烈爆炸。[11] 自2026年6月以来，乌克兰军队一直在罗斯托夫州对俄罗斯军事目标进行日益频繁的打击，包括机场、空军基地和防空系统，旨在削弱俄罗斯的打击和防空能力。[12]

俄罗斯继续依赖朝鲜对乌克兰发动战争并缓解俄罗斯劳动力短缺问题。乌克兰总统泽连斯基9月17日表示，朝鲜已向俄罗斯派遣3万至5万名士兵接受军事训练并与俄罗斯无人机操作员合作。[13] 泽连斯基称，朝鲜决定不向乌克兰部署士兵，以避免遭受与乌克兰在库尔斯克行动中朝鲜士兵伤亡规模相当的伤亡。[14] 泽连斯基于2026年8月8日表示，俄罗斯正准备接收多达5万名朝鲜士兵，但没有具体说明这些部队将部署到何处或何时部署。[15]多边制裁监测小组（MSMT）——一个旨在监测和报告违反和规避联合国对朝鲜制裁行为的国际联盟——于9月16日发布报告称，截至2025年底，约有1.5万至3万名朝鲜人在俄罗斯的无人机工厂工作，其中包括位于鞑靼斯坦共和国阿拉布加经济特区的工厂。[16] MSMT报告称，俄罗斯政府设立了一种特殊的学生签证计划，将朝鲜工人伪装成学生。ISW此前曾报道过俄罗斯为缓解俄罗斯劳动力短缺问题而向朝鲜人发放虚假学生签证或放宽签证要求的举措。[17]

立陶宛总统吉塔纳斯·瑙塞达于9月16日公开承认，俄罗斯可能故意允许其无人机偏离预定航线，进入北约领空，以惩罚支持乌克兰的国家。瑙塞达在9月16日表示，近期无人机入侵欧洲领空的事件表明，俄罗斯的行为日益咄咄逼人。此前，他曾表示，一架俄罗斯无人机于9月14日至15日夜间进入立陶宛领空。[18] 瑙塞达指出，俄罗斯可能故意允许其无人机“偏离”预定航线，进入波罗的海国家的领空。瑙塞达表示，无论俄罗斯无人机入侵是意外还是蓄意，俄罗斯都从其针对欧洲的行动的模糊性中获益，因为这种模糊性使波罗的海国家“忐忑不安”。瑙塞达的声明与摩尔多瓦总统玛雅·桑杜 8 月 18 日的声明相呼应，桑杜称俄罗斯故意将一些无人机发射到摩尔多瓦和北约领空。[19] ISW 继续评估认为，此类无人机入侵是俄罗斯“零阶段”行动的一部分，该行动旨在为未来可能对北约进行的挑衅创造信息和心理条件，包括俄罗斯的假旗挑衅、破坏、电子战干扰和飞越。[20]

9月16日，美国众议院通过了《2026年林赛·格雷厄姆制裁俄罗斯和伊朗法案》，该法案授权美国对俄罗斯石油和天然气五大进口国征收最高100%的关税。[21] 美国总统唐纳德·特朗普需要签署该法案才能生效。

乌克兰在莱曼方向发起的“维瓦尔第行动”表明，乌克兰在恢复战场战术机动能力方面取得了近期进展，这部分得益于乌克兰的塑造行动和中程打击行动，这些行动削弱了俄罗斯的电子战能力。

乌克兰军队利用严格的作战安全措施（OPSEC）和反无人机行动，削弱了俄罗斯军队的作战感知能力，从而实现了作战上的出其不意。

俄罗斯军队正在向多布罗皮利亚方向转移装甲和无人机支援资产，以备在 2026 年秋季进行未来的机械化进攻。

乌克兰军队正在加强对俄罗斯军事资产的远程打击行动，包括在罗斯托夫州开展压制和摧毁敌方防空系统（SEAD/DEAD）行动。

俄罗斯继续依靠朝鲜对乌克兰发动战争，并缓解俄罗斯的劳动力短缺问题。

立陶宛总统吉塔纳斯·瑙塞达于9月16日公开承认，俄罗斯可能故意允许俄罗斯无人机偏离预定航线进入北约空域，以惩罚支持乌克兰的国家。

9月16日，美国众议院通过了《2026年林赛·O·格雷厄姆制裁俄罗斯和伊朗法案》，该法案授权美国对俄罗斯石油和天然气五大进口国征收高达100%的关税。

乌克兰军队最近在库皮扬斯克附近推进。

俄罗斯一夜之间向乌克兰发射了 157 架无人机、10 枚 Banderol/Dan-T 巡飞弹和数量不明的导弹。

ISW已调整其在顿涅茨克州和第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州的战略轴线，以更好地反映俄罗斯夺取乌克兰顿涅茨克州要塞带的行动。ISW将在即将出版的特刊中更详细地分析俄罗斯在顿涅茨克州的行动。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

9月16日至17日夜间，乌克兰军队继续对雅罗斯拉夫尔州的俄罗斯石油基础设施发动远程打击。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，乌克兰军队夜间袭击了位于雅罗斯拉夫尔市（距国际边界约700公里）的斯拉夫石油-亚诺斯炼油厂，导致AVT-3主炼油装置起火。[22] 乌克兰总参谋部指出，斯拉夫石油-亚诺斯炼油厂是俄罗斯最大的炼油厂之一，年产能约为1500万吨原油。9月17日公布的地理定位图像显示，炼油厂出现火灾和浓烟，美国国家航空航天局（NASA）的火灾信息资源管理系统（FIRMS）数据显示，炼油厂存在多处热异常。[23] 雅罗斯拉夫尔州州长米哈伊尔·叶夫拉耶夫于9月17日承认了乌克兰对该炼油厂的袭击。[24]

有关乌克兰在俄罗斯的行动的更多报道，请参阅正文摘要。

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心

乌克兰军队最近在苏梅州北部推进或巩固了阵地。根据 9 月 14 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队在西北部的扎普西利亚（苏梅市东北部）占据阵地——此前俄罗斯方面声称俄军在这些地区占据了阵地。[25]

乌克兰军队继续对别尔哥罗德州和布良斯克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月17日报告称，乌克兰军队在布良斯克州维戈尼切夫区（距国际边界约83公里）摧毁了两套S-400防空导弹系统。[26] 根据9月17日公布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队在别尔哥罗德州邦达列夫附近（距国际边界约10公里）摧毁了一辆俄罗斯装甲车。[27]

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

9月16日和17日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在哈尔科夫市北部进行反击，俄军并未取得确切进展。[28] 俄罗斯国防部声称俄军占领了马拉沃夫恰（位于哈尔科夫市东北部）。[29] 俄罗斯北方集团军则将占领该定居点的功劳归于俄罗斯第126摩托化步兵团（隶属于列宁格勒军区第14军第71近卫摩托化步兵师）。[30]

俄罗斯军队继续采用“猎杀平民”战术，蓄意在哈尔科夫州猎杀平民。哈尔科夫州检察官办公室于9月17日报告称，一架俄罗斯第一视角（FPV）无人机在科蒂夫卡（哈尔科夫市东北部）附近的一个公共交通站点附近击中并杀害了一名平民。[31] 情报与安全研究所（ISW）持续评估认为，俄罗斯使用FPV无人机袭击乌克兰近后方主要平民目标的行为，表明俄罗斯军方内部存在一种普遍的文化，即试图将蓄意伤害平民武器化并制度化，以此作为一种有目的的战争手段。[32]

据报道，乌克兰军队在韦利基布尔卢克东北部发动了一次机械化进攻。俄罗斯北方联邦军区（GoF）的一份报告称，9月17日，乌克兰军队使用装甲车在维尔胡瓦特卡附近发动了反击。[33] 消息人士称，瓦西里夫卡、布拉霍达特内和乔尔内（均位于维尔胡瓦特卡西北部）是双方交战的灰色地带，乌克兰和俄罗斯军队都在这些地区活动。

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

乌克兰军队近期向库皮扬斯克以北推进。根据9月16日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队近期向扎帕德内（库皮扬斯克以北）以东推进。[34] 随后，俄罗斯方面于9月17日发布了据称拍摄于扎帕德内以东地区的视频，声称俄罗斯控制了该地区，尽管有证据表明事实并非如此。[35] 9月17日，俄罗斯西部政府的一位消息人士声称，俄军放弃了扎帕德内以东的几个阵地，而乌克兰军队沿着位于扎帕德内北部和东部的P-79德沃里奇纳-库皮扬斯克公路略有推进。[36]

9月16日和17日，俄军继续在博罗瓦以东进行有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[37] 据报道，俄罗斯西部边境部队称，博罗瓦方向的战斗已变得高度阵地战，恶劣的天气条件和植被减少使得小型渗透小组难以隐蔽行动。[38]

乌克兰军队继续对卢甘斯克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部9月17日报告称，乌克兰军队于9月16日或9月16日至17日夜间袭击了位于被占领的卢甘斯克市（距前线约105公里）的俄罗斯物资和技术仓库，以及位于德鲁日内（距前线约143公里）的俄罗斯人员集结地。[39]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

9 月 16 日至 17 日，俄军继续向莱曼方向发动进攻，但由于乌克兰军队在该地区进行反击，俄军未能取得进展。[40]

有关莱曼战术行动中乌克兰持续反击的更多信息，请参阅正文。

俄罗斯军队可能正试图加强对乌克兰后方后勤枢纽的打击，以阻止乌克兰在莱曼以北继续推进进攻。一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，为应对乌克兰最近在莱曼以北的推进，俄罗斯军队正在增加对伊久姆的滑翔炸弹袭击，9月16日进行了约40次袭击。[41]

根据 9 月 17 日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯军队对赖霍罗多克（位于莱曼西南，沿 T-05-14 莱曼-斯拉维扬斯克公路）进行了五次 FAB-500 制导滑翔炸弹袭击。[42]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

9月16日和17日，俄军继续在斯拉维扬斯克以东的克里瓦卢卡附近、斯拉维扬斯克东南的尤尔基夫卡附近以及克拉马托尔斯克东南的费多里夫卡附近发动进攻，但并未取得进展。[43]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

9月17日和18日，俄军继续在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡及其西南地区发动进攻，但并未取得确切进展。[44] 9月17日，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称俄军已推进至尼古拉皮利亚以北（科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡以西）。[45]

一位与克里姆林宫有关联的著名俄罗斯军事博主对俄罗斯官方关于在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡附近取得进展的说法提出质疑。[46] 这位军事博主承认，乌克兰军队在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡和恰西夫亚尔（科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡东北部）之间的地区保持着广泛的存在，并且俄罗斯军队如果不巩固对斯廷基、切尔沃内、尼古拉耶夫卡和波多尔斯克（均位于科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡东北部）的控制，就无法在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡以北和维罗柳比夫卡（科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡以北、恰西夫亚尔以东）发动进攻。该军事博主还驳斥了俄罗斯关于俄军控制奥列克西耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡（位于科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡西北部）部分地区的说法，指出俄军仅存在于奥列克西耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡周边地区，并未在德鲁日基夫卡镇内驻扎。该博主还承认，俄军在赖斯克、佩特里夫卡、新戈里霍里夫卡或新安德里夫卡（均位于德鲁日基夫卡西南部）附近没有集中兵力，只有零星的渗透小组在无人机支援下活动。包括俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在内的俄罗斯官方消息人士早在2026年6月就声称俄军在奥列克西耶沃-德鲁日基夫卡保持驻军，俄罗斯国防部也声称俄军占领了科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡北部和西北部的几个定居点，但ISW并未发现任何证据表明俄军在这些地区有任何驻军。[47]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

俄罗斯军队最近在多布罗皮利亚以南进行了一次渗透行动。乌克兰军队袭击了格里申以西（多布罗皮利亚以南）的俄罗斯阵地，ISW 根据 9 月 17 日发布的地理定位视频评估，这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[48]

请参阅有关乌克兰破坏俄罗斯通过多布罗皮利亚包围要塞带的行动的要点。

9月16日和17日，俄罗斯军队继续对被占领的顿涅茨克州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部报告称，乌克兰军队于9月16日或9月16日至17日夜间袭击了位于被占领的顿涅茨克市附近（距前线约60公里）的俄罗斯无人机储存、准备和发射场，以及位于库拉希夫卡（距前线约40公里）和新马里夫卡（距前线约110公里）的物资和技术仓库。[49]

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

9月17日，俄罗斯和乌克兰军队均未报告在诺沃巴甫利夫卡方向发生地面活动。

9月16日和17日，俄军在奥列克桑德里夫卡东南方向的别列佐韦和雷布内进行了有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[50]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

9月16日和17日，俄军继续向胡利亚波列方向发起进攻，但并未取得确切进展。[51]

俄罗斯国防部持续夸大其在胡利亚波列方向取得的进展。9月17日，俄罗斯国防部声称俄军占领了罗日夫卡（位于胡利亚波列西北部，距离俄军推进的最远点至少13公里）。[52] 俄罗斯军事博客作者将此次占领归功于俄罗斯第五独立坦克旅（隶属于东部军区第36合成集团军）的部分兵力。[53] 俄罗斯国防部和俄罗斯军事博客作者的报道模式与克里姆林宫系统性的认知战策略相符，即捏造俄军在未建立持久阵地的地区取得战术胜利的说法，以虚假地描绘前线崩溃的景象，这与现有证据相悖。[54]

9月16日和17日，俄军继续在奥里希夫以西和以南进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展。[55]

俄罗斯军队继续在扎波罗热州使用“猎杀平民”战术，蓄意猎杀平民。扎波罗热州军事管理局9月17日报告称，俄罗斯军队在扎波罗热市对一辆客车发动无人机袭击，造成5名平民受伤。[56]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的扎波罗热州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。根据9月17日公布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队袭击了位于被占领的梅利托波尔（距前线约64公里）的一座俄罗斯变电站。[57]

9月17日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

俄罗斯军队继续在赫尔松州使用“猎杀平民”战术，蓄意猎杀平民。赫尔松州军事管理局局长奥列克桑德·普罗库金于9月17日报告称，俄罗斯军队在因胡列茨（赫尔松市东北部）袭击并杀害了一名骑摩托车的平民。[58]

乌克兰军队继续对被占领的赫尔松州的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部于9月17日报告称，乌克兰军队于9月16日或9月16日至17日夜间袭击了位于被占领的斯特里尔科夫（距前线约140公里）的俄罗斯人员集结地。[59]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[60]

9月16日至17日夜间，俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列远程无人机和导弹袭击。乌克兰空军报告称，俄罗斯军队从库尔斯克州发射了数量不详的“缟玛瑙”反舰导弹；从布良斯克州和沃罗涅日州发射了数量不详的“伊斯坎德尔-M”/“S-400”/“KN-23”弹道导弹；从里海发射了4枚“口径”海基巡航导弹；从亚速海上空发射了10枚“班德罗尔”型/“丹-T”巡飞弹；并从奥廖尔市、罗斯托夫州米列罗沃、被占领的顿涅茨克市和被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向发射了157架“沙赫德”型（包括喷气式）攻击无人机和“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[61]乌克兰空军报告称，乌克兰军队击落了7枚“班德罗尔”型//丹-T巡飞弹和124架无人机，数量不详的无人机和导弹袭击了36个地点，无人机和导弹残骸落在5个地点。乌克兰官员报告称，俄罗斯军队袭击了哈尔科夫州、基辅州、敖德萨州、切尔卡瑟州、基洛沃格勒州、尼古拉耶夫州、扎波罗热州和日托米尔州的民用、住宅、能源、工业、铁路和物流基础设施。[62]

俄罗斯军队继续袭击黑海的民用船只。敖德萨州军事管理局局长奥列格·基佩尔于9月17日报告称，俄罗斯军队在黑海袭击了一艘悬挂坦桑尼亚国旗的民用船只，造成船长死亡，三名船员受伤。[63]

据报道，乌克兰拦截无人机于9月16日至17日夜间拦截了一架俄罗斯“沙赫德”型喷气式无人机。乌克兰总统泽连斯基于9月17日报告称，乌克兰军队于9月16日至17日夜间使用乌克兰无人机拦截器成功拦截了一架俄罗斯“沙赫德”型喷气式无人机，乌克兰一直在持续发展其无人机拦截能力。[64] 喷气式无人机的飞行速度远高于非喷气式无人机，最高可达每小时600公里，这使得拦截无人机更难将其击落，因为拦截无人机的速度需要比目标快约25%。[65]

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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