The US and Europe must recalibrate their security partnership

If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the threat of former President Trump to withdraw from NATO did not spur America’s European allies to fix the structural imbalance in transatlantic defense, what could put that security partnership on a sustainable path? During an era of U.S. global security dominance and quiescent rivals, Washington could manage to bear disproportionate burdens in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Today, military conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, aggressive Russian revisionism and growing Chinese ambitions and capacity for coercion and power projection create a real crunch for the United States that requires a more serious long-term European response.

Europeans have executed a major shift in recent years, to be sure, with Europeans plus Canada spending 62 percent more on defense now compared to 2014. But this improvement does not compensate for the deteriorating global security environment – most particularly, the U.S. need to strengthen its posture in the Indo-Pacific and prepare for the potential for conflict. With their focus on achieving a two-percent-of-GDP spending target for defense that was set in 2014, NATO is, in defense budget terms, fighting the last war.

Transatlantic leaders must address this risky situation and put their burden-sharing bargain on a new footing. NATO’s political objective should shift from an abstract spending target to tangible, purpose-driven, and growing commitments from European allies that give U.S. decision makers the flexibility they need to meet their global security obligations – especially in the Indo-Pacific – in the late 2020s and through the 2030s without compromising transatlantic security. The alliance now is on the verge of making crucial defense planning decisions, which presents a unique moment to reconceptualize roles and future-proof transatlantic defense.

American strategic thinkers are concerned that U.S. conventional forces, with a “one major war” sizing, would be unable to sustain the U.S. deterrence strategy in both Europe and Asia beyond 2026, as reflected in the recent report of the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture Commission. This is not a partisan issue. Some draw from it the conclusion that the United States should reduce its commitments to Europe in order to be prepared for a potential, era-defining challenge to U.S. defense strategy in Asia. The potential for unanticipated regional conflicts to further stretch U.S. capacities is demonstrated by the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel and the need identified by the Biden administration to channel U.S. military assistance to its most important Middle Eastern partner.

Viewed from Europe, the current U.S. impasse over providing support for Ukraine and the real possibility of a victory by Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential election demonstrate the unpredictability of U.S. politics and the risks to Europe. Trump has been making no secret about his willingness to consider a U.S. withdrawal from NATO if re-elected. Whether he would attempt it or not, it is virtually guaranteed that he would use such a threat as leverage to obtain concessions, military, political, or economic, from European allies. The mere existence of the threat would serve to embolden the West’s adversaries, first and foremost Russia. It also would rattle European belief in the reliability of the United States’ most solemn promise to its allies – decisive solidarity in a military crisis – which would stoke centrifugal political forces and weaken European cohesion. Former President Trump is a catalyzing factor, but the fundamentals show a persistent and growing gap between Republican and Democratic voters’ views toward NATO: the gap in favorability reached 27 points (76 percent Democratic supporters to 49 percent of Republican supporters) in a recent poll .

The United States’ interest in a free, stable, and prosperous transatlantic community is undeniable. It is a cornerstone of the international order it wants to sustain. Insecurity in Europe cannot be the solution. Considering the clear signs that the center of U.S. strategic gravity is shifting and public opinion is polarizing, the United States and Europe need a dramatic change to avoid a confidence death-spiral and shore up their greatest strategic asset—the transatlantic security bond.

Right-sizing Europe’s share

A deteriorating international security dynamic requires a new transatlantic security understanding within NATO, which since 2014 has centered around exhorting European allies to raise their defense spending from paltry post-Cold War levels to the mark of two percent of GDP. That may have been appropriate from 2014 to 2022, before Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, but Moscow’s recent decision on a massive, long-term reinvestment in its military should leave no doubt about the enduring threat to Europe. Germany, which has often been at the center of criticism due to its decades-long underinvestment in its armed forces, is an example of a country that is now doggedly focused on reaching the 2 percent threshold . Berlin expects to reach that target next year for the first time since 1991, its current budget crisis notwithstanding. The critical task for Germany and its European neighbors, however, is not only to spend more but to spend that additional money in ways that address the ongoing shifts in international security. A higher level of spending by Europe alone does not guarantee that America’s most critically stretched capabilities will in the future be available for another theater.

Over-dependence backfires

The challenge is to define targeted commitments that strengthen Europe’s deterrence and defense posture towards Russia while also resolving the fundamental concerns of U.S. strategists who see a looming strategic choice between Europe and Asia. European leaders can alleviate U.S. concerns about overstretch by finally making a credible political commitment to erasing as a matter of urgency NATO’s over-dependence on those scarce U.S. military capabilities that the Pentagon would need in an Asian security contingency, and for which NATO’s European members rely too heavily on the United States. Among these high-demand, low-density capabilities that are required in both theaters are air and missile defense, suppression of enemy air defense, air-to-air refueling as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

It is a principle of NATO defense planning that no single ally should be responsible for providing more than 50 percent of a given capability – but in practice, the United States all too frequently must bear that burden. The good news is that Europe has the technological and industrial capacity to provide many of these capabilities. A good example is the supply of missile defense systems to Ukraine by several European manufacturers, such as the German IRIS-T and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T . Precision deep strike Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles provided by the United Kingdom and France have proven to be highly effective. While there are growing gaps between U.S. and European defense technology in certain capabilities, Europe’s defense industry remains able to produce many high-demand assets.

The time for European leaders to act is now. Over the next three months, NATO will determine its Minimum Capability Requirements, a key stage in its defense planning that must be approved by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and their NATO colleagues when alliance defense ministers meet in February 2024. These requirements will determine the capabilities the alliance must have in order to ensure that NATO can prevail against a near-peer, nuclear armed competitor, and they should be constructed so that the United States’ ability to engage in another major conflict is not impinged.

Europeans must bear the majority of this burden and should make this political and defense-planning commitment now in order to yield results within a few years. Agreeing on an ambitious program will build multiyear, multilateral European commitments and raise the pressure for European NATO to implement these obligations, driving future procurement and budgeting decisions. Germany in particular needs this framework to keep its national policymaking on task. The German Ministry of Defense, for example, which has underscored its commitment to swiftly meeting NATO’s capability targets in its recently released Defense Policy Guidelines , should immediately incorporate them into the national capability priorities that are expected to be finalized in the first half of 2024.

Getting ahead of election season

There are compelling diplomatic reasons for the United States and its European allies to future-proof their security balance. From the perspective of U.S. politics, a new headline commitment from America’s partners would demonstrate success in the Biden administration’s bet on revitalizing alliances. Though no one would argue that foreign affairs will decide the U.S. election, it would help neutralize a predictable line of attack from the president’s campaign opponent. The impending election campaign also increases U.S. leverage to press now for reforms within the alliance. For Europeans, a U.S. overstretch risk is clear and ominous, and stepped-up European efforts will be inevitable, regardless of the political direction in Washington and who wins in November. The prospect of shaping the transatlantic bargain in advance is preferable to being driven potentially by the 2024 presidential election result.

A strengthened European solidarity on defense would also serve urgent political needs. Germany has neglected its European policy, and as a result centrifugal forces are pulling the continent apart. German relations with Poland are at a post-Cold War low point (driven largely by the Polish far right, now on its way out of office), the strategic disconnect with France is deepening, and the concerns of eastern and northern European countries threatened by Russia get short shrift. It is an opportune moment for Berlin to play once again its traditional integrative role and give new life to Europe-wide security efforts. A strengthened European pillar within NATO can reassure central Europe while involving France and Italy on a major initiative that can equally serve EU defense ambitions in the worst-case scenario of a U.S. disengagement.

How to bring about this realignment? The simple reality is that nothing important happens in NATO without U.S. leadership and the agreement of the leading allies: the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, and given their military and economic potential, Italy and Poland should be part of the inner circle on this issue. Consultations now should lay the groundwork for a rollout in the spring. Alliance politics and diplomacy normally are shrouded from public view, but the challenges are too great to consign to technocratic management. NATO should aim for this recalibration of the transatlantic security arrangement to be a public centerpiece at NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington in July next year.

Showing that burden-sharing is living up to a generational challenge in the era that is unfolding would send three clear messages to America’s political leadership, European partners, and adversaries alike. First, it would send an unmistakable political signal to Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. that European allies will free up critical U.S. defense capabilities, explicitly stating that the United States will not have to make a strategic choice between Europe and Asia. Second, it would map a concrete path for Europe to shoulder that greater share of responsibility within NATO, which will also provide Europe an insurance policy should the United States ever diminish its transatlantic security commitments. Finally, it will demonstrate to the skeptics in the United States as well as potential adversaries anywhere that the institutions Washington created 75 years ago to deal with the aftermath of global conflagration can adapt to and effectively address current and future challenges.

Jeff Rathke is the President of the American-German Institute at Johns Hopkins University and formerly U.S. diplomat and NATO official.

Theresa Lütkefend is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute.

如果俄罗斯入侵乌克兰以及前总统特朗普威胁退出北约都未能促使美国的欧洲盟友解决跨大西洋防务中的结构性失衡问题，那么究竟是什么才能使这一安全伙伴关系走上可持续发展的道路？在美国主导全球安全、竞争对手偃旗息鼓的时代，华盛顿或许能够承担在欧洲、中东和亚洲不成比例的重担。而如今，欧洲和中东的军事冲突、俄罗斯咄咄逼人的修正主义以及中国日益增长的野心和胁迫及力量投射能力，都给美国带来了真正的危机，亟需欧洲做出更加严肃的长期应对。

诚然，近年来欧洲在国防开支方面做出了重大调整，欧洲国家加上加拿大目前的国防开支比2014年增加了62%。但这种增长并不能弥补日益恶化的全球安全环境——尤其重要的是，美国需要加强其在印太地区的态势，并为潜在的冲突做好准备。北约致力于实现2014年设定的国防开支占GDP 2%的目标，就国防预算而言，它实际上是在打一场上一场战争。

跨大西洋领导人必须正视这一风险局面，并重新构建其责任分担机制。北约的政治目标应从抽象的开支目标转向切实可行、目标明确且不断增长的欧洲盟国承诺，从而赋予美国决策者所需的灵活性，使其能够在2020年代末至2030年代履行其全球安全义务——尤其是在印太地区——同时又不损害跨大西洋安全。北约目前正处于制定关键防务规划决策的关键时刻，这为重新构想各方角色、确保跨大西洋防务的未来发展提供了难得的契机。

美国战略思想家担忧，按照“一场大战”的规模，美国常规部队将无法在2026年以后维持其在欧洲和亚洲的威慑战略，这一点在两党组成的美国战略态势委员会最近的报告中有所体现。这并非党派之争。一些人由此得出结论：美国应减少对欧洲的军事投入，以便为可能出现的、对美国在亚洲的防御战略构成时代性挑战做好准备。哈马斯对以色列的恐怖袭击以及拜登政府提出的将美国军事援助转向其最重要的中东伙伴的必要性，都表明了意料之外的地区冲突可能进一步削弱美国的军事能力。

从欧洲的角度来看，美国目前在支持乌克兰问题上的僵局，以及唐纳德·特朗普在2024年总统大选中获胜的可能性，都凸显了美国政治的不可预测性以及欧洲面临的风险。特朗普毫不掩饰地表示，如果连任，他愿意考虑美国退出北约。无论他是否会真的这么做，几乎可以肯定的是，他会利用这种威胁来迫使欧洲盟友做出军事、政治或经济方面的让步。这种威胁本身的存在就会助长西方对手的气焰，尤其是俄罗斯。它还会动摇欧洲对美国向盟友做出的最庄严承诺——在军事危机中坚定团结——的信心，从而加剧政治离心力，削弱欧洲的凝聚力。前总统特朗普是一个催化因素，但基本面显示，共和党和民主党选民对北约的看法存在持续且不断扩大的差距：在最近的一项民意调查中，支持率差距达到了 27 个百分点（76% 的民主党支持者对 49% 的共和党支持者）。

美国对自由、稳定和繁荣的跨大西洋共同体的利益毋庸置疑。这是美国希望维护的国际秩序的基石。欧洲的不安全局势绝非解决之道。鉴于美国战略重心正在转移、公众舆论日益两极分化的明显迹象，美国和欧洲亟需做出重大改变，以避免信任危机螺旋式恶化，并巩固其最重要的战略资产——跨大西洋安全纽带。

合理调整欧洲的份额

日益恶化的国际安全形势要求北约内部建立新的跨大西洋安全共识。自2014年以来，北约一直致力于敦促欧洲盟国将国防开支从冷战后微薄的水平提高到GDP的2%。在俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰之前，即2014年至2022年期间，这一目标或许尚可接受。但莫斯科近期决定对其军力进行大规模的长期再投资，无疑表明欧洲面临的持续威胁。德国长期以来因军力投入不足而饱受诟病，如今却正坚定地朝着2%的目标迈进。尽管面临当前的预算危机，柏林仍预计明年将自1991年以来首次实现这一目标。然而，对于德国及其欧洲邻国而言，关键任务不仅在于增加军费开支，更在于如何将这些额外资金用于应对国际安全形势的持续变化。单靠欧洲增加开支并不能保证美国目前最为紧张的军事能力将来能够用于其他战区。

过度依赖会适得其反

挑战在于如何制定有针对性的承诺，既能加强欧洲对俄罗斯的威慑和防御态势，又能消除美国战略家们的根本担忧——他们认为欧洲和亚洲之间迫在眉睫的战略选择。欧洲领导人若能最终做出可信的政治承诺，即紧急消除北约对美国稀缺军事能力的过度依赖，就能缓解美国对欧洲过度扩张的担忧。这些能力是五角大楼在亚洲安全突发事件中所必需的，而北约欧洲成员国在这些能力方面也过度依赖美国。在亚洲和亚洲两个战区都需要的高需求、低密度能力包括防空和导弹防御、压制敌方防空系统、空中加油以及情报、监视和侦察。

北约防御规划的一项原则是，任何单一盟国都不应承担超过50%的特定能力供应——但在实践中，美国却常常不得不承担这一重担。好消息是，欧洲拥有提供许多此类能力的技术和工业能力。一个很好的例子是，多家欧洲制造商向乌克兰提供了导弹防御系统，例如德国的IRIS-T和法意联合研制的SAMP/T。英国和法国提供的“风暴阴影”（Storm Shadow）/SCALP精确纵深打击巡航导弹已被证明非常有效。尽管在某些能力方面，美欧国防技术之间的差距日益扩大，但欧洲国防工业仍然能够生产许多高需求装备。

欧洲领导人现在必须采取行动。未来三个月，北约将确定其最低能力要求，这是其防御规划的关键阶段，必须由美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀、德国国防部长鲍里斯·皮斯托瑞斯以及其他北约成员国国防部长在2024年2月的会议上批准。这些要求将决定北约必须具备的能力，以确保其能够战胜实力接近的、拥有核武器的竞争对手，并且这些能力的构建应确保美国参与另一场重大冲突的能力不受影响。

欧洲人必须承担大部分责任，并且现在就应该做出这项政治和国防规划承诺，以便在几年内取得成效。达成一项雄心勃勃的计划将建立多年期的多边欧洲承诺，并加大欧洲北约履行这些义务的压力，从而影响未来的采购和预算决策。德国尤其需要这一框架来确保其国家政策制定工作步入正轨。例如，德国国防部在其最近发布的《国防政策指南》中强调了其致力于迅速实现北约能力目标的承诺，应立即将这些目标纳入预计将于2024年上半年最终确定的国家能力优先事项中。

提前做好选举季准备

美国及其欧洲盟友出于外交考量，有充分的理由确保其安全平衡能够适应未来。从美国政治角度来看，美国伙伴国做出新的重大承诺，将表明拜登政府重振联盟的策略取得了成功。尽管没有人会认为外交事务将决定美国大选的最终结果，但这将有助于抵消总统竞选对手可能发起的攻击。即将到来的大选也增强了美国的筹码，使其能够立即推动联盟内部的改革。对欧洲人而言，美国过度扩张的风险显而易见且令人担忧，无论华盛顿的政治走向如何，也无论谁赢得11月的大选，欧洲都将不可避免地加大力度。提前制定跨大西洋协议的前景，远比受制于2024年总统大选结果更为可取。

加强欧洲在防务领域的团结也符合紧迫的政治需求。德国忽视了其欧洲政策，导致离心力将欧洲大陆撕裂。德国与波兰的关系处于冷战后最低点（这主要是由于波兰极右翼势力造成的，而该势力目前正处于下台之际），与法国的战略脱节日益加深，而受俄罗斯威胁的东欧和北欧国家的关切则被轻视。现在正是柏林重拾其传统的整合角色，为全欧洲安全努力注入新活力的良机。加强北约内部的欧洲支柱可以安抚中欧，同时也能让法国和意大利参与到一项重大倡议中来，这项倡议即使在美国撤军的最坏情况下也能同样服务于欧盟的防务目标。

如何实现这一调整？现实情况很简单：如果没有美国的领导以及主要盟国——英国、德国和法国——的同意，北约的任何重大举措都难以推进。鉴于意大利和波兰的军事和经济实力，它们也应成为这一问题的核心参与者。当前的磋商应为春季的正式实施奠定基础。联盟的政治和外交通常不为公众所知，但此次调整的挑战过于艰巨，不能仅仅依靠技术官僚式的管理。北约应力争使此次跨大西洋安全安排的调整成为明年7月在华盛顿举行的北约成立75周年峰会的公开焦点。

在当前时代背景下，展现责任分担机制能够应对代际挑战，将向美国政治领导层、欧洲伙伴以及对手发出三个明确的信息。首先，这将向美国共和党和民主党发出一个明确的政治信号：欧洲盟友将释放美国关键的国防能力，明确表明美国无需在欧洲和亚洲之间做出战略选择。其次，这将为欧洲在北约内部承担更大责任指明一条切实可行的路径，同时也将为欧洲提供一份保障，以防美国削弱其跨大西洋安全承诺。最后，这将向美国国内的怀疑论者以及任何潜在的对手证明，华盛顿75年前为应对全球冲突后果而建立的机构，能够适应并有效应对当前和未来的挑战。

杰夫·拉斯克是约翰·霍普金斯大学美德研究所所长，曾任美国外交官和北约官员。

特蕾莎·吕特凯芬德是全球公共政策研究所的非常驻研究员。