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South Korea faces no good choices in sending forces for Trump’s unpopular Iran mission

Experts worry that U.S. requests for troop contributions to America's faraway campaigns could leave South Korea exposed when it matters most.

Defense NewsLeilani Chavez2026-09-22 15:18查看原文 ↗

MANILA, Philippines — As Washington presses South Korea to contribute to securing the Strait of Hormuz, experts said Seoul is facing a military capacity dilemma , as forces could get stretched amid escalating threats from North Korea.

The worry comes as Washington exerts pressure on South Korea to support U.S. operations in the Strait of Hormuz , where the war with Iran is choking worldwide oil supplies, even while North Korean threats escalate.

The South Korean Army reported that the North had fired two ballistic missiles on Sunday and earlier this month launched a 5,000-ton guided missile destroyer in the Pacific.

The security environment in East Asia raises a military allocation concern, especially since South Korean officials mentioned sending a “practical contribution” to U.S. efforts in the Middle East.

“If such [U.S.] requests become recurrent, Seoul could face trade-offs between extra-regional missions and deterrence around the Korean Peninsula,” Ju Hyung Kim, president of Security Management Institute, a Seoul-based defense think tank, told Defense News.

Last week, President Lee Jae Myeong had drawn the line and said there would be “no deployment to a war.”

The government may instead extend the activities of the Cheonghae Unit, a naval task force group stationed in the Sea of Aden for counter-piracy operations.

The Cheonghae Unit is a small maritime task group that includes a KDX-II destroyer, a maritime helicopter, as well as Marines, naval special forces and support personnel.

South Korean protesters take part in a rally to oppose the deployment of Korean troops to the Strait of Hormuz on Sept. 9, 2026, in Seoul, South Korea. (Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images)

The Cheonghae may be the “least burdensome option,” Kim said, and would allow the Lee government to skirt the domestic political costs of a troop deployment and provide a military contribution.

While the range of operations could extend from Somalia to the Middle East, an expert based in Seoul told Defense News on condition of anonymity that the unit’s role will be limited to protecting South Korean ships and conducting humanitarian assistance activities.

“I don’t see the possibility of upgrade or recalibration … given the current security situation in the region,” the expert said.

Either way, the Cheonghae detachment would be navigating rough waters. Esmaeil Baqaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, warned on Sept. 7 that any foreign military involvement in the strait could face serious consequences.

Iranian academic Mohammad Marandi said that Tehran could regard South Korea as an enemy and target Korean economic and military assets across the Persian Gulf if Seoul joined a U.S.-led effort to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

The warnings had escalated anxieties in Seoul, where the deployment question remains a point of contention.

If South Korean personnel or assets are targeted, Lee would be pressured to either “escalate by deploying combat forces or to scale back to contain domestic backlash and protect his political standing,” Kim said.

“Seoul would need to define the mission, geographical scope, rules of engagement and command arrangements very carefully, while also managing external expectations about what a ‘practical contribution’ actually entails,” Kim said.

The government had begun to assess contribution requirements, which experts said are evident in an earlier recon mission to the United Arab Emirates to examine the Al Dhafra Air Base and Jebel Ali Port.

Findings from the trip have not been made public. But a successive mission to Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the multinational Combined Maritime Forces, “could involve examining basing, logistics, intelligence-sharing, maritime-domain awareness and coordination with multinational forces,” Kim said.

The Cheonghae Unit may be enough to appease Washington for now, especially after Seoul committed a $20 billion investment in an energy project in Texas, Kim said.

But the larger challenge is the precedent it might create: President Donald Trump might expect additional contributions as the conflict in the Middle East continues.

And Kim said force allocation will become a graver concern if alliance commitments take South Korean assets far from the peninsula for a prolonged period of time.

“A P-8A deployed to the Gulf, for example, cannot simultaneously perform maritime-surveillance or anti- submarine missions around the Korean Peninsula,” he said.

“So the key question is not simply whether the Cheonghae Unit is sufficient now, but whether it becomes the beginning of recurring U.S. expectations for South Korean deployments beyond Northeast Asia,” Kim said.

Leilani Chavez is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. Her reporting expertise is in East Asian politics, development projects, environmental issues and security.

菲律宾马尼拉——随着华盛顿敦促韩国为确保霍尔木兹海峡的安全做出贡献，专家表示，首尔正面临军事能力困境，因为在朝鲜威胁不断升级的情况下，韩国兵力可能会捉襟见肘。

令人担忧的是，华盛顿正向韩国施压，要求其支持美国在霍尔木兹海峡的军事行动。在霍尔木兹海峡，与伊朗的战争正在扼杀全球石油供应，与此同时，朝鲜的威胁也在不断升级。

韩国陆军报告称，朝鲜周日发射了两枚弹道导弹，并在本月初向太平洋下水了一艘5000吨级的导弹驱逐舰。

东亚的安全环境引发了人们对军事资源分配的担忧，尤其是韩国官员曾表示要为美国在中东的行动做出“实际贡献”。

“如果美国提出此类要求成为常态，首尔可能会面临在朝鲜半岛周边地区执行域外任务和威慑之间的权衡，”首尔国防智库安全管理研究所所长金柱亨（Ju Hyung Kim）告诉《防务新闻》。

上周，李在明总统划清界限，表示“不会向战争地区部署军队”。

政府可能会扩大清海部队的活动范围，该部队是一支驻扎在亚丁海的打击海盗行动的海军特遣部队。

清海部队是一支小型海上特遣队，包括一艘 KDX-II 型驱逐舰、一架海上直升机，以及海军陆战队员、海军特种部队和支援人员。

2026年9月9日，韩国首尔，韩国民众举行集会，反对向霍尔木兹海峡部署韩国军队。（Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images）

金表示，青海条约可能是“负担最小的选择”，可以让李明博政府规避在国内部署军队的政治代价，并提供军事贡献。

虽然行动范围可能从索马里扩展到中东，但一位驻首尔的专家匿名告诉《防务新闻》，该部队的作用将仅限于保护韩国船只和开展人道主义援助活动。

“鉴于该地区目前的安全形势，我认为升级或重新校准的可能性不大，”这位专家说。