The military may be top-heavy. Don't make things worse with hasty cuts.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Gen. John Caine testify before a Senate committee in Washington, D.C., on July 21, 2026. Getty Images

Congress should closely monitor Hegseth’s latest effort to reduce the number of generals and admirals.

News broke Tuesday that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is planning to order the elimination of one-fifth of the U.S. military’s general and flag billets. There is a legitimate case for examining whether the Armed Forces have have become too top-heavy. There is also a legitimate reason to be concerned about how reductions in the senior officer corps are carried out.

For more than 20 years, I worked as a federal contractor operating mission-critical facilities supporting the Defense Department, State Department, and federal law-enforcement agencies. That experience gave me an appreciation for something that can be difficult to quantify on an organizational chart: institutional knowledge.

Large organizations accumulate layers of management. The military is not immune. Headquarters expand, responsibilities overlap, and positions created to meet one requirement sometimes remain long after circumstances change.

Congress recognized this issue well before the current administration. In 2017, lawmakers reduced the authorized number of active-duty general and flag officer positions by about 11 percent. They also ordered a comprehensive look at whether another 10 percent of flag jobs might be cut, and if so, which ones.

This is important context for today's debate: concern about “rank creep” did not suddenly appear in 2025, nor is questioning the number of generals and admirals inherently an attack on military leadership. It is a legitimate management and national-security question.

But it is only the beginning of the analysis.

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In May 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directed a minimum 20 percent reduction in active-component four-star positions, a minimum 20 percent reduction in National Guard general officers, and an additional minimum 10 percent reduction in general and flag officers associated with restructuring the Unified Command Plan. That order came amid broader cuts to the defense civilian workforce, a campaign noted for a lack of planning and consequent disruption .

Hegseth’s new order to cut 20 percent of general and flag billets reportedly comes with a similarly tight deadline: Jan. 1.

The question Congress and the American public should be asking is not simply, "How many generals can we eliminate?" It should be: Which positions does the military need to accomplish its mission, and what happens when those positions and the officers who fill them disappear?

There is an enormous difference between eliminating an unnecessary headquarters position and losing an experienced operational commander. There is a difference between removing a redundant layer of administration and disrupting the succession of officers being prepared for increasingly demanding commands. And there is a difference between making an organization leaner and simply making it smaller.

The men and women who reach the senior ranks of our Armed Forces generally arrive there after decades of increasingly demanding assignments. The combined operational, technical, and institutional experience represented by those officers is an asset that cannot quickly or easily be replaced.

That does not mean every general or admiral billet should be preserved. If a headquarters is unnecessary, eliminate it. If two commands unnecessarily duplicate one another, consolidate them. If a position no longer requires a general or flag officer, downgrade it. If layers of bureaucracy interfere with getting resources and authority to the people actually performing the mission, remove those layers.

But make those decisions based upon the requirements of the mission—not simply the desire to achieve a predetermined percentage reduction.

The same principle should apply farther down the ranks. A serious examination of military "rank creep" should not stop with four-star generals. Congress should examine the entire personnel structure and determine whether the balance among general and flag officers, field-grade officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and the junior enlisted personnel who perform much of the military's day-to-day operational work remains appropriate for today's force.

The answer may differ considerably among the services. A Navy built around technologically complex ships, submarines and aviation cannot necessarily be evaluated using the same personnel ratios as an Army ground formation. Cyber, space, intelligence and nuclear missions also require experienced technical personnel. That is precisely why percentage reductions alone are an inadequate substitute for manpower analysis.

There is another consequence that deserves attention: the effect on the officers who remain. If capable and deserving officers come to believe that opportunities for advancement are disappearing for reasons unrelated to their performance, qualifications or the needs of the service, the consequences can extend far beyond the officers whose promotions are affected. It can influence retention, morale and the willingness of talented younger officers to commit their careers to military service.

Promotion and command decisions should be based upon merit and military requirements, without regard to sex, ethnicity or orientation. The objective should be straightforward: identify and advance the most capable people required to defend the country.

Congress therefore has an important oversight responsibility. It should determine which senior positions are actually being eliminated, which are merely being left vacant or reassigned, whether the positions involve administrative or operational responsibilities, what effect the changes have on succession and readiness, and how today's reductions compare with the reforms Congress itself initiated nearly a decade ago.

Lawmakers should also ask a deceptively simple question: Did the FY2017 reforms work?

If Congress previously ordered substantial reductions and today's Defense Department again concludes that the senior ranks are excessive, policymakers should understand why. Were the earlier reductions implemented as intended? Did new headquarters and billets subsequently replace those eliminated? Did missions change? Or does the underlying personnel system itself encourage rank growth? Those answers matter.

We should streamline the military where the evidence supports doing so. Every dollar and every billet consumed by unnecessary overhead is a resource unavailable to the warfighter. But efficiency cannot be measured simply by counting how many stars have disappeared from an organizational chart. We should not endeavor to achieve a managerial statistic by dulling the point of the spear and sacrificing the careers of dedicated members of our Armed Forces.

James Jacobson spent more than 20 years as a federal contractor operating mission-critical facilities supporting the Department of Defense, Department of State, and federal law-enforcement agencies. He lives in Naples, Florida.

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2026年7月21日，国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯和约翰·凯恩将军在华盛顿特区出席参议院委员会听证会。（图片来源：Getty Images）

国会应密切关注赫格塞斯为减少将军和海军上将人数所做的最新努力。

周二有消息称，国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯计划下令裁减美军五分之一的将军和将官职位。美军是否存在官僚机构过于臃肿的问题，确实值得探讨。同时，高级军官裁减的具体实施方式也令人担忧。

二十多年来，我一直担任联邦承包商，负责运营为国防部、国务院和联邦执法机构提供支持的关键设施。这段经历让我深刻体会到组织架构图中难以量化的东西：机构知识。

大型组织会积累多层管理层级，军队也不例外。总部规模扩大，职责重叠，为了满足某一特定需求而设立的职位，有时会在情况发生变化后长期保留下来。

国会早在现任政府之前就意识到了这个问题。2017年，议员们将现役将领和高级军官的编制人数削减了约11%。他们还下令全面审查是否需要再裁减10%的高级军官职位，如果需要，具体裁减哪些职位。

这对于今天的辩论至关重要：对“军衔膨胀”的担忧并非突然出现在2025年，质疑将军和海军上将的数量也并非必然是对军事领导层的攻击。这是一个合情合理的管理和国家安全问题。

但这仅仅是分析的开始。

在赫格塞斯削减开支一年后，国防部文职人员反映“工作效率下降”和士气低落。

国防部长只给了国防部领导人不到两周的时间来制定削减方案和调整措施。

国防劳动力队伍因剧烈的变化而陷入混乱和恐惧。

2025年5月，国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯指示，现役部队四星上将职位至少削减20%，国民警卫队将官职位至少削减20%，此外，与重组统一指挥计划相关的将官和高级军官职位至少再削减10%。这项命令是在国防部文职人员大幅裁减之际发布的，而此次裁员行动因缺乏规划和由此造成的混乱而备受诟病。

据报道，赫格塞斯下令削减 20% 的将军和高级将领职位，并设定了同样紧迫的最后期限：1 月 1 日。

国会和美国公众应该问的问题不应该仅仅是“我们可以裁减多少名将军？”而应该是：军队需要哪些职位才能完成其使命，以及当这些职位和担任这些职位的军官消失时会发生什么？

裁撤一个不必要的总部职位和失去一位经验丰富的作战指挥官之间有着天壤之别。移除一个冗余的行政层级和扰乱军官的继任计划（这些军官正为应对日益严峻的指挥任务而接受培训）之间也存在着巨大的差异。精简组织和简单地缩小组织规模之间同样存在着巨大的差异。

那些晋升到我军高级军衔的官兵，通常都是在经历了数十年日益艰巨的任务后才走到这一步的。这些军官所积累的作战、技术和制度方面的经验，是一笔无法轻易替代的宝贵财富。

但这并不意味着每个将军或海军上将的职位都应该保留。如果一个司令部没有必要，就撤销它。如果两个指挥机构职能重叠，就合并它们。如果某个职位不再需要将军或海军将领，就降低它的级别。如果层层官僚阻碍了资源和权力落到真正执行任务的人员手中，就精简这些层级。

但做出这些决定时，要根据任务的要求，而不是仅仅为了实现预定的减少百分比。

同样的原则也应适用于更低级别的军官。对军队“军衔膨胀”问题的认真审视不应止步于四星上将。国会应审查整个人员结构，并确定将官、少将、中校、高级士官以及承担军队日常作战任务的初级士兵之间的比例是否仍然适合当今的军队。

不同军种的答案可能大相径庭。海军的核心是技术复杂的舰艇、潜艇和航空兵，因此不能简单地用陆军地面部队的人员比例来评估其人员配置。网络、太空、情报和核任务也需要经验丰富的技术人员。正因如此，仅仅依靠人员削减百分比不足以替代人力分析。

还有另一个值得关注的后果：对留任军官的影响。如果有能力且有资格的军官开始认为晋升机会的消失并非出于他们的表现、资历或部队需求，那么其后果将远远超出那些晋升受到影响的军官。它会影响人员留任率、士气，以及有才华的年轻军官是否愿意将毕生奉献给军队。

晋升和指挥决策应以功绩和军事需求为依据，不应考虑性别、种族或性取向。目标应明确：选拔并提拔最能胜任保卫国家所需工作的优秀人才。

因此，国会负有重要的监督责任。它应该确定哪些高级职位实际上被裁撤，哪些职位只是空缺或重新分配，这些职位涉及的是行政职责还是业务职责，这些变化对继任计划和战备能力有何影响，以及今天的裁员与国会近十年前启动的改革相比如何。

立法者们还应该问一个看似简单却意义深远的问题：2017 财年的改革是否奏效？

如果国会此前已下令大幅裁减军衔，而如今国防部再次认定高级军衔人员过多，那么决策者就应该弄清原因。之前的裁减是否按预期执行？新的总部和职位是否取代了被裁减的岗位？任务是否发生了变化？或者，现有的人事制度本身是否鼓励军衔晋升？这些问题的答案至关重要。

在证据支持的情况下，我们应该精简军队。每一分钱、每一个不必要的编制都意味着作战人员无法获得所需的资源。但效率不能仅仅通过统计组织结构图中少了多少星级来衡量。我们不应该为了追求管理指标而削弱作战力量，牺牲我们忠诚的军人的职业生涯。

詹姆斯·雅各布森曾担任联邦承包商超过20年，负责运营为国防部、国务院和联邦执法机构提供支持的关键设施。他现居佛罗里达州那不勒斯。

下一篇报道：制约国防工业基础的不是资金，而是时间。