Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2026俄罗斯攻势评估,2026年10月3日
Five Russian drones, including Banderol loitering munitions, crashed in Moldova on the morning of October 3.

Five Russian drones, including Banderol loitering munitions, crashed in Moldova on the morning of October 3, exceeding the number of aerial vehicles involved in the last Russian violation of Moldovan airspace. Moldovan President Maia Sandu reported that five Russian “air attack weapons”, including Banderol loitering munitions, violated Moldovan airspace and crashed in Moldova.[1] Moldovan Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii stated that three “missiles,” likely referring to Russian Banderol loitering munitions, and two drones violated Moldovan airspace.[2] The Moldovan Foreign Ministry reported that drone debris fell in the Causeni, Hincesti, Anenii Noi, and Stefan Voda districts and near Crocmaz.[3] The Moldovan National Army reported that another unspecified object entered Moldovan airspace near Udobne, Odesa Oblast, with a trajectory toward Palanca, Stefan Voda District, and left the airspace after one minute in the direction of Bilyayivka, Odesa Oblast.[4] Russian drones and drone debris have been increasingly violating Moldovan airspace in recent months, with at least 20 violations occurring between February 2022 and July 2026 and seven since August 2026 alone.[5] Most Russian drone incursions, including the most recent violation on September 30, when a likely Russian drone crashed near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi Raion, have involved a single Geran- or Gerbera-type drone, making the October 3 violation a notable increase in the number of aerial vehicles.[6] ISW continues to assess that increasingly intense and frequent Russian drone incursions into Moldovan and NATO airspaces are likely part of Moscow’s efforts to normalize airspace violations with increasingly intense and frequent violations.[7]
Russian forces struck the Northern Bridge in Kyiv City on October 3 as part of Russia’s continued efforts to degrade the city’s traffic across the Dnipro River and cause wider disruptions to Ukraine’s economy and daily civilian life. Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian forces struck the Northern Bridge over the Dnipro River in Kyiv City on October 3.[8] Russian forces have struck the Southern and Northern bridges in Kyiv City six separate times since the afternoon of October 1, resulting in severe disruptions to civilian transportation and logistics across the Dnipro River as Russian forces continue attempts to physically split Kyiv City.[9] The drone strikes against Kyiv City’s bridges are part of a wider Russian long-range strike campaign to degrade Ukraine’s economy and to make life in major Ukrainian cities difficult in an effort to force Ukraine to capitulate.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a warning on October 3, recommending foreign citizens and diplomats to leave Kyiv City and explicitly stating that Russian forces will continue launching long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] The Russian MFA statement indicates that Russian forces intend to continue targeting Ukraine’s civilian and critical infrastructure, especially in major cities, aiming to generate a political crisis in Ukraine during Winter 2026-2027 and to degrade Ukraine’s ability to sustain its battlefield successes.[12]
Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on October 3 that Russian forces used one or more mesh network repeaters that provide a temporary local connection through which Russian drone operators can adjust the drone’s trajectory during strikes on Kyiv City’s bridges.[13] Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces used a similar device during the failed September 4 assassination attempt against Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) Head Oleksandr Poklad.[14] The devices that Beskrestnov described function as gateways that receive commands over the internet and convert them into radio-frequency signals for a nearby Russian drone, allowing Russian drone operators to maintain live control of the drone’s trajectory without any other signal-repeating drones or mesh ground control stations around.
Five Russian drones, including Banderol loitering munitions, crashed in Moldova on the morning of October 3, exceeding the number of aerial vehicles involved in the last Russian violation of Moldovan airspace.
Russian forces struck the Northern Bridge in Kyiv City on October 3 as part of Russia’s continued efforts to degrade the city’s traffic across the Dnipro River and cause wider disruptions to Ukraine’s economy and daily civilian life.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against missile and drone launch sites in Russia. Russia launched 157 drones against Ukraine overnight and Banderol loitering munitions on the morning of October 3.
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Sumy City.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against missile and drone launch sites in Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 3 that Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander ballistic missile launch system in Bryansk Oblast on October 2 or 3.[15] Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center reported on October 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strike drone launch complex near Tsimbulova, Oryol Oblast (roughly 175 kilometers from the international border), on the night of October 2 to 3.[16] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from October 2 to 3 shows heat anomalies near Tsimbulova.[17]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position north of Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 1, indicating that Russian forces consolidated their positions in the area.[18]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 3 that Russian forces seized Nova Kozacha (north of Kharkiv City).[20] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) with the seizure of Nova Kozacha.[21]
A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 3, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[22]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian forces maintain a presence within and north of Kupyansk but are reportedly struggling to supply and expand their positions. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kivsharivka (north of Kupyansk) and control half of the settlement.[23] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are still operating within Kupyansk itself but that it is almost impossible for them to receive reinforcements.[24] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and Kindrashivka and noted that Russian forces are struggling to supply their forward units north of Kupyansk.[25]
Russian sources reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations north and southeast of Borova on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[26]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian sources commented on continued Ukrainian counteroffensive activity along the Zherebets River, including near Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and Zarichne (east of Lyman), on October 3.[27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Ukrainian attacks likely continue to disrupt Russian plans for frontal assaults against Fortress Belt cities from the east. Russian milbloggers continue to report that fighting is ongoing east of Slovyansk near Mykolaivka, Kryva Luka, and Rai-Oleksandrivka.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also counterattacked east of Kramatorsk toward Vasylivska Pustosh, Vasyutinske, and Pershomarivka.[29] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking near Virolyubivka and Fedorivka (both east of Druzhkivka).[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian forces continued offensive operations within, west of, and northwest of Kostyantynivka on October 2 and 3 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Druzhkivka direction.[31]
Russian forces do not currently appear to be using armored vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on October 3 that there are currently no Russian groups using armored vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[32] The NCO added that constant Ukrainian reconnaissance and strikes against Russian logistics in the area have complicated Russian attempts to covertly accumulate armored vehicles.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian forces continued offensive operations within and east, south, and southwest of Dobropillya and west of Pokrovsk on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[33]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 3.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Mokri Yaly River crossing near occupied Novoocheretuvate (roughly seven kilometers from the frontline) on October 2 or overnight on October 2 to 3, likely as part of an effort to disrupt Russian logistics and reinforcement capacity on the western bank of the river.[35]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian forces recently conducted two infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in southern and central Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), according to geolocated footage published on October 3, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[36]
Russian forces reportedly conducted a platoon-sized mechanized assault west of Hulyaipole on an unspecified date aimed at testing Ukrainian defenses. Ukrainian forces struck Russian armored and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) west of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) during a Russian mechanized assault on an unspecified date that first aimed to “probe” Ukrainian defenses, according to geolocated footage published on October 2.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within and northwest, west, and directly east of Orikhiv on October 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Russian forces consolidated positions in the eastern part of Omelnyk (northeast of Orikhiv) but noted that there are many Ukrainian drones in the area, suggesting that Ukrainian drone operations are preventing Russian forces from advancing into the central and western parts of the settlement.[39] Another milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian airborne (VDV) elements gained a foothold south of Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[40]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on October 2 and 3 but did not advance.[41]
Ukraine’s ongoing intermediate-range strike campaign across occupied southern Ukraine continues to cause power and water issues in occupied Crimea. Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo reported on October 3 that it enacted power restrictions throughout Crimea, likely due to continuous Ukrainian strikes against Crimean energy infrastructure.[42] The water volume in Crimean reservoirs decreased by 11 million cubic meters in September 2026, according to the Russian occupation authorities.[43] Ukrainian forces have been striking Crimean energy infrastructure, including power plants and substations, throughout Summer 2026, causing repeated power outages that have subsequently affected water pumping stations at reservoirs.[44]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[45]
See topline text for more reports of Russian strikes against the Northern Bridge in Kyiv City.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3 and Banderol loitering munition strikes on the morning of October 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed-type strike drones (45 of which were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[46] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 131 drones; that drones hit 12 locations; and that debris fell at five locations. Ukrainian officials additionally reported that Russian forces struck Odesa Oblast with an unspecified number of Banderol loitering munitions on the morning of October 3, but that most of the Banderols did not reach their intended targets.[47] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile, Shahed and Gerbera-type drones (including jet-powered Shahed-type drones), and guided glide bombs against southern Ukraine at unspecified times between 0800 local time on October 2 and 0900 local time on October 3.[48] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transport, residential, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts and a vessel in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast.[49] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Hostomel near Kyiv City overnight, and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck a logistics center in the area.[50]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have struck at least 27 Ukrainian data centers since September 20, including in some repeat strikes, but the milblogger acknowledged that these hits caused only local and temporary disruptions.[51]
The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is upgrading Russian Garpiya drones to include jet engines, but Ukraine’s new interceptor drones will likely be able to defend against these new drones in the future. Russian forces exhibited new jet-powered versions of the Garpiya strike drone (a version of the Russian-made Geran-type drone) during the Center-2026 Strategic Command and Staff exercises in Chelyabinsk Oblast.[52] Russian forces already extensively use jet-powered Geran-type drones, and the Kremlin is likely expanding its jet-powered drone inventory to boost production and expand use of these faster drones. A Ukrainian source assessed on October 2, however, that production volumes for the modified Garpiya drones are not large and that the Garpiya drones do not currently use mesh modems or cameras for enhanced navigation and strike precision. Ukraine is actively working to test and scale up production of new interceptor drones that can down Russian jet-powered drones and drone-missile hybrids, and the window during which Ukrainian forces are unable to consistently down the jet-powered strike vehicles in high numbers may start to narrow in the near term.[53]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/2106288502438801787 [2] https://tvrmoldova dot md/article/9e16f417a7258869/nosatii-cele-cinci-incidente-de-sambata-implica-trei-rachete-si-doua-drone.html [3] https://t.me/maeiexplica/5582 [4] https://t.me/MDNationalArmy/2634 [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ [8] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7755; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7756; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7757 [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ [11] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2151808/ [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ [13] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7786 [14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/ [15] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2106400448680808909 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21182 [16] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2106274451545375149 [17] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@35.817,53.371,13.699z [18] https://t.me/tro119ua/132; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13107 [19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [20] https://t.me/mod_russia/67897 [21] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22367 [22] https://t.me/severnnyi/9503 [23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48312 [24] https://t.me/severnnyi/9503 [25] https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19967 [26] https://t.me/grvZapad/19967; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [27] https://t.me/grvZapad/19967; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [28] https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [29] https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [30] https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56463; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w&pp=0gcJCf4LAYcqIYzv; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1418331-na-desatki-kilometriv-uglib-93-ombr-urazae-logistiku-okupantiv-na-kostantinivskomu-napramku/ [33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42456 [36] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2106289060968800587?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1460763202650395 [37] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1814; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2106090886203338766?s=20 [38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56451 [39] https://t.me/voin_dv/21408 [40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56451 [41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451 [42] https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13607-14-37; https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13600-13-36; https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13598-12-35 [43] https://t.me/rian_crimea/105786 [44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/105596; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1375004-simferopol-kerc-ani-kapu-armansk-feodosia-bez-vodi-u-krimu-die-takoz-obmezenna-elektropostacanna/ [45] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [46] https://t.me/kpszsu/82542 [47] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid027VCcc9bxf5YLED6TVNePywWbzrkyUvMzHbDzSF2figavsmgxyrNXJ6rhMczVCdJ4l; https://t.me/kpszsu/82542 [48] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid027VCcc9bxf5YLED6TVNePywWbzrkyUvMzHbDzSF2figavsmgxyrNXJ6rhMczVCdJ4l [49] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2106400448680808909; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32337; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32339; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32356; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32359; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7755; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7756; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7757; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/03/u-gostomeli-cherez-rosijskyj-obstril-postrazhdaly-chetvero-lyudej-sered-nyh-dytyna/; https://t.me/kyivoda/59750; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/613; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1418499-rf-atakuvala-sudno-na-odesini-odin-zagiblij-troe-poranenih/; [50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67891; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/03/u-gostomeli-cherez-rosijskyj-obstril-postrazhdaly-chetvero-lyudej-sered-nyh-dytyna/; https://t.me/kyivoda/59750 [51] https://t.me/rybar/83671 [52] https://t.me/milinfolive/180747; https://t.me/war_home/7720; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/reaktyvnyi-versiyu-garpyya/ [53] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/
10月3日上午,五架俄罗斯无人机(包括“班德罗尔”巡飞弹)在摩尔多瓦坠毁,数量超过了上次俄罗斯侵犯摩尔多瓦领空事件中涉及的飞行器数量。摩尔多瓦总统玛雅·桑杜报告称,五架俄罗斯“空袭武器”(包括“班德罗尔”巡飞弹)侵犯了摩尔多瓦领空并坠毁。[1] 摩尔多瓦国防部长阿纳托利·诺萨蒂表示,三枚“导弹”(可能指俄罗斯“班德罗尔”巡飞弹)和两架无人机侵犯了摩尔多瓦领空。[2] 摩尔多瓦外交部报告称,无人机残骸落在考塞尼、欣切什蒂、阿内尼诺伊和斯特凡沃达区以及克罗克马兹附近。[3]摩尔多瓦国民军报告称,另一个不明物体在敖德萨州乌多布内附近进入摩尔多瓦领空,其飞行轨迹指向斯特凡·沃达区帕兰卡,一分钟后向敖德萨州比利亚伊夫卡方向离开领空。[4] 近几个月来,俄罗斯无人机及其残骸侵犯摩尔多瓦领空的事件日益增多,2022年2月至2026年7月期间至少发生了20起侵犯事件,仅2026年8月以来就发生了7起。[5] 大多数俄罗斯无人机入侵事件,包括最近一次发生在9月30日的侵犯事件(当时一架疑似俄罗斯无人机在阿内尼新区希尔博瓦特附近坠毁),都只涉及一架Geran或Gerbera型无人机,因此10月3日的侵犯事件表明,入侵的无人机数量显著增加。[6] ISW 继续评估认为,俄罗斯无人机对摩尔多瓦和北约空域日益频繁和猛烈的入侵,很可能是莫斯科为使空域侵犯行为正常化而采取的措施,即不断加剧和频繁的侵犯行为。[7]
10月3日,俄罗斯军队袭击了基辅市北桥,这是俄罗斯持续破坏第聂伯河两岸交通、扰乱乌克兰经济和民众日常生活的行动之一。基辅市市长维塔利·克利奇科报告称,俄罗斯军队于10月3日袭击了基辅市第聂伯河上的北桥。[8] 自10月1日下午以来,俄罗斯军队已六次袭击基辅市南桥和北桥,导致第聂伯河两岸的民用交通和物流严重中断,俄罗斯军队继续试图从物理上分割基辅市。[9] 对基辅市桥梁的无人机袭击是俄罗斯旨在削弱乌克兰经济、使乌克兰主要城市生活陷入困境,从而迫使乌克兰投降的更大规模远程打击行动的一部分。[10]俄罗斯外交部于10月3日发布警告,建议外国公民和外交官离开基辅市,并明确表示俄罗斯军队将继续对乌克兰发动远程无人机和导弹袭击。[11] 俄罗斯外交部的声明表明,俄罗斯军队打算继续以乌克兰的民用和关键基础设施为目标,尤其是在主要城市,目的是在2026-2027年冬季在乌克兰制造政治危机,并削弱乌克兰维持其战场胜利的能力。[12]
乌克兰总统国防技术顾问谢尔盖·“闪电”·别斯克列斯特诺夫于10月3日报告称,俄罗斯军队使用了一个或多个网状网络中继器,这些中继器提供临时本地连接,俄罗斯无人机操作员可以通过该连接在袭击基辅市桥梁期间调整无人机的飞行轨迹。[13] 别斯克列斯特诺夫报告称,俄罗斯军队在9月4日针对乌克兰安全局(SBU)局长奥列克桑德·波克拉德的未遂暗杀行动中也使用了类似的设备。[14] 别斯克列斯特诺夫描述的这些设备充当网关,通过互联网接收指令并将其转换为射频信号,发送给附近的俄罗斯无人机,从而使俄罗斯无人机操作员能够在没有任何其他信号中继无人机或网状地面控制站的情况下,实时控制无人机的飞行轨迹。
10 月 3 日上午,五架俄罗斯无人机(包括 Banderol 巡飞弹)在摩尔多瓦坠毁,超过了上次俄罗斯侵犯摩尔多瓦领空时涉及的飞行器数量。
10 月 3 日,俄罗斯军队袭击了基辅市的北桥,这是俄罗斯持续破坏第聂伯河两岸交通、对乌克兰经济和平民日常生活造成更大程度破坏的行动的一部分。
乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯境内的导弹和无人机发射场进行远程打击。俄罗斯于10月3日夜间向乌克兰发射了157架无人机,并在当天上午发射了“班德罗尔”巡飞弹。
俄军最近向苏梅市东南方向推进。
我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行,因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道,而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响,特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行,尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。
乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动
乌克兰军队继续对俄罗斯境内的导弹和无人机发射场进行远程打击。乌克兰总统泽连斯基于10月3日表示,乌克兰军队于10月2日或3日袭击了布良斯克州的“伊斯坎德尔”弹道导弹发射系统。[15] 乌克兰战略通信中心于10月3日报告称,乌克兰军队于10月2日至3日夜间袭击了奥廖尔州齐姆布洛瓦附近(距国际边界约175公里)的俄罗斯攻击型无人机发射场。[16] 美国国家航空航天局(NASA)的火灾资源管理系统(FIRMS)数据显示,10月2日至3日齐姆布洛瓦附近出现热异常。[17]
俄罗斯的支持行动:北方轴心
俄罗斯军队最近在苏梅州北部取得了进展。根据 10 月 1 日发布的地理定位视频显示,乌克兰军队袭击了诺沃德米特里夫卡(苏梅市东南)以北的俄罗斯阵地,这表明俄罗斯军队巩固了其在该地区的地位。[18]
俄罗斯的支持行动:哈尔科夫州
9月2日和3日,俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部发动进攻,但并未取得确切进展。[19] 10月3日,俄罗斯国防部宣称俄军占领了新科扎恰(位于哈尔科夫市北部)。[20] 俄罗斯北方集团军将新科扎恰的占领归功于俄罗斯第245摩托化步兵团(隶属莫斯科军区第1近卫坦克集团军第47坦克师)、车臣西部-阿赫马特营和车臣阿赫马特特种部队瓦哈营(隶属第204阿赫马特特种部队团)。[21]
有消息人士报道,俄罗斯北方部队于 10 月 3 日继续在韦利基布尔卢克方向进行进攻行动,但 ISW 没有观察到俄罗斯军队取得进展的证据。[22]
俄罗斯的支持行动:奥斯基尔河
俄军在库皮扬斯克及其北部地区保持驻军,但据报道,俄军在补给和扩张阵地方面面临困难。一位俄罗斯军事博客作者于10月2日声称,俄军已向基夫沙里夫卡(库皮扬斯克北部)东南方向推进,并控制了该镇一半的区域。[23] 一位关于俄罗斯北方部队集群的消息人士称,俄军仍在库皮扬斯克境内作战,但几乎不可能获得增援。[24] 俄罗斯方面声称,乌克兰军队在扎帕德内(库皮扬斯克北部)和金德拉希夫卡附近发动反击,并指出俄军在库皮扬斯克北部的前沿部队补给方面面临困难。[25]
俄罗斯方面消息称,10 月 2 日和 3 日,俄军继续在博罗瓦北部和东南部进行进攻行动,但并未取得进展。[26]
俄罗斯主要行动:夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领
俄军下属主要行动一:从西北方向包围要塞带
10 月 3 日,俄罗斯消息人士评论了乌克兰在热列别茨河沿岸(包括扬皮尔(莱曼东南)和扎里奇内(莱曼东)附近)持续进行的反攻活动。[27]
俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带
乌克兰的袭击很可能继续扰乱俄罗斯从东部对“堡垒带”城市发动正面进攻的计划。俄罗斯军事博客持续报道称,斯拉维扬斯克以东,靠近尼古拉耶夫卡、克里瓦卢卡和赖奥列克桑德里夫卡一带的战斗仍在继续。[28] 一位俄罗斯军事博客声称,乌克兰军队还在克拉马托尔斯克以东,向瓦西里夫斯卡普斯托什、瓦休京斯克和佩尔绍马里夫卡方向发动了反击。[29] 另一位俄罗斯军事博客声称,俄军正在维罗柳比夫卡和费多里夫卡(均位于德鲁日基夫卡以东)附近发动进攻。[30]
俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进
10 月 2 日和 3 日,俄军继续在科斯蒂安蒂尼夫卡境内、西部和西北部进行进攻行动,但并未取得进展,因为乌克兰军队在德鲁日基夫卡方向进行了反击。[31]
目前看来,俄军在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡方向并未使用装甲车辆。10月3日,一名在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡方向作战的乌克兰旅士官报告称,目前没有俄军部队在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡方向使用装甲车辆。[32] 该士官还补充说,乌克兰持续不断的侦察和对该地区俄军后勤设施的打击,使得俄军秘密集结装甲车辆的企图变得复杂。
俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带
10 月 2 日和 3 日,俄军继续在多布罗皮利亚及其东部、南部和西南部以及波克罗夫斯克西部发动进攻行动,但并未取得进展。[33]
俄罗斯支援行动:进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州
10月3日,俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告新巴甫洛夫卡方向有地面活动。
10 月 2 日和 3 日,俄军继续在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向进行有限的进攻行动,但没有取得进展。[34] 乌克兰总参谋部 10 月 3 日报告称,乌克兰军队于 10 月 2 日或 10 月 2 日夜间至 3 日凌晨袭击了位于被占领的新沃切列图瓦特附近(距前线约 7 公里)的莫克里亚利河渡口,这很可能是为了破坏俄军在河西岸的后勤和增援能力。[35]
俄罗斯的支持行动:南方轴心
俄罗斯军队最近在胡利亚伊波列方向进行了两次渗透行动。根据10月3日发布的地理定位视频,乌克兰军队袭击了沃兹德维日夫卡南部和中部(胡利亚伊波列西北部)的俄罗斯阵地,而ISW评估认为这是俄罗斯渗透行动的结果。[36]
据报道,俄罗斯军队在胡利亚伊波列以西地区进行了一次排级规模的机械化突击,具体日期不详,目的是测试乌克兰的防御能力。根据10月2日公布的地理定位视频显示,在一次俄罗斯机械化突击中,乌克兰军队在扎利兹尼奇内(胡利亚伊波列以西)以西地区对俄罗斯的装甲车和全地形车(ATV)进行了打击。此次突击的最初目的是“试探”乌克兰的防御能力。[37]
10月2日和3日,俄军继续在奥里希夫及其西北部、西部和正东部地区发动进攻,但并未取得确切进展。[38] 一位俄罗斯军事博主于10月3日声称,俄军巩固了奥梅尔尼克东部(奥里希夫东北部)的阵地,但同时指出该地区有大量乌克兰无人机,暗示乌克兰无人机行动阻止了俄军向该定居点的中部和西部推进。[39] 另一位军事博主于10月2日声称,俄罗斯空降兵(VDV)在诺沃亚科夫利夫卡(奥里希夫西北部)南部站稳了脚跟。[40]
10月2日和3日,俄军继续在赫尔松方向进行有限的进攻行动,但并未取得进展。[41]
乌克兰持续在被占领的乌克兰南部地区发动中程空袭,导致被占领的克里米亚地区电力和供水问题持续存在。克里米亚占领区能源运营商克里米亚国家电力公司(Krymenergo)于10月3日报告称,已在克里米亚全境实施电力限制,这很可能是由于乌克兰持续袭击克里米亚能源基础设施所致。[42] 据俄罗斯占领当局称,2026年9月克里米亚水库蓄水量减少了1100万立方米。[43] 2026年夏季,乌克兰军队持续袭击克里米亚能源基础设施,包括发电厂和变电站,导致多次停电,进而影响了水库的抽水站。[44]
俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动
注:自 8 月 11 日起,乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[45]
有关俄罗斯袭击基辅市北部大桥的更多报道,请参阅正文。
10月2日至3日夜间,俄罗斯军队对乌克兰发动了一系列无人机袭击,并在10月3日上午使用了“班德罗尔”巡飞弹进行空袭。乌克兰空军报告称,俄罗斯军队从布良斯克市、克拉斯诺达尔边疆区滨海-阿赫塔尔斯克、被占领的顿涅茨克市以及被占领的克里米亚赫瓦尔季斯克方向发射了157架“沙赫德”型攻击无人机(其中45架为喷气式动力无人机)、“格贝拉”型攻击无人机和“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机。[46] 乌克兰空军报告称,乌克兰军队击落了131架无人机;无人机击中了12个地点;并在5个地点发现了无人机残骸。乌克兰官员还报告称,10月3日上午,俄罗斯军队向敖德萨州发射了数量不详的“班德罗尔”巡飞弹,但大多数“班德罗尔”巡飞弹并未击中预定目标。[47] 乌克兰南部作战司令部报告称,10月2日当地时间08:00至10月3日当地时间09:00之间,俄罗斯军队向乌克兰南部发射了一枚“伊斯坎德尔-M”弹道导弹、“沙赫德”和“格贝拉”型无人机(包括喷气式“沙赫德”型无人机)以及制导滑翔炸弹。[48] 乌克兰官员报告称,俄罗斯军队袭击了第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州和基辅州的交通、住宅、商业和能源基础设施,以及敖德萨州切尔诺莫尔斯克的一艘船只。[49] 乌克兰官员报告称,俄罗斯军队夜间袭击了基辅市附近的霍斯托梅尔,俄罗斯国防部则声称,俄罗斯军队袭击了该地区的一个后勤中心。[50]
一位与克里姆林宫有关联的俄罗斯军事博主声称,自 9 月 20 日以来,俄罗斯军队至少袭击了 27 个乌克兰数据中心,其中一些是重复袭击,但这位军事博主承认,这些袭击只造成了局部和暂时的中断。[51]
俄罗斯国防工业基地(DIB)正在对俄罗斯“加尔皮亚”(Garpiya)无人机进行升级,使其加装喷气发动机,但乌克兰的新型拦截无人机未来很可能能够防御这些新型无人机。在车里雅宾斯克州举行的“中心-2026”战略指挥参谋部演习期间,俄军展示了新型喷气动力版“加尔皮亚”攻击无人机(俄罗斯制造的“格朗”(Geran)型无人机的改进型)。[52] 俄军已广泛使用喷气动力版“格朗”型无人机,克里姆林宫很可能正在扩大其喷气动力无人机的库存,以提高产量并扩大这些速度更快的无人机的使用范围。然而,一位乌克兰消息人士在10月2日评估称,改进型“加尔皮亚”无人机的产量并不大,而且这些无人机目前没有使用网状调制解调器或摄像头来增强导航和打击精度。乌克兰正在积极测试和扩大新型拦截无人机的生产规模,这些无人机可以击落俄罗斯的喷气式无人机和无人机导弹混合体,乌克兰军队无法持续大量击落喷气式攻击车辆的窗口期可能在短期内开始缩小。[53]
白俄罗斯的重大活动
没有什么重大事项需要报告。
注:ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料,仅使用公开信息,并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体,以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。
[1] https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/2106288502438801787 [2] https://tvrmoldova dot md/article/9e16f417a7258869/nosatii-cele-cinci-incidente-de-sambata-implica-trei-rachete-si-doua-drone.html [3] https://t.me/maeiexplica/5582 [4] https://t.me/MDNationalArmy/2634 [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/Russia-ukraine/ Russian-offective-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ [8] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7755; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7756; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7757 [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ [11] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2151808/ [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ [13] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7786 [14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/ [15] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2106400448680808909 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21182 [16] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2106274451545375149 [17] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@35.817,53.371,13.699z [18] https://t.me/tro119ua/132; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13107 [19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [20] https://t.me/mod_russia/67897 [21] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22367 [22] https://t.me/severnnyi/9503 [23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48312 [24] https://t.me/severnnyi/9503 [25] https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19967 [26] https://t.me/grvZapad/19967; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [27] https://t.me/grvZapad/19967; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [28] https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [29] https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [30] https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56463; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933 [32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w&pp=0gcJCf4LAYcqIYzv; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1418331-na-desatki-kilometriv-uglib-93-ombr-urazae-logsiku-okupantiv-na-kostantinivskomu-napramku/ [33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360 [34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42456 [36] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2106289060968800587?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1460763202650395 [37] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1814; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2106090886203338766?s=20 [38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451; https://t.me/wargonzo/37360; https://t.me/dva_majors/99933; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56451 [39] https://t.me/voin_dv/21408 [40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56451 [41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42453; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42451 [42] https://crimea-energy.ru/about/news/13607-14-37; https://crimea-energy.ru/about/news/13600-13-36; https://crimea-energy.ru/about/news/13598-12-35 [43] https://t.me/rian_crimea/105786 [44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-6-2026/; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/105596; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1375004-simferopol-kerc-ani-kapu-armansk-feodosia-bez-vodi-u-krimu-die-takoz-obmezenna-elektropostacanna/ [45] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-Russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [46] https://t.me/kpszsu/82542 [47] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid027VCcc9bxf5YLED6TVNePywWbzrkyUvMzHbDzSF2figavsmgxyrNXJ6rhMczVCdJ4l; https://t.me/kpszsu/82542 [48] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid027VCcc9bxf5YLED6TVNePywWbzrkyUvMzHbDzSF2figavsmgxyrNXJ6rhMczVCdJ4l [49] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2106400448680808909; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32337; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32339; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32356; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32359; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7755; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7756; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7757; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/03/u-gostomeli-cherez-rosijskyj-obstril-postrazhdaly-chetvero-lyudej-sered-nyh-dytyna/; https://t.me/kyivoda/59750; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/613; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1418499-rf-atakuvala-sudno-na-odesini-odin-zagiblij-troe-poranenih/; [50] https://t.me/mod_ Russia/67891; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472;https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76472;https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/10/03/u-gostomeli-cherez-rosijskyj-obstril-postrazhdaly-chetvero-lyudej-sered-nyh-dytyna/;https://t.me/kyivoda/59750 [51] https://t.me/rybar/83671 [52] https://t.me/milinfolive/180747;https://t.me/war_home/7720; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/reaktyvnyi-versiyu-garpyya/ [53] https://understandingwar.org/research/ Russia-ukraine/ Russian-offective-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/