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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 9, 2026

US President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 9 to waive sanctions on Russian diesel.

ISWAllan Saunders查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月9日

US President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 9 to waive sanctions on Russian diesel to increase diesel supply to the United States’ and global markets — a decision which will fund Russia’s war effort and protract Russia’s war in Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that Russia will immediately supply over 300,000 tons of diesel to the United States’ and global markets, another 500,000 tons in November 2026, and one million tons “immediately thereafter” and noted that Russian oil refineries can supply another three million tons of diesel “in a short time” depending on their conditions. The US Treasury Department issued a temporary general license, at Trump‘s direction, to allow Russian diesel supply to the global market.[2] Russian exports accounted for only 9.5 percent of the global diesel export supply in 2025, and the Russian Federation temporarily banned diesel exports on July 8, 2026 as Ukraine intensified its long-range strike campaigns against Russia’s oil refining capacity and intermediate-range campaign against Russian logistics, including the deliveries of fuel to occupied Ukraine and the frontline.[3] The US’ decision to allow Russia to supply diesel to the global markets, including to the United States, will support the Kremlin’s efforts to stonewall US efforts to end the war, as the profits from diesel exports will enable Russia to continue funding its war in Ukraine. The US decision to grant Russia a waiver to export diesel also represents a unilateral US concession in its negotiation posture with Russia, when Russia has offered the US no concessions in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Montenegrin law enforcement authorities detained Mikhail Zvinchuk – the founder of the Russian ultranationalist Telegram channel “Rybar” – in Risan, Bay of Kotor, Montenegro on the morning of October 9. The Montenegrin police and the Montenegrin National Security Agency (ANB) detained Zvinchuk, his wife, and three of his associates after days of surveillance, according to a Montenegrin publication, Vijesti.[4] Zvinchuk and his associates arrived in Montenegro to film a documentary video on the negative impacts of the European Union (EU) visa policy, which Montenegrin authorities thought aimed to present European integration as a politically forced process that negatively impacts Montenegrin tourism, economic stability, and national interests. Montenegrin law enforcement agencies reported that the Zvinchuk’s detention aimed to suppress the “hybrid activities” of the network of channels linked to Kremlin propaganda dissemination and foreign information influence operations. Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajic stated on October 9 that Montenegrin authorities are protecting the country’s national interests to prevent “hybrid actions” and destabilization attempts.[5] The Rybar Telegram channel claimed that Zvinchuk and his associates were in Montenegro legally and did not violate local laws.[6]

Russian officials and milbloggers responded with outrage and urged the Russian government to take retaliatory measures, including reciprocally detaining US and European nationals, in response to Zvinchuk’s arrest. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Russia will need to start detaining European and US nationals to “replenish” its “exchange fund.”[7] A Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russia should detain and arrest a few EU journalists.[8] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov claimed that Russia should apply a new Russian law that allows Russian President Vladimir Putin to use Russian military forces to protect Russian citizens abroad in the event of their arrest, detention, criminal prosecution, or other legal proceedings in foreign courts.[9]

The Montenegrin Police Directorate deported Zvinchuk and his associates to Russia shortly after their detention on October 9 despite Zvinchuk being under British sanctions and being an internationally wanted person by the US government.[10] Zvinchuk reportedly served in the Spetsnaz of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff and worked in the press service of the Russian Ministry of Defense during the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War.[11] Zvinchuk previously received funding from Russian defense companies, including Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, and cooperated with Russian intelligence services.[12] Zvinchuk notably worked closely with the deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, who likely funded the Rybar channel for a time, and has possibly connected Zvinchuk to Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) representatives to arrange the publishing of favorable information.[13] The United Kingdom issued sanctions against 10 individuals linked to the Rybar Telegram channel on July 13, 2026, for spreading false narratives about Ukraine and interfering in European elections.[14] The US Department of State offered a $10 million reward in October 2024 for information on or the location of Zvinchuk, his wife, and a number of Rybar channel associates for promoting Russia’s political interests ahead of the 2024 US election.[15]

Ukrainian forces conducted a second long-range strike against a Yandex (Russia’s closest analog to Google) data center in Kaluga Oblast on October 9. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point stated that Ukrainian forces struck the largest of Yandex’s five data centers with a 63 megawatts capacity in Kaluga City, Kaluga Oblast (roughly 290 kilometers from the frontline). [16] Fire Point noted that the Kaluga City strike is the second Yandex data center that Ukrainian forces targeted, implying that Ukrainian forces struck Yandex’s data center in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast (roughly 530 kilometers from the international border) on October 8.[17] Yandex confirmed that a drone strike damaged part of the data center infrastructure in Kaluga City, completely disabling several modules and causing some service outages.[18] The data center houses over 3,800 server racks over 130,000 square meters.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 8 that Ukraine is responding to Russian strikes, including those targeting Ukraine’s data centers, but did not share additional details.[20] Yandex Kaluga data center is the second Russian data center that Ukrainian forces struck over the past two days amidst intensified Russian strikes against Ukrainian data centers since mid-September 2026.[21] Western export controls and sanctions against Russia will very likely prevent Yandex from promptly replacing the likely-damaged advanced semiconductors. Russia remains highly susceptible to international sanctions that restrict its access to technologically advanced components used to repair the equipment damaged during Ukraine’s strikes, such as oil processing equipment and semiconductors, further degrading Russia’s economic and military potential. Ukraine’s recent strikes targeting Yandex’s infrastructure may enable the Russian government to potentially nationalize Yandex under the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 24 decree which authorized the Russian federal government to seize critical infrastructure facilities failing to adequately protect or repair their assets.[22] Russia’s nationalization of Yandex would allow the Kremlin to control Russia’s most popular internet search engine and have access to private data through Yandex’s email service and cloud storage, broadening the Kremlin’s censorship and repression capabilities.[23]

Russia is likely attempting to indigenize the production and assembly of key Geran-type strike drone components in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on October 9 that Russian Geran-type drones that recently struck Kyiv City contained 32-element controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPAs) — an upgrade from the previously used 16-element CRPAs.[24] Beskrestnov noted that the 32-element CRPAs double the number of electronic warfare (EW) systems that Ukraine needs to jam in order to suppress the drone’s Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance. An independent Russian investigative publication, The Insider, reported on October 9 that the 32-element CRPAs feature engraved “ALB” markings, indicating that Russian drone production facilities at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) produced or assembled the antennas.[25] The Insider noted that an increasing number of drone components carry Russian-language stickers, which may indicate their assembly at the Alabuga SEZ. The Insider added that the new CRPA design closely resembles the PRC company Harxon’s design. Local assembly of advanced CRPAs and PRC-origin Telefly TF-TJ2000A turbojet engines for Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered drones at the Alabuga SEZ is part of Russia’s continued efforts to indigenize the production and assembly of key advanced components for its jet-powered drones.[26] A PRC-owned company supplied a Russian facility at the Alabuga SEZ with 46 tons of carbon fiber precursors earlier in 2026 as Russia attempts to expand its carbon fiber production capacity at the Alabuga SEZ.[27] Russia has been continuously expanding and centralizing its drone production capacity at the Alabuga SEZ, while simultaneously constructing new underground workshops and passive air defenses to protect its drone production from Ukraine’s long-range strikes.[28] The PRC remains a key contributor to Russia’s strike drone production, and the possibly licensed production and local assembly of key drone components indicate continued deep technological cooperation between Russia and the PRC.

US President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 9 to waive sanctions on Russian diesel to increase diesel supply to the United States’ and global markets – a decision which will fund Russia’s war effort and protract Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Montenegrin law enforcement authorities detained Mikhail Zvinchuk – the founder of the Russian ultranationalist Telegram channel “Rybar” – in Risan, Bay of Kotor, Montenegro on the morning of October 9.

Russian officials and milbloggers responded with outrage and urged the Russian government to take retaliatory measures, including reciprocally detaining US and European nationals, in response to Zvinchuk’s arrest.

The Montenegrin Police Directorate deported Zvinchuk and his associates to Russia shortly after their detention on October 9 despite Zvinchuk being under British sanctions and being an internationally wanted person by the US government.

Ukrainian forces conducted a second long-range strike against a Yandex (Russia’s closest analog to Google) data center in Kaluga Oblast on October 9.

Russia is likely attempting to indigenize the production and assembly of key Geran-type strike drone components in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian defense industrial facilities and oil infrastructure in Russia overnight on October 8 to 9. Russian forces launched 136 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman and east of Oleksandrivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian defense industrial facilities in Nizhny Novgorod and Tver oblasts overnight on October 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Barmin Research Institute of Launch Systems near Dalneye Konstantinovo-5 (roughly 720 kilometers from the international border), which is a subsidiary of the Center for the Operation of Ground-Based Space Infrastructure Facilities and develops and produces launch and technical systems; refueling equipment; and ground-, air-, and sea-based missile and space systems.[29] Ukrainian forces also struck the Center for the Elimination of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles near Surovatikha, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (roughly 743 kilometers from the international border), which specializes in explosives and missile fuel production.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Redkino Research Plant, which produces fuel components for Russia’s Kh-55 and Kh-101 cruise missiles, near Redkino, Konakovsky Okrug, Tver Oblast (roughly 513 kilometers from the international border). Tver Oblast Governor Vitaly Korolev acknowledged on October 9 that a Ukrainian strike caused a fire at a plant in Konakovsky Okrug.[31]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Komi Republic. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Ukhta Oil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic (roughly 1,780 kilometers from the international border) using new An-196 RS drones.[32]

Ukrainian forces also continued their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system near Kudepsta, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 439 kilometers from the international border) on October 8 or overnight on October 8 to 9.[33]

Open-source imagery provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure. Satellite imagery published on October 8 shows one RVS-20000 and four RVSPK-50000 oil tanks burning following Ukrainian strikes against the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 937 kilometers from the international border) on October 2 and 7.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 8 and 9 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Sumy City .[35] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 8 that Russian forces cleared a forested area south of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[36]

Ukrainian military officials denied Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims of advances north of Sumy City .[37] The Russian MoD claimed on October 9 that Russian forces seized Kyianytsia (north of Sumy City).[38] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade with the claimed seizure.[39] The Ukrainian 8th Airborne Assault Corps denied the Russian MoD’s claim and reported that Ukrainian forces maintain control over the settlement.[40]

Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against military infrastructure in Russian border areas. Geolocated footage published on October 8 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against a Russian Irbis counterbattery radar southwest of Krasnaya Polyana, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 20 kilometers from the international border.[41]

Recent reports suggest that Ukrainian forces may be more active near the borders of Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk oblasts. Russian milbloggers claimed on October 7 and 9 in since-deleted posts that Russian forces and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service recently repelled a Ukrainian attempt to advance at the Troebortnoye border crossing at the junction of Russia’s Bryansk and Kursk oblasts and Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast.[42] The milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted HIMARS strikes against Khinel, Bryansk Oblast (just northwest of the checkpoint).[43] A Russian source made nearly identical claims on October 8 but did not delete the post.[44] Other Russian milbloggers claimed on October 6 that Ukrainian forces were increasingly infiltrating into Bryansk Oblast and noted that Russian forces and border guards in the area lack sufficient fortified strongpoints and firepower.[45] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 24 that fighting has resumed near Otruba, Kursk Oblast, which the source described as one of the final areas where Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Kursk Oblast.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces appear to be increasing the intensity of their infiltration missions, including by undertaking highly attritional tactics, to seize settlements in northern Kharkiv Oblast before the onset of autumnal weather. The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on October 8 that Russian forces are trying to seize Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City) and Mali Prokhody (north of Kharkiv City) by the end of October.[47] The commander reported that some Russian forces have been able to enter Kozacha Lopan but that Ukrainian forces maintain control over the settlement. The commander reported that Russian forces are trying to take advantage of better weather conditions, such as the last summer leaves that offer concealment, before the onset of fall. The commander added that Russian forces have been resorting to unconventional tactics, such as moving over open terrain during the day, while the main group of Russian soldiers distract Ukrainian forces. These daytime tactics across open fields — a time and place when Russian infiltrators are usually most vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes — suggest a sense of urgency as Russian forces are trying to advance before weather conditions change.

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 9 that elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are attempting to seize Kozacha Lopan despite the fact that Russian officials previously announced the seizure of the settlement on September 2.[48] The source stated, however, that the regiment’s forward positions are still in Hraniv (roughly one kilometer north of Kozacha Lopan’s northern boundary) and that only infiltrators have been able to reach Nova Kozacha (just south of Kozacha Lopan).

Russian milbloggers continue to debate the existence of the alleged large-scale encirclement between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces isolated Varvarivka and Mykolaivka (both north of Velykyi Burluk), supposedly creating a smaller encirclement within the claimed larger Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and milbloggers have regularly made baseless claims of a large-scale encirclement in the Velykyi Burluk direction, despite no evidence to support their claims.[50] Another Russian milblogger complained on October 8 that many Russian sources are presenting exaggerated Russian advances in the Kharkiv Oblast encirclement that do not correspond to reality.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember in southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on October 8, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, while a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that fighting is ongoing in the settlement.[53] The Russian MoD claimed on October 9 that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against a bridge over the Oskil River near Osynovo (just west of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi), likely in order to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics in the area and prevent Ukrainian forces from moving personnel and materiel across the river to Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[54]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 8 and 9 but did not advance. [55]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian forces recently advanced toward the Zherebets River northeast of Lyman. Geolocated footage published on October 8 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position west of Zarichne (northeast of Lyman on the western bank of the Zherebets River), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area as Ukrainian forces continue to push Russian forces back to the river as part of Operation Vivaldi.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control Zarichne.[57] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are moving toward the river near Yampil (south of Zarichne) and are trying to enter the Serebryanske forest (east of Yampil).[58] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Yampil is a contested “gray zone” into which small Ukrainian groups are penetrating.[59]

Ukrainian forces reportedly heavily relied on artillery strikes in order to prevent Russian forces from regaining lost positions during Operation Vivaldi, demonstrating how artillery remains relevant even in modern, drone-dominated battlefield conditions. Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps stated on October 9 that the corps assembled a large artillery group during Operation Vivaldi such that Ukrainian forces could maintain continuous fire even when individual artillery guns were inoperable.[60] The corps added that Ukrainian forces were able to keep Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, and Kolodyazi (all north and northeast of Lyman) under fire such that Russian forces could not bring up reserves, equipment, or ammunition to try to restore their lost positions. The corps reported that Ukrainian HIMARS strikes destroyed over 20 artillery guns, two Buk air defense systems, and two transport-loading vehicles and struck Russian command posts at and above the battalion level.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Evidence continues to emerge that Ukrainian forces have crossed the Siversky Donets River east of Slovyansk. Geolocated footage published on October 8 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions just south of the Siverskyi Donets River northwest of Pyskunivka (east of Slovyansk and on the southern bank of the river).[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control about half of Pyskunivka.[62] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces control eastern Kryva Luka (just east of Pyskunivka on the southern bank of the river) but that the western part is a contested “gray zone.”[63] ISW began to observe claims on September 23 suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have crossed the Siverskyi Donets River, and that Ukrainian advances across the river aim to disrupt Russian attempts to assault Slovyansk from the east from the Mykolaivka area.[64]

Order of Battle: Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 9 that elements of the Russian 71st Separate Unmanned Systems Forces Regiment (Moscow Military District) are operating in the Lyman direction — the first time ISW has observed evidence of this unit operating in Ukraine.[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on October 8 and 9 but did not advance.[66] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 9 that Ukrainian forces control the northern part of Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[67] The milblogger added that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka).

The Russian MoD reiterated its false claims that Russian forces have seized Kostyantynivka.[68] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have yet to seize the city and have not consolidated many of the positions in the city into which Russian forces have infiltrated. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces had advanced within less than 40 percent of Kostyantynivka as of early October.[69] Russian officials first claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka in early July 2026.[70]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged how Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction has disrupted the wider Russian campaign to seize the Fortress Belt. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that advances within Dobropillya will allow Russian forces to create a “pincer” for a wide envelopment of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the west but noted that continued destabilization on the northern flank — referring to Ukraine’s successful Operation Vivaldi north of the Fortress Belt — will make attacks in Dobropillya “practically pointless.”[71] Russian forces initially intended to conduct a deep encirclement of the entire Fortress Belt from the Lyman direction in the north and the Dobropillya direction in the southwest, linking up near Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast.[72]

Russian forces may be increasing the tempo of their attacks in and near Dobropillya in order to try to realize the Russian MoD’s false claims of advance in the area before autumnal weather conditions make movement more difficult. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing in northern and western Dobropillya — in line with the Russian MoD’s baseless allegations that Russian forces recently made significant advances to encircle the town.[73] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on October 9, however, that Ukrainian forces are eliminating Russian infiltrators within Dobropillya.[74] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction reported that Russian forces are increasing the number of assaults before the onset of bad weather conditions.[75] Russian forces may be pushing to seize as much territory in the Dobropillya direction as they can before the start of the muddy rasputitsa season during which infantry movement on foot and vehicle movement both for attacks and supplies becomes more difficult.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that an October 6 Ukrainian strike destroyed a Russian airborne (VDV) division command and observation post near Ukrainka (southeast of Pokrovsk and Dobropillya and roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[76] Elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division are operating in the Dobropillya direction.[77]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 9.

Ukrainian forces advanced east of Oleksandrivka, and Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southwest of Oleksandrivka. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 9 that Ukrainian forces liberated Fedorivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[78] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position southeast of Ternuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka), according to geolocated footage published on October 6, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Burlatske, Nove Pole, and Temyrivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka).[80]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 8 and 9 but did not advance.[81]

Ukrainian forces are conducting defensive actions in the Hulyaipole direction to halt Russian advances toward Zaporizhzhia City. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 8 that it has taken over responsibility for the Hulyaipole direction and that the corps is prioritizing degrading Russian forces’ offensive potential; interdicting Russian logistics, especially along the P-85 (formerly T-0401) Hulyaipole-Polohy highway; and denying Russian forces the ability to use Hulyaipole as a staging ground for offensive operations toward Zaporizhzhia City.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 8 that Russian forces control the eastern outskirts and central parts of Orikhiv.[84] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 9 that Russian forces have trapped Ukrainian forces in northern Orikhiv and Preobrazhenka (just north of Orikhiv) and are interdicting Ukrainian attempts to supply the trapped forces.[85] ISW has observed no evidence to indicate that Russian forces have advanced or even infiltrated into northern Orikhiv, into Preobrazhenka, or north of the two settlements.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 8 or 9.

Areas of occupied Crimea are experiencing power outages, likely as continued effects of Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against the peninsula. A Crimean source reported on October 9 that residents of occupied Bakhchysarai Raion have been without power for four days due to unspecified “technological malfunctions.”[86]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [87]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 136 Shahed-type (including 93 jet-powered drones) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 114 drones (including 77 jet-powered drones), that an unspecified number of drones struck eight locations, and that debris fell on seven locations.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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