What will the surge of US forces to the Middle East cost the military?美国向中东增兵将给军方带来多大的代价?
The Pentagon says its surge in forces has helped avert a regional war. But officials warn that it could wear down the services.

SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINES — The day the Middle East almost erupted into a full regional war this summer, Lloyd Austin was touring an Asian shipyard.
Just before the defense secretary visited Subic Bay, Philippines, the former site of a massive U.S. Navy base, Israel killed the political leader of Hamas, who was visiting Iran.
Austin’s July visit was meant to show his focus on Asia, the region America says is its top priority. Instead, he ended the trip distracted by the Middle East, spending hours containing the crisis on a flight back to Washington.
“We’re going to do everything we can to make sure that we keep things from turning into a broader conflict,” Austin told reporters that day.
The U.S. military has spent much of the past year backing up that sentiment.
Since Oct. 7, when Hamas’ attack on Israel provoked all-out war in Gaza, the Pentagon has been on call. When the region has approached a wider war, the Defense Department surged forces there to calm it down. But after a year, some in Congress and the Pentagon are growing concerned about how to sustain that pace, and what it will cost the military in the long term.
Call it the U.S. Central Command squeeze. The Pentagon insists its surge has helped stop the Middle East from falling into chaos. But the longer the region borders on conflict, the more the U.S. tests its endurance for crises later on, most notably, a future conflict with China.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at Philippine navy headquarters as part of his visit to Subic Bay, Philippines, July 2024. (DOD)
The pressure on the military increased even further this week. After their most intense attacks in almost 20 years, Israel and the Lebanese militia group Hezbollah are close to a larger war. On Monday, Austin yet again ordered more troops to the region, joining 40,000 other American personnel there, 6,000 more than normal. Another aircraft carrier may soon follow.
“We’re caught in this kind of never-ending quagmire of having to divert resources, and we’re burning [out] on the back end,” a senior congressional aide said.
This story is based on interviews with analysts, current and former defense officials and congressional staffers, many of whom were allowed to speak anonymously either because they weren’t permitted to talk to the press or because they were discussing sensitive topics.
Their message was that America’s military wouldn’t exhaust itself anytime soon, but that a year of unplanned deployments and spent missiles come with a cost. Even more, they said, the longer the crisis continues, the more the Pentagon will have to manage tradeoffs between the urgent needs of the Middle East and the rising challenges of the Indo-Pacific.
A sailor passes information via sound-powered phone on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt in the Middle East earlier this month. (U.S. Navy)
The way American military leaders in the Middle East describe it, they woke up to an entirely new world on Oct. 7.
For the last several years, the narrative around U.S. forces in the region had been one of decreased focus, with adversaries in the Europe and the Pacific taking priority.
That changed when Hamas fighters stormed into Israel, killing 1,200 and taking hundreds more hostage . For the short-term, at least, the U.S. was refocused on the Middle East.
“We didn’t know what this was the start of,” an American military official told Defense News. “We immediately started to go to worst-case planning.”
Within weeks of Oct. 7, in support of Israel, the U.S. sent two carrier strike groups, the Gerald R. Ford and the Dwight D. Eisenhower, to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Middle East. It doubled the number of Air Force fighter squadrons in CENTCOM. And to defend its forces already in the region, the Pentagon rushed valuable air defense batteries nearby.
“Our advice to those who might seek to exploit the situation or amplify the conflict is simple, don’t,” a senior U.S. defense official warned in an October press briefing.
This phrase, which became a cliché among senior members of the U.S. government, was still a clear statement of mission. America was sprinting to defend Israel and its own forces in the region.
That became harder the longer the war lasted. Oct. 7 brought direct attacks between Hamas and Israel, but it also upset a delicate balance among other groups.
Soon after the attack, Israel and Hezbollah — which has a formidable force, armed with over 130,000 rockets — started trading fire in a cycle of escalating skirmishes.
Militant groups armed by Iran started attacking Israeli and American forces, especially the 3,500 or so stationed between Iraq and Syria , with three soldiers dying in one such attack in January.
Three Army Reserve soldiers were killed in the Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack on the Tower 22 base in Jordan. They are: Sgt. Kennedy L. Sanders, Sgt. Breonna A. Moffett, and Staff Sgt. William J. Rivers. All three were assigned to the 718th Engineer Company, based at Fort Moore, Georgia, and were posthumously promoted. (U.S. Army)
Meanwhile, the Houthis, a terrorist group in Yemen, started firing on commercial ships in the Red Sea, a vital economic waterway where 15% of global trade flowed before last fall.
The Navy’s running sea fight with the Houthis is the longest and most kinetic since World War II, according to service leaders.
“There’s flavors of all those activities in the past and previous rounds that I’ve been involved in, but I don’t recall a period when so many of them have merged,” said another senior U.S. defense official, describing the different attacks.
As the threats rose, so too did the demand on America’s military. By December, the U.S. began Operation Prosperity Guardian , a multinational mission to protect shipping in the Red Sea. It devoted an aircraft carrier and destroyers to the task.
In April, when Iran lobbed hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel, the U.S. and its partners helped intercept nearly all of them.
America’s national defense strategy accepts that its military can’t be everywhere in the numbers it would want. Instead, the plan is to have a movable force. Put more practically: the U.S. argues it can rush to contain crises like the Middle East after Oct. 7 while still deterring a conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific.
“That’s what we were saying before Oct. 7 and we just demonstrated it,” said Dana Stroul, a top Pentagon Middle East official until early this year. “It’s been a proof of concept.”
But the plan requires these emergencies to eventually end. Despite months of intense diplomacy in the region, the administration is now showing less confidence in its proposed ceasefire deal. And now Israel — the country America has spent the last year defending — may itself be opening a new front in the war against Hezbollah.
“You can’t employ diplomacy without the backbone of military capability,” said retired Gen. Frank McKenzie, who led CENTCOM until 2022. “Military capability without diplomatic messaging is not a good way to approach the problem either.”
The Navy destroyer Laboon, shown here in December, is one of several warships that have shot down drones and missiles fired by Iran-backed Houthi Rebels over the Red Sea. (U.S. Navy)
“You need both but you have to be willing to bear the burden,” he continued.
For some in Congress especially, the concern is that the Middle East is a distraction from the Indo-Pacific.
Pentagon leaders say they calculate the risk in pulling assets from one region to another, and that the choice to move forces away from Asia is a sign that they consider the region stable enough to do so.
Not everyone in the region is convinced.
“I have relayed messages that it is better to invest in deterrence where there is no overt conflict, rather than intervene in a conflict where there is one already,” the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro said in an August interview. He wouldn’t specify who in the U.S. those messages have reached.
The benefit, in the Defense Department’s eyes, of such a large response in the Middle East over the last year is to contain a crisis that threatened to engulf the entire region.
The periodic surges haven’t accomplished everything the U.S. has wanted. The Navy regularly intercepts Houthi drones and missiles, but the attacks by the Iran-backed group continue, and most shipping companies have chosen to reroute rather than risk becoming a target. Nor is it certain that the militia group will stop even if there is a ceasefire — something Pentagon officials say they still don’t know.
As the recent fire between Israel and Hezbollah has shown, the U.S. is also stuck responding to the rise and fall in the regional conflict, what Pentagon leaders often liken to riding a roller coaster.
“It’s obviously lasted longer than anyone would want,” the second defense official said.
That notwithstanding, there hasn’t yet been a wider war in the Middle East. And while it acknowledges other forces at work, the Pentagon says it’s helped avoid one.
“The force posture does matter,” Secretary Austin told reporters this month. “In some cases, Iran can see … many of the capabilities that we have available. In many cases, they can’t.”
That said, the cost of this posture is also becoming clearer.
The first, and perhaps the most important, part of that tally is the military’s ability to meet future needs, known as “readiness” in defense jargon. By sending more forces to the Middle East, the Pentagon is accepting what amounts to a mortgage: higher costs on its forces to avoid an even bigger bill.
There’s no more pressing example of this trade than aircraft carriers.
These ships are the Navy’s most powerful, most visible weapon, and they’re a primary way the U.S. often flexes its military muscle.
An F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to the "Jolly Rogers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 103 launches from the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower during its extended deployment to the Middle East that ended this summer. (U.S. Navy)
That said, carriers need a lot of maintenance, and spend about two-thirds of their life in port undergoing some kind of repair. The Navy calibrates their time at sea and their time for maintenance, allowing for some margin, but not much.
Central Command spent two years without a carrier after America left Afghanistan in 2021. But since Oct. 7, the U.S. has rotated four of them into the Middle East. Most of them have also been deployed longer than their scheduled seven months at sea.
“If we delay a carrier from going back into port and going back into a maintenance period by a month, it causes an even longer period” of disruption, the third defense official said. “It’s not a one-for-one delay.”
Without specifying the impact of these extensions so far, multiple defense officials and congressional aides said the U.S. is already having to manage “tradeoffs” between the needs of the Middle East today and other areas in the future.
Still, in an interview, the head of readiness for the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command, which oversees the East Coast-based fleet, argued that the schedules and ships themselves have proved resilient and aren’t yet showing higher wear.
“Sailing those ships in harm’s way for more months certainly will put stress on that, but I really don’t see that process breaking,” Rear Adm. Paul Lanzilotta said.
This February, the Houthis shot a ballistic missile at the Navy destroyer Gravely in the Red Sea, one of many times the militia group targeted American ships in the waterway.
But this one came close. In fact, the ship used a short-range weapon — rather than the typical missile — to intercept the attack. The Houthis came within a nautical mile of success, according to Navy officials.
This is an example of the other two costs involved in the Pentagon’s response. One is to personnel, who are being targeted by militia groups more often and are, in some cases, being deployed longer than planned. The other is the military’s own weapons needed to respond.
The Navy estimates that between Oct. 7 and mid-July, it fired $1.16 billion worth of munitions while on station in the Red Sea.
Many of these are older versions of missiles — such as Tomahawks and Standard Missile 2 interceptors — that wouldn’t be as useful in a fight against China, said a second congressional aide.
Drawings of drones and missiles that have been shot down are painted on the fuselage of a fighter jet stationed on the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea on June 11, 2024. The U.S.-led campaign against Iran-backed Houthi rebels has turned into the most intense running sea battle the Navy has faced since World War II. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
Still, as long as the Navy is around the Red Sea, it will need to fire weapons that cost more than what they’re shooting down — an equation known in the military as an “exchange ratio.” That deficit has fallen as the U.S. escorts fewer vessels and experiments more with other ways to stop these attacks, multiple officials and analysts told Defense News. But there’s only so many ways the military can adapt, and it won’t risk losing sailors or ships that cost billions.
“We’ve dodged disaster so far, but that doesn’t really mean it’s mission accomplished,” said a third congressional aide.
In April, Congress passed a $95 billion addition to the Pentagon budget, with $2.44 billion in extra money for Central Command. That funding was designed to last six months, according to the first congressional aide, which would mean it’s almost out today.
The Pentagon comptroller office declined to offer an estimate of how much more the surge in forces is costing and whether the Defense Department was still running a deficit to pay for it.
Multiple staffs in Congress said the bill for the last six months will be about the same number as in April: $2 to $3 billion.
Lawmakers can either pay the bill down in another supplemental or by folding the total into their overall defense spending bill, as the Senate did with $1.75 billion for Central Command. That said, lawmakers will soon start the year on a short-term budget called a continuing resolution, which freezes Pentagon spending at last year’s level.
The Navy destroyer Gravely launches Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles in the Red Sea on Jan. 12. (U.S. Navy)
‘Still in the crisis’
Meanwhile even as funding runs out, the war in Gaza shows no sign of ending.
In August, after Austin returned to Washington from the Philippines, he sent a fighter squadron, a submarine, destroyers and a second aircraft carrier rerouted from the Indo-Pacific this year to CENTCOM. Iran didn’t attack, and Hezbollah’s response to an Israeli strike was limited. After a month and a half of relative calm, one of the two carriers in the region left.
During regular briefings, the Pentagon even started arguing that it had gotten in the “headspace” of Iran.
Then, earlier this month, Israel detonated thousands of devices belonging to Hezbollah and launched airstrikes in Lebanon — prompting the group to vow revenge. The two sides are now exchanging heavy fire across the border. Austin postponed a trip to Israel and Jordan this week, containing yet another flare up.
Between the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and CENTCOM, the U.S. now has at least one submarine, an aircraft carrier, three amphibious warships and nine destroyers, a defense official said. Two of those destroyers are in the Red Sea and were once slated to exit, the official said. After the attacks last week, the official continued, the Pentagon ordered them to stay.
In a call with reporters after Israel and Hezbollah’s latest standoff began, a senior administration official yet again said that the U.S. had helped avert a wider war and that a ceasefire was the best option for all in the region.
In the days after, Israel continued striking Lebanon killing hundreds in attacks that escalated their conflict further.
Another carrier strike group deployed for Europe this week on a previously scheduled deployment. The defense official said the Pentagon is drawing up plans in case it needs to divert into CENTCOM and transit the Red Sea.
“We very much will maintain that deterrent posture, because we are still in crisis,” the senior administration official said.
Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.
菲律宾苏比克湾——今年夏天,就在中东几乎爆发全面地区战争的那一天,劳埃德·奥斯汀正在参观一家亚洲造船厂。
就在国防部长访问菲律宾苏比克湾(美国海军曾经的大型基地所在地)之前,以色列杀害了正在伊朗访问的哈马斯政治领导人。
奥斯汀7月的访问旨在展现他对亚洲的重视,美国称亚洲是其首要关注的地区。然而,他此行的最终目的却被中东局势分散了注意力,在返回华盛顿的航班上花费数小时处理危机。
“我们将尽一切努力确保事态不会演变成更大的冲突,”奥斯汀当天告诉记者。
过去一年来,美国军方一直在大力支持这种观点。
自10月7日哈马斯袭击以色列引发加沙全面战争以来,五角大楼一直处于待命状态。每当该地区局势接近更大规模的战争时,国防部都会向该地区增派兵力以平息事态。但一年过去了,国会和五角大楼的一些人士开始担忧如何维持这种部署速度,以及从长远来看这将给军方带来怎样的代价。
不妨称之为美国中央司令部的“紧缩”。五角大楼坚称,其增兵行动帮助阻止了中东陷入混乱。但该地区冲突边缘持续的时间越长,美国就越是在考验自身应对未来危机的能力,尤其是应对未来与中国的冲突。
2024年7月,美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀在访问菲律宾苏比克湾期间,参观了菲律宾海军总部。(美国国防部)
本周,军方面临的压力进一步加大。以色列和黎巴嫩真主党在发动了近20年来最激烈的袭击后,距离更大规模的战争仅一步之遥。周一,奥斯汀再次下令向该地区增派部队,使驻扎在那里的美军人数达到4万人,比正常情况下多出6000人。另一艘航空母舰可能很快也会加入其中。
一位国会高级助理表示:“我们陷入了这种永无止境的资源转移泥潭,最终导致我们精疲力竭。”
这篇报道基于对分析人士、现任和前任国防官员以及国会工作人员的采访,其中许多人被允许匿名发言,要么是因为他们不被允许接受媒体采访,要么是因为他们讨论的是敏感话题。
他们的信息是,美国军力不会很快耗尽,但一年来计划外的军事部署和废弃导弹的使用都会付出代价。他们还表示,危机持续的时间越长,五角大楼就越需要在中东的迫切需求和印太地区日益严峻的挑战之间权衡取舍。
本月初,一名水兵在中东的“西奥多·罗斯福”号航空母舰飞行甲板上通过声控电话传递信息。(美国海军)
用美国驻中东军事领导人的话来说,10月7日,他们醒来后发现世界已经完全不同了。
过去几年,围绕美国在该地区的军事力量的讨论重点一直在减少,欧洲和太平洋地区的对手成为了优先事项。
哈马斯武装分子入侵以色列,造成1200人死亡,数百人被劫为人质,局势由此改变。至少在短期内,美国的关注焦点转移到了中东。
一位美国军方官员告诉《防务新闻》:“我们当时并不知道这究竟意味着什么。我们立即开始着手制定最坏情况应对方案。”
10月7日后的几周内,为了支持以色列,美国向东地中海和中东地区派遣了两个航母打击群,分别是“杰拉尔德·R·福特”号和“德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔”号。美国还将中央司令部空军战斗机中队的数量增加了一倍。为了保护已在该地区的部队,五角大楼紧急在附近部署了重要的防空导弹系统。
“我们给那些可能试图利用局势或加剧冲突的人的建议很简单:不要这样做,”一位美国高级国防官员在10月份的新闻发布会上警告说。
这句在美国政府高层中已成老生常谈的短语,仍然清晰地表明了美国的使命:美国正全力以赴地保卫以色列及其在该地区的军队。
战争持续的时间越长,情况就越发艰难。10月7日,哈马斯和以色列之间爆发了直接冲突,同时也打破了其他各方之间脆弱的平衡。
袭击发生后不久,以色列和拥有强大力量(装备有超过 13 万枚火箭弹)的真主党开始交火,双方陷入不断升级的小规模冲突。
伊朗武装组织开始袭击以色列和美国军队,特别是驻扎在伊拉克和叙利亚之间的约 3500 名美军士兵,1 月份的一次袭击中,有三名士兵丧生。
2024年1月28日,美国陆军预备役三名士兵在约旦22号塔楼基地遭无人机袭击身亡。他们分别是:肯尼迪·L·桑德斯中士、布雷奥娜·A·莫菲特中士和威廉·J·里弗斯上士。三人均隶属于驻扎在佐治亚州摩尔堡的第718工兵连,并被追授军衔。(美国陆军)
与此同时,也门的恐怖组织胡塞武装开始向红海的商船开火。红海是重要的经济航道,去年秋天之前,全球 15% 的贸易都要经过这里。
据军方领导人称,海军与胡塞武装的持续海战是二战以来持续时间最长、战斗最为激烈的海战。
另一位美国高级国防官员在描述这些不同的袭击时说:“过去和以前我参与过的几轮行动中都有这些活动的影子,但我记不清有哪个时期这么多活动融合在一起。”
随着威胁加剧,美国军方面临的需求也随之增加。到12月,美国启动了“繁荣卫士行动”,这是一项旨在保护红海航运的多国联合行动。为此,美国派遣了一艘航空母舰和多艘驱逐舰。
今年4月,伊朗向以色列发射了数百枚导弹和无人机,美国及其盟友帮助拦截了几乎所有这些目标。
美国的国家防御战略承认,其军队无法像预期那样遍布全球。因此,美国的计划是建立一支机动部队。更实际地说:美国认为,在10月7日之后,它既可以迅速应对中东等危机,又能遏制与中国在印太地区的冲突。
“我们在10月7日之前就是这么说的,而我们刚刚也证明了这一点,”今年年初卸任的五角大楼中东高级官员达纳·斯特鲁尔说。“这已经证明了这一概念的可行性。”
但该计划的前提是这些紧急情况最终必须结束。尽管几个月来该地区进行了密集的外交斡旋,但美国政府现在对其提出的停火协议表现出越来越少的信心。而现在,美国过去一年一直在保卫的以色列,可能正在与真主党的战争中开辟新的战线。
“没有军事能力作为后盾,外交就无从谈起,”曾任中央司令部司令直至2022年的退役将军弗兰克·麦肯齐说。“没有外交沟通,军事能力也不是解决问题的好方法。”
图中这艘海军驱逐舰“拉布恩”号(摄于去年12月)是击落伊朗支持的胡塞武装在红海上空发射的无人机和导弹的多艘军舰之一。(美国海军)
“两者都需要,但你必须愿意承担相应的责任,”他继续说道。
尤其是一些国会议员担心,中东问题会分散人们对印太地区的注意力。
五角大楼领导人表示,他们会计算将资产从一个地区调往另一个地区的风险,而选择将部队从亚洲撤离,表明他们认为该地区足够稳定,可以这样做。
并非该地区的所有人都对此深信不疑。
菲律宾国防部长吉尔伯托·特奥多罗在8月份的一次采访中表示:“我已传达的信息是,与其介入已经发生的冲突,不如在没有公开冲突的地方投资威慑。”但他没有具体说明这些信息传达给了美国哪些人。
在国防部看来,过去一年在中东采取如此大规模的应对措施的好处在于遏制了一场有可能席卷整个地区的危机。
周期性的军事增援并未完全实现美国的预期目标。海军虽然定期拦截胡塞武装的无人机和导弹,但这个伊朗支持的组织发动的袭击仍在继续,大多数航运公司为了避免成为攻击目标,选择改道航行。即使达成停火协议,也无法确定该武装组织是否会停止袭击——五角大楼官员表示,他们对此仍然一无所知。
正如最近以色列和真主党之间的冲突所表明的那样,美国也陷入了对地区冲突起伏的应对之中,五角大楼领导人经常把这种情况比作坐过山车。
“显然,这种情况持续的时间比任何人希望的都要长,”第二位国防官员说。
尽管如此,中东地区尚未爆发更大规模的战争。五角大楼虽然承认还有其他因素在起作用,但表示它已帮助避免了战争的爆发。
“兵力部署确实很重要,”奥斯汀部长本月对记者表示。“在某些情况下,伊朗可以看到……我们拥有的许多能力。但在很多情况下,他们看不到。”
话虽如此,这种做法的代价也越来越明显。
这项评估的首要部分,或许也是最重要的部分,是军队满足未来需求的能力,也就是国防术语中的“战备”。五角大楼通过向中东增派兵力,实际上相当于背负了一笔债务:为了避免更大的损失,不得不承担更高的部队开支。
这种贸易最直接的例子莫过于航空母舰。
这些舰艇是海军最强大、最引人注目的武器,也是美国展示军事实力的主要方式之一。
隶属于第103战斗攻击机中队“海盗旗”的F/A-18F超级大黄蜂战斗机从“德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔”号航空母舰上起飞,该航母在中东的长期部署于今年夏季结束。(美国海军)
话虽如此,航母需要大量的维护保养,大约三分之二的服役时间都在港口进行各种维修。海军会合理安排航母的出海时间和维护时间,留出一定的余地,但余地并不大。
美国中央司令部在2021年撤出阿富汗后,经历了两年没有航母部署的时期。但自10月7日以来,美国已将四艘航母轮换部署到中东。其中大多数航母的部署时间也超过了原定的七个月。
第三位国防官员表示:“如果我们让航母延迟一个月才能返回港口进行维护,就会造成更长时间的混乱。这不是一对一的延迟。”
虽然没有具体说明这些延期措施迄今为止的影响,但多位国防官员和国会助理表示,美国已经不得不权衡当前中东的需求和未来其他地区的需求之间的“取舍”。
不过,负责监督东海岸舰队的海军舰队司令部战备负责人接受采访时表示,进度安排和舰船本身都已证明具有韧性,尚未出现明显的磨损。
“让这些舰船在危险海域航行数月肯定会给它带来压力,但我真的不认为这个过程会崩溃,”保罗·兰齐洛塔海军少将说。
今年二月,胡塞武装向红海中的美国海军驱逐舰“格雷夫利”号发射了一枚弹道导弹,这是该民兵组织多次袭击该水道上的美国船只的事件之一。
但这次攻击非常接近成功。事实上,这艘军舰使用的是短程武器,而不是通常使用的导弹,来拦截胡塞武装的袭击。据海军官员称,胡塞武装距离成功仅差一海里。
这是五角大楼应对措施所涉及的另外两项成本的一个例子。一是人员成本,他们越来越频繁地成为民兵组织的袭击目标,在某些情况下,他们的部署时间甚至超过了原计划。二是军方自身应对措施所需的武器装备成本。
美国海军估计,从 10 月 7 日到 7 月中旬,在红海部署期间,海军发射了价值 11.6 亿美元的弹药。
另一位国会助理表示,其中许多是较老版本的导弹,例如战斧导弹和标准导弹2型拦截器,在与中国的战斗中作用不大。
2024年6月11日,在红海的“德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔”号航空母舰上,一架战斗机的机身上绘有被击落的无人机和导弹图案。美国领导的打击伊朗支持的胡塞武装的行动已演变为二战以来美国海军面临的最激烈的海上战斗。(美联社照片/贝尔纳特·阿曼格)
然而,只要美国海军还在红海附近活动,它就必须使用成本高于其击落目标的武器——这在军事上被称为“交换比率”。多位官员和分析人士告诉《防务新闻》,随着美国减少护航舰艇数量并尝试更多其他方式来阻止此类袭击,这一成本缺口有所下降。但军方能够采取的应对措施毕竟有限,它不会冒着损失水兵或价值数十亿美元的舰艇的风险。
“到目前为止,我们已经躲过了一场灾难,但这并不意味着任务已经完成,”第三位国会助理说道。
今年四月,国会通过了一项为五角大楼追加950亿美元的预算,其中24.4亿美元额外拨给了中央司令部。据国会第一助理透露,这笔资金的设计期限为六个月,这意味着它今天就几乎用完了。
五角大楼财务主管办公室拒绝估算增兵成本增加了多少,以及国防部是否仍在为支付这笔费用而出现赤字。
国会多位工作人员表示,过去六个月的账单金额将与四月份的账单金额大致相同:20亿至30亿美元。
议员们可以选择通过另一项补充拨款来偿还这笔费用,或者像参议院那样,将总额并入整体国防开支法案中,就像参议院将17.5亿美元纳入中央司令部预算那样。不过,议员们很快将以一项名为“持续决议”的短期预算开始新的一年,该决议将五角大楼的支出冻结在去年的水平。
1月12日,美国海军驱逐舰“格雷夫利”号在红海发射“战斧”陆攻导弹。(美国海军)
“仍处于危机之中”
与此同时,尽管资金已经耗尽,加沙战争却丝毫没有结束的迹象。
8月,奥斯汀从菲律宾返回华盛顿后,派遣了一个战斗机中队、一艘潜艇、几艘驱逐舰以及今年从印太地区调往中央司令部的第二艘航空母舰。伊朗没有发动攻击,真主党对以色列空袭的反应也较为有限。经过一个半月的相对平静后,该地区的两艘航母中的一艘离开了。
在例行简报会上,五角大楼甚至开始辩称,它已经“摸透”了伊朗的“思维模式”。
本月初,以色列引爆了数千枚属于真主党的爆炸装置,并对黎巴嫩发动了空袭,这促使真主党誓言报复。目前,双方正在边境地区激烈交火。奥斯汀本周推迟了前往以色列和约旦的行程,以避免局势再次升级。
一位国防官员表示,目前美国在东地中海和中央司令部之间至少部署了一艘潜艇、一艘航空母舰、三艘两栖战舰和九艘驱逐舰。该官员称,其中两艘驱逐舰位于红海,原本计划撤离。但上周袭击事件发生后,五角大楼命令它们留在红海。
在以色列和真主党最新一次对峙开始后,一位高级政府官员在与记者通话时再次表示,美国帮助避免了一场更大规模的战争,停火是该地区所有各方的最佳选择。
此后几天,以色列继续袭击黎巴嫩,造成数百人死亡,使双方冲突进一步升级。
本周,另一个航母打击群按原计划部署到欧洲。这位国防官员表示,五角大楼正在制定计划,以防需要转入中央司令部并穿越红海。
“我们将继续保持这种威慑姿态,因为我们仍然处于危机之中,”这位高级政府官员说。
诺亚·罗伯逊是《防务新闻》的五角大楼记者。他此前曾为《基督教科学箴言报》报道国家安全新闻。他拥有弗吉尼亚州威廉斯堡威廉与玛丽学院的英语和政治学学士学位。