Is the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy sustainable?

On Aug. 24, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy delivered an inspirational speech in Kyiv’s St. Sophia Square to mark Ukraine’s Independence Day. His message was familiar to anyone who has heard or read a Zelenskyy speech since he became a wartime president. “We are fighting the enemy,” he told the crowd . “And we know what we are capable of. We are capable of winning! And we will prevail!”

Nearly 5,000 miles away, U.S. President Joe Biden is exhibiting clarity of his own. The White House has stated time and again that the U.S. will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” which if defined literally would mean his administration is prepared to arm and finance Ukraine’s war effort against Russia until Kyiv’s total and complete military victory. It’s a pledge Biden reaffirmed during his phone call to Zelenskyy on the same day the Ukrainian president gave his Independence Day speech.

Lofty aspirations, however, are often blunted by cold, hard reality. And the reality is that the Biden administration’s Ukraine strategy is increasingly being tested by political, policy and resource constraints.

In the weeks and months after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his full-scale invasion , the administration was able to tap into the deeply ingrained, justifiable outrage expressed on Capitol Hill to get Ukraine the military assistance it needed to defend itself. About three weeks after the first Russian missiles fell, Congress tacked on $13 billion in emergency aid for Kyiv to the 2022 omnibus. In total, Congress has appropriated $113 billion in aid to Ukraine in four tranches — about 60%, or $67 billion, was earmarked for military assistance.

But what was possible yesterday might not be possible today. Having passed the war’s 18-month mark, a growing crop of lawmakers are questioning whether the U.S. can keep up the current level of support in perpetuity.

Ukraine aid is a major topic of debate within the Republican Party writ large. While GOP congressional leadership remains largely onboard, the rank and file are either opposed to writing more checks or are tying additional aid to more stringent accountability measures such as the formation of a special inspector general.

Fifty-five percent of Americans surveyed by CNN in July said Congress shouldn’t authorize more war funding, while 51% said the U.S. has already done enough for Ukraine.

Battlefield dynamics need to be considered as well. While the war has never been easy on Ukrainian forces at the front, 2022 was a year when the Ukrainian Army vastly outperformed expectations. Helped by consistent U.S. weapons supplies and a bumbling Russian military that couldn’t shoot straight or maintain its supply lines, Ukrainian troops were able to accomplish repeated tactical successes.

In April 2022, Russian units were forced to abandon their drive toward Kyiv after weeks of being bogged down by a lumbering, poor logistical system. In September, Ukrainian forces humiliated the Russian Army in Kharkiv; two months later, in Kherson, Russian commanders concluded it was better to organize a retreat from the Dnieper River’s western bank than keep investing manpower and equipment into tenuous positions.

But this year is proving to be far harder and more complicated for Ukrainian troops. The 10-weeklong Ukrainian counteroffensive along three points of the 600-mile front line can best be described as grueling. Anybody who anticipated a replay of the Kharkiv episode set themselves up for disappointment. The days when whole chunks of Ukrainian territory could be reclaimed are likely long gone, replaced with a highly intense combat environment in which those on the offensive reclaim tiny bits of land at a high cost in men and materiel.

While it’s too early to say that Kyiv’s counteroffensive has failed, neither can one assume it will eventually succeed. The Ukrainian Army has to find a way to break through three layers of Russian defensive fortifications and, just as importantly, hold those positions without atrophying its forces or degrading its ability to defend against Russian counterattacks. The U.S. intelligence community is skeptical this can be done this year, if ever.

To date, the Biden administration has managed to accomplish two objectives:

Assist Ukraine as it resists Russia’s aggression.

Ensure NATO isn’t dragged into the conflict, preventing escalation with a nuclear-armed Russia.

It’s a fine balancing act that could quickly unravel depending on how the war evolves. Straddle back the aid, and Russia’s prospects on the ground improve; outsource U.S. policy to Ukraine’s maximalist objectives, particularly in Crimea, and run the risk of a desperate Putin making even more desperate, dangerous decisions.

Biden, therefore, will have to be prepared for a scenario in which Russia’s defensive lines are simply too strong to break through. This is more likely than the full Russian troop withdrawal the Ukrainian government has been aiming for over the last year and a half.

The U.S. should adjust its policy accordingly, now, by dropping its support for maximalist Ukrainian war aims and pivot toward support for armed neutrality: consistent U.S. defensive support for the Ukrainian Army so it can keep the territory it presently holds and ensure Kyiv’s deterrent against Russian aggression is intact over the long haul.

Such a pivot will require compromises, but it’s the best way of bolstering Ukraine’s defensive needs in the least costly way possible. Meanwhile, Europe, which has more of a security imperative in boosting Ukraine’s victory or at least preventing its defeat, should use the time to exhibit primary leadership over this issue.

Tough but necessary choices are around the corner.

Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at the Chicago Tribune.

8月24日，乌克兰总统泽连斯基在基辅圣索菲亚广场发表了鼓舞人心的演讲，庆祝乌克兰独立日。自泽连斯基担任战时总统以来，他的演讲内容对任何听过或读过他演讲的人来说都耳熟能详。“我们正在与敌人作战，”他告诉人群，“我们知道我们有能力做到什么。我们有能力取得胜利！我们必将胜利！”

远在近5000英里之外，美国总统乔·拜登也展现出了清晰的立场。白宫一再声明，美国将“不惜一切代价”支持乌克兰。如果按字面意思理解，这意味着拜登政府准备武装并资助乌克兰对抗俄罗斯的战争，直至基辅取得彻底的军事胜利。在乌克兰总统泽连斯基发表独立日讲话的同一天，拜登在与泽连斯基的通话中重申了这一承诺。

然而，远大的抱负往往会被残酷的现实所击碎。而现实是，拜登政府的乌克兰战略正日益受到政治、政策和资源限制的考验。

在俄罗斯总统普京下令全面入侵乌克兰后的数周和数月里，美国政府利用国会山民众根深蒂固且合情合理的愤怒情绪，为乌克兰争取到了所需的军事援助，使其得以自卫。在俄罗斯首批导弹落下约三周后，国会在2022财年综合拨款法案中追加了130亿美元的紧急援助款项，用于援助基辅。迄今为止，国会已分四批向乌克兰拨款1130亿美元，其中约60%（即670亿美元）被指定用于军事援助。

但昨天可能发生的事情，今天未必就可能发生。战争已经持续了18个月，越来越多的议员开始质疑美国是否能够永远维持目前的援助水平。

对乌克兰的援助是共和党内部争论的焦点。虽然共和党国会领导层基本支持援助，但普通党员要么反对增加援助，要么要求将额外援助与更严格的问责措施挂钩，例如成立特别监察长办公室。

CNN 7 月份的一项调查显示，55% 的美国人表示国会不应该批准更多的战争资金，而 51% 的人表示美国已经为乌克兰做了足够多的事情。

战场动态也必须纳入考量。虽然战争对乌克兰前线部队而言从未轻松过，但2022年乌克兰军队的表现却远远超出了预期。得益于美国持续不断的武器供应，以及俄军在射击精度和后勤保障方面表现不佳，乌克兰军队得以屡次取得战术上的胜利。

2022年4月，俄军因后勤保障系统落后、行动迟缓，被迫放弃向基辅推进的计划。同年9月，乌克兰军队在哈尔科夫击败俄军，令其颜面尽失。两个月后，在赫尔松，俄军指挥官意识到，与其继续在脆弱的阵地上投入人力物力，不如从第聂伯河西岸撤退。

但对乌克兰军队而言，今年的形势远比以往更加艰难复杂。乌克兰军队在长达600英里的前线三处发起的为期10周的反攻，可谓异常艰苦。任何期待哈尔科夫战役重演的人都注定要失望。过去那种能够大面积收复乌克兰领土的日子恐怕早已一去不复返了，取而代之的是高度激烈的战斗环境，进攻方必须付出惨重的人员和物资代价，才能夺回一小块土地。

现在断言基辅的反攻失败还为时尚早，但也不能断言它最终一定会成功。乌克兰军队必须找到突破俄军三层防御工事的方法，而且同样重要的是，要在不消耗自身兵力或削弱抵御俄军反击能力的情况下守住这些阵地。美国情报界对此持怀疑态度，认为即使能够实现，今年也未必能做到。

迄今为止，拜登政府已成功实现两个目标：

援助乌克兰抵抗俄罗斯的侵略。

确保北约不被卷入冲突，防止与拥有核武器的俄罗斯发生冲突升级。

这是一种微妙的平衡，随时可能因战争的演变而崩溃。如果减少援助，俄罗斯在当地的前景就会改善；如果将美国政策外包给乌克兰的极端目标，尤其是在克里米亚问题上，则可能面临走投无路的普京做出更加孤注一掷、危险的决定的风险。

因此，拜登必须做好准备，应对俄罗斯防线过于坚固而无法突破的情况。这种情况发生的可能性比乌克兰政府过去一年半以来一直追求的俄罗斯军队全面撤出的可能性要大得多。

美国现在应该相应地调整其政策，放弃对乌克兰最大限度战争目标的支持，转而支持武装中立：持续向乌克兰军队提供防御支持，使其能够保住目前控制的领土，并确保基辅对俄罗斯侵略的威慑力在长期内保持完好。

这样的转变需要做出妥协，但这却是以尽可能低的成本加强乌克兰防御能力的最佳途径。与此同时，欧洲在确保乌克兰取得胜利或至少避免其战败方面负有更大的安全责任，因此应该利用这段时间在这一问题上展现出主导作用。

艰难但必要的抉择即将到来。

丹尼尔·德佩特里斯是国防优先事项研究员，也是《芝加哥论坛报》的专栏作家。