China’s military may discard its rigid command structure, report warns

Even as China embarks on a massive military buildup, America comforts itself with an ironclad belief: As with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, superior Communist numbers will be undercut by rigid command and clumsy tactics that can be exploited by more agile U.S. forces.

But what if China embraces the more flexible Western concept of mission command?

“A Chinese military that fully embraces mission command would likely lead to improved operational performance, with quicker decision-making, better adaptability, and greater resilience in the face of degraded C4ISR,” according to a new report by Rand Corporation.

There is evidence that Chinese military reformers are beginning to push for the People’s Liberation Army to adopt mission command, researchers warn in the U.S. think tank’s Oct. 22 report. A more flexible, decentralized Chinese system would be more resistant to U.S. tactics such as attacking command and control centers. In turn, the report suggests, this would force the U.S. to revise its strategy.

The concept of mission command essentially means commanders expressing the general intent of the mission, leaving subordinates to use their own judgment on how to implement those goals. It is an approach that worked well for the Germans in World War II and works well for the Israel Defense Forces today, enabling initiative and rapid decisions while their opponents waited for orders from higher command. Today’s U.S. military — in theory at least — embraces mission command, despite frequent concerns that commanders micromanage their subordinates.

China’s political leaders have long worried that the effectiveness of their armed forces are being undermined by rigid and over-centralized command, unrealistic training and widespread corruption. A 2023 Pentagon report pointed to “genuine anxieties among PRC [People’s Republic of China] leaders about the PLA’s readiness and ability to conduct joint operations if tested under real combat conditions.” China’s president Xi Jinping has conducted repeated purges of senior officers, with nine generals and officials recently expelled as part of an anticorruption drive.

For now, reformers are gingerly testing the waters, with mission command appearing in select units such as special operations forces and warships operating in distant waters, according to the Rand report’s authors.

“There is ample evidence that Chinese military strategists are advocating for institutional PLA adoption of mission command,” Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, who co-authored the Rand study, told Defense News. “And that some PLA units are experimenting with mission command in some PLA exercises, but it is unclear so far how widely mission command is being adopted throughout the PLA.”

Controlling the military is a dilemma for any authoritarian government. The military is usually the force that props up the regime — and is the one force that can overthrow it. In Nazi Germany, for example, the armed forces, or Wehrmacht, were made to swear an oath to Adolf Hitler rather than Germany itself.

Similarly, the PLA is not the armed forces of the Chinese nation, but rather the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. Commissars sharing command with regular officers at every level — from army headquarters to submarines on patrol — enable the CCP to keep an eye on the military. For the PLA, the “first and primary responsibility is to ensure the continued survival of the CCP regime, and generally to faithfully follow the orders of the CCP leadership,” Rand researchers noted.

YJ-19, China's first operational hypersonic cruise missile, seen during a military parade in Beijing, Sept. 3, 2025. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)

The report’s authors see three options for China. For the U.S. and its allies, the most dangerous would be for the Chinese military to fully adopt mission command, the report suggests.

“The U.S. way of war has historically focused on degrading adversary C2 [command and control],” the report notes. “A PLA that embraces mission command is likely to be much more resilient against such U.S. strategies, requiring adapting or developing new U.S. approaches.”

One way for the U.S. to impede Chinese adoption of mission command is to avoid joint exercises.

“Potential PLA exposure to successful foreign command practices should be a factor when U.S. allies and partners consider undertaking a bilateral or multilateral exercise with the PLA,” the authors suggest.

Another option is partial adoption of mission command, perhaps out of skepticism that Chinese commanders are capable of fully implementing the concept. Some units, such as special operations and warships, would enjoy some degree of operational freedom (though nuclear, space and cyber forces would likely remain tightly controlled). However, this could be problematic if “inadequate implementation and organizational dynamics lead to a faulty hybrid of centralized and mission command that result in inconsistent PLA operational performance,” the study states.

It could also increase the chance of war.

“A PLA command structure that empowers lower-level command while not improving command capability and discipline could result in more aggressive and self-interested behavior, without central PLA leadership direction,” the report warns.

On the other hand, China’s leaders may simply decide that it’s safer to keep the existing system of tight command. This may involve more frequent use of “skip echelon,” where military and political leaders bypass the chain of command and issue orders directly to lower-level formations. This option would show “CCP desires for political control outweigh any acknowledged benefits for operational performance, leading to slow, more brittle PLA command,” according to the report.

Still, voices within the Chinese military may still carefully call for reform.

“The CCP will almost certainly continue to prioritize Party control, as evident in recent purges of PLA senior leadership,” Beauchamp-Mustafaga said. “But PLA advocates of mission command would argue that Beijing can have its cake and eat it too. Decentralized execution while retaining high levels of Party control when it matters.”

Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him at theuncommondefense.com. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.

即使中国开始大规模扩充军备，美国仍然坚信：就像冷战时期的苏联一样，数量占优的共产党军队会被僵化的指挥和笨拙的战术所削弱，而这些弱点可以被更灵活的美国军队所利用。

但如果中国接受西方更灵活的任务指挥理念呢？

兰德公司的一份新报告称，“全面采用任务指挥的中国军队可能会提高作战效能，加快决策速度，增强适应能力，并在 C4ISR 能力下降的情况下具有更强的韧性。”

美国智库10月22日发布的报告警告称，有证据表明，中国军事改革者正开始推动中国人民解放军采用任务指挥制。报告指出，一个更加灵活、分散的中国军事体系将更能抵御美国攻击指挥控制中心等战术。反过来，这将迫使美国重新审视其战略。

任务指挥的概念本质上是指指挥官表达任务的总体意图，而让下属自行判断如何实现这些目标。这种方法在二战中对德国军队行之有效，如今对以色列国防军也同样适用，它使以色列军队能够主动出击，快速决策，而他们的对手却只能等待上级的命令。尽管人们经常担心指挥官对下属进行微观管理，但如今的美军——至少在理论上——也奉行任务指挥。

中国政治领导人长期以来一直担忧，僵化且过度集中的指挥体系、不切实际的训练以及普遍存在的腐败正在削弱其军队的效能。2023年五角大楼的一份报告指出，“中华人民共和国领导人对解放军在实战条件下进行联合作战的准备和能力确实感到担忧”。中国国家主席习近平已多次清洗高级军官，最近有九名将军和官员因反腐行动而被撤职。

据兰德公司报告的作者称，目前改革者们正在谨慎地试探水温，任务指挥权已出现在特种作战部队和在远海作战的军舰等特定单位中。

“有大量证据表明，中国军事战略家正在倡导解放军制度化地采用任务指挥，”兰德公司研究报告的合著者内森·博尚-穆斯塔法加告诉《防务新闻》。“而且一些解放军部队正在一些演习中试验任务指挥，但目前尚不清楚任务指挥在解放军中的普及程度。”

对于任何专制政府而言，控制军队都是一个难题。军队通常是政权的支柱，也是唯一能够推翻政权的力量。例如，在纳粹德国，国防军（Wehrmacht）被迫向阿道夫·希特勒而非德国宣誓效忠。

同样，解放军并非中华民族的武装力量，而是中国共产党的武装力量。从陆军总部到巡逻潜艇，各级军官都由政委与普通军官共同指挥，这使得中共能够密切监控军队。兰德公司的研究人员指出，对于解放军而言，“首要职责是确保中共政权的持续生存，并忠实地执行中共领导层的命令”。

2025年9月3日，中国首款投入实战的高超音速巡航导弹YJ-19在北京阅兵式上亮相。（图片来源：Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images）

报告作者认为中国有三种选择。报告指出，对美国及其盟友而言，最危险的情况是中国军队全面采用任务指挥制。

报告指出，“美国的战争方式历来侧重于削弱对手的指挥控制能力。一支采用任务指挥的解放军更有可能抵御美国的此类战略，迫使美国调整或发展新的作战方式。”

美国阻止中国采用任务指挥的一种方法就是避免联合演习。

作者建议：“当美国盟友和伙伴考虑与中国人民解放军进行双边或多边演习时，解放军可能接触到成功的外国指挥实践应该是一个考虑因素。”

另一种选择是部分采用任务指挥，这或许是出于对中国指挥官能否全面贯彻这一理念的怀疑。一些部队，例如特种作战部队和军舰，将享有一定程度的作战自主权（尽管核力量、太空力量和网络力量可能仍将受到严格控制）。然而，研究指出，如果“实施不力以及组织动态导致集中式指挥和任务指挥相结合的模式出现缺陷，从而造成解放军作战表现不稳定”，那么这种做法可能会带来问题。

这也可能增加战争爆发的可能性。

报告警告说：“如果解放军的指挥结构赋予下级指挥官更多权力，却不提高指挥能力和纪律，那么在缺乏中央领导指导的情况下，可能会导致更具侵略性和自私自利的行为。”

另一方面，中国领导人可能认为维持现有的严密指挥体系更为稳妥。这可能意味着更频繁地使用“跳级指挥”，即军事和政治领导人绕过层级指挥系统，直接向下级单位下达命令。报告指出，这种做法表明“中共对政治控制的渴望超过了任何公认的作战效能提升，导致解放军指挥系统运转缓慢且更加脆弱”。

不过，中国军方内部可能仍然会有谨慎的声音呼吁改革。

“中共几乎肯定会继续优先考虑党的控制，最近解放军高层领导的清洗就证明了这一点，”博尚-穆斯塔法加说。“但解放军任务指挥的支持者会认为，北京可以两全其美。既能分散执行，又能在关键时刻保持高度的党的控制。”

迈克尔·佩克是《防务新闻》的通讯员，也是欧洲政策分析中心的专栏作家。他拥有罗格斯大学政治学硕士学位。您可以在theuncommondefense.com找到他。他的邮箱是mikedefense1@gmail.com。