The EU is finding its voice on defense. The US should embrace it.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been called a “ wake-up call ” for Europe to step up on defense. But in the last year, Europe has grown even more dependent on U.S. military capabilities. Yet appearances are deceptive. A stronger European defense is in the making, emerging in fits and starts from the war in Ukraine. European countries still need to invest more in defense, but they are finally starting to spend smarter , in a more coordinated and efficient way.

Last week, EU countries approved a plan to “speed up the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine” over the next twelve months. The EU initiative earmarks a billion euros ($1.1 billion) to send artillery to Ukraine from existing stockpiles and another billion to jointly procure ammunition , primarily 155-millimeter rounds, needed both to replenish their own stocks and supply Ukraine. It also supports the rapid ramping-up of Europe’s defense manufacturing capabilities, with the European Commissioner Thierry Breton touring member states to visit companies which could increase their production.

The ink is barely dry on the deal, yet some pundits are already warning Brussels “ might not be up to the task. ” They fail to see the potential of this initiative: It is not only about meeting Ukraine’s artillery needs, it is also about laying out a way forward for greater burden-sharing within transatlantic relations.

First, the EU initiative establishes an important precedent addressing supply chain and interoperability issues. As NATO’s efforts to deliver tanks to Ukraine have shown, pooling European military resources results in duplication and other inefficiencies – they collectively have 17 different types of main battle tanks. For years, advocates of European defense reform have called for the EU to have a greater role in addressing this problem. Over the last few years the EU has established the European Defense Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to enhance joint capability research and development.

What makes this new initiative on joint ammunition procurement so groundbreaking is that it will be the first time the EU will fund joint arms contracts. EU policy is often path dependent, meaning states build on past policy accomplishments. Indeed, the proposal for this initiative referred to the EU’s unprecedented decision to collectively buy Covid-19 vaccines . By continuing to break new ground, the EU may have found a scheme it can reproduce to rationalize and integrate its efforts.

Second, Estonia’s leadership on this initiative reinforces the idea that European countries do not have to choose between the EU or NATO when it comes to defense and security. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was the first to propose the idea of jointly buying ammunition for Ukraine. In the past, Paris has often led the way in trying to bolster European industrial capabilities, but its efforts have often encountered pushback from eastern European countries. The idea that a stronger European defense pillar will come at the expense of American involvement in NATO dies hard.

Estonia’s taking the lead on this initiative demonstrates that addressing a lack of industrial defense capacity is a shared priority across the continent. It also challenges the false dichotomy between pro-EU and pro-NATO countries that has long impeded greater European defense integration. Critically, this initiative hints at an alternative narrative, one in which bolstering European capabilities is meant to ensure that in any future conflict, the decision to support or to act is not limited by industrial weakness but only by strategic interest.

Finally, the initiative lays bare that if the United States is serious about burden sharing, it will need to embrace EU defense cooperation. For too long, the United States has criticized NATO allies for not spending enough on their defense, while insisting American defense companies be able to compete for European contracts. But buying American-made weapons limits the ability of Europe to be the key defense player Washington needs. The good news is that this time, the Biden administration refrained from making a heavy-handed intervention to nip this new initiative in the bud; contracts are only open to European firms. Still, US Representative to NATO Julianne Smith expressed some muted regret that US firms could not participate in the initiative. It would seem American ambivalence about a stronger European pillar within NATO dies hard, too.

But Europe is adapting to a new strategic environment, and Washington ought to embrace it. Europeans are not doing so because they want to act without the United States, but because failing to do so is actually costly to both European and American security.

Kelly A. Grieco is a Senior Fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center.

Marie Jourdain is Visiting Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Before that, she worked for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

俄罗斯入侵乌克兰被视为对欧洲加强防御的“警钟”。但在过去一年里，欧洲对美国军事能力的依赖程度却日益加深。然而，表象往往具有欺骗性。更强大的欧洲防御体系正在形成，它正从乌克兰战争中断断续续地发展起来。欧洲各国仍需加大国防投入，但它们终于开始以更明智、更协调、更高效的方式进行国防开支。

上周，欧盟各国批准了一项计划，旨在未来十二个月内“加快向乌克兰交付和联合采购弹药”。欧盟的这项倡议将拨款10亿欧元（约合11亿美元）用于从现有库存中向乌克兰运送火炮，另拨款10亿欧元用于联合采购弹药，主要是155毫米炮弹，以满足欧盟自身库存和乌克兰的供应需求。该计划还支持欧洲国防制造能力的快速提升，欧盟委员会委员蒂埃里·布雷顿将走访成员国，考察那些能够提高产能的企业。

协议墨迹未干，一些评论员就已警告布鲁塞尔“可能无法胜任这项任务”。他们未能看到这项倡议的潜力：它不仅关乎满足乌克兰的火炮需求，还关乎为跨大西洋关系中更大程度的责任分担指明前进方向。

首先，欧盟的这项倡议为解决供应链和互操作性问题树立了一个重要的先例。正如北约向乌克兰交付坦克的行动所表明的那样，欧洲军事资源的整合会导致重复建设和其他效率低下问题——他们总共拥有17种不同类型的主战坦克。多年来，欧洲防务改革的倡导者一直呼吁欧盟在解决这一问题上发挥更大的作用。过去几年，欧盟设立了欧洲防务基金和永久结构性合作（PESCO），以加强联合能力研发。

这项关于联合弹药采购的新举措之所以具有开创性意义，是因为这将是欧盟首次为联合军火合同提供资金。欧盟的政策往往具有路径依赖性，这意味着成员国会借鉴以往的政策成果。事实上，这项举措的提案就提到了欧盟史无前例地集体采购新冠疫苗的决定。通过不断开拓创新，欧盟或许已经找到了一种可以复制的模式，从而更好地协调和整合其各项工作。

其次，爱沙尼亚在这一倡议上的领导作用强化了这样一种理念：在国防和安全问题上，欧洲国家不必在欧盟和北约之间做出选择。爱沙尼亚总理卡娅·卡拉斯是第一个提出联合向乌克兰购买弹药的人。过去，巴黎经常在增强欧洲工业能力方面发挥带头作用，但其努力往往遭到东欧国家的抵制。认为加强欧洲防务力量会以牺牲美国在北约的参与为代价的观念根深蒂固。

爱沙尼亚率先发起这项倡议，表明解决国防工业能力不足问题是整个欧洲大陆的共同优先事项。这也挑战了长期以来阻碍欧洲防务一体化的亲欧盟国家和亲北约国家之间人为制造的对立。至关重要的是，这项倡议暗示了一种新的思路：增强欧洲能力旨在确保在未来的任何冲突中，支持或采取行动的决定不再受限于工业实力不足，而仅仅取决于战略利益。

最后，这项倡议清楚地表明，如果美国真心想要分担责任，就必须接受欧盟的防务合作。长期以来，美国一直批评北约盟国在国防上的投入不足，同时又坚持美国国防企业应该能够参与欧洲合同的竞争。然而，购买美国制造的武器会限制欧洲成为华盛顿所需要的关键防务力量的能力。好消息是，这一次拜登政府没有采取强硬手段扼杀这项新倡议；合同只对欧洲公司开放。尽管如此，美国驻北约代表朱莉安·史密斯还是对美国公司无法参与这项倡议表示了些许遗憾。看来，美国对于在北约内部建立更强大的欧洲支柱的矛盾态度也难以消除。

但欧洲正在适应新的战略环境，华盛顿应该接受这一点。欧洲人这样做并非因为他们想绕过美国采取行动，而是因为如果不这样做，实际上会给欧洲和美国的安全都带来沉重代价。

Kelly A. Grieco 是史汀生中心“重塑美国大战略计划”的高级研究员。

玛丽·茹尔丹是大西洋理事会欧洲中心的访问学者。此前，她曾在法国国防部国际关系与战略总局工作。