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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense presented its main rhetorical framing of what will be Russia’s brutal Fall-Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign.

ISWNadia Sleiman查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月4日

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) presented its main rhetorical framing to justify what will become Russia’s brutal Fall-Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The Russian MoD is unfoundedly framing these strikes as a response to many grievances going back several months. The Russian MoD announced on October 4 that it is intensifying its strikes against infrastructure in Kyiv City and Oblast and Ukraine writ large and framed this intensification as a response to alleged Ukrainian strikes against Russian civilian targets in multiple instances since June 2026.[1] Russian forces began its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in late September 2026 ahead of Ukraine’s heating season.[2] Ukraine’s 2026 battlefield successes appear to be forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his original theory of victory in Ukraine and shift focus to compelling Ukraine to surrender through the Winter 2026-2027 long-range strike campaign, as opposed to advances on the battlefield.[3] This strike campaign aims to make civilian life in Ukraine unbearable such that Ukraine will capitulate to Russia’s demands. Russia has waged a similar strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure every winter since Winter 2022-2023 and is likely beginning its campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure earlier than usual before Ukraine can develop effective countermeasures to Russian ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones, which have inflicted significant damage already.[4] The Russian MoD’s rhetorical framing is attempting to justify the intensification of its strike campaign, which will target Ukraine’s already-degraded energy infrastructure and other critical infrastructure, to Russians and the international community.

The Russian strikes are not an actual response to specific events, however, and many of the MoD’s specific claims are blatantly false. The Russian MoD named Ukraine’s strike series against military and industrial infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2026 and alleged strikes against Russian electoral infrastructure in Moscow City during the September 18 to 20 State Duma elections as some of the grievances to which these strikes are responding.[5] Russia has made repeated accusations that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian electoral infrastructure during the September 2026 Duma elections but has failed to provide evidence supporting its claims.[6] Ukrainian strikes against Moscow City on September 19 to 20 targeted Russian oil refineries and warehouses.[7]

The prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Rybar media project criticized the Russian MoD’s disingenuous framing of its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign as retaliatory in nature. Rybar criticized the MoD for framing Russian strikes as “reactive,” as if Russian forces had not deliberately struck Kyiv City for the past four years of war.[8] Rybar criticized the implicit messaging that the Russian MoD only “came to its senses” and conducted strikes after the September State Duma elections, and reminded its readers that Russian forces have been bombarding Kyiv regularly since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Rybar noted, however, that the MoD is shifting to increasingly candid rhetoric and praised this change in rhetoric.

Ukraine is already suffering from Russia’s increasingly deadly strike campaign that has intensified since late September 2026, however. Russian forces are escalating strikes against bridges in Kyiv City, striking both the Northern and Southern bridges in Kyiv City a total of seven times between October 1 and 4 in an effort to disrupt Ukraine’s economy and daily civilian life.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 4 that Russian forces used over 1,900 strike drones (including over 800 jet-powered ones), 1,700 aerial bombs, and 25 missiles against Ukraine during the week of September 27 to October 4.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 135 Shahed-type (including 52 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya decoy drones against Ukraine overnight on October 3 to 4.[11] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 123 drones and two Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and that an unspecified number of strike vehicles struck five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, medical, communication, and residential infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts.[12]

Russian forces have been adapting their strike packages and technology to maximize the suffering of Ukrainian civilians.[13] United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated on October 2 that the UN confirmed at least 15,280 civilian deaths and injuries in Ukraine during the first eight months of 2026, marking a 55 percent increase compared to the same period in 2025.[14] Russia appears to be committed to a strike campaign against Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure with increasing brutality and lethality, as the Kremlin hopes that these strikes can distract from Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes and ultimately force Ukraine into capitulation by making daily life untenable.[15]

Ukraine is urgently pursuing domestic production of jet-powered drone interceptors to combat Russia’s escalating strike campaign, as Russia continues to stockpile ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles for future long-range strikes. Zelensky reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces currently intercept about 85 to 92 percent of conventional Shahed-type drones and 50 to 60 percent of jet-powered Shahed-type drones.[16] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will install at least 12 anti-drone turrets equipped with .50 caliber machine guns in Kyiv City and an additional eight in Kyiv Oblast in order to defend against Russian jet-powered drones.[17] Zelensky emphasized the importance of leveraging F-16 fighter jets, which also appear to be a cost-effective method for intercepting Russian jet-powered drones in these increasingly large strike packages.[18] Ukraine meanwhile is also developing new anti-jet drone interceptors and scaling their production to respond to the increased Russian use of jet-powered drones, which fly faster than traditional interceptor-drones. Zelensky reported that Ukraine and Germany are jointly developing new Bars jet-drone interceptors, which reportedly have the highest interception rate of available systems at around 30 percent.[19] Zelensky noted that other systems have also shown promise and are “catching up” to the Bars system. Zelensky noted that Russia has stockpiled up to 700 ballistic missiles and is producing 130-140 per month, however, amidst an ongoing Patriot interceptor shortage. Russian forces are likely stockpiling their ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles in order to conduct intense future long-range strikes after Russia’s jet-powered drones lose their current advantage.[20] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other forms of air defense for a diverse, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[21]

The Russian military continues forming new maneuver divisions as part of the implementation of its longstanding plans to transition towards a force structure based on mass and divisions. The Russian military command very likely reorganized its 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) into the 84th Motorized Rifle Division. The official Telegram channel of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade rebranded itself as the 84th Motorized Rifle Division in late September or early October.[22] The Russian MoD has not officially commented on the reorganization as of October 4. The newly-formed 84th Motorized Rifle Division is one of the primary fighting forces in Kostyantynivka (Russia’s priority effort) and, previously as a brigade, was heavily staffed and supplied, featuring at least two motorized rifle regiments and several separate battalions operating under it.[23] The newly formed 84th Motorized Rifle Division is the first division-level formation operating under the 3rd CAA. [24] The reorganization of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade into a division is part of ongoing military reforms that Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 and brings the total tally of Russian brigades reorganized into maneuver divisions to 12 since 2022. [25] All of the newly formed divisions have been engaged in combat operations in Ukraine, however, and it remains unclear if or how Russia will staff these formations to doctrinal end-strength. The Russian military will likely be able to bring them up to their full end strength rapidly after the end of fighting in Ukraine.[26]

Russian civilians protested the results of the September 2026 State Duma elections in Moscow City on October 4. The Communist Party (CPRF) announced on October 4 that Russian authorities detained at least 65 Russian citizens at an authorized Communist Party (CPRF) rally in Moscow City to commemorate victims of the massacre during the 1993 Black October constitutional crisis.[27] Hundreds reportedly attended the rally, and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs forces began detaining participants after they started chanting “down with the Tsar.” CPRF representatives announced on September 23 that they would hold the rally on October 4 to protest State Duma election fraud.[28] There were large-scale election violations and fraud throughout the Duma elections, including Russian election authorities detaining or disqualifying several hundred observers from the CPRF and the opposition Yabloko Party (after banning Yabloko candidates from participating in the elections at all).[29] The choice to hold the rally on the anniversary of Black October, in which former Russian President Boris Yeltsin performed a self-coup and used military force to kill and detain opposition leaders, is notable, and the CPRF very likely intended to draw parallels to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime. Protests of this size are highly unusual in Moscow City and demonstrate growing discourse within Russian society surrounding the continued war in Ukraine and its effects on Russian society.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) presented its main rhetorical framing to justify what will become Russia’s brutal Fall-Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The Russian MoD is unfoundedly framing these strikes as a response to many grievances going back several months.

The Russian strikes are not an actual response to specific events, however, and many of the MoD’s specific claims are blatantly false.

The prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Rybar media project criticized the Russian MoD’s disingenuous framing of its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign as retaliatory in nature.

Ukraine is already suffering from Russia’s increasingly deadly strike campaign that has intensified since late September 2026, however.

Ukraine is urgently pursuing domestic production of jet-powered drone interceptors to combat Russia’s escalating strike campaign, as Russia continues to stockpile ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles for future long-range strikes.

The Russian military continues forming new maneuver divisions as part of the implementation of its longstanding plans to transition towards a force structure based on mass and divisions.

Russian civilians protested the results of the September 2026 State Duma elections in Moscow City on October 4.

Ukrainian forces advanced in the Borova direction and Lyman tactical area.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets. Russia launched 135 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-34 multirole fighter jet, a Su-35 bomber aircraft, and an ammunition depot at the Khanskaya Airbase, Adygea Republic (roughly 440 kilometers from the frontline), overnight.[30]

An improvised explosive device (IED) reportedly killed a Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) employee and a Ukrainian war veteran who was involved in the torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Local Russian newspaper Novomoskovsk Today confirmed on October 3 that Russian veteran Roman Syromyatnikov died in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, but did not state the cause of death.[31] A Russian insider source reported that unidentified actors placed an IED under Syromyatnikov’s car and that the explosion killed him.[32] Syromyatnikov fought in Ukraine under the Russian 51st Guards Airborne Regiment (106th Guards Airborne [VDV] Division), and the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office filed charges against Syromyatnikov in 2025 for the torture of Ukrainian POWs at a penal colony in Tula Oblast.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 3 and 4 but did not advance.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sources are overclaiming Russian presence in Pokrovka (east of Sumy City), likely based on footage published on October 2 that demonstrated a very minor Russian presence north of Pokrovka.[35]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian electronic warfare station near Klimovo, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline), on October 3 or overnight October 3 to 4.[36]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 3 and 4 but did not advance.[37] Russian forces recently infiltrated along a railway line south of Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City), based on geolocated footage published on October 3.[38]

The Russian MoD continues to peddle false claims of Ukrainian encirclement northeast of Kharkiv City. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are tightening their encirclement and striking Ukrainian forces in Rublene, Nefedivka, Kupyne, and Chorne (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[39] ISW has observed no evidence that would indicate any encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the area and continues to assess that these claims are part of a Russian cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian advances and distracting from Ukrainian battlefield successes.[40]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on October 3 and 4 but did not advance.[41]

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces hit a Russian electrical substation in occupied Nova Tarasivka (about 20 kilometers from the frontline) on an unspecified date since September 24.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and southeast of Kupyansk on October 3 and 4 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[43]

Russian sources continue to use likely AI-generated or AI-altered footage to make aggrandized claims in the Kupyansk direction. A Russian milblogger published likely AI-generated or AI-altered footage on October 2 showing two Russian personnel purportedly from the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) in front of the Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi train station (southeast of Kupyansk), asserting Russian control over half of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[44] The milblogger criticized Russian official claims of having seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi as of January 27, 2026, while fighting continues. Russian opposition source Astra noted on October 3 that the footage in question shows the train station’s roof and facade as intact, whereas recent drone footage shows more significant damage to both the building’s roof and facade.[45] Russian sources continue to use AI-generated and AI-altered videos to assert territorial control over areas of Ukraine that Russian forces have not seized as both a cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian forces’ defense as collapsing and in order reinforce lies within the Russian military itself.[46]

Ukrainian forces appear to be degrading Russian positions northeast and southeast of Borova amid continued offensive operations northwest of Lyman. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 4 that Russian forces maintain positions about one kilometer from Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely pushed Russian forces north and west of the outskirts of Borivska Andriivka.[47] Mashovets reported that small Russian infantry groups have only managed to infiltrate a single windbreak northeast of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova), indicating that Russian forces likely do not hold Novoplatonivka. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Hrekivka (southeast of Borova), indicating Ukrainian forces also maintain control over Druzhelyubivka and Olhivka (both west of Hrekivka), contrary to Russian claims. Mashovets reported that Russian forces hold positions about three kilometers west of Karmazynivka and that Ukrainian forces advanced two kilometers from Hrekivka toward Makiivka (all southeast of Borova).

Russian forces are reportedly holding some unspecified motorized rifle regiments and battalions in reserve in both the Lyman and Borova directions. Mashovets assessed on October 4 that three to four motorized rifle or rifle battalions and up to four to five motorized rifle or rifle regiments of the Russian Territorial Defense Forces and mobilization reserve are likely active in the Borova and Lyman directions.[48]

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck five Russian electrical substations in occupied Luhansk Oblast (all between 17 and 145 kilometers from the frontline) since September 24.[49]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian forces continue pushing back Russian forces northwest to southeast of Lyman. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces advanced into Zarichne (northeast of Lyman) and Myrne (immediately west of Zarichne across the Zherebets River), as well as eastward to the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River between Yampolivka and Zarichne (south of Yampolivka).[50] Mashovets indicated that Ukrainian forces are still fighting for Myrne and Zarichne and that residual Russian infantry groups remain in the Stavky-Kolodyazi-Myrne-Zarichne area.[51] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces have cleared most Russian infiltrators from the Lyman area, but that at least one Russian infiltration group maintains a very limited presence in eastern Lyman.[52] Mashovets also reported that elements of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) continue to control a significant portion of a forested area between Yampil and Lyman (southeast of Lyman), but that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Yampil and recently advanced between Yampil and Lyman. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces forced Russian forces to withdraw from the Dibrova (southeast of Lyman) area, but that some individual Russian forces remain near Dibrova and in Ozerne (southeast of Dibrova).

Ukrainian operations east and southeast of Lyman may threaten the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army’s (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) operations towards Slovyansk (south of Lyman). Mashovets noted on October 4 that as Ukrainian counteroffensive operations are forcing elements of the Russian 25th CAA to slow infiltration missions into Lyman itself and forcing these elements to retreat southeast of Lyman, they have also impacted the Russian 3rd CAA’s offensive operations towards Slovyansk (southwest of Lyman) through Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[53] Mashovets assessed that the Russian 3rd CAA will likely have to deploy part of its forces from the Mykolaivka effort to defend its northern flank and hold the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka and toward Mykolaivka on October 3 and 4 but did not advance.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in northern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 3, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces continued intensified offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 3 and 4 but did not advance.[56]

Russian forces continue to prioritize efforts against Dobropillya, indicating that Russian forces remain committed to conducting a wide envelopment of the Fortress Belt from the southwest despite the loss of the intended northern pincer. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk (southwest of Dobropillya) direction reported on October 4 that Russian forces attempt to infiltrate into urban areas in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) between 70 to 80 times per day.[57] The brigade reported that Russian forces are using Geran drones to strike frontline Ukrainian positions. Geran drones are relatively expensive for tactical frontline missions and are largely used for Russia’s long-range strike campaign, and Russian usage of Geran drones in the Dobropillya area indicates that the Russian military command is highly prioritizing this area.

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck 14 electrical substations, including repeat strikes against at least one substation, in occupied Donetsk Oblast (all between 20 to 70 kilometers from the frontline) since September 24.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 4.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka on October 3 and 4 but did not advance.[59]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 3 and 4 but did not advance.[60]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 surface-to-air missile system near occupied Kuroshany (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline) on October 3 or overnight October 3 to 4.[61] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck six Russian electrical substations in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast (all between 38 and 87 kilometers from the frontline) since September 24.[62]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 4.

Ukrainian forces continue to strike energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea, as part of their campaign intended to isolate Crimea. Brovdi reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck 17 electrical substations in occupied Crimea (all between 110 and 215 kilometers from the frontline) and one substation in occupied Kherson Oblast since September 24.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [64]

See topline text for reports on Russian overnight strikes against Ukraine.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ [10] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21196 [11] https://t.me/kpszsu/82681 [12] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21196; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32372; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7761 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7765; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21341; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3368 [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/ [14] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/10/hc-turk-ukraine-alongside-peace-there-must-be-accountability [15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/; [16] https://suspilne dot media/1419079-zelenskij-ukraina-nini-zbivae-ponad-85-zvicajnih-i-do-60-reaktivnih-sahediv/ [17] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4170924-zelenskij-u-kievi-vstanovili-ponad-12-turelej-proti-reaktivnih-droniv.html [18] https://suspilne dot media/1419079-zelenskij-ukraina-nini-zbivae-ponad-85-zvicajnih-i-do-60-reaktivnih-sahediv/; 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