Russian Inexpensive Quasi-Cruise Missiles: An Emerging Threat for Ukraine’s Air Defenses

Russian forces began integrating inexpensive, highly maneuverable quasi-cruise missiles into their missile strike packages in mid-2026 — marking a concerning shift toward low-cost, cruise-missile-like weapons that can strain Ukraine’s scarce air defense stocks. Russian forces likely aim to use quasi-cruise missiles to augment the devastating effects of the ballistic missile and jet-powered drone combined strikes, which have been exploiting and exacerbating Ukrainian interceptor missile shortages. Russian developers are actively expanding production, improving speed and maneuverability, and diversifying launch platforms in an effort to increasingly deploy these weapons in 2027 before Ukraine can field countermeasures at scale. Ukraine and its partners therefore face a limited window to expand the production of low-cost interceptors, electronic warfare (EW), and layered air defenses able to handle cruise-missile-like air threats.

Russian forces began integrating inexpensive, highly maneuverable quasi-cruise missiles into their missile strike packages after scaling Banderol production in mid-2026, likely to further exploit Ukraine’s air defense interceptor shortages before Ukraine can field alternatives at scale. Banderols (Russian designation S8000) are quasi-cruise missiles with Chinese-made jet engines that allow them to fly at speeds and trajectories similar to much more expensive and less maneuverable Russian cruise missiles.[1] Russian forces first started conducting Banderol strikes against Odesa Oblast in Spring 2025 but have been regularly including Banderols in their long-range strike packages since Summer 2026.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that over 40 of the Russian daily strike packages between May 14 and September 30 included Banderols.[3] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced in late July 2026 that Russia had completed the testing of Banderols and moved to mass production at an unspecified date.[4] The GUR added that Russian forces started launching Banderols against targets with known coordinates in southern Ukraine, such as ports, logistics hubs, terminals, and food warehouses.[5] The GUR noted that existing Ukrainian drone interceptors proved ineffective against Banderols at the time. Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk estimated in late July 2026 that 80 percent of Russian strikes against the Odesa City port included Banderols.[6] Russian forces reportedly used Banderols against civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Oblast; a bridge over the Dniester River and port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast; the Zhytomyr City Main Directorate of the National Police; and unspecified infrastructure in Kyiv City and Oblast between May and September 2026.[7]

Russia also introduced the new Dan-T jet-powered quasi-cruise missiles in September 2026 to further diversify Russia’s strike vehicle arsenal. Russia’s state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec unveiled the Dan-T at an international airshow in Egypt on September 8.[8] Rostec described the Dan-T as an air-launched “loitering munition” capable of striking targets at a distance of 450 kilometers at high speed.[9] Rostec claimed that the Dan-T weighs up to 270 kilograms; can fly to its target autonomously after launch; and has a flight mode designed to avoid detection and interception by air defenses.[10] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated that the Dan-T resembles the Banderol, and Ukrainian analysts estimated that Dan-T could have a range of up to 500 kilometers and a 135-kilogram warhead.[11] A Ukrainian defense outlet reported that Russian forces designed the Dan-T to target armored vehicles, fortified field positions, and unspecified light infrastructure.[12]

Russian forces have not yet fielded Banderols and Dan-Ts at the same scale as Russian Geran (Shahed) jet-powered one-way attack drones, which are currently tying up Ukrainian air defense measures intended for intercepting cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated in mid-August 2026 that the use of Banderols had not been widespread at the time.[13] It is unclear if Russian forces have already fielded Dan-Ts in Ukraine at scale as of late September 2026. Rostec claimed that Russian forces conducted “hundreds of successful strikes” with Dan-Ts against targets in Ukraine.[14] The Ukrainian Air Force began referring to Dan-Ts in its daily strike reports on September 13.[15] Ukrainian reporting has generally continued to group Dan-T and Banderol munitions together, however, making it difficult to assess whether Russian forces have already deployed Dan-Ts in Ukraine.[16] Some Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian forces may have used a Dan-T to strike a shopping mall in Dnipro City on September 19, although others suggested that Russian forces may have used ballistic missiles or Geran strike drones.[17]

Ihnat noted in mid-August 2026 that Russian forces used far fewer Banderols than jet-powered Geran/Shahed-type drones and that it was still too early to say that Banderols have been systematically overloading Ukrainian air defenses compared to other Russian air vehicles.[18] Ihnat later noted in September 2026 that Russian forces have launched over 7,700 Geran/Shahed-type jet-powered drones against Ukraine thus far, and that the Russian monthly use of jet-powered strike drones has been rising steadily since June 2026.[19] Ihnat acknowledged, however, that Russia’s prioritization of the production and use of jet-powered weapons in general will further strain Ukrainian air defense capabilities.

Russian quasi-cruise missiles pose an emerging threat that requires serious attention because these weapons bridge the gap between inexpensive and slow one-way attack drones and expensive cruise missiles, allowing Russia to impose additional pressure on Ukrainian air defenses at lower cost. Ukrainian officials classify Banderols and Dan-Ts as jet-powered loitering munitions or low-cost, light cruise missiles because they combine characteristics of both weapon types.[20] It is not clear if these systems actually fit the traditional definition of loitering munitions, which are usually distinguished by their ability to change targets dynamically (either through human control or onboard automation). Jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles occupy an intermediate capability tier, pairing cruise-missile-like speed and heavier payloads with the lower cost, shorter ranges, and precision of long-range attack drones. Banderols, for example, have a speed of up to 650 kilometers per hour, an operational range of up to 500 kilometers, and up to a 150-kilogram fragmentation warhead.[21] Banderol’s frame also resembles a scaled-down Kh-101 cruise missile.[22] Russian Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile, in comparison, generally has a speed of up to 1,000 kilometers per hour, an operational range of up to 2,500 kilometers, and a 480-kilogram warhead.[23] A Ukrainian aviation expert estimated that Russia can produce Banderols at an estimated cost of about $50,000 to $150,000, while domestic production of the Kh-101 cruise missile can cost around two million dollars.[24] Beskrestnov described Banderols as a “budget cruise missile with a small warhead.”[25]

The speed of jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles can force Ukraine to employ scarce, expensive air defense missiles or fixed-wing aircraft typically used to intercept cruise missiles.[26] The relatively low cost of jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles therefore imposes an unfavorable cost exchange on Ukrainian air defenses. A Ukrainian aviation expert noted that it is challenging for Ukrainian forces to intercept Banderols when Russian forces launch them alongside Gerans/Shaheds and missiles.[27] The expert noted that Ukrainian drone interceptors are too slow to catch up to Banderols and that it is too dangerous to use fixed-wing aircraft to shoot down Banderols during combined missile strikes. Jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles also have a smaller turning radius than Russian cruise missiles, which makes their trajectories unpredictable and difficult to detect and intercept with small arms or mobile fire groups.[28]

Jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles can augment recent Russian efforts to keep air raid alerts active, thereby exhausting Ukrainian air defenses, disrupting civilian life, wearing down Ukrainian resistance, and damaging the Ukrainian economy. Russian forces often use Banderols in a “missile spam” tactic, in which Russian forces launch individual missiles at intervals throughout the day to keep Ukraine’s air defenses and air raid alerts persistently active.[29] Russian forces regularly employ Banderols alongside jet-powered Geran/Shahed drones or Kh-59/69 cruise missiles to facilitate their “missile spam” tactic.[30] Russian forces have been increasingly launching prolonged, hours-long drone and missile strike series against Ukraine, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Oblast, to maximize civilian damage and disrupt daily civilian functions.[31]

Quasi-cruise missiles slightly differ from Russian Geran/Shahed jet-powered, one-way attack drone variants primarily in warhead size and operational range. Russian forces first used jet-powered strike drones in late 2023 and early 2024 with the Geran 3 (also known as the Shahed-238) — the first modification of the Geran/Shahed drone line that integrated a turbojet engine.[32] Russian forces have since introduced Geran 4 and Geran 5 jet-powered drone variants, with the Geran 5 reportedly reaching a speed of 600 kilometers per hour, operating at up to 1,000 kilometers in range, and carrying a smaller 90-kilogram warhead.[33] The Geran-5 is a missile-shaped drone with a turbojet engine, which evolved from the propeller-driven Geran/Shahed line, whereas Russian developers deliberately designed Banderol as a hybrid between a drone and a cruise missile. In short, Banderol and Dan-T quasi-cruise missiles have a slightly larger warhead than that of Geran 4 and Geran 5, enabling them to inflict greater damage than Geran/Shahed jet-powered drones but at shorter ranges.[34]

Russian developers are increasingly prioritizing efforts to innovate jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles and expand their production in late 2026 and 2027. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in late September 2026 that Russia plans to spend $12 billion to produce jet-powered drones and loitering munitions alone.[35] Beskrestnov observed that Russian developers ordered as many cruise-missile-like loitering munitions as jet-powered Geran/Shahed drones and that these weapons will come online in five to six months.[36] Beskrestnov added that Russian developers are trying to modify Banderol, Dan-T, and Dan-M munitions and the Gerbera-5 multipurpose drone to reach speeds of up to 750 kilometers, fly at low altitudes, and maneuver. Beskrestnov assessed that these innovations will further complicate Ukrainian efforts to intercept these air targets. Beskrestnov reported that Russia plans to produce 120 Banderols per month and estimated that such a production rate would allow Russian forces to launch four Banderols per day.[37] The GUR assessed that Russia was producing 80 Banderols per month as of August 2026 and aims to manufacture up to 1,000 in 2026.[38] A Ukrainian military analyst and veteran assessed in August 2026 that Russia could be aiming to produce approximately 10,000 Dan-Ts in 2027, while other Ukrainian sources assess that Russia plans to manufacture 2,000 Dan-Ts by the end of 2026 and 14,000 in 2027.[39]

Russia is attempting to create many low-cost strike vehicles that increasingly reach speeds comparable to subsonic cruise missiles by repurposing old technologies such as the Dan-M target aircraft. A Ukrainian aviation expert stated in September 2026 that the Dan-T jet-powered quasi-cruise missile is a modification of the Dan-M target aircraft.[40] Russian developers originally designed the ground- and air-launched Dan-Ms in the early 1990s as unmanned target aircraft imitating tactical aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles for air defense training.[41] Russian developers have since modified existing Dan-M stockpiles into strike munitions by changing the target aircraft’s color from red and adding a warhead.[42] The Dan-M can reportedly fly for 25 to 40 minutes at a speed of 400 to 750 kilometers per hour and an altitude of up to nine kilometers.[43] Beskrestnov, however, noted that Dan-T and Dan-M are distinct air vehicles, and that Russia has significant stockpiles of Dan-M target aircraft.[44]

Russian forces first launched Dan-Ms in Spring and Summer 2025, reportedly launching a group of these munitions against Odesa City from occupied Crimea and against Kyiv City.[45] A Russian military analyst claimed that Russian forces launched Dan-Ms before conducting a missile or Geran/Shahed drone strike to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defense systems.[46] Russian forces have not used Dan-Ms at scale since mid 2025, but Russia’s experimentation with such systems suggests that Russian developers are searching for low-cost vehicles that can reach speeds comparable to subsonic cruise missiles and can be rapidly refurbished into strike vehicles.

Russian developers are also experimenting with launching quasi-cruise missiles from tactical aircraft likely in an effort to increase their operational ranges and launch rates. Russian forces originally launched Banderols from fixed-wing Orion large strike and reconnaissance drones, which used to be one of the flagship Russian drone models before Russia adopted Iranian-designed Shaheds.[47] Evolution in tactical air defense and counter-drone technology rendered large fixed-wing drones such as the Orion and Turkish-made Bayraktar ineffective near the frontline because their sizes and relatively slow speeds made them vulnerable to detection and interception.[48] Russian developers effectively repurposed Orion drones to function as Banderol launch platforms, developing a new use case for the drone.

Russian developers have since prioritized expanding the range of quasi-cruise missiles, primarily by launching these air targets from helicopters and planning to develop launchers for fixed-wing aircraft. An unnamed GUR official stated in late July 2026 that Russian forces developed the capability to launch Banderols from Mi-28 helicopters, and Beskrestnov noted in mid-July 2026 that Russian forces practiced launching Banderols from Mi-8 helicopters.[49] GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi later stated in August 2026 that Russian forces can launch Banderols and Dan-Ts from helicopters and that Russian developers are actively innovating ways to launch these munitions from tactical aircraft.[50] A Ukrainian veteran and analyst assessed in August 2026 that Russian forces could increasingly launch Dan-T munitions from Mi-28 helicopters and the four main models of the Russian Sukhoi combat aircraft family in 2027.[51] Rostec advertised Dan-T as a weapon that can be launched from foreign- or Russian-made aircraft and helicopters (such as Yak-130, MiG-29, Mi-28N, and Mi-8).[52]

A Ukrainian weapons and military equipment researcher warned in June 2026 that launches from tactical aircraft will allow Russian quasi-cruise missiles to increasingly avoid Ukrainian air defense systems and strike targets at ranges up to 1,000 kilometers.[53] A Ukrainian aviation expert estimated that the Dan-T could have a range of up to 500 kilometers when launched from Russian fighter aircraft.[54] Extended operational ranges may allow Russian forces to expand their Banderol and Dan-T strikes beyond southern and central Ukraine.

Russian developers are also developing ground- and sea-based launch platforms for quasi-cruise missiles, likely to expand their operational ranges to strike targets in Ukraine’s intermediate rear. The GUR reported in July 2026 that Russian forces are using ground launchers in occupied Crimea to launch Banderols.[55] The Ukrainian veteran and analyst assessed that Russian forces could increasingly launch Dan-Ts from ground systems and ships in 2027.[56] The analyst also amplified an image of a possible launcher mounted on a wheeled chassis, which can transport and launch two Dan-Ts from the ground. Ground- and sea-based launchers could expand Banderol or Dan-T operational use, potentially allowing Russian forces to pursue targets in the Black Sea or fortified positions or critical logistics nodes in the intermediate rear of Ukrainian forces. Ground-launched Banderols can reduce warning and reaction time by making launch locations and attack trajectories less predictable.[57] Ground-based launchers require the air vehicle to expend significantly more energy during launch than air-launched platforms, however, meaning that Russian developers likely reduced Banderol’s warhead or its flight range.[58]

Russia will likely prioritize the development and expanded production of jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles in late 2026 and 2027 to stay ahead of Ukraine’s evolving countermeasures against jet-powered Gerans/Shaheds. Ukrainian forces are increasingly adapting to jet-powered drones but remain less prepared to counter jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles at this time. Ukrainian developers unveiled in August 2026 the upgraded version of the LITAVR+ interceptor designed to counter jet-powered Geran/Shahed attack drones at speeds exceeding 400 kilometers per hour.[59] Ukrainian developers also announced in July 2026 that they were combat-testing Sting 2.0 interceptors in response to the growing Russian jet-powered drone threat.[60] Beskrestnov noted that Ukraine developed at least three to five interceptors for jet-powered Gerans/Shaheds, but that these interceptors have to undergo testing.[61] Russia will likely further develop quasi-cruise missiles and improve jet-powered drones to maintain pressure on Ukrainian air defenses.

Recent Russian innovations in cruise-missile-like weapons indicate that Russia is trying to find cheap and rapidly scalable ways to augment its ballistic missile strike campaign in Ukraine. Russian combined drone and missile strike packages have relied on ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles to exploit Ukraine’s Patriot interceptor missiles shortage and cause significant damage in 2026.[62] Russia’s ballistic and quasi-ballistic missile stockpiles, however, are limited, and their production cycle is longer and more complicated than that of quasi-cruise missiles or jet-powered loitering munitions or drones. Russian forces will likely be unable to replicate the effects of combined jet-powered-drone-and-ballistic-missile strike packages relying largely or exclusively on ballistic missiles. Russian forces will seek to use combined jet-powered drone and ballistic missile strike packages to damage Ukraine’s critical infrastructure before Ukraine is able to deploy sufficient countermeasures, and the addition of jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles to these packages will only further complicate the air defense picture in Ukraine. The outcome of this aspect of the continuous offensive-defensive technological race that has characterized the war in Ukraine remains unclear, however.

Ukraine and its partners must start preparing to counter Russia’s increased use of jet-powered loitering munitions and quasi-cruise missiles within the next few months in addition to developing counter-ballistic missile systems over a longer time horizon. Beskrestnov stated that Ukrainian developers need to prioritize creating cheap interceptors for cruise-missile-like targets.[63] Beskrestnov also implied that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems can be effective in repelling Banderols and Dan-Ts since these weapons rely on satellite and inertial navigation.[64] Ukraine’s Brave1 defense tech cluster announced in early September 2026 that Ukrainian developers have already created and deployed some unspecified countermeasures for Banderols and are currently trying to scale their production.[65] It will likely take additional time for Ukrainian developers to study Banderols, Dan-Ts, and other jet-powered air targets and their modifications before they can develop and mass-produce interceptors at scale.

The weapon innovation cycle in Ukraine further demonstrates that Ukraine, the United States, and their allies must urgently diversify air defense capabilities to counter the emerging threat of quasi-cruise and quasi-ballistic cheap alternatives, which aim to exploit global air defense missile shortages. An effective air defense toolkit must include low-cost kinetic countermeasures such as interceptors for low- and high-altitude air targets and constantly upgraded EW systems, in addition to traditional air defense systems such as MANPADS and surface-to-air systems (SAMs).

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https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-capable-of-producing-up-to-80-banderol-missiles-per-month/ [38] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/articles/2026/08/17/8049064/ [39] https://english dot nv.ua/russian-war/russia-plans-to-produce-up-to-14-000-dan-t-weapons-in-2027-rbc-ukraine-50643126.html; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/noviy-stil-drapatogo-bitva-donechchinu-i-1789905942.html [40] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/desheva-raketa-500-km-visnazhennya-ppo-ukrayini-1788261316.html [41] https://testpilot dot ru/russia/sokol/dan/; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-dan-m-drone-training-target-wonder-weapon-ukraine-war-bw-080425 [42] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/05/raskryty-zadachi-nazvannogo-v-ssha-chudo-oruzhiem-svo-drona-dan-m/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025/ [43] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5683; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/05/raskryty-zadachi-nazvannogo-v-ssha-chudo-oruzhiem-svo-drona-dan-m/ [44] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7740; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5683 [45] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5683; https://riamo dot ru/news/spetsoperatsija/rossija-atakovala-ukrainu-novym-tipom-udarnogo-bpla/; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-dan-m-drone-training-target-wonder-weapon-ukraine-war-bw-080425; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-dan-m-drone-training-target-wonder-weapon-ukraine-war-bw-080425 ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/05/v-ssha-rossiyskuyu-dan-m-nazvali-chudo-oruzhiem-svo/?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fstory%2F8ae67bd8-f81b-59a7-ad2a-f7834f6c321b [46] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/05/raskryty-zadachi-nazvannogo-v-ssha-chudo-oruzhiem-svo-drona-dan-m/ [47] https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraine-strikes-russian-fuel-train-confirms-damage-to-multimillion-dollar-orion-drones-in-occupied-regions/ [48] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7560 [49] https://english dot nv.ua/nation/russia-s-banderol-missile-now-in-serial-production-50628339.html; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7560 [50] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/rf-vikonue-plan-raketah-pauza-obstrilah-navryad-1786309469.html [51] https://x.com/kriegsforscherd/status/2093294081598185540; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/10-tysyach-dan-t-rosiyany-vygotovljat-2027/ [52] https://ria dot ru/20260908/boepripas-2116347730.html [53] https://en dot interfax dot com.ua/news/general/1176201.html; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/13/zhertvuyut-tochnist-zarady-kilkosti-vorog-naroshhuye-vyrobnycztvo-zasobiv-povitryanogo-napadu/ [54] https://english dot nv.ua/russian-war/russia-plans-to-produce-up-to-14-000-dan-t-weapons-in-2027-rbc-ukraine-50643126.html [55] https://english dot nv.ua/nation/russia-s-banderol-missile-now-in-serial-production-50628339.html; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/articles/2026/08/17/8049064/; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-s8000-banderol-missile-receives-ground-based-launcher/; https://t.me/war_home/7371?single [56] https://x.com/kriegsforscherd/status/2093294081598185540; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/10-tysyach-dan-t-rosiyany-vygotovljat-2027/ [57] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/articles/2026/08/17/8049064/; https://t.me/rybar/82766 [58] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-s8000-banderol-missile-receives-ground-based-launcher/ [59] https://united24media dot com/defense-tech/how-ukraines-litavr-interceptor-hunts-jet-powered-shahed-drones-21540; https://lb dot ua/society/2026/08/10/757292_yak_prodati_droni_ssha_rozmova.html; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/perehoplyuvach-litavr-ponad-400-km-god/ [60] https://thedefender dot media/en/2026/07/sting-2-0/ [61] https://24tv dot ua/military/rosiya-masovo-bude-atakuvati-ukrayinu-deshevimi-raketami-flesh_n3142611 [62] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; ttps://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ [63] https://24tv dot ua/military/rosiya-masovo-bude-atakuvati-ukrayinu-deshevimi-raketami-flesh_n3142611 [64] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7748 [65] https://lb dot ua/tech/2026/09/08/764520_ukrayini_stvorili_novu.html; https://brave1 dot gov.ua/news/brave1-technology-destroys-russian-banderol-missile-drones

俄罗斯军队于2026年中期开始将廉价、高机动性的准巡航导弹整合到其导弹打击体系中——这标志着俄罗斯武器装备正朝着低成本、类似巡航导弹的武器方向发展，令人担忧，而这可能会加剧乌克兰本就稀缺的防空资源压力。俄罗斯军队很可能计划利用准巡航导弹来增强弹道导弹和喷气式无人机联合打击的破坏力，而这种联合打击一直在利用并加剧乌克兰拦截导弹的短缺。俄罗斯研发人员正在积极扩大生产规模，提高导弹的速度和机动性，并开发多样化的发射平台，力图在2027年乌克兰能够大规模部署反制措施之前，逐步增加这些武器的部署。因此，乌克兰及其盟友面临着一个有限的窗口期，需要扩大低成本拦截导弹、电子战（EW）装备以及能够应对类似巡航导弹空中威胁的多层次防空系统的生产。

在2026年中期扩大“班德罗尔”（Banderol）导弹的生产规模后，俄罗斯军队开始将价格低廉、机动性极高的准巡航导弹整合到其导弹打击组合中，这很可能是为了在乌克兰大规模部署替代导弹之前，进一步利用乌克兰防空拦截器的短缺。“班德罗尔”（俄罗斯代号S8000）是一种准巡航导弹，配备中国制造的喷气发动机，使其飞行速度和弹道与价格昂贵得多、机动性却差得多的俄罗斯巡航导弹相似。[1] 俄罗斯军队于2025年春季首次对敖德萨州使用“班德罗尔”导弹进行打击，但自2026年夏季以来，他们一直在远程打击组合中定期使用“班德罗尔”导弹。[2] 乌克兰空军报告称，在5月14日至9月30日期间，俄罗斯每日打击组合中有超过40个使用了“班德罗尔”导弹。[3]乌克兰军事情报总局（GUR）于2026年7月下旬宣布，俄罗斯已完成“班德罗尔”（Banderols）无人机的测试，并已于某个未指明的日期开始批量生产。[4] GUR补充说，俄罗斯军队开始使用“班德罗尔”无人机袭击乌克兰南部已知坐标的目标，例如港口、物流枢纽、码头和食品仓库。[5] GUR指出，当时乌克兰现有的无人机拦截器对“班德罗尔”无人机无效。乌克兰总统制裁政策专员弗拉迪斯拉夫·弗拉修克（Vladyslav Vlasiuk）于2026年7月下旬估计，俄罗斯对敖德萨市港口的袭击中，80%使用了“班德罗尔”无人机。[6] 据报道，俄罗斯军队还使用“班德罗尔”无人机袭击了哈尔科夫市和哈尔科夫州的民用基础设施；敖德萨州的一座德涅斯特河大桥和港口基础设施；以及日托米尔市国家警察局。 2026 年 5 月至 9 月期间，基辅市和州的部分基础设施未进行具体说明。[7]

俄罗斯于2026年9月推出了新型丹-T喷气式准巡航导弹，进一步丰富了俄罗斯的打击武器库。俄罗斯国有国防集团Rostec于9月8日在埃及举行的国际航展上正式发布了丹-T导弹。[8] Rostec将丹-T描述为一种空射“巡飞弹”，能够以高速打击450公里外的目标。[9] Rostec声称，丹-T导弹重达270公斤；发射后可自主飞行至目标；并具有一种旨在规避防空系统探测和拦截的飞行模式。[10]乌克兰总统国防技术顾问谢尔盖·“闪电”·别斯克列斯特诺夫表示，丹-T导弹与班德罗尔导弹相似，乌克兰分析人士估计，丹-T导弹的射程可达500公里，弹头重135公斤。[11] 一家乌克兰国防媒体报道称，俄罗斯军队设计丹-T导弹的目的是打击装甲车辆、坚固的野战阵地和未指明的轻型基础设施。[12]

俄罗斯军队尚未像部署“沙赫德”（Shahed）喷气式单向攻击无人机那样大规模地部署“班德罗尔”（Banderol）和“丹-T”（Dan-T）无人机。“沙赫德”无人机目前正在牵制乌克兰用于拦截巡航导弹的防空系统。乌克兰空军发言人尤里·伊格纳特上校在2026年8月中旬表示，“班德罗尔”无人机当时尚未广泛使用。[13] 截至2026年9月下旬，尚不清楚俄罗斯军队是否已在乌克兰大规模部署“丹-T”无人机。俄罗斯国家技术集团公司（Rostec）声称，俄罗斯军队使用“丹-T”无人机对乌克兰境内的目标进行了“数百次成功打击”。[14] 乌克兰空军于9月13日开始在其每日打击报告中提及“丹-T”无人机。[15]然而，乌克兰方面的报道通常仍将丹-T和班德罗尔弹药归为一类，这使得评估俄罗斯军队是否已在乌克兰部署丹-T弹药变得困难。[16] 一些俄罗斯军事博客作者推测，俄罗斯军队可能在9月19日使用丹-T弹药袭击了第聂伯罗市的一家购物中心，尽管其他人认为俄罗斯军队可能使用了弹道导弹或格朗攻击无人机。[17]

伊格纳特在2026年8月中旬指出，俄军使用的“班德罗尔”无人机数量远少于喷气式动力“格兰/沙赫德”型无人机，现在就断言“班德罗尔”无人机与其他俄罗斯飞行器相比已经系统性地对乌克兰防空系统造成了过载还为时尚早。[18] 伊格纳特随后在2026年9月指出，俄军迄今已向乌克兰发射了超过7700架喷气式动力“格兰/沙赫德”型无人机，并且自2026年6月以来，俄罗斯每月使用喷气式攻击无人机的数量一直在稳步增长。[19] 然而，伊格纳特也承认，俄罗斯优先生产和使用喷气式武器的总体战略将进一步加剧乌克兰防空能力的压力。

俄罗斯的准巡航导弹构成了一种新兴威胁，需要引起高度重视。这些武器弥合了廉价但速度较慢的单向攻击无人机和昂贵的巡航导弹之间的差距，使俄罗斯能够以更低的成本对乌克兰的防空系统施加更大的压力。乌克兰官员将“班德罗尔”（Banderols）和“丹-T”（Dan-Ts）归类为喷气动力巡飞弹或低成本轻型巡航导弹，因为它们兼具两种武器类型的特点。[20] 目前尚不清楚这些系统是否符合巡飞弹的传统定义，巡飞弹通常以其动态改变目标的能力（通过人工控制或机载自动化）为特征。喷气动力巡飞弹和准巡航导弹处于中间能力层级，它们兼具巡航导弹般的速度和更大的有效载荷，以及远程攻击无人机的低成本、短程和高精度。例如，“班德罗尔”导弹的速度可达每小时650公里，射程可达500公里，并可携带重达150公斤的破片弹头。[21] “班德罗尔”导弹的外形也类似于缩小版的Kh-101巡航导弹。[22] 相比之下，俄罗斯Kh-101空射巡航导弹的速度通常可达每小时1000公里，射程可达2500公里，并配备480公斤的弹头。[23] 一位乌克兰航空专家估计，俄罗斯生产“班德罗尔”导弹的成本约为5万至15万美元，而国产Kh-101巡航导弹的成本约为200万美元。[24] 别斯克列斯特诺夫将“班德罗尔”导弹描述为“一种配备小型弹头的廉价巡航导弹”。[25]

喷气式巡飞弹和准巡航导弹的速度迫使乌克兰动用稀缺且昂贵的防空导弹或通常用于拦截巡航导弹的固定翼飞机。[26] 因此，喷气式巡飞弹和准巡航导弹相对较低的成本对乌克兰防空系统造成了不利的成本交换。一位乌克兰航空专家指出，当俄军同时发射“班德罗尔”巡飞弹和“格朗斯/沙赫德”巡航导弹及其他导弹时，乌克兰军队拦截“班德罗尔”巡飞弹非常困难。[27] 该专家指出，乌克兰无人机拦截器的速度太慢，无法追上“班德罗尔”巡飞弹，而且在联合导弹打击中，使用固定翼飞机击落“班德罗尔”巡飞弹也过于危险。喷气动力巡飞弹和准巡航导弹的转弯半径也比俄罗斯巡航导弹小，这使得它们的飞行轨迹难以预测，并且难以用小型武器或机动火力组进行探测和拦截。[28]

喷气式巡飞弹和准巡航导弹可以增强俄罗斯近期持续保持空袭警报活跃的行动，从而消耗乌克兰的防空力量，扰乱平民生活，削弱乌克兰的抵抗力量，并损害乌克兰经济。俄军经常使用“班德罗尔”导弹进行“导弹狂轰滥炸”战术，即俄军在一天中间隔发射多枚导弹，以持续保持乌克兰的防空系统和空袭警报处于活跃状态。[29] 俄军经常将“班德罗尔”导弹与喷气式“格朗/沙赫德”无人机或Kh-59/69巡航导弹配合使用，以实施其“导弹狂轰滥炸”战术。[30] 俄军越来越多地对乌克兰发动持续数小时的无人机和导弹袭击，主要目标是基辅市和基辅州，以最大限度地造成平民伤亡并扰乱日常民生。[31]

准巡航导弹与俄罗斯“格兰/沙赫德”喷气式单向攻击无人机的主要区别在于弹头尺寸和作战范围。俄罗斯军队于2023年末至2024年初首次使用喷气式攻击无人机，即“格兰3”（又称“沙赫德-238”），这是“格兰/沙赫德”无人机系列中首个集成涡轮喷气发动机的改进型。[32] 此后，俄罗斯军队又推出了“格兰4”和“格兰5”喷气式无人机，据报道，“格兰5”的最高时速可达600公里，作战范围可达1000公里，并携带较小的90公斤弹头。[33] “格兰-5”是一款导弹形状的无人机，配备涡轮喷气发动机，由螺旋桨驱动的“格兰/沙赫德”系列发展而来；而俄罗斯研发人员则有意将“班德罗尔”设计成无人机和巡航导弹的混合体。简而言之，Banderol 和 Dan-T 准巡航导弹的弹头比 Geran 4 和 Geran 5 的弹头略大，因此它们能够比 Geran/Shahed 喷气动力无人机造成更大的破坏，但射程较短。[34]

俄罗斯研发人员正日益重视喷气动力巡飞弹和准巡航导弹的创新研发，并计划在2026年底和2027年扩大其产量。乌克兰总统泽连斯基在2026年9月下旬表示，俄罗斯计划斥资120亿美元专门用于生产喷气动力无人机和巡飞弹。[35] 别斯克列斯特诺夫指出，俄罗斯研发人员订购的巡航导弹式巡飞弹数量与喷气动力“格朗/沙赫德”（Geran/Shahed）无人机数量相当，这些武器将在五到六个月内投入使用。[36] 别斯克列斯特诺夫补充说，俄罗斯研发人员正试图改进“班德罗尔”（Banderol）、“丹-T”（Dan-T）和“丹-M”（Dan-M）弹药以及“格伯拉-5”（Gerbera-5）多用途无人机，使其飞行速度达到750公里/小时，并具备低空飞行和机动能力。别斯克列斯特诺夫评估认为，这些创新将进一步增加乌克兰拦截这些空中目标的难度。别斯克列斯特诺夫报告称，俄罗斯计划每月生产 120 枚“班德罗尔”导弹，并估计这样的生产速度将使俄罗斯军队每天能够发射 4 枚“班德罗尔”导弹。[37] 乌克兰军事研究小组 (GUR) 评估称，截至 2026 年 8 月，俄罗斯每月生产 80 枚“班德罗尔”导弹，并计划在 2026 年达到每月 1000 枚的产量。[38] 一位乌克兰军事分析家兼退伍军人在 2026 年 8 月评估称，俄罗斯可能计划在 2027 年生产约 10000 枚“丹-T”导弹，而其他乌克兰消息来源则评估称，俄罗斯计划在 2026 年底前生产 2000 枚“丹-T”导弹，并在 2027 年生产 14000 枚。[39]

俄罗斯正试图通过改造丹-M靶机等旧技术，制造出多种低成本打击飞行器，使其速度逐渐达到亚音速巡航导弹的水平。一位乌克兰航空专家在2026年9月表示，丹-T喷气动力准巡航导弹是丹-M靶机的改进型。[40] 俄罗斯研发人员最初在20世纪90年代初设计了地空两用丹-M靶机，作为无人靶机，用于模仿战术飞机和战斧巡航导弹进行防空训练。[41] 此后，俄罗斯研发人员将现有的丹-M库存改造为打击弹药，方法是将靶机的颜色从红色改为其他颜色，并加装弹头。[42] 据报道，丹-M靶机可以以每小时400至750公里的速度飞行25至40分钟，飞行高度可达9公里。[43]不过，别斯克列斯特诺夫指出，丹-T 和丹-M 是不同的飞行器，而且俄罗斯拥有大量的丹-M 靶机库存。[44]

据报道，俄罗斯军队于2025年春夏两季首次发射了丹-M导弹，并从被占领的克里米亚向敖德萨市和基辅市发射了一批此类弹药。[45] 一位俄罗斯军事分析家声称，俄罗斯军队在发动导弹或“格朗/沙赫德”无人机袭击前发射丹-M导弹，旨在分散和消耗乌克兰的防空系统。[46] 自2025年中期以来，俄罗斯军队未再大规模使用丹-M导弹，但俄罗斯对这类系统的试验表明，俄罗斯研发人员正在寻找能够达到与亚音速巡航导弹相当的速度，并能快速改装成打击车辆的低成本飞行器。

俄罗斯研发人员也在试验从战术飞机上发射准巡航导弹，这很可能是为了提高导弹的作战射程和发射频率。俄军最初使用猎户座大型固定翼攻击侦察无人机发射“班德罗尔”导弹，该无人机曾是俄罗斯在采用伊朗设计的“沙赫德”无人机之前的旗舰机型之一。[47] 战术防空和反无人机技术的进步使得猎户座和土耳其制造的“拜拉克塔尔”等大型固定翼无人机在前线附近失效，因为它们体积庞大且速度相对较慢，容易被探测和拦截。[48] 俄罗斯研发人员有效地改造了猎户座无人机，使其成为“班德罗尔”导弹的发射平台，从而为该型无人机开发了新的用途。

此后，俄罗斯研发人员优先考虑扩大准巡航导弹的射程，主要方法是从直升机上发射这些空中目标，并计划为固定翼飞机开发发射装置。一位不愿透露姓名的乌克兰国家武器局（GUR）官员在2026年7月下旬表示，俄军已具备从米-28直升机上发射“班德罗尔”（Banderol）导弹的能力；贝斯克列斯特诺夫在2026年7月中旬指出，俄军已进行过从米-8直升机上发射“班德罗尔”导弹的演练。[49] 乌克兰国家武器局副局长瓦迪姆·斯基比茨基少将随后在2026年8月表示，俄军可以从直升机上发射“班德罗尔”和“丹-T”（Dan-T）导弹，并且俄罗斯研发人员正在积极创新从战术飞机上发射这些弹药的方法。[50] 一位乌克兰退伍军人和分析人士在2026年8月评估认为，俄军可能在2027年越来越多地从米-28直升机和俄罗斯苏霍伊战斗机系列的四款主要机型上发射“丹-T”导弹。[51]俄罗斯国家技术集团将 Dan-T 宣传为一种可以从外国或俄罗斯制造的飞机和直升机（如 Yak-130、MiG-29、Mi-28N 和 Mi-8）上发射的武器。[52]

2026年6月，一位乌克兰武器和军事装备研究人员警告说，从战术飞机上发射将使俄罗斯准巡航导弹能够越来越有效地绕过乌克兰的防空系统，并打击远达1000公里的目标。[53] 一位乌克兰航空专家估计，当从俄罗斯战斗机上发射时，丹-T导弹的射程可达500公里。[54] 更远的作战半径可能使俄罗斯军队能够将班德罗尔和丹-T导弹的打击范围扩大到乌克兰南部和中部以外的地区。

俄罗斯研发人员也在开发陆基和海基准巡航导弹发射平台，这很可能是为了扩大其作战范围，打击乌克兰中后方的目标。乌克兰国家安全局（GUR）在2026年7月报道称，俄军正在被占领的克里米亚使用地面发射装置发射“班德罗尔”导弹。[55] 这位乌克兰退伍军人和分析人士评估认为，俄军可能在2027年越来越多地从地面系统和舰艇上发射“丹-T”导弹。[56] 该分析人士还展示了一张可能安装在轮式底盘上的发射装置的图片，该装置可以从地面运输和发射两枚“丹-T”导弹。陆基和海基发射装置可以扩大“班德罗尔”或“丹-T”导弹的作战用途，使俄军有可能打击黑海目标、乌克兰中后方的防御工事或关键后勤节点。陆基“班德罗尔”导弹可以通过使发射地点和攻击轨迹更难以预测来缩短预警和反应时间。[57]然而，地面发射装置需要飞行器在发射过程中消耗比空射平台多得多的能量，这意味着俄罗斯的研发人员可能减少了“班德罗尔”的弹头或飞行距离。[58]

俄罗斯很可能在2026年末和2027年优先发展和扩大喷气动力巡飞弹和准巡航导弹的生产，以领先于乌克兰不断改进的针对喷气动力“格兰/沙赫德”无人机的反制措施。乌克兰军队正在日益适应喷气动力无人机，但目前在应对喷气动力巡飞弹和准巡航导弹方面准备不足。乌克兰研发人员于2026年8月发布了升级版的LITAVR+拦截器，旨在对抗速度超过400公里/小时的喷气动力“格兰/沙赫德”攻击无人机。[59] 乌克兰研发人员还在2026年7月宣布，他们正在进行“毒刺2.0”拦截器的实战测试，以应对日益增长的俄罗斯喷气动力无人机威胁。[60]别斯克列斯特诺夫指出，乌克兰至少研制了三到五种用于拦截喷气式“格朗斯/沙赫德”导弹的拦截器，但这些拦截器必须经过测试。[61] 俄罗斯可能会进一步研制准巡航导弹，并改进喷气式无人机，以继续对乌克兰防空系统施加压力。

俄罗斯近期在类似巡航导弹的武器方面取得的创新表明，俄罗斯正试图寻找廉价且可快速扩展的方法来增强其在乌克兰的弹道导弹打击行动。俄罗斯的无人机和导弹联合打击计划依靠弹道导弹和准弹道导弹来利用乌克兰“爱国者”拦截导弹的短缺，并计划在2026年造成重大破坏。[62] 然而，俄罗斯的弹道导弹和准弹道导弹库存有限，而且其生产周期比准巡航导弹、喷气式巡飞弹或无人机更长、更复杂。俄罗斯军队很可能无法复制主要或完全依赖弹道导弹的喷气式无人机和弹道导弹联合打击计划的效果。俄罗斯军队将寻求使用喷气式无人机和弹道导弹联合打击力量，在乌克兰部署足够的反制措施之前破坏乌克兰的关键基础设施。此外，在这些打击力量中加入喷气式巡飞弹和准巡航导弹，只会进一步加剧乌克兰的防空形势。然而，这场贯穿乌克兰战争的持续攻防技术竞赛的最终结果，目前仍不明朗。

乌克兰及其伙伴必须在未来几个月内开始着手应对俄罗斯日益增多的喷气式巡飞弹和准巡航导弹，同时还需要在更长的时间跨度内研发反弹道导弹系统。别斯克列斯特诺夫指出，乌克兰研发人员需要优先研发针对巡航导弹类目标的廉价拦截器。[63] 别斯克列斯特诺夫还暗示，乌克兰的电子战系统可以有效拦截“班德罗尔”和“丹-T”导弹，因为这些武器依赖卫星和惯性导航。[64] 乌克兰“勇敢1”国防科技集群于2026年9月初宣布，乌克兰研发人员已经研发并部署了一些针对“班德罗尔”导弹的未公开反制措施，目前正在努力扩大生产规模。[65] 乌克兰研发人员可能还需要更多时间来研究“班德罗尔”、“丹-T”和其他喷气式空中目标及其改进型，之后才能大规模研发和生产拦截器。

乌克兰的武器创新周期进一步表明，乌克兰、美国及其盟友必须紧急实现防空能力多元化，以应对准巡航导弹和准弹道导弹等新兴廉价武器的威胁，这些武器旨在利用全球防空导弹短缺的局面。有效的防空体系除了便携式防空导弹系统（MANPADS）和地对空导弹系统（SAM）等传统防空系统外，还必须包括低成本的动能对抗措施，例如用于拦截低空和高空空中目标的拦截器，以及不断升级的电子战系统。

[1] https://kyivindependent.com/cheaper-than-a-missile-just-as-hard-to-down-russias-banderol-munition-adds-strain-to-ukraines-air-defenses/; https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrainian-mirage-2000-5f-shoots-down-banderol-missile-with-cannon-for-first-time/; https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/rosiya-mozhe-vyroblyaty-do-80-banderolej-shhomisyatsya/; https://english.nv.ua/nation/banderol-technical-specifications-range-warhead-and-risks-infographic-and-description-50634405.html [2] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5469; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5479; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5505; https://war-sanctions dot gur.gov.ua/ru/components?f%5Btitle_uk%5D=wgroup-386; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5686; https://english dot nv.ua/nation/banderol-technical-specifications-range-warhead-and-risks-infographic-and-description-50634405.html [3] https://t.me/kpszsu/61846; https://t.me/kpszsu/62647; https://t.me/kpszsu/63655; https://t.me/kpszsu/63867; https://t.me/kpszsu/64087; https://t.me/kpszsu/64202; https://t.me/kpszsu/64426; https://t.me/kpszsu/64565; https://t.me/kpszsu/64700; https://t.me/kpszsu/64976; https://t.me/kpszsu/65248; https://t.me/kpszsu/65566; https://t.me/kpszsu/65808; https://t.me/kpszsu/67095; https://t.me/kpszsu/67924; https://t.me/kpszsu/68398; https://t.me/kpszsu/68985; https://t.me/kpszsu/69144; https://t.me/kpszsu/69330; https://t.me/kpszsu/69455; https://t.me/kpszsu/70584; https://t.me/kpszsu/71026; https://t.me/kpszsu/71167; https://t.me/kpszsu/72056; https://t.me/kpszsu/72740; https://t.me/kpszsu/72905; https://t.me/kpszsu/73403; https://t.me/kpszsu/74294; https://t.me/kpszsu/74748; https://t.me/kpszsu/75160; https://t.me/kpszsu/75261; https://t.me/kpszsu/75371; https://t.me/kpszsu/75880; https://t.me/kpszsu/76051; https://t.me/kpszsu/76336; https://t.me/kpszsu/76746; https://t.me/kpszsu/76967; https://t.me/kpszsu/77395; https://t.me/kpszsu/77891; https://t.me/kpszsu/77970; https://t.me/kpszsu/78070; https://t.me/kpszsu/78115; https://t.me/kpszsu/78956; https://t.me/kpszsu/79268; https://t.me/kpszsu/79650; https://t.me/kpszsu/7986; https://t.me/kpszsu/80051; https://t.me/kpszsu/81294； https://t.me/kpszsu/81455； https://t.me/kpszsu/81982 [4] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/raketa-banderol-u-serijne-vyrobnytstvo/ [5] https://english dot nv.ua/nation/ Russia-s-banderol-missile-now-in-serial-product-50628339.html [6] https://www.intellinews.com/ Russia-begins-mass-product-of-cheap-upgraded-banderol-cruise-missile-458360/； https://kyivindependent.com/cheaper-than-a-missile-just-as-hard-to-down-russias-banderol-munition-adds-strain-to-ukraines-air-defenses/; https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/raketa-banderol-u-serijne-vyrobnytstvo/ [7] https://suspilne.media/kharkiv/1350026-do-400-kg-vibuhivki-rosiani-vdarili-po-nemislanskomu-rajonu-harkova-raketou-banderol-prokuratura/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47764; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/; 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