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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10, 2026

Putin used his phone call with US President Donald Trump on October 9 to falsely blame Ukraine for the lack peace negotiations’ progress

ISWJordan Glynn查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月10日

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his phone call with US President Donald Trump on October 9 to falsely blame Ukraine for the lack peace negotiations’ progress despite Russia’s continued unwillingness to engage in meaningful negotiations or make any concessions to end the war in Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Putin told Trump that Ukraine’s alleged long-range strikes against Russian election infrastructure during the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections “thwarted the possibility” of “immediately” resuming peace negotiations — attempting to malign Ukraine as the party responsible for halting peace negotiations.[1] There is, in fact, no evidence that Ukraine targeted Russian election infrastructure during the September 2026 Duma elections, and Russian claims that Ukraine attempted to target election infrastructure remain unfounded. Putin emphasized that Russia’s commitment to achieve all its war goals and objectives — which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender — remain unchanged. Ukraine, the United States, and Europe have repeatedly presented various ceasefires and peace proposals with concessions to Russia — all of which the Kremlin has continuously rejected.[2] Moscow has insisted on painting Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts despite the fact that Russia has not offered any concessions and has rejected numerous compromise proposals that the US and Ukraine have offered. Putin’s October 9 reiteration of his commitment to Russia’s unchanged war aims demonstrates the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to accept any compromised peace proposals on any terms that fall short of fulfilling Russia’s maximalist demands of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[3]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is presenting a tailored weekly summary of the Russian forces’ exaggerated military successes aimed specifically at Russia’s domestic audience through Max – the new social media platform that the Russian state has developed to control the Russian internet. The Russian MoD published a rollup of Russian claimed battlefield successes on October 9 only on its Max channel, a Russian messenger platform which requires Russian or Belarusian phone numbers as a prerequisite for registration, and claimed that Russian forces seized two settlements in Ukraine between October 3 and 9 and another three over the past 24 hours.[4] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces thwarted Ukrainian forces’ attempts to conduct rotations or break out of the claimed encirclements in Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast, and near Chorne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[5] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized 414 square kilometers and 20 settlements since encircling Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast — an exaggerated claim that has no basis in reality, as Ukrainian forces and Russian milbloggers themselves have refuted or questioned claims that Russian forces encircled any Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[6] The MoD rollup also highlighted the Russian long-range strikes against defense industry facilities, telecommunications centers, and dry cargo ships in Ukraine over the past week.[7] The Russian MoD notably only published this weekly summary on its Max channel rather than on its internationally-facing Telegram channel, indicating that the Russian MoD likely aims to highlight and exaggerate the Russian forces’ weekly military achievements specifically for the Russian domestic audience and present Russian continuing battlefield successes despite evidence that Russian advances have significantly slowed.[8] The apparent difference in messaging suggests that the Kremlin seeks to minimize the amount of international scrutiny it receives from its baseless claims of Russian successes, though the MoD still makes highly exaggerated claims on its Telegram channel — claims that ISW regularly refutes.[9]

US President Donald Trump’s October 9 announcement about the diesel export deal between the United States and Russia disrupted the negotiations meeting between a Ukrainian delegation and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner in Miami. Ukraine’s negotiating team met with Witkoff, Kushner, and the representatives of the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), the European Commission, and NATO in Miami, Florida, on October 9 to discuss Ukraine’s preparations ahead of Winter 2026-2027, peace proposals and proposals for “territorial solutions,” security guarantees, Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction, and long-term Ukraine’s and Europe’s security agreements.[10] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Alex Raufoglou reported, citing unspecified sources, that there will be no second day of negotiations and that the talks between Ukraine’s delegation and the United States ended sooner than planned.[11] Three people familiar with the matter told Financial Times that Trump’s announcement about a diesel export deal with Russia ”blindsided” the Ukrainian delegation.[12] Ukrainian Presidential Communications Adviser Dmytro Lytvyn confirmed on October 10 that Ukraine’s negotiating team is heading back to Ukraine.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his phone call with US President Donald Trump on October 9 to falsely blame Ukraine for the lack peace negotiations’ progress despite Russia’s continued unwillingness to engage in meaningful negotiations or make any concessions to end the war in Ukraine.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is presenting a tailored weekly summary of the Russian forces’ exaggerated military successes aimed specifically at Russia’s domestic audience through Max – the new social media platform that the Russian state has developed to control the Russian internet.

US President Donald Trump’s October 9 announcement about the diesel export deal between the United States and Russia disrupted the negotiations meeting between a Ukrainian delegation and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner in Miami.

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil and railway infrastructure in Rostov Oblast on October 10. Russian forces launched 160 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Rostov Oblast on October 10. Geolocated footage published on October 10 shows a fire at the NZNP oil-loading terminal in Rostov-on-Don (roughly 210 kilometers from the frontline) following a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[14]

Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces struck railway infrastructure in Rostov and Bryansk oblasts on October 10. Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed on October 10 that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged a railway bridge in Rostov-on-Don and two vessels in Azov (20 kilometers from Rostov-on-Don). [15] The local branch of Russian state-owned Russian Railways confirmed that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged a railway bridge in Rostov-on-Don, suspending rail traffic.[16] Bryansk Oblast Governor Yegor Kovalchuk claimed on October 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge in Vygonichsky Raion (roughly 80 kilometers from the international border), disrupting rail traffic.[17]

Drone debris from an October 9 strike reportedly caused a fire and shut down an automobile factory in Kaluga Oblast. The Russian automotive holding company AGR Automotive Group reported on October 9 that it is suspending the production of Tenet automobiles at its auto plant in Kaluga City(roughly 290 kilometers from the frontline) for safety reasons after drone debris reportedly fell on the plant during Russian air defense operations.[18] AGR’s Kaluga auto plant is located in the Grabtsevo Industrial Park in Kaluga City alongside the Yandex Kaluga data center that Ukrainian forces struck on October 9.[19]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

A Russian milblogger denied Russian claims that Russian forces control forested areas near Kyianytsia (north of Sumy City). [20] Ukrainian military officials previously refuted claims from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that Russian forces seized Kyiantysia on October 9.[21]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian air defenses in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an electronic warfare system near Trukhanovo (roughly 47 kilometers from the international border) on October 9 or the night of October 9 to 10.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers south of Volokhivka (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on October 10, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[23] Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian position east of Komisarove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), according to geolocated footage published on October 9, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[24]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers continue to make baseless claims about the alleged large-scale encirclement between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions. The Russian MoD claimed on October 10 that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Lukashove (north of Velykyi Burluk) and Lobanivka (south of Lobanivka).[25] Russian sources credited elements of the 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD], under the operational control of the Northern GoF) with the claimed seizures of Lukashove and Lobanivka, respectively.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that the alleged seizures of Lobanivka and Lukashove will allow Russian forces to outflank Riznykove (between Lobanivka and Lukashove) from the north and south.[27] The milblogger claimed that there are only five settlements in the alleged encirclement in northern Kharkiv Oblast that Russian forces have not yet seized. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that the claimed seizures of Lobanivka and Lukashove require further confirmation, however.[28] The Russian MoD and milbloggers have regularly made baseless claims of a large-scale encirclement in the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk directions, despite no evidence to support their claims.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage posted on October 9.[30] Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian-occupied building along the Pivdenna Railway on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on October 9.[31] ISW assesses that both strikes occurred after Russian infiltration missions. Some Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, but some Russian sources claimed that fighting continues in the settlement and it is premature to talk about full Russian control over it.[32]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on October 9 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position northwest of Borova Andriivka (northeast of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[33]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

A prominent Russian milblogger assessed that Russian forces maintaining control over settlements along the Zherebets River, where Ukrainian forces are counterattacking is vital for Russian logistics and future efforts to seize Lyman. Several Russian milbloggers noted that Ukrainian forces are attacking near Zarichne (northeast of Lyman) and Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[34] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger assessed that the future Ukrainian liberation of Zarichne would fix Russian forces in the Svyati Hory National Nature Park, a large forested area that runs between Zarichne and Yampil and eastward into the Russian near rear, but noted that Russian forces in the forest are still able to receive supplies from Torske (just west of Zarichne on the other side of the Zherebets River) and Yampil.[35] The milblogger claimed that elements of the both the Russian Western and Southern groupings of forces, operating in the Lyman and Slovyansk directions, respectively, are striking Ukrainian forces attacking near Yampil. The milblogger assessed that Russia’s loss of Zarichne and Yampil will make a new offensive against Lyman “impossible.”

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces are trying to recapture Rai-Oleksandrivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces liberated the settlement.[36] The milblogger connected the Ukrainian liberation of Rai-Oleksandrivka to Ukrainian successes in the Lyman area with Operation Vivaldi. Ukrainian forces also continued counterattacks east of Kramatorsk near Yurkivka, Minkivka, and Vasyutynske, according to Russian milbloggers.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on October 9 and 10 but did not advance. [38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position northeast of Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on October 10, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 9 that Russian forces are consolidating positions near Vesele Pole (north of Dobropillya) — in line with the Russian MoD’s baseless allegations that Russian forces recently made significant advances to encircle the town.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on October 9 and 10 but did not advance.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian milbloggers are issuing conflicting reports about the extent of Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 10 that Russian forces are advancing near Barvinivka and Voskresenka, two nearby settlements connected by the T-0408 highway that are northwest of Hulyaipole and 20 and 22 kilometers from ISW-assessed Russian advances, respectively.[42] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 9, however, that Russian forces recently established fire control over a portion of the T-0408 road connecting Voskresenka and Tersyanka (4.4 kilometers north of Voskresenka), suggesting that Russian positions are further back from Voskresenka and Barvinivka than the Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Orikhiv on October 9 and 10 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces are attempting to infiltrate into central and eastern Orikhiv. [44]

Russian forces launched five glide bombs against Zaporizhzhia City on October 10, killing at least 17 people and injuring at least 16. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, confirmed on October 10 that Russian forces launched five glide bombs against residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia City.[45] Russia’s recent intensification of strikes against civilian and critical infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City intends to complicate civilian life within major population centers, introduce constant fear and uncertainty to daily life, degrade the Ukrainian economy, and degrade defenses in the city to facilitate future Russian offensives.[46]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military training areas in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian training center for non-commissioned officers (NCOs) near Khorly (roughly 74 kilometers from the frontline) on October 9 or overnight on October 9 to 10.[47]

Ukrainian long-range strikes against a railway bridge in Rostov Oblast on October 10 are causing train delays in occupied Crimea. A private Russian railway carrier, Grand Service Express, reported that all trains that travel from occupied Crimea to southern Russia are experiencing delays due to the damage to the railway bridge between Rostov-on-Don and Bataysk, Rostov Oblast.[48]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [49]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 9 to 10, causing power outages that stopped public transport in much of Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 160 Shahed-type drones (including 110 jet-powered drones), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[50] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 117 drones, including 82 jet-powered drones; that an unspecified number of drones hit 14 locations; and that drone debris fell at 10 locations. Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian jet-powered drone near Lviv City on the morning of October 10, which Russian and Ukrainian sources noted was the first instance of a Russian jet-powered drone entering Lviv City’s airspace.[51] Ukrainian officials reported that train traffic and escalators at all three underground metro lines in Kyiv City suspended operations after Russian strikes caused a sudden loss of voltage from external electrical supply hubs, and that trolleybus and tram routes also suspended operations in parts of the capital due to substation outages.[52] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported water supply disruptions in the city on October 10.[53]

Russia’s Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid is trying in part to damage Ukraine’s infrastructure for transmitting electricity between regions. Ukrainian state energy company Ukrenergo reported on October 9 that Russian forces are using a new strike tactic to degrade Ukraine’s energy grid — continuous strikes on substations, transmission lines, and distribution systems, especially near large cities that consume high quantities of electricity.[54] Russian forces are systematically destroying power generation facilities in some Ukrainian oblasts, leading to energy shortages in those areas and forcing Ukrainian authorities to transmit electricity from other regions hundreds of kilometers away. Ukrenergo noted that continuous Russian strikes and air raid sirens complicate efforts to rapidly repair and restore damaged energy infrastructure. A multi-part Russian plan for the Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign, which Western media outlets recently reviewed and publicized, also calls for Russian strikes to disable substations, transmission lines, and interconnectors near Ukraine’s western border through which Ukraine imports European electricity.[55] Russia’s Winter 2025-2026 strike campaign also targeted Ukraine’s transmission and distribution infrastructure.[56]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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