F FEICELL News全球新闻 · 本地动态 · 实时更新
← 返回新闻首页
军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2026

Ukraine's ability to use SpaceX's Starlink and Starshield to intercept Russian jet-powered drones remains unclear as of October 18.

ISWStefaniia Bern查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月18日

Ukraine’s ability to use SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) to intercept Russian jet-powered drones remains unclear as of October 18. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine’s access to Starlink technology to intercept Russian jet-powered drones in Ukraine remains restricted to 161 kilometers per hour (around 100 miles per hour).[1] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on October 17 that Ukraine does not have access to Starshield (a more secure, jam-resistant, and military-oriented version of the Starlink satellite network that SpaceX designed for government use) and that Ukraine’s access to Starshield technology to strike deep into Russia is “under discussion.”[2]

Ukrainian forces conducted their largest strike against Russian digital, energy, and logistics infrastructure in St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast since 2022, overnight on October 17 to 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 1,015 Ukrainian drones over Russia, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea, and Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko reported that Russian forces downed 145 drones over Leningrad Oblast alone overnight on October 17 to 18.[3] Ukrainian forces struck and significantly damaged a Russian VKontakte (VK) social media platform data center near St. Petersburg (roughly 854 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated imagery published on October 18.[4] VK’s Press Service acknowledged the Ukrainian strikes and claimed that its services remained available to users.[5] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that VK users complained about a significant VK service disruption following Ukrainian strikes, however.[6] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck and damaged the Vostochnaya 330 kV substation, which is located next to the VK data center, and Drozdenko reported that Ukrainian strikes left around 20,000 people without power.[7] Ukrainian forces struck the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal in Leningrad Oblast (roughly 856 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on October 18.[8] Ukrainian forces also struck an Ozon marketplace warehouse in St. Petersburg (roughly 844 kilometers from the international border) and caused a large fire, according to geolocated footage published on October 18.[9] The Ozon Press Service acknowledged the Ukrainian strike and a resulting fire.[10] Ukrainian forces also struck a cable-stayed bridge along the Western High-Speed Diameter Highway bridge linking northern and southern St. Petersburg (roughly 860 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on October 17.[11] Ukraine’s October 17-18 strikes against Leningrad Oblast were both large in volume and covered a notably wide target set, highlighting Russia’s persistent air defense vulnerabilities and command-and-control problems.[12] Ukrainian forces have been conducting a strike campaign against Russian digital infrastructure and data centers, causing widespread service and power disruptions within Russia’s digital ecosystem.[13]

Russia continues to expand kinetic actions in Europe that are likely intended to disrupt Western assistance to Ukraine and test NATO resolve. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported on October 17 that the Romanian Air Force detected and downed two unidentified drones 20 kilometers east and 25 kilometers southeast of Sulina, Romania (near Romania’s southeastern border with Ukraine) over the Black Sea on the evening of October 17.[14] Romanian Acting Defense Minister Radu Miruta stated on October 18 that the drones could be Russian Geran-4 jet-powered drones, as they were flying at a speed of 450 kilometers per hour, indicating the use of a turboprop engine.[15] Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius reported that overnight on October 17 to 18, unspecified actors attempted arson at the site of a Lithuanian company that stores Starlink communication equipment and attributed the incident to Russia’s kinetic activity against Europe.[16] Sinkevicius noted that the October 18 arson attempt in Lithuania resembled similar incidents in Poland and Bulgaria.[17] Russia has been recently intensifying its kinetic activity against Europe, including through arson and other sabotage attempts against European defense industrial enterprises supplying arms to Ukraine and drone incursions into European airspace, in order to disrupt the transportation of Western aid and military equipment to Ukraine.[18]

ISW has observed additional evidence corroborating information about the recent restructuring of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade into the 84th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]). A Telegram channel purportedly affiliated with the Russian “148th Motorized Rifle Regiment” announced on October 8 that the Regiment had assumed command over the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) and that the channel was no longer representing the brigade’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion.[19] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apti Alaudinov seemingly confirmed the subordination of the 148th Motorized Rifle Regiment to the 84th Motorized Rifle Division in a Telegram post from October 15.[20] While it is unclear what the Telegram channel of the “148th Motorized Rifle Regiment” meant by the regiment assuming command of the 4th Brigade, both these reports appear to be consistent with recent reporting of the formation of the 84th Motorized Rifle Division on the basis of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade.[21] The claim that the 148th Motorized Rifle Regiment is assuming command over the former 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that the Russian command continues efforts to restructure the former brigade within a division-based command hierarchy, including via the integration and redistribution of regiment and brigade-echelon elements. The recently-formed 84th Motorized Rifle Division and its subordinate formations are one of the primary fighting forces in Kostyantynivka (Russia’s priority effort).[22] Russia’s recent reorganization of units and formations is part of ongoing military reforms that Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 and brings the total tally of Russian brigades reorganized into maneuver divisions to 12 since 2022.[23] It remains unclear if or how Russia will staff these units and formations to doctrinal end-strength.

Ukraine’s ability to use SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) to intercept Russian jet-powered drones remains unclear as of October 18.

Ukrainian forces conducted their largest strike against Russian digital, energy, and logistics infrastructure in St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast since 2022, overnight on October 17 to 18.

Russia continues to expand kinetic actions in Europe that are likely intended to disrupt Western assistance to Ukraine and test NATO resolve.

ISW has observed additional evidence corroborating information about the recent restructuring of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade into the 84th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District).

Russia launched 337 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile against Ukraine during the day on October 17 and overnight on October 17 to 18.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Russian digital, oil, and logistics infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Sumy City. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position northeast of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 15, in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[24] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 18 that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are primarily conducting offensive operations toward and near Myropillya and near Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City).[25]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on October 17 and 18 but did not advance. [26]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 18. A Ukrainian brigade refuted recent Russian claims that Russian forces seized Kolodyazne (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission south of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position north of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) using drone-dropped munitions, according to geolocated footage published on October 17, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[28]

Some sources continue refuting Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s falsified October 16 claims of Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces refuted on October 17 Gerasimov’s October 16 claim that Russian forces seized Kovalivka (west of Kupyansk) and Palamarivka (northwest of Kupyansk), asserting that these claims are unconfirmed.[29]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 18.

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continue efforts to infiltrate into Lyman. Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission near existing observed infiltration areas on the eastern outskirts of Lyman, according to geolocated footage published on October 17.[30]

Ukrainian sources continue to provide more details on tactics that Ukrainian forces used during Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction. An officer of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion that participated in Operation Vivaldi reported that Ukrainian drones escorted Ukrainian infantry and conducted missions akin to close air support (operations typically by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces, requiring close integration between ground and air forces and missions).[31] The officer reported that mechanized Ukrainian forces encircled Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and liberated the settlement without urban combat.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[32] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kurtivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and near Kostyantynivka on October 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Raiske (northwest of Kostyantynivka along the east [left] bank of the Kazennyi Torets River).[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in southeastern Dobropillya. Geolocated footage published on October 18 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag in southeastern Dobropillya after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[36] Ukrainian military officials have recently refuted Russian claims of seizing or encircling Dobropillya, and ISW has not yet observed evidence that Russian forces have consolidated positions within Dobropillya.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on October 17 but did not advance.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 17 and 18 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area. [39]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission south of Orikhiv. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian all-terrain vehicle (ATV) in southern Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on October 18, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[40]

Ukrainian officials directly refuted Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s October 16 claims of exaggerated Russian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Maksym Kravchuk reported on October 18 that Ukrainian forces retain control over Malokaterynivka (immediately south of Zaporizhzhia City) despite Gerasimov’s claims.[41] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky suggested on October 18 that Russian forces are about 20 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, contrary to Russian claims that Russian forces are five kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City.[42] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced or infiltrated as close as 24 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City as of October 18.

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian rocket launchers in occupied southern Ukraine. A Ukrainian unmanned systems group reported on October 17 that Ukrainian drones destroyed a Russian BM-30 Smerch multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and its transport loading vehicle approximately 60 kilometers from the frontline, presumably in occupied southern Ukraine.[43] The Ukrainian drone group reported that Russian forces used the Smerch to strike Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes during the day on October 17 and overnight into October 18, continuing to primarily target Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed- (including 25 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, and other unspecified drones as well as six Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions during the day on October 17.[45] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 140 drones (including 22 jet-powered ones) and all six Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces then launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast, 180 Shahed- (including 26 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight on October 17to 18.[46] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 152 drones (including 16 jet-powered ones), that unspecified air vehicles struck 20 locations, and that air vehicle debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck electrical substations in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Odesa oblasts overnight, causing power outages.[47] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Ternopil and Odesa oblasts and that Ukrainian officials imposed power limitation schedules across all of Ukraine and rolling blackouts in some regions.[48] Ukrainian officials also reported that a Russian strike damaged two four-story apartment buildings and a school in Zaporizhzhia City, killing at least one civilian and injuring at least two.[49]

Russian forces are reportedly equipping Gerbera-2 type strike drones with additional incendiary warheads. A Ukrainian source reported on October 17 that Russian forces have begun to equip Gerbera-2 type strike drones with incendiary warheads in addition to their standard 10-kilogram warhead.[50]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/zelenskyy-says-it-s-a-pity-trump-bypassed-sanctions-law-named-for-lindsey-graham-271778373559 [2] https://x.com/StateDept/status/2111634266216108211 [3] https://t.me/mod_russia/68312; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/12764 [4] https://t.me/dronebomber/41549 ; https://x.com/markito0171/status/2111764580007625181 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2111799572276388227 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2111707374067052974 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/32943 [5] https://vk dot company/ru/press/releases/12438/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/400885 [6] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/10/18/polzovateli-vkontakte-pozhalovalis-na-sboi-posle-ataki-na-data-tsentr-vk-v-peterburge [7] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-urazyly-data-tsentr-ta-terminal/; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/12764 [8] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2111737804854046772; https://t.me/exile_plus/2788; https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2111766290180567481; https://t.me/supernova_plus/61636; https://x.com/LayBay_ish/status/2111739745269088265 [9] https://x.com/dmitrij46839/status/2111701310248501351; https://t.me/supernova_plus/61641 [10] https://t.me/ozonhq/1583 [11] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8279; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2935 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2937 [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; [14] https://x.com/MAERomania/status/2111497346928230507

[15] https://informat dot ro/en/current-affairs/miruta-romania-shoots-down-russian-geran-4-drones-for-the-first-time-144136 [16]https://www.facebook.com/SinkeviciusMindaugas/posts/pfbid02B1sRZ83pth5tx929qDUMbQUQWiqukfugiH96jDhzn7qEVcs9J6WyfuGw9jXPeyBKl? cft [0]=AZhI9uwN34P4qjHMUBntlDdibcAIV1d6-Wgt_qve6o9-Y7QNOB48aiMgDlf5h24Io_STHrqsy2-JJtQMor6XYEJDhUWH7j8ZwhVAz9-MgjpFUxlrHpjvNXI9O2nMlJo1sT1TOFYo4QeepsB-dKyc6mMhvw& tn =%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/3086039/sinkevicius-bandyta-padegti-lietuvos-imone-kurioje-saugomas-starlink-rysio-iranga

[17] https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/3086039/sinkevicius-bandyta-padegti-lietuvos-imone-kurioje-saugomas-starlink-rysio-iranga; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/ [19] https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/316 [20] https://t.me/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT/24151 [21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ [22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ [23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ [24] https://t.me/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT/24158 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13255?single [25] https://t.me/severnnyi/9648 [26]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42616 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37707 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9648 [27] https://t.me/army_3heavy/3870 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/18/ne-vidpravyly-navit-pihotu-na-harkivshhyni-okupanty-namagalys-zahopyty-kolodyazne-dronom-praporonosczem/ [28] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DemdDL0Itj4/?srtk=cW13NTJiMDJzdGVr ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13257 [29] https://t.me/grvZapad/20128 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/ [30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13253; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1291294973130373; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1092686003526087 [31] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1430489-zakrili-nebo-ta-otocili-selo-vijskovij-rozpoviv-ak-zvilnali-kolodazi-na-doneccini-pid-cas-operacii-vivaldi/ [32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42616 [33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34152 [34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42616; https://t.me/wargonzo/37707 [35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34152 [36] https://t.me/Black_Berets_177/2460 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3700 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2111738290412147061?s=20 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3702 ; https://t.me/Black_Berets_177/2461 [37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/ [38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42616 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37707 [39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42616 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21628 [40] https://t.me/bolgarodessaanbu/287 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2111751130577502343 [41] https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/19402 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/ [42] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/nashi-voyini-zvilnili-bilshe-teritoriyi-z-pochatku-oseni-niz-106945 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81009 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/ [43] https://t.me/lasars_group/258 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/17/znajshly-za-60-km-vid-frontu-lasars-group-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-smerch-razom-iz-mashynoyu-zaryadzhannya/ [44] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [45] https://t.me/kpszsu/87786 [46] https://t.me/kpszsu/87843 [47] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21421 [48] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5554; https://t.me/ternopiloblenerho/1865; https://t.me/ternopiloblenerho/1863; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid0nFr4j1Hi1SEvWPaGgbwQ7uwtmCe9bVy8fmCEiSvthnQsDt5SJLYeGGaNczyWXbKgl?rdid=bJPhwoeooDGO2J3l [49] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2111703752369467825; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68473 [50] https://t.me/war_home/7760

手机左右滑动，电脑按 ← → 键，也能切换新闻