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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17, 2026

It remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces can use SpaceX’s Starlink and Starshield to intercept Russian jet-powered drones as of Oct. 17.

ISWFiona Noonan查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月17日

It remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces can use SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) to intercept Russian jet-powered drones as of October 17. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 17 that Ukrainian forces cannot use “Starlink or Starshield technology” to intercept jet-powered drones in Ukraine as of October 17 because of a “speed limit” of 161 kilometers per hour (around 100 miles per hour).[1] Zelensky added that Ukrainian drones that fly above this speed limit lose the “Starlink connection.” Sources within the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously stated on October 15 that some Ukrainian units reported that their Starlink / Starshield service resumed unrestricted access, following the initial, unexplained October 14 speed restrictions.[2] The current ability of Ukrainian forces to use Starlink/Starshield technologies without encountering speed restrictions remains unclear as of October 17.

Starshield is a more secure, jam-resistant, and military-oriented version of the Starlink satellite network that SpaceX designed for government use, while Starlink serves civilian and commercial purposes.[3] Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or any other Starlink services over Russian territory, as SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to within Ukraine’s international borders.[4]

The Ukrainian military officially refuted Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s exaggerated battlefield claims from October 16. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Major Andriy Kovalev stated on October 17 that Gerasimov’s claim that Russian forces seized over 1,800 square kilometers and 92 settlements since September 1, 2026, is false and noted that Ukrainian forces liberated more territory across the theater than Russian forces seized since the beginning of Fall 2026.[5] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces suffered a net loss of 122 square kilometers since September 1, 2026 – an assessment consistent with Kovalev’s statement.[6] Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces control Dobropillya, Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka), and Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka) and maintain defensive positions in Kostyantynivka, contrary to Gerasimov’s October 16 claims that Russian forces seized all of these locations. A Ukrainian brigade similarly stated on October 17 that Ukrainian forces control Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Novotroitske, and Petrivka (all northeast of Dobropillya), refuting Russian claims that Russian forces encircled Dobropillya, and stated that Russian forces conduct infiltration and flag-raising missions to create the illusion of advances in the Dobropillya direction.[7] ISW has not observed any evidence to suggest that Russian forces have consolidated positions in Dobropillya, Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, or Velykomykhailivka. Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces control Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) and have eliminated small Russian infiltration groups on Mykolaivka’s southern outskirts, refuting Gerasimov’s October 16 claim that Russian forces control 50 percent of the settlement.[8] Kovalev stated that Russian forces are 22 kilometers from the center of Zaporizhzhia City, contrary to Gerasimov’s October 16 claim that Russian forces are five kilometers from the city’s southern outskirts.[9] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces are at least 20.95 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, or 11.6 kilometers when accounting for Russian infiltration efforts. Ukraine’s 8th Airborne Assault Corps also stated on October 17 that the frontline is around 20 kilometers from the northern outskirts of Sumy City and that Russian Northern GoF Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov’s claim that Russian forces seized 14 settlements in Sumy Oblast from the Kursk direction in 2026 is false.[10] Ukrainian forces’ official refutations from October 17 are consistent with the available open-source evidence that ISW collects and verifies from Russian and Ukrainian reporting, geolocated footage, and remotely sensed data.

The Russian MoD, meanwhile, continued reiterating Gerasimov’s false October 16 claims that Russian forces seized Kovalivka (west of Kupyansk), Palamarivka (northwest of Kupyansk), Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, Pervomaiske (north of Dobropillya), Serhiivka (southwest of Dobropillya), Dobropillya, Malokaterynivka (just south of Zaporizhia City), and Velykomykhailivka.[11] Senior Russian military officials continue to greatly exaggerate the extent of Russian advance across the frontline as part of a broader cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian advances as sweeping across the battlefield despite evidence to the contrary. Senior Russian military officials very likely also have a distorted assessment of the frontline situation due to a pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military, which results in “beautiful reports” filtering inaccurate information up the chain of command.[12]

US President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order on the night of October 16 that waives key sanctions, restrictions, and tariff provisions against Russia from the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act – a decision that will help Russia finance and protract the war in Ukraine. [13] The Executive Order stated that Trump is waiving sanctions provisions after submitting a certification to the US Congress that such a waiver is in the US national interest. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev called the suspension of the Graham Sanctions Act a “significant and truly historic” moment.[14] Trump’s decision to invoke sanction exemptions against Russia comes shortly after Trump announced an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 9 to waive sanctions on Russian diesel to increase diesel supply to US and global markets.[15] Trump’s October 16 Executive Order does not support Trump’s stated foreign policy objectives of ending the war in Ukraine and will only enable Russia to continue financing and protracting the war in Ukraine without any proper incentives that may force Russia to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations.[16]

Polish authorities warn that Russia may escalate its sabotage attempts and provocations against Polish logistics infrastructure, likely in an attempt to disrupt the transportation of Western aid to Ukraine during Winter 2026-2027. Former Polish National Security Bureau head Jacek Siewiera stated on October 16 that there could be “a significant increase” in “hybrid operations” against European countries, including unspecified air attacks (likely meaning drone attacks) against infrastructure, administration facilities, and civilian objects during Winter 2026-2027.[17] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk responded to Siewiera’s comments and noted that Polish, Ukrainian, and allied intelligence services indicate that Poland can expect “some escalation” of an unspecified nature before Christmas Eve, likely meaning soon and before the end of the year.[18] Tusk added that “Russia will escalate” sabotage attempts and provocations – including against the transportation of gas, oil, and food to Ukraine and logistics and railway infrastructure on the Polish-Ukrainian border – and test Polish responses. Russian-linked actors most notably targeted Polish train tracks along the Dorohusk Poland-Ukraine crossing on November 15, 2025.[19] Russia has been increasingly conducting drone strikes against Ukrainian border crossings and targets along the Polish-Ukrainian border in September 2026.[20] The Kremlin likely hopes that such sabotage attempts will dissuade the West from providing aid to Ukraine amidst an intensifying Russian Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign targeting civilian and critical infrastructure in Ukraine that aims to cause wider disruptions to Ukraine’s economy and daily civilian life.[21] Russia has been intensifying arson and sabotage attacks against European defense industrial enterprises since at least 2024, including the most recent attacks against Estonia and Germany, since such attacks provide the Kremlin a low-cost method of disrupting the transportation of Western aid to Ukraine.[22]

It remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces can use SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) to intercept Russian jet-powered drones as of October 17.

The Ukrainian military officially refuted Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s exaggerated battlefield claims from October 16.

US President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order on the night of October 16 that waives key sanctions, restrictions, and tariff provisions against Russia from the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act – a decision that will help Russia finance and protract the war in Ukraine.

Polish authorities warn that Russia may escalate its sabotage attempts and provocations against Polish logistics infrastructure, likely in an attempt to disrupt the transportation of Western aid to Ukraine during Winter 2026-2027.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kramatorsk, and Russian forces recently advanced north of Kostyantynivka.

Russia launched 332 drones and an unspecified number of missiles and Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently struck drone and missile infrastructure in Russia, part of efforts to reduce Russia’s capabilities to produce drones and launch missile strikes. Ukrainian forces struck a production and warehouse building at the Russian drone manufacturer Roboavia enterprise near Lenina, Rostov Oblast (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline), on October 16, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that the October 12 Ukrainian strike damaged a warehouse building of a Russian missile brigade’s logistics support unit near Latishi, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 131 kilometers from the international border).

Ukrainian strikes continue to hinder Russia’s refinery production. The Ryazan Oil Refinery near Ryazan City (roughly 485 kilometers from the international border) suspended operations of one of its primary crude distillation units after a Ukrainian drone strike on October 15, according to two industry sources speaking to Reuters.[24] The sources added that the latest strike damaged several refinery pipelines and that the refinery still has three other crude distillation units in operation.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

See topline text for Ukrainian refutations of Russian claims regarding the northern Sumy Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continue to thwart Russian attempts to conduct infiltration missions through pipes in Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces detonated several explosives at the exit of a pipeline in Sumy Oblast, according to footage published on October 16.[25] The Ukrainian 8th Airborne Assault Corps reported on October 17 that Russian forces continue attempts to conduct infiltration missions through a pipeline in Sumy Oblast, as they are unable to advance on the ground.[26]

Ukrainian forces continue to interdict Russian ground lines of communication (GLOC) in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge over the Unecha River near Sloboda-Seletskaya, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 55 kilometers from the international border), on October 16 or overnight on October 16 to 17.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 16 and 17 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City.[28] Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian helicopters in Belgorod Oblast using disproportionately cheaper fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones. Geolocated footage published on October 14 and 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian Mi-28 helicopters near Lozovoe (roughly eight kilometers from the frontline) and near Rovenek (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline) using fixed-wing FPV drones.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

See topline text for Ukrainian refutations of Russian claims regarding the Kupyansk direction.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Myrove (directly northwest of Kupyansk).[31]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 17.

Ukrainian forces deployed forward drone elements as Ukrainian infantry advanced during offensive operations during Operation Vivaldi. The concurrent forward deployment of Ukrainian drone elements along with advancing infantry forces expanded Ukrainian forces’ ability to target Russian positions at deeper ranges. A Ukrainian brigade reported on October 17 that Ukrainian advances as part of Operation Vivaldi allowed Ukrainian drone operators to reposition closer to the frontline and conduct surprise strikes against Russian tanks and armored vehicles in Luhansk Oblast that were previously out of range of Ukrainian drones.[32]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian TOS-3 “Drakon” heavy thermobaric artillery system during Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction.[33] A Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment reported on October 17 that its drone elements struck the system over 12 kilometers from the frontline. The TOS-3 “Drakon” heavy thermobaric artillery system is the latest development in Russia’s thermobaric artillery systems and can fire 15 unguided thermobaric rockets at an estimated range of 15 kilometers.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kramatorsk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 17 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators in Tykhonivka (east of Kramatorsk) and west of the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

See topline text for Ukrainian refutations of Russian claims regarding Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.

Ukrainian forces maintain positions west of Kostyantynivka. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Rozkishne (west of Kostyantynivka) and that Russian forces are operating a few kilometers east of Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces do not maintain positions in Mykolaipillya and Rozkishne or in the fields south of Mykolaipillya.[36] Mashovets stated that Russian forces maintain positions between Panfilova Street in northwestern Kostyantynivka and the Kryvyi Torets River and that Russian forces are active west of the city and trying to advance along the western bank of the river – suggesting that Russian forces reached positions in northwestern Kostyantynivka from the city’s western outskirts.

Russian forces recently advanced and infiltrated into areas north of Kostyantynivka. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are operating in Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka) and are trying to advance from Molocharka (north of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces have infiltrated Molocharka.[37]

Ukrainian resistance within and around Kostyantynivka is preventing Russian forces from consolidating positions in Kostyantynivka and advancing further in the direction of Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk. Mashovets reported that Russian forces have not fully seized Kostyantynivka.[38] Mashovets added that the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (GoF) is trying to establish full control over Kostyantynivka as fast as possible while simultaneously pushing to move its main fighting force to the near approaches of Druzhivka and Kramatorsk.[39] Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern and central Kostyantynivka.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

See topline text for Ukrainian refutations of Russian claims regarding Dobropillya, Pervomaiske, and Serhiivka.

Russian forces are attempting to replicate the tactics they used to seize Pokrovsk in February 2026 to seize Dobropillya. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 17 that there is no confirmation that Russian forces have advanced in central Dobropillya or on the town’s western outskirts.[41] The milblogger reported that Russian drone operators are isolating the area from supply routes while Russian infiltrators enter the town and hunt Ukrainian drone pilots. The milblogger noted that Russian forces used similar tactics to seize Pokrovsk. The milblogger added that Russian drone pilots have not entered Dobropillya, indicating that Ukrainian forces are still present in the town.

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations near and northeast of Novopavlivka on October 16 and 17 but did not advance.[42]

See topline text for Ukrainian refutations of Russian claims regarding the Oleksandrivka direction.

Ukrainian forces are striking river crossings in the Russian near rear in the Oleksandrivka direction, likely to complicate Russian efforts to move supplies from Velyka Novosilka to forward positions. Geolocated footage published on October 16 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a GBU-62 guided glide bomb strike against a Russian crossing over the Mokri Yaly River near the O-0509 Velyka Novosilka-Komar highway just east of Novoocheretuvate (just north of Velyka Novosilka on the western bank of the river and roughly six kilometers from the frontline).[43]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest, west, and southwest of Hulyaipole on October 16 and 17 but did not advance.[44]

See topline text for Ukrainian refutations of Russian claims regarding western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 16 and 17 but did not advance.[45]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 17.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[46]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes that heavily targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of October 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Rostov oblasts and occupied Crimea; an unspecified number of Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from the airspace over occupied Crimea; and four Kalibr cruise missiles from Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[47] Russian forces also launched 332 Shahed-type drones (including 31 jet-powered drones), S-8000 Banderol loitering munitions, Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all four Kalibr missiles and 289 drones and Banderols (including 23 jet-powered drones), that an unspecified number of drones and missiles hit 22 locations, and that debris fell at three locations. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian forces struck energy facilities in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi and Kharkiv oblasts on the night of October 16 to 17 and in the morning on October 17, resulting in power outages.[48]

Russian forces continue to target Ukraine’s heavy industry, part of efforts to degrade Ukraine’s economy and defense industrial production. Kromberg and Schubert, a German company that produces electrical cable systems, reported on October 17 that it suspended operations at its plant in Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, after a Russian strike.[49] The Metinvest Group (a Zaporizhia-headquartered group of steel and mining companies that owns operations in Ukraine, Italy, Bulgaria, the UK, and the US) reported that Russian forces again struck its Zaporizhstal steel plant in Zaporizhzhia City with six ballistic missiles on the morning of October 17 and that the plant had not yet returned to normal operations following an earlier strike.[50] The Russian MoD reported that Russian forces struck the Zaporizhstal plant overnight and the Kromberg and Schubert plant during the day on October 17 and claimed that Russian forces also struck a metallurgical plant in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[51]

Ukrainian forces continue to struggle to intercept Russia’s faster jet-powered drones at the same high rate as the conventional piston engine-driven drones. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told the Wall Street Journal on October 16 that Russian forces launched 3,520 jet-powered Geran drones in September 2026 and that Ukrainian forces intercepted only 54 percent of the drones.[52] Ihnat added that Russian forces launched about 4,900 piston engine-driven drones in the same period but that the Ukrainian interception rate of these drones, in contrast, was about 90 percent.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to deploy ballistic missiles to Belarus but did not suggest that any specific deployment was imminent.[53] Zelensky also acknowledged that Russia would need Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s support to deploy ballistic missiles to Russia. The deployment of Russian ballistic missiles to Belarus would further Russia’s decades-long effort to de facto annex Belarus, as ISW has long forecasted.[54] Russian signal repeaters that relay video streams and extend the operable range of Russian strike drones into Ukrainian territory, including in Rivne, Volyn, and Lviv oblasts in western Ukraine, continue to operate in Belarus.[55]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-trump-zelenskyy-starlink-russia-war-drones/; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/87379; https://www.ft.com/content/e26723df-9076-416c-957a-7fa3bd00b4d7?syn-25a6b1a6=1; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DemRJL5Mb3Z/?exln=ZHJ2aHp3aTFydjd5

[2] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4174649-robota-starshield-dla-sil-oboroni-vidnovilasa-dzerelo.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/10/15/ukrinform-rabota-starlink-dlya-vsu-polnostyu-vozobnovilas ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://www.spacex.com/starshield; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-06/spacex-gets-us-contract-to-expand-ukraine-s-access-to-starshield

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[5] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4175401-genstab-zsu-sprostuvav-zaavi-rosian-pro-uspihi-na-fronti.html

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/

[7] https://t.me/bureviy_brigade/5556

[8] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4175401-genstab-zsu-sprostuvav-zaavi-rosian-pro-uspihi-na-fronti.html

[9] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4175401-genstab-zsu-sprostuvav-zaavi-rosian-pro-uspihi-na-fronti.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/

[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81009; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122194903832859069&id=61575772076572&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=F8iG7y6NcMy0Ieli#

[11] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28225167 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81009 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ;

[13] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/

[14] https://t.me/kadmitriev/735

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/

[16] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202600500/html/DCPD-202600500.htm ; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202600136/html/DCPD-202600136.htm ; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202600575/html/DCPD-202600575.htm ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf#page=29 ; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500325/html/DCPD-202500325.htm ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/statement-from-secretary-rubio-and-nsc-waltz-on-call-with-zelenskyy/

[17] https://wiadomosci.wp dot pl/siewiera-o-konfrontacji-z-rosja-tej-zimy-zasadniczy-akord-7340606430988288a

[18] https://wiadomosci.wp dot pl/tusk-ostrzega-przed-eskalacja-jeszcze-przed-wigilia-7340766943455264a

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/

[22] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west; https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42615

[24] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ryazan-refinery-halted-processing-one-primary-unit-after-drone-attacks-sources-2026-10-16/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/

[25] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2111088994259710182

[26] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122194903832859069&id=61575772076572&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=F8iG7y6NcMy0Ieli

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42614

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42611 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42609 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9639 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48870 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37677

[29] https://t.me/army_corp_10/3390; https://t.me/ZSU_115OMBr/3698; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2111161828277706929; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2110279934598152668

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42611; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42609; https://t.me/severnnyi/9639; https://t.me/grvZapad/20122; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48872; https://t.me/wargonzo/37677;

[31] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56942

[32] https://t.me/ombr66/3116 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/17/%c2%abfront-posunuvsya-a-bronetehnika-zalyshylas%c2%bb-okupanty-ne-vstygayut-za-ukrayinskym-tempom/

[33] https://t.me/ab3army/7583; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/17/8058481/; https://t.me/kraken_ab3/1645 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/17/trijka-vpolyuvala-%c2%abdrakona%c2%bb-rosiyany-vtratyly-novitnyu-vazhku-vognemetnu-systemu-tos-3/

[34] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/17/8058481/

[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3648

[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3649

[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3648

[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3647

[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3648

[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3648

[41] https://t.me/rybar/83983

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42609; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42611

[43] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38976; https://t.me/soniah_hub/18704

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42611; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42609 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37677

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56938 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42611 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42609 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37677

[46] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[47] https://t.me/kpszsu/87534

[48] https://t.me/energyofukraine/8116

[49] https://www.facebook.com/kroschuLutsk/posts/pfbid0uR4ciK9jq3YPp1Ubw4xaN8ye1TfTuvFRkxbTqziSfL3Dmx3d83bppggdcxac9ET9l

[50] https://metinvestholding dot com/ua/media/news/russia-attacks-zaporizhstal-for-the-fifth-time-firing-six-more-ballistic-missiles-at-the-steelworks

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/68294

[52] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-russia-jet-drones-defenses-ca520fcd

[53] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2111473458164981969

[54] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf

[55] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/

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