F FEICELL News全球新闻 · 本地动态 · 实时更新
← 返回新闻首页
军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 5, 2026

A Russian drone struck a Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossing on the morning of October 5, injuring a Moldovan citizen.

ISWNate Ha查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月5日

A Russian drone struck a Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossing on the morning of October 5, injuring a Moldovan citizen — the first confirmed Moldovan injury due to Russian drones. The Moldovan Border Police reported on October 5 that a Russian drone struck near the Palanca-Mayaky-Udobne border crossing, damaging a passenger bus and injuring a Moldovan border patrol employee.[1] It is unclear whether the drone hit in Ukrainian or Moldovan territory, but geolocated imagery indicates that the drone ricocheted into Moldovan territory.[2] Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian border crossings with Moldova, Romania, and Poland in recent weeks.[3] Russian drones and drone debris have been increasingly violating the airspace of these states in recent months, violating Moldovan airspace in particular at least 20 times between February 2022 and July 2026, and 10 times since August 2026.[4] Five Russian drones, including Banderol loitering munitions, crashed in Moldova on the morning of October 3.[5] Russia likely intends for these strikes and incursions to intimidate NATO into abandoning its support for Ukraine and to normalize airspace violations by intensifying their frequency.

Russian forces are fielding new drone adaptations intended to maximize damage against Ukrainian infrastructure and frontline areas before Ukraine can implement effective countermeasures at scale. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 5 that Russia has modified its Geran-4 long-range strike drone’s optical navigation, compass, and warhead.[6] The GUR reported that this Geran-4 modification includes new autonomous navigation components, including a US-manufactured, high-precision, magneto-inductive sensor that presumably allows the drone to more easily conduct autonomous targeting and navigation under electronic warfare (EW) conditions. The GUR stated that Russia also replaced the variant’s People’s Republic of China (PRC)-origin jet engine with a new Russian engine manufactured at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). Russia has been using the ASEZ to indigenize aspects of the drone assembly and production process as opposed to relying on imported Iranian or PRC-produced components and assembly.[7] The GUR also confirmed that these new Geran variants are also using a new specialized cumulative-cutting special payload warhead (KRSN) designed to target Ukrainian bridges. This new warhead is designed to destroy hardened steel and concrete targets as well as damage cable-stayed bridges, and Russian forces have intensified strikes against Kyiv City’s Northern and Southern bridges over the Dnipro River in recent days.[8] The Ukrainian 8th Army Corps reported on October 5 that Ukrainian forces intercepted the new Russian Molniya-13 reconnaissance drone, which is reportedly one-and-a-half times larger than previous variants and has four engines.[9] Russian developers continue to actively expand Russian forces’ drone capabilities, including by expanding production, improving their speed and maneuverability, and diversifying launch platforms.[10] Russia may seek to field new, more resilient and dangerous variants of its strike drones before Ukraine can develop effective countermeasures in order to degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure and logistics in the fall ahead of what will very likely be a brutal strike campaign in the coming winter.

Russia has successfully used jet-powered drones to degrade Ukraine’s railway infrastructure and rolling stock. Ukrainian Agrarian Policy and Food Minister Taras Vysotskyi reported on October 5 that Ukraine has nearly exhausted locomotive reserves due to Russian strikes against Ukraine’s rolling stock and railway infrastructure.[11] Vysotskyi stated that Ukrainian officials are negotiating with European countries that use the same railway gauge to procure more locomotives. The CEO of Ukrainian private port manager TIS stated that Russian forces struck three locomotives near the Pivdennyi port terminal in Odesa Oblast alone in an unspecified timeframe and that locomotive shortages are already becoming a weak point in port logistics. Russian forces damaged or destroyed over 500 locomotives between February 2022 and mid-September 2026.[12] Russian drone adaptations, including expanded production and improved speed and maneuverability, allow Russian forces to conduct effective and expanded strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, and Russia will likely seek to escalate this campaign as it fields new drone adaptations in the fall into winter.

Russian State Duma officials weaponized reporting that Estonia is reinforcing its border with Russia to promote a cognitive warfare campaign that frames NATO as “escalating” and provoking conflict with Russia. The Financial Times ( FT ) reported on October 5, citing unspecified Estonian officials, that Estonia permanently redeployed elite “crack troops” from Tapa to Johvi, Estonia, about 50 kilometers from the Estonian-Russian border, and is building a new military facility capable of housing up to 1,000 personnel in Narva to prepare for possible Russian military action against Estonia.[13] FT reported that Estonian military and intelligence chiefs assess that Russia does not want a full-scale war with NATO in the next two years (to about 2028), and a senior Estonian military and intelligence official told FT that the next one to four years (between about 2027 and 2030) are the most critical period for the Baltic states to address failures in their prior deterrence strategy. United Russia State Duma Deputy Alexander Asafov responded to the FT article on October 5, claiming that Estonian troop deployments to its border with Russia demonstrate that the Baltic states are the leading actors in NATO’s “escalation” against Russia.[14] State Duma Defense Committee member Andrei Kolesnik claimed on October 5 that Estonian and Finnish troop deployments to their respective borders with Russia are “provocative actions” and that Russia will take unspecified countermeasures.[15] Russian officials are waging a cognitive warfare effort aimed at presenting legitimate NATO defensive reactions to Russia’s aggression as evidence of unprovoked NATO escalation, when in fact Russia has repeatedly attacked Ukraine and threatened to attack European countries, including with nuclear weapons, for the past several years.[16] Russia has been waging campaigns against Europe using a wide range of kinetic and cognitive activity that is far from limited to conventional military operations in order to achieve its objectives, however.[17]

A Russian drone struck a Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossing on the morning of October 5, injuring a Moldovan citizen — the first confirmed Moldovan injury due to Russian drones.

Russian forces are fielding new drone adaptations intended to maximize damage against Ukrainian infrastructure and frontline areas before Ukraine can implement effective countermeasures at scale.

Russia has successfully used jet-powered drones to degrade Ukraine’s railway infrastructure and rolling stock.

Russian State Duma officials weaponized reporting that Estonia is reinforcing its border with Russia to promote a cognitive warfare campaign that frames NATO as “escalating” and provoking conflict with Russia.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russia launched 205 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian strikes continue to generate outsized impacts on Russia’s oil refining capacity. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on October 5 that Ukrainian long-range strikes have disabled over 51 percent of Russian oil refining capacity.[18] Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure have created outsized impacts on Russian oil exports and refining capacity, undercutting Russia’s ability to fund its war through oil revenue.[19]

Satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes. Satellite imagery collected on October 4 indicates that Ukraine’s overnight October 3 strike against the Khanskaya Airbase, Adygea Republic (roughly 440 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed a Russian Su-34 multirole fighter jet and a Su-35 bomber aircraft.[20] Satellite imagery published on October 5 indicates that Ukraine’s September 26 strike against the Ilsky Oil Refinery, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 357 kilometers from the frontline), damaged the refinery’s AVT-3, AVT-5, and AVT-6 primary processing units and two technical overpasses.[21] Satellite imagery published on October 5 indicates that Ukraine’s October 2 strike against the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 937 kilometers from the international border), significantly damaged or destroyed two vertical steel tanks with volumes of 20,000 and 50,000 cubic meters, respectively, and damaged two others.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 4 and 5 but did not advance.[23] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that fighting continues near the international border north of Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City), on the right bank of the Seym River.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian infiltrators from roughly 10 square kilometers of territory east of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), while Russian forces managed to infiltrate other portions of the same area. A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast published footage on October 3 and reported that Ukrainian forces liberated 10 square kilometers of a forested area northeast of Vovchanski Khutory (east of Vovchansk), clearing three Russian infiltration groups from the area since June 10, 2026.[25] The footage indicates that Russian forces likely advanced in northeastern Vovchansk, north of Vovchanski Khutory, north of Zybyne (east of Vovchanski Khutory), and conducted infiltration missions south and southeast of Zybyne on a prior date.

Russian forces continue to use glide bombs to strike frontline cities, resulting in high civilian casualties. Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on October 5 that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a residential building in Kharkiv City, killing five and injuring 59 . [26] Russian forces regularly strike civilian targets across Ukraine and have widely weaponized civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[27]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 5, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and southeast of Kupyansk on October 4 and 5 but did not advance.[29]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 5.

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian occupation officials are amplifying the Kremlin’s blatantly false claims of Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on October 5 that Russian forces have seized several settlements near Dobropillya over the last week and have completed clearing operations in eastern Dobropillya.[30] ISW has observed evidence to assess that the nearest point of Russian advance in this area is at least seven kilometers from the eastern outskirts of Dobropillya. Pushilin claimed that fighting is ongoing within Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (south of Druzhkivka) and Druzhkivka itself.[31] ISW has observed limited Russian infiltration missions south of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka but has not observed any evidence to indicate that Russian forces maintain any presence in either Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka or Druzhkivka. ISW has observed evidence to assess that the closest point of Russian advance is at least five kilometers from Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and roughly 13 kilometers from Druzhkivka. Pushilin stated that Slovyansk and Kramatorsk will likely be the last territory that Russian forces seize in Donetsk Oblast, implicitly acknowledging that Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction curtailed the Russian offensive against the Fortress Belt from the north.[32] Continued Russian officials’ aggrandized claims of advance are part of a cognitive warfare effort that aims to present Russian advances as sweeping and to divert attention from Ukraine’s elimination of the Russian salient north of Lyman in recent months.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 4 and 5 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks northeast and southeast of Lyman.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk toward Mykolaivka on October 4 and 5 but did not advance.[35] Ukrainian forces likely cleared Russian infiltrators west of Yurkivka (southeast of Slovyansk) on a prior date, given that Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 29 that Ukrainian forces had cleared Russian infiltrators from Orikhuvatka (north of Yurkivka) and geolocated footage published on October 3, but likely taken on a prior date, shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember west of Yurkivka.[36] ISW had not previously observed Russian positions west of Yurkivka, and the footage indicates that Russian forces likely infiltrated west of Yurkivka prior to Ukrainian clearing operations.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and southwest of Kostyantynivka on October 4 and 5 but did not advance.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission into Dobropillya. Geolocated footage published on October 5 shows one Russian servicemember in southwestern Dobropillya during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 5. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka), likely on a prior date.[39]

The Russian MoD continues to use flag-raising tactics to make exaggerated claims of Russian advance that do not reflect battlefield realities. Russian sources published footage on October 5 purporting to show elements of the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags on the outskirts of Samiilivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka and roughly 16 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[40] ISW has not observed evidence to indicate any Russian presence in the area. The Russian MoD used the footage to claim that Russian forces had seized Samiilivka.[41] ISW continues to assess that flag-raising tactics are a part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian gains and create a false perception of military strength.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 4 and 5 but did not advance.[43]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast and northwest of Orikhiv on October 4 and 5 but did not advance.[44]

Russian authorities reportedly imposed traffic restrictions on the M-14 Crimea-Rostov highway in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast due to the threat of intermediate-range Ukrainian drone strikes. A Russian source reporting on Ukrainian strikes in occupied Ukraine claimed on October 4 that occupation authorities restricted traffic on the M-14 between Prymorsk and Berdyansk due to the threat of Ukrainian sleeper drones striking trucks along the highway.[45] Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian logistics along the M-14 highway east of occupied Azov (about 90 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on October 4.[46]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 5.

Ukrainian forces continue efforts to supply food to the starving residents of occupied Oleshky (south of Kherson City) as Russia fails to respond to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the village . A Ukrainian marine operating in the Kherson direction reported that Ukrainian drone operators are conducting a large-scale operation to deliver food, medicine, and hygiene products to Oleshky residents.[47] The marine stated that Ukrainian forces control the low-altitude skies and are conducting these deliveries without losing drones. Russia stopped deliveries of food and supplies to Oleshky in May 2026, and Russia’s mismanagement of the area, coupled with severe product shortages, has created a dire humanitarian crisis. Ukrainian forces have been delivering food and supplies to residents of occupied Oleshky since at least March 2026, and Ukrainian officials have made multiple unreciprocated attempts to establish a limited humanitarian ceasefire.[48] Russian forces appear to have actively interfered with Ukrainian food and supply drops to civilians while actively refusing to deliver assistance themselves.[49]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[50]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 205 Shahed-type (including 49 jet-powered ones) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[51] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 172 drones, that unspecified air vehicles struck 13 locations, and that debris fell on three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, agricultural, communications, civilian, industrial, energy, and port infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Odesa oblasts.[52]

Russian forces struck a Turkish-flagged civilian vessel transporting corn in neutral waters of the Black Sea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 5 that Russian forces struck a Turkish-flagged civilian ship carrying corn in neutral waters of the Black Sea, killing the captain of the vessel and injuring one crewmember.[53] Russian forces have been increasingly targeting civilian vessels in the Black Sea, particularly those carrying crop-based products, in an attempt to constrain Ukraine’s economy.

Ukrainian forces are using AI-automated machine gun turrets to intercept Russian jet-powered strike drones. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on October 5 that Ukrainian forces have begun to use AI-automated machine gun turrets to intercept Russian jet-powered Geran-type strike drones.[54] Ihnat stated that the use of AI in these automated turrets helps eliminate human error and uses machine vision to intercept jet-powered drones. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on October 4 that Ukraine plans to install more of these new AI-automated turrets in addition to the 12 already in Kyiv City.[55] Jet-powered drones fly at a faster rate, which Ukrainian interceptor drones have struggled to intercept. Ukrainian forces continue to adapt and respond to Russian drone adaptations as part of the ongoing offense-defense technological race.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://border dot gov.md/incident-urma-atacurilor-rusiei-asupra-infrastructurii-ucrainene? [2] https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2107046715568087056 ; https://x.com/InsiderGeo/status/2107034484210086357 [3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; [5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ [6] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9644 [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/ [8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ [9] https://t.me/kuaairbome8/1266; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/05/novitnya-rosijska-rozrobka-syly-oborony-zbyly-vorozhyj-bpla-%c2%abmolniya-13%c2%bb/ [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-inexpensive-quasi-cruise-missiles-an-emerging-threat-for-ukraines-air-defenses/ [11] https://www.ft.com/content/cc96ac01-7929-4954-97a3-7b30e00ef324; https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/ukraine-turns-to-europe-for-more-locomotives-1791226308.html [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/ [13] https://www.ft.com/content/0293497e-e4b5-473e-be49-67d1fc005fae?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [14] https://lenta dot news/news/2026/10/05/v-rossii-otreagirovali-na-perebrosku-estonskih-voysk-k-granitse/ [15] https://news dot ru/europe/vitok-eskalacii-voenekspert-o-perebroske-estoniej-vojsk-k-granice-s-rf [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-10/?ct=1790972233967; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/1740 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-7/; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/489; https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1787427096320430252; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78632 ; https://life dot ru/p/1890902 [17] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-defining-the-threat/; https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/?utm_source=constantcontact&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=russianeffortsandobjectives [18] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/16309 ; https://suspilne dot media/1419209-sili-oboroni-viveli-z-ladu-ponad-51-naftopererobnih-potuznostej-rf-minoboroni/ [19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/ [20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://x.com/avivector/status/2106828406205661433 ; https://x.com/avivector/status/2106828406205661433; [21] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8228 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ [22] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/na-ilskomu-npz-drony-poshkodyly-ustanovky-pererobky-na-lvds-samara-rezervuary/ ; https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/145 [23]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42473; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42471; https://t.me/dva_majors/100021; https://t.me/wargonzo/37390; https://t.me/severnnyi/9521; [24] https://t.me/severnnyi/9521 [25] https://x.com/DPSU_ua/status/2106309930244546732 [26] https://t.me/synegubov/26272 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26273 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26277; https://t.me/synegubov/26292 [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/ [28] https://t.me/dva_majors/100021; https://t.me/wargonzo/37390; https://t.me/severnnyi/9521; [29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42473 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42471 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100021 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37390 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19989 [30] https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/pushilin-o-situacii-posle-nochnykh-atak-vsu-i-obstanovke-na-fronte [31] https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/pushilin-o-situacii-posle-nochnykh-atak-vsu-i-obstanovke-na-fronte [32] https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/pushilin-o-situacii-posle-nochnykh-atak-vsu-i-obstanovke-na-fronte [33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ [34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42473 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42471 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100021 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48402 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19989 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42473 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42471 [36] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2106857093240426734; https://t.me/yokaiUA/560 [37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42473 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42471 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37390 [38] https://t.me/btr80/41832 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13131 [39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56530 [40] https://t.me/Osintpen/3645; https://t.me/voin_dv/21429 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13127 [41] https://t.me/mod_russia/67957 [42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ [43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42473 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42471 [44] https://t.me/wargonzo/37390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42473; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42471 [45] https://t.me/lpr1_treugolnik/286693; https://t.me/lpr1_treugolnik/286609; https://t.me/lpr1_treugolnik/286585 [46] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2106773784808378487?s=20; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2106721305743511685?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2107070966732034147?s=20; https://browser.dataspace.copernicus.eu/?zoom=14&lat=46.7638&lng=36.51092&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=U2FsdGVkX18UO9q%2BUm3LC2%2BP0rCpgTl%2FUrpiWhJKfjPFw5vD1WUWjmZMt296bndh6qoafKlG3Am5Z7ZyK49x9CFPjEW69KlvunobvSJe0Ocru%2FOFWKlIoR6zpyAHXtwf&datasetId=S2_L2A_CDAS&fromTime=2026-10-04T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2026-10-04T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=3-WILDFIRES&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22&cloudCoverage=30&dateMode=SINGLE&panel=layers; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2107129470335459520?s=20 [47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-russia-governs-through-humanitarian-decline/ [48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-how-russia-governs-through-humanitarian-decline/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ [49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ [50] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ [51] https://t.me/kpszsu/82937 [52] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/32133; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29013; https://t.me/synegubov/26254 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26256 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26258 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4727 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4729; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/76571; https://t.me/kyivoda/60104; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02M62VUVLHwxp1fQ6Tr77Ek5dVxJyDWhjrZ9Lf8pwpXGZaXZfkGbguUKZhc53YbWBHl; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34894; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21361; [53] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21218; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107089743523533253 [54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/05/urazhayut-navit-reaktyvni-bpla-tureli-z-%c2%abmashynnym-zorom%c2%bb-vzhe-znyshhuyut-rosijski-%c2%abgeran-5%c2%bb/ [55] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7789

手机左右滑动，电脑按 ← → 键，也能切换新闻